Thoughts on the Market

Our Head of Asia Technology Research Shawn Kim explains what disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz could mean for the global semiconductor supply chain and the immediate future of AI infrastructure.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Shawn Kim, Head of Morgan Stanley’s Asia Technology Team.Today: why the Strait of Hormuz closure may matter to the global technology industry.It’s Friday, March 13th, at 8 pm in Taipei. AI and advanced chips may represent the cutting edge of technology, but they depend on something far more basic: that’s energy. And a large share of that energy flows through one narrow shipping lane in the Middle East – the Strait of Hormuz. When energy supply chains are disrupted, the effects can quickly ripple into semiconductor manufacturing.Advanced semiconductor fabrication is, in fact, one of the most energy‑intensive industrial processes in the world. Take Taiwan, for example – home of the world’s largest share of leading-edge chip production. Just one major manufacturer alone accounts for roughly 9–10 percent of the country's total electricity consumption. That scale of energy use means the stability of power supply is critical.Taiwan relies heavily on imported LNG to generate electricity. But storage levels are limited. It maintains roughly one and half weeks worth of LNG inventory, with several additional weeks supplied by vessels currently at sea. If shipping through the Strait of Hormuz were significantly disrupted, that supply chain could come under pressure. The immediate impact might not necessarily be an outright shortage – but rising energy costs could still affect semiconductor production economics. And that's important because advanced chips are foundational to everything from cloud computing to artificial intelligence systems.Energy isn't the only potential bottleneck. Another lesser-known input in the semiconductor ecosystem is sulfur. More than 90 percent of the world's sulfur supply is produced as a by‑product of oil refining. That sulfur is then used to produce sulfuric acid, a key chemical that supports semiconductor materials, metal processing, and battery components.Disruptions in oil refining tied to shipping constraints or energy market shocks could also affect sulfur supply. In other words, a disruption in energy markets could trigger second‑order effects across multiple layers of the technological supply chain. And those effects extend beyond chips themselves. The downstream impact touches industries tied to electrification, data centers, and advanced electronics manufacturing.History also offers some lessons learned about how technology markets react when energy prices spike. During periods of major oil price surges – such as in 2008 and again in 2021 through 2022 – semiconductor equities experienced significant drawdowns. In both cases, semiconductor stocks declined by roughly 30 percent before reaching an inflection point. The mechanism is fairly intuitive. Higher oil prices raise costs across the economy and can weaken consumer spending. At the same time, companies building energy‑intensive infrastructure – like large‑scale AI data centers – may face higher operating costs and low revenues.So when energy markets move sharply, technology markets often move with them. A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz wouldn’t automatically halt chip production, but it could ripple through power costs, materials supply, and the economics of building AI infrastructure. And that highlights an important reality for investors: the future of technology isn’t just written in code. It’s powered by energy, by infrastructure, and the fragile global networks behind the digital economy.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our co-heads of Securitized Products Research Jay Bacow and James Egan discuss the impact of upcoming regulatory changes on U.S. mortgage rates and home sales.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Jay Bacow: It is March and there's some madness going on. I'm Jay Bacow, here with Jim Egan, noted Wahoo Wa fan. James Egan: Hey, it looks like Virginia's going to be back in the tournament this year, hoping for a three seed, looking like a four seed. It's the first year that my son is really excited about it. So, hoping we can win a few games. Jay Bacow: Let's hope they don't lose the first game and make him cry like you did a few years ago. But … Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Jay Bacow, co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley. James Egan: And I'm Jim Egan, the other co-head of Securitized Products Research at Morgan Stanley. Jay Bacow: Today, with everything going on in the world, we thought it'd be prudent to discuss the U.S. mortgage and housing market. It's Thursday, March 12th at 10:30am in New York. James Egan: Jay, as you mentioned, there is a lot going on in markets right now, but hey, people need to live somewhere. And those somewheres remain pretty unaffordable. But this administration has been very focused on affordability, and we also have some updates on what is clearly the most exciting part of the housing and mortgage markets – regulation. What's going on there? Jay Bacow: Look, nothing gets me more excited than thinking about the regulatory outlook for the mortgage market. We've been focusing a lot on what's happening in D.C. with possible changes that could be helping out affordability, changes to the investor program, changes to the policy rate. But Michelle Bowman, who is the Vice Chair of Supervision, has been recently on the tape saying that we could get an update and a proposal for the Basel Endgame by the end of this month; and that proposal for the Basel Endgame is likely to make it easier for banks to hold loans on their balance sheet. It's going to give banks excess capital and the combination of these, along with some other changes that are going to be coming from the Fed, the FDIC and the OCC around: For instance, the GSIB surcharge that our banking analysts led by Manan Gosalia have spoken about – it's really going to help out the mortgage market in our view. James Egan: Alright, so freeing up capital, helping the mortgage market. When we think about the implications to affordability specifically, what do you think it means for mortgage rates? Jay Bacow: Right. So, it's important that [when] we think about the mortgage rate, we realize where it's coming from. The mortgage rate starts off with the level of Treasury rates, and then you add upon that a spread. And the spread is dependent among a number of different factors. But one of the biggest ones is just the demand. And one of the reasons why mortgage rates have been so high over the previous four years was (a) Treasury rates were high, but also the spread was wide. And we think one of the biggest reasons why the spread was wide is that the domestic banks, who are the largest asset type investor in mortgages – they own $3 trillion of mortgages – basically weren't buying them over the past four years. And one of the reasons they weren't buying was they didn't have the regulatory clarity. And so, if the banks come back, that will cause that spread to tighten, which will likely cause the mortgage rate to come down. That is presumably, Jim, good about affordability, right? James Egan: Yes. And I want to clarify, or at least emphasize, that affordability itself has been improving. Over the course of the past four to five months at this point, we've been close to, if not at the lowest mortgage rate we've seen in three years. And when we think about what that has practically done to the monthly principal and interest payment on homes purchased today. Like that monthly payment on the median priced home is down $150 over the past year. That's about a 7 percent decrease. When we lay in incomes – or when we layer in incomes to get into that actual affordability equation, we're at our most affordable place since the second quarter of 2022. So yes, big picture, this is still a challenge to affordability environment. But it's not as challenged as it's been over the past three years. Jay Bacow: All right, so affordability improving. It's still challenged though. What does that mean for home prices then? James Egan: So, when we think about the home price implication of mortgage rates coming down; of mortgage rates coming down in an environment where incomes are going up – we're thinking about demand for shelter, purchase volumes and supply of that shelter. And demand really has not reacted to the improved affordability environment. That's not unusual. Normally takes about 12 months for affordability improvement to pull through in terms of increased transaction volumes. But we do think that the lock-in effect that we've talked about in detail on this podcast in the past, that is going to play a role here. Mortgage rates end of February finally hit a five handle, really, for the first time in three years. They're back above that now with the volatility in the interest rate markets. But from 4 percent to 6 percent, mortgage rates is effectively an air pocket. We don't think you're going to get a lot of unlocking at these levels. So we think that transaction volumes will pick up. We're calling for 3 to 4 percent growth in purchase volumes this year. But they've been largely flat for two to three years at this point. And more importantly, any improvement in affordability that comes from a decrease in mortgage rates is going to lead to commensurately more supply alongside that growth in demand – which is going to keep home prices, specifically, very range bound here. The pace of growth is slowed to about 1.3 to 1.5 percent right now. We've been here for four or five months. We think we're pretty much going to stay here. We we're calling for 2 percent growth, so a little bit acceleration. But we think you're in a very range bound home price market. Jay Bacow: All right, so home prices range bound, affordability improved. But still has a little bit of room to go. Some possible tailwinds from the deregulatory path that will make homes being a little bit more affordable. Fair amount going on. Jim, always a pleasure speaking to you James Egan: And always great speaking to you too, Jay. And to all of our regular listeners, thank you for adding us to your playlist. Let us know what you think wherever you get this podcast. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.Jay Bacow: Go smash that subscribe button!

Our analysts Andrew Sheets and Martijn Rats discuss why a prolonged disruption of oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz would be unprecedented—and nearly impossible for the market to absorb.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.Martijn Rats: I'm Martijn Rats, Head of Commodity Research at Morgan Stanley.Andrew Sheets: Today on the program we're going to talk about why investors everywhere are tracking ships through the Strait of Hormuz.It's Wednesday, March 11th at 2pm in London.Andrew Sheets: Martijn, the oil market, which is often volatile, has been historically volatile over the last couple of weeks following renewed military conflict between the United States and Iran.Now, there are a lot of different angles to this, but the oil market is really at the center of the market's focus on this conflict. And so, I think before we get into the specifics, I think it's helpful to set some context. How big is the global oil market and where does the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz fit within that global picture?Martijn Rats: Yeah, so the global oil consumption is a little bit more than a 100 million barrels a day. But that splits in two parts. There is a pipeline market and there is a seaborne market. And when it comes to prices, the seaborne market is really where it's at. If you're sitting in China, you're buying oil from the Middle East, all of a sudden, it's not available. Sure, if there is a pipeline that goes from Canada into the United States, that doesn't really help you all that much.Andrew Sheets: So, it's the oil on the ships that really matters.Martijn Rats: It's the oil on ships that is the flexible part of the market that we can redirect to where the oil is needed. And that is also the market where prices are formed. The seaborne market is in the order of 60 million barrels a day. So, only a subset of the 100 [million]. Now relative to that 60 million barrel a day, the Strait of Hormuz flows about 20 [million]. So, the Strait of Hormuz is responsible for about a third of seaborne supply, which is, of course, very large and therefore, you know, very critical to the system.Andrew Sheets: And I think an important thing we should also discuss here, which we were just discussing earlier today on another call, is – this is a market that could be quite sensitive to actually quite small disruptions in oil. So, can you give just some sense of sensitivity? I mean, in normal times, what sort of disruptions, in terms of barrels of oil, kind of, move markets; get investors' attention?Martijn Rats: Yeah, look, this is part of why this situation is so unusual, and oil analysts really sort of struggle with this. Look normally, at relative to the 100 million barrels a day of consumption, we care about supply demand imbalances of a couple of 100,000 barrels a day. That becomes interesting.If that, increases to say 1 million barrel a day, over- or undersupplied, you can expect prices to move. You can expect them to move by meaningful amounts. We can write research; the clients can trade. You have a tradable idea in front of you. When that becomes 2 to 3 million barrels a day, either side, you have major historical market moving events.So, in [20]08-09, oil famously fell from over 100 [million] down to something like 30 [million], on the basis that the oil market was 2-2.5 million barrel day oversupplied for two quarters. In 2022, we all thought – this actually never happened, but we all thought that Russia was going to lose about 3 million barrel day of supply. And on that basis, just on the basis of the expectation alone, Brent went to $130 per barrel. So, 2-3 [million] either side you have historically large moves. Now we're talking about 20 [million].Andrew Sheets: And I think that's what's so striking. I mean, again, I think investors, people listening to this, they can do that arithmetic too. If this is a market where 2 to 3 million barrels a day have caused some of the largest moves that we've seen in history, something that's 20 [million] is exceptional. And I think it's also fair to say this type of closure of the Strait [of Hormuz] is something we haven't seen before.Martijn Rats: No, which also made it very hard to forecast, by the way. Because the historical track records did not point in that direction, and yet here we are. The historical track record – look, you can look at other major disruptions historically.The largest disruption in the history of the oil market is the Suez Crisis in the mid-1950s that took away about 10 percent of global oil consumption. This is easily double that. So really unusual. If you look at supply and demand shocks of this order of magnitude, you can think about COVID. In April 2020, for one month, at the peak of COVID, when we're all sitting at home. Nobody driving, nobody flying. Yeah, we lost very briefly 20 million barrels a day of demand. Now we're losing 20 million barrels a day of supply. So, look, the sign is flipped, but it's in the same order of magnitude. And yeah, these are unusual events that you wouldn't actually, sort of, forecast them that easily. But that is what is in front of us at the moment.Andrew Sheets: So, I think the next kind of logical question is if shipping remains disrupted, and I'd love for you to talk a little bit about, you know, you're sitting there with satellite maps on your screen tracking shipping, which is – a development. But, you know, what are the options that are available in the region, maybe globally to temporarily balance this supply and create some offset?Martijn Rats: Yeah. So, like of course when we have a big disruption like this one, of course the market is going to try to solve for this. There are a few blocks that we can work with. I'll run you through them one by one, including some of the numbers. But very quickly you arrive at the conclusion that this is; this puzzle – we can't really solve it.Like in 2022, the market was very stressed. We thought Russia was going to lose 3 million barrels a day of supply, but we could move things around in our supply demand model. Russia oil goes to China and India. Oil that they buy, we can get in Europe, we can move stuff around to kind of sort of solve a puzzle.This puzzle is very, very difficult to solve. So, through the Strait of Hormuz, 15 million barrels a day have crude, 5 million barrels a day of refined product, 20 million barrels a day in total. What can we do?Well, the biggest offset, is arguably the Saudi EastWest pipeline. Saudi Arabia has a pipeline that effectively allows it to ship oil to the Red Sea at the Port of Yanbu, where it can be evacuated on tankers there. That pipeline has a capacity of 7 million barrels a day. We think it was probably already flowing at something like 3 million barrels a day. So, there's probably an incremental 4 [million] that can become available through that. That's the biggest block, that we can see of workaround capacity, so to say.After that the numbers do get smaller. The UAE has a pipeline that goes through Fujairah that's also beyond the Strait of Hormuz. We think there is maybe 0.5 million barrel a day of capacity there. Then you're basically, sort of, done within the region, and you have to look globally for other sources of oil.If there are sanctions relief, maybe on Russian oil, you can find a 0.5 million barrel day there. Here, there and everywhere. 100,000 barrels a day, 200,000 barrels a day. But the numbers get…Andrew Sheets: It’s still not… So, if you kind of put all of those, you know, kind of, almost in a best-case scenario relative to the 20 million that's getting disrupted.Martijn Rats: If you add another one or two from a massive SPR release, the fastest release from SPR…Andrew Sheets: That's the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.Martijn Rats: Yeah, exactly. Earlier today, we got an announcement, that the IEA is proposing to release 400 million barrels from Strategic Reserve across its member countries. That is a very large number. But – and that is important. But more important is how fast can it flow because the extraction rate from these tanks is not infinite. The fastest ever rate of SPR release is only 1.3 million barrels a day. Now, maybe the circumstances are so extraordinary, we can do better than that and we can get it to 2 [million]. But beyond that, you're really in very, very uncharted territory.So maybe in the region, work around sanctions relief, SPR release, we can probably find like 7 million barrels a day out of a problem that is 20 [million]. You're left with another 13 [million]. The 13 [million] is four times what we thought Russia would lose. So, you're left with this conclusion: Look, this really needs to come to an end.Andrew Sheets: And the other rebalancing mechanism, which again, you know, when we come back to markets and forecasting, this is obviously price. And, you know, you talk about this idea of demand destruction, which I think we could paraphrase as – the price is higher so people use less of it and then you can rebalance the market that way.But give us just a little sense of, you know, as you and your team are sitting there modeling, how do you think about, kind of, the price of oil? Where it would need to go to – to potentially rebalance this the other way.Martijn Rats: Yeah, that price is very high. So, what it's a[n] really interesting analysis to do is to look at the historical frequency distribution of inflation adjusted oil prices.You take 20 years of oil prices. You convert it all in money of the day, adjusted for inflation, and then simply plot the frequency distribution. What you get is not one single bell curve centered around the middle with some variation around the midpoint. You get, sort of, two partially overlapping bell curves.There is a slightly larger one, which is, sort of, the normal regime. Lower prices, 60, 70, 80 bucks. Ther

Our Chief Cross-Asset Strategist Serena Tang discusses how rising oil prices and geopolitical tensions could make stocks and bonds move in the same direction, challenging one of the key principles of portfolio diversification.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Serena Tang, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Cross-Asset Strategist. Today: what happens if your main diversification strategy suddenly stops working because of oil price moves? It’s Tuesday, March 10th, at 10am in New York. For decades, investors have relied on the idea that stocks and bonds return tend to move in opposite directions. When equities fall, bonds often rise, helping cushion portfolio losses. But that relationship isn’t guaranteed. Between 2021 and 2023, coming out of the pandemic, stocks and bonds sold off together, and the traditional 60/40 equity-bond portfolio suffered its worst annual performance in nearly a century. Now, recent geopolitical tensions and rising oil prices are raising a familiar concern for investors: Could that uncertainty dynamic return? At first glance, oil prices may seem like a narrow commodity story. But in reality, they can shape the entire macroeconomic environment. The classic negative correlation between stocks and bonds depends on a fairly simple economic pattern: growth and inflation moving in the same direction. When economic growth accelerates, inflation often rises as well. In that environment, equities may perform well while bonds weaken. But when growth and inflation move in opposite directions, the relationship between stocks and bonds can flip. That’s what happened coming out of the pandemic. Bond investors worried about rising inflation, while equity investors were worried about slowing growth. In that scenario, both asset classes' returns declined at the same time.A sustained oil price shock could potentially recreate those conditions. Higher oil prices can push up inflation while also weighing on economic activity – a combination that economists often refer to as stagflation. If markets begin to price in that kind of environment again, the relationship between stocks and bonds could shift back toward that less favorable regime. Despite recent volatility tied to tensions in the Middle East, the relationship between stocks and bonds today still largely reflects the traditional pattern. Overall, stock-bond returns correlation remains negative, meaning bonds can still help diversify equity risk. In fact, correlations between U.S. stocks and 2-year Treasury returns have been trending negative since 2024, and on a longer-term basis they are now extremely negative relative to the past three years. But the key point here is that not all bonds behave the same way. Many investors think of government bonds as a single asset class. But the maturity of the bond – how long it takes to repay – matters a lot for diversification. Shorter-dated bonds, such as 2-year U.S. Treasuries, have maintained stronger negative correlations with equities. Longer-dated bonds, however – particularly the 30-year Treasury – have behaved a bit differently. Their correlation with stocks has been stickier and less negative, partly because markets increasingly view longer-dated bonds as risky. As a result, the difference between how 2-year and 30-year Treasuries move relative to stocks has remained unusually wide for several years. In recent days oil prices have been rising -- linked in part to concerns around the Strait of Hormuz. That’s pushing up yields at the front end of the Treasury curve, creating what’s known as a bear-flattening. In other words, short-term interest rates are rising faster than long-term ones, reflecting markets placing more emphasis on inflation risks. And that brings us to the key questions for investors: Which risks will dominate from here – is it going to be higher inflation or slower growth? The answer could determine which assets provide better diversifications in the months ahead. So the takeaway is this: Higher oil prices and geopolitical risks could increase the chances that stocks and bonds move together again. But diversification isn’t disappearing. It’s just becoming more nuanced. For investors, the real question isn’t whether bonds diversify portfolios. It’s which bonds do. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explains why history, technicals and fundamentals suggest a clearer runway for U.S. stocks six months out, despite geopolitical concerns.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.  Today on the podcast, I’ll be discussing the conflict in Iran and what it means for equities. It's Monday, March 9th at 11:30 am in New York.  So, let’s get after it. While most believe the current equity market correction began in February, it's clear to me that it actually began last fall when liquidity began to tighten. In fact, back in September I warned that the Fed was not doing enough with the balance sheet – and financial conditions were likely to tighten and cause some stress in equities. Starting in October, that stress manifested as a sharp correction in the most speculative parts of the equity market and crypto currencies. The Fed responded by ending its balance sheet reduction earlier than expected and restarting asset purchases which led to strong equity performance in January. At this point, the correction is very well advanced in both time and price, with many stocks down 30 percent, or more. Meanwhile, dispersion has rarely been higher with the spread between winners and losers the highest we have seen in 20+ years. As usual, the markets got it right by anticipating many of the concerns that are now obvious to all. The questions for equity investors now are what will the world look like in six months and are prices cheap enough to start assuming a better future? The short answer is not yet, but get your shopping lists ready. In many ways, we find ourselves in a very similar position to last year. Recall that the major indices started to accelerate lower in Late February and early March. The concern at the time was centered around tariffs, but like today, equity markets had already been trading poorly for months on concerns that had nothing to do with tariffs. This time around, markets have been worried about AI labor disruption, private credit defaults and liquidity shortages long before the Iran conflict escalated.  Corrections typically don’t end until the best stocks and highest quality indices get hit and that usually takes a bigger shock, like Liberation Day or war. That process has begun with the S&P 500 having its worst week since October. The other thing to consider is that market levels tend to be tied to where they were a year ago. This year-over-year comparison is very important when thinking about support.  Given the sharp decline last year, it tells me we have another month during which the equity markets are likely to struggle. Based on this simple observation and other technical indicators, I think the S&P 500 could trade toward 6300 by early April before our favorable fundamental outlook can take hold again.  Does this mean we shouldn’t worry about the conflict in Iran taking oil prices sustainably above $100? No, but since no one seems to be able to predict the outcome of military conflicts or oil prices, I am not going to try either. Instead, I am going to assume that in six months, things have likely settled down after this initial surge, much like we saw after Russia invaded Ukraine. Importantly, the spike in oil prices is the result of a logistical logjam in the Straits of Hormuz rather than a shortage of supply. That logjam is a real constraint, but necessity is the mother of ingenuity and will likely be solved.  Another reason to be optimistic six months out is the broadening in earnings growth, a trend that remains intact and a key call in our 2026 outlook. Secondarily, the US is much more resilient than Asia and Europe to an oil shock given its energy independence. This should attract investor flows back to the US. And finally, tax incentives for capital spending and tax cuts for individuals in the [One] Big Beautiful Bill should provide a positive offset to the higher oil prices in the short term. On the negative side, the flight to quality and safety could lead to more US dollar strength which is a headwind to global liquidity.  Bottom line, oil and US dollar strength is likely to persist until the conflict simmers down. While much of the damage has likely been done to the most vulnerable parts of the equity market, the index remains vulnerable to another 5-7 percent downside in my opinion while crowded stocks could see double digit declines before a final low appears next month. Remember market lows happen faster than tops so be ready to add risk in anticipation of the bull market resuming later this year. Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!

In the second of our two-part panel discussion from Morgan Stanley’s TMT conference, our analysts break down the complexity of financing AI’s infrastructure and the technological disruption happening across industries.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Michelle Weaver: Welcome back to Thoughts on the Market, and welcome to part two of our conversation live from the Technology, Media and Telecom conference. I'm Michelle Weaver, U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist at Morgan Stanley. Today we're continuing our conversation with Stephen Byrd, Josh Baer and Lindsay Tyler. This time looking at financing AI and some of the risks to the story. It's Friday, March 6th at 11am in San Francisco. So yesterday we spoke about AI adoption. And while there's a lot of excitement on this theme, there've also been some concerns bubbling up. Lindsay, I want to start with you around financing. That's another critical component of the AI build out. What's your latest on the magnitude of the data center financing gap, and what role [are] credit markets playing here? Lindsay Tyler:  Yeah, in partnership with Thematic Research, Stephen and team, and colleagues across fixed income research last summer, we did put out a note, thinking about the data center financing gap, right? So, Stephen and team modeled a $3 trillion global data center CapEx need over a four-year timeframe. So, in partnership with fixed income across asset classes, we thought: okay, how will that really be funded? And we came to the conclusion that the hyperscalers, the high quality hyperscalers, generate a good amount of cash flow, right? So, there's cash from ops that can fund approximately half of that. But then we think that fixed income markets are critical to fund the rest of the funding gap. And really private credit is the leader in that and then aided by corporate credit and also securitized credit. What we've seen since is that yes, private credit has served a role. There is this difference between private credit 1.0, which is more of that middle market direct lending. And then private credit 2.0, which is more ABF – Asset Based Finance or Asset Backed Finance. And what we see there is an interest in leases of hyperscaler tenants, right? We've also seen in the market over the past nine months or so, investment grade bond issuance by hyperscalers. Obviously, a use of cash flow by hyperscalers. We've seen the construction loans with banks and also private credit per reports. We've also seen high yield bond issuance, which is kind of a new trend for construction financing. We've seen ABS and CMBS as well. And then something new that's emerging in focus for investors is more of a chip-backed or compute contract backed financings, like more creative solutions.   We're really in early innings of the spend right now. And so, there is this shift. As we start to work through the construction early phases, the next focus is: okay, but what about the chips? And so, I think a big focus is that, you know, chips are more than 50 percent of the spend for if you're looking at a gigawatt site. And it depends what type of chips and kind of what generation. But that's the next leg of this too. So, it's kind of a focus, you know, for 2026. Michelle Weaver: And how do you view balance sheet leverage and financing when you think about hyperscaler debt raising magnitude and timelines? Lindsay Tyler: So just to bring it down to more of a basic level, if you need compute, you really might need two things, right? A powered shell and then the chips. And so, if you're looking for that compute, you could kind of go in three basic ways. You could look to build the shell and kind of build and buy the whole thing. You could lease the shell, from, you know, a developer, maybe a Bitcoin miner too – that is converted to HBC. And then you kind of buy the chips and you put them in yourselves. Or you could lease all the compute; quote unquote lease, it's more of a contract.  In terms of the funding, if you're thinking about the cash flows of some of the big companies – think of that as primarily being put towards chip spend. If you're thinking about the construction that's kind of split between cash CapEx but also leases. And so, what we've seen is that there is more than [$]600 billion of un-commenced lease obligations that will commence over the next two to five years, across the big four or five players. And then my equity counterparts estimate around [$]700 billion of cash CapEx that needs this year for some of those players as well. So, these are big numbers. But that's kind of how, at a basic level, they're approaching some of the financing. It's a split approach. Michelle Weaver: And what have you learned around financing the past few days at the conference? Anything incremental to share there? Lindsay Tyler: Sure. Yeah. I think I found confirmation of some key themes here at the conference. The first being that numerous funding buckets are available. That was a big focus of our note last year is that you can kind of look at asset level financing. You can look at public bonds, you can look at some equity.   There are these different funding buckets available.The second is that tenant quality matters for construction financing. I think I've seen this more in the markets than maybe at this conference over the past two to three weeks. But that has been a focus of pricing for the deals, but also market depth for the deals. A third confirmation of a key theme was around the neo clouds and also the GPU as a service business models. Thinking about those creative financings, right. Are they thinking about from their compute counterparties? Would they like upfront payments? Might they look to move financing off [the] balance sheet, if they have a very high-quality investment grade rated counterparty? So, there is some of this evolution around those solutions. And then a fourth key theme is just around the credit support. And Stephen has and I have talked about this around some of the Bitcoin miners – is that, you know, there can be these higher quality investment grade players that might look to lend their credit support. Maybe a lease backstop to other players in the ecosystem in order to get a better pricing on construction financing. And we are seeing some press pickup around how that might play out in chip financing down the road too. Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. AI driven risk and potential disruption has been a big feature of the price action we've seen year-to-date in this theme. Stephen, what are some asset classes or businesses you see as resistant to some of this disruption? Stephen Byrd: We spend a lot of time thinking about, sort of, asset classes that are resistant to deflation and disruption. And what's interesting is there's actually a handful of economists in the world that are doing remarkable work on this concept. That they would call it the economics of transformative AI. There are three Americans, two Canadians, two Brits, a number of others who are doing really, really interesting work. And essentially what they're looking at is what do economies look like? As we see very powerful AI enter many industries – cause price reductions, deflation… What does that do? They have a lot of interesting takeaways, but one is this idea that the relative value of assets that cannot be deflated by AI goes up. Very simple idea. But think of it this way, I mean, there's only, you know, one principle resort on Kauai. You know, there's a limited amount of metals. And so, what we go through is this list that's gotten a lot of investor attention of resistant asset classes or more of the resistant asset classes that can go up in value. So, there are obvious ones like land, though you have to be a little careful with real estate in the sense that like, office real estate probably wouldn't be where you would go. Nor would you potentially go sort of towards middle income, lower income housing. But more, you know, think of industrial REITs, higher-end real estate. But there are a lot of other categories that are interesting to me. All kinds of infrastructure should be quite resistant, all kinds of critical materials. Metals should do extremely well in this. But then when you go beyond that, it's actually kind of interesting that there; arguably there's a longer list than those classic sort of land and metals examples.Examples here would be compute… Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. Stephen Byrd: I thought Jensen put it, well, you know, if there's a limited amount of infrastructure available, you want to put the best compute. And ultimately, in some ways, intelligence becomes the new coin of the realm in the world, right? So, I would want to own the purveyors of intelligence.  It could include high-end luxury. It could include unique human experiences. So, I don't know how many of y'all have children who are sort of college age. But my children are college age, and they absolutely hate what they would call AI slop.They want legit human content, and they seek it out. And they absolutely hate it when they see bad copies of human content. And so, I think there is a place in many parts of the economy for unique human experiences, unique human content, and it's interesting to kind of seek out where that might be in the economy. So those would be some examples of resistant assets. Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. Josh, software's been at really the center of this AI disruption debate. How would you compare the current pullback in software multiples to prior periods of peak uncertainty? And do you think any of these concerns are valid? Or how are you thinking about that? Josh Baer: Great question. I mean, software multiples on an EV to sales basis are down 30 – 35 percent just from the fall, I will say. And that's overall in the group. A lot of stocks, multiple handfuls, are down 60-70 percent over the last year. And what's being priced in is really peak uncertainty, a lot of fear. And these multiples, no

Live from Morgan Stanley’s TMT conference, our panel break down where AI is already delivering real returns—and where rapid advances are raising new risks.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Michelle Weaver: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michelle Weaver, U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist here at Morgan Stanley.Today we've got a special episode on AI adoption. And this is a first in a two-part conversation live from our Technology, Media and Telecom conference.It's Thursday, March 5th at 11am in San Francisco.We're really excited to be here with all of you taping live. And we've got on stage with me. Stephen Byrd, he's our Global Head of Thematic and Sustainability Research; Josh Baer, Software Analyst; and Lindsay Tyler, TMT Credit Research Analyst.So, Stephen, I want to start with you, pretty broad, pretty high level. We recently published our fifth AI Mapping Survey that identifies how different companies are exposed to the broad AI theme. Can you just share with us some insights from that piece and how stocks are performing with this AI exposure?Stephen Byrd: Yeah, it's interesting. I mean, we've been doing this survey now, thanks to you, Michelle, and your excellent work, for quite a while. And every six months it is pretty telling to see the progression.I would say a few things that got my attention from our most recent mapping was the number of companies that are quantifying the adoption benefits continues to go up quite a bit. And to me that feels like that's going to be table stakes very soon as in every industry you see two or three companies that are really laying out quite specifically what they expect to be able to do with AI and lay out the math. I think that really is going to pull all the other companies to follow suit. So, we're seeing that in a big way.We do see adopters, with real tangible benefits performing well. But a new thing that we're seeing now, of course, in the market is concerns that in some cases adoption can lead to dramatic deflation, disruption, et cetera. That's coming up as well. So, we're seeing greater concerns around disruption as well.But broadly, I'd say a proliferation of adoption, that that universe of companies continues to grow, increases in quantification of the benefits. So, that is good. What's really surprised me though, is the narrative among investors has so quickly moved from those benefits which we've talked about into flipping that to toggle all negative, which I know some of our analysts have to deal with every day. The mapping work suggests significant benefits. But the market is fast forwarding to very powerful AI that is very disruptive in deflation. And that's been a surprise to me.Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. Josh, I want to bring software into this. Your team has been arguing that AI is actually good for software. And it's really something that you need that application layer to then enable other companies to adopt AI. Can you tell us a little bit about how much GenAI could add to the broader enterprise software market? And how are you thinking about monetization these days?Josh Baer: Of course. I think the best starting place is a reminder that AI is software, and so we see software as a TAM expander. And in many ways, even though this is extremely exciting innovation, it's following past innovation trends where first you see value accrue and market cap accrue to semiconductors, and then hardware and devices, and then eventually software and services. And we do think that that absolutely will occur just given [$]3 trillion in infrastructure investment into data centers and GPUs.There's got to be an application layer that brings all of these productivity and efficiency gains to enterprises and advanced capabilities to consumers as well. And so we see AI more as an evolution for software than a revolution. An evolution of capabilities and expansion of capabilities. LLMs and diffusion engines absolutely unlocked all of these new features of what software can do. But incumbents will play a key role in this unlock.And our CIO surveys really support that. Quarterly we ask chief information officers about their spending intentions, and these application vendors who we cover in the public markets are increasingly selected as vendors that companies will go to, to help deploy and apply AI and LLM technologies.So, to answer your question, we estimate GenAI could unlock [$]400 billion in incremental TAM for software; for enterprise software by 2028. And this is based on looking at the type of work able to be automated, the labor costs associated with that work, the scope of automation, and then thinking about how much of that value is captured typically by software vendors.Michelle Weaver: And you have a bit of a different lens on AI adoption. So, what are some of the ways you're hearing software customers using these AI tools and anything interesting that popped up at the conference?Josh Baer: To echo what Stephen laid out, I mean, all of our software companies are using AI internally, both to drive efficiencies, but also to move faster. So thinking about product. Innovation, you know, the incumbents are able to use all of the same coding tools and, you know, …Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm.Josh Bear: … products geared to developers to move faster and more efficiently on R&D. So, they're doing more. From a sales and marketing perspective, a G&A perspective, every area of OpEx, our software companies are in a great position to deploy the AI tools internally.I think more important[ly], speaking to this TAM and expanded opportunity, is our companies have skews that they're monetizing. It might be a separate suite that incorporates advanced AI functionality. It might be a standalone offering, or it might be embedded into the core platform because the essence of software is AI and it, you know, leading to better retention rates and acceleration from here.Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. And Stephen, going back to you on the state of play for AI, we had the AI labs here and we heard a lot about the developments and what's to come. So, what's your view on the trajectory for LLM advancements and what are some of the key signposts or catalysts you're watching here?Stephen Byrd: Yeah, this is for me, maybe the most important takeaway of the conference – is this continued non-linear improvement of LLMs, which we've been writing about for quite some time. And just to give you an example, we think many of the labs have achieved a step change up in terms of the compute that they have, in some cases 10 x the amount of compute to train their LLMs. And that [if] the scaling laws hold – and we see every sign that they will – a 10x increase in compute used to train the models results in about a doubling of the model capabilities.Now just let that sink in for a moment. Let's just think about that. A doubling from here in a relatively short period of time is difficult to predict. It's obviously very significant and I think several of the LLM execs at our event sounded to me extremely bullish on what that will be. A lot of that I think will be evident in greater agentic capabilities.But also, I'd say greater creativity. It was about three weeks ago, three of the best physics minds in the world worked with an LLM to achieve a true breakthrough in physics – solving a problem that had never been solved before. A couple of days ago, a math team did the same thing. And so, what we're seeing is sort of these breakthrough capabilities in creativity. This morning I thought Sam speaking to, you know, incredible increases in what these models can do – which also brings risk. You know, I think it was interesting he spoke to, you know, the risk of misalignment, the risk of what these models are doing.But for me, that's the single biggest thing that I'm thinking about, and that's going to be evident in the next several months.Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm.Stephen Byrd: So, you know, on the positive side, it leads to greater benefits from AI adoption. And to Josh's point that, you know – more and more the economy can be addressed by AI, I do get concerned about the risk that that kind of step change will create greater concerns about disruption and deflation.That causes me to think a lot about that dynamic. Interestingly, we think the Chinese labs will not be able to keep pace just for one reason, which is compute. We think the Chinese labs have everything else they need. They have the talent, the infrastructure. They certainly have the energy, power. But they don't have the chips.If what we laid out with the American models turns out to be true, I could see a chain reaction where the Chinese government pushes the Trump administration for full transfer of the best technology to China. And China could use their rare earth trade position to ensure that. So, that's sort of the chain reaction I've been thinking about.Michelle Weaver: Mm-hmm. So, let's think about then bottlenecks in the U.S. Power is still one of the main bottlenecks. We had several of the solutions providers here at the conference. So, what are you thinking in terms of the size of the power bottleneck in the U.S. and how are we going to fix that?Stephen Byrd: Yeah, absolutely. I am bullish on the companies that can de-bottleneck power, not just in the U.S., a few other places. Let's go through the math in terms of the problem we face and then the solution.So, we have this very cool – it is cool if you're a nerd – power model that starts in the chip level up, from our semiconductor teams. And from that, we build a global power demand model for data centers. We then apply that to the U.S.Through 2028 we need about 74 gigawatts of data centers, both AI and non-AI to be built in the United States. I don't think we'll be able to achieve that for lots of reasons. But starting from that 74, we have sort of 10 gigs that have been recently built or are under construction. We have 15 gigs of incremental grid access, but after thos

Our Deputy Global Head of Research Michael Zezas and Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore assess the potential market outcomes of the Middle East conflict, weighing its possible duration and economic impact.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Deputy Global Head of Research. Ariana Salvatore: And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research. Michael Zezas: Today we're discussing the escalating U.S.-Iran conflict, the market reaction, and what investors should be watching for next. It's Wednesday, March 4th at 7:30am in San Francisco. Ariana Salvatore: And 10:30am in New York. Michael Zezas: So, Ariana, I'm in San Francisco at Morgan Stanley's TMT Conference, but obviously events in the Middle East have captured everyone's attention. There's uncertainty around the conflict and really important questions about how it affects all of us. And of course, markets have to discount all sorts of future uncertainty about very specific impacts – to financial asset prices, to commodity prices – and really look at it through that narrow lens.And so, Ariana, the administration has suggested that this conflict and this campaign could last a few weeks. But also it said it could continue as long as it takes. So, what are the clearest signals investors should watch for to gauge duration? Ariana Salvatore: For now, we're focused on three main indicators. First, I would say, and most important, is clarity around the objectives. The president and others in the administration have referenced things like eliminating Iran's missile arsenal, its navy and limiting proxy activity. Those goals are broader than the earlier focus on just the nuclear programs. Each objective, of course, implies a different timeline. A narrower objective likely means a shorter engagement. Broader ambitions, conversely, would extend it. So that's the first thing. Second, obviously extremely important is traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. We'd viewed a full closure as unlikely, given the economic consequences for Iran itself. But tanker flows have at least temporarily fallen close to zero, and that's significant because production across the region has not been impaired. This is not about oil fields going offline. It's about whether or not oil can actually move. If shipping lanes normalize within weeks, markets can recalibrate. However, if flows remain materially curtailed beyond five weeks, the risks rise meaningfully. Third, the frequency of strikes and proxy activity. Sustained or escalating engagement would suggest a longer conflict. Signs of diplomacy, on the other hand, might indicate de-escalation. Michael Zezas: Right. So, let's build on that and talk about oil. And our colleague, Martijn Rats has really laid this out with a lot of different scenarios. But what we're seeing right now is that when it comes to oil, this is really a shock to the transport of it, not necessarily a shock to its production. So, oil supply exists. The question is really – can it be delivered or not? So, if tanker flows normalize and the geopolitical risk premium fades, what Martijn is saying is that global oil prices could move back towards $60 to $65 a barrel. If the logistical disruption lasts four to five weeks, then prices maybe trade in the $75 to $80 range. And if disruption extends beyond five weeks and flows are materially constrained, then you could see a situation where oil prices have to rise towards $120 or $130 a barrel. And at that level, demand destruction is what becomes the balancing mechanism in setting price for oil. So, one signal to watch is longer dated oil prices. Early month contracts can spike during geopolitical stress, but a sustained move materially above $80 to $85 [per] barrel would likely require longer dated prices to move higher as well. And that might signal that markets believe the disruption is persistent and not temporary. Ariana, what about natural gas here? How does gas situation fit into the energy story? Ariana Salvatore: As of this recording, Qatar has halted liquified natural gas production putting roughly 20 percent of global supply at risk. Prices have, as you might expect, risen sharply, which likely reflects expectations of a relatively short disruption. If exports were to resume quickly, prices could retrace. But, of course, if the outage lasts longer, prices could move meaningfully higher. Again, duration of the conflict is really critical here. Michael Zezas: So, let's bring this back to the U.S. Ariana, how does this conflict feed into the domestic, political and economic backdrop? Ariana Salvatore: When we're thinking about the midterm elections later this year, the way we see it, the clearest transmission channel is gasoline prices. Polling shows a majority of Americans oppose military action related to Iran, but voters typically prioritize domestic issues: things like inflation, cost of living, affordability over foreign policy. However, there's a very clear caveat here. If oil prices stay elevated, gasoline prices rise, and that's where this becomes politically more salient. Michael Zezas: Right, and so our economists and our chief U.S. Economist Michael Gapen has been all over this. And the way he assesses it is if oil prices remain about 10 percent higher than where they were before the conflict for several months, headline inflation would likely rise by 0.3 percent before dissipating. Historically, oil price shocks primarily affect headline inflation rather than underlying inflation. That's an important distinction that they point out. So maybe that could delay Federal Reserve rate cuts, even if policymakers ultimately look through the move. But if oil prices rise enough to weaken economic activity, particularly in the labor market or consumer spending, then our economists say the Fed could pivot toward easing despite elevated inflation. Ariana Salvatore: So, given that backdrop, what's the simple takeaway for investors in stocks or bonds? Michael Zezas: Right. So, I think we have to think about this in terms of duration of conflict and economic impact. So, if tanker flows normalize within a few weeks and oil prices move back towards that $60 to $65 range, then our economists are saying economic damage would be limited. And historically geopolitical events alone have not led to sustained volatility for U.S. equities. So, in that environment, our cross-asset team points out that stocks would likely remain supported. If instead, oil prices remain elevated long enough to push inflation higher and weigh on growth, the picture would change. A sharp and persistent rise in oil prices – that can pose a risk to the duration of the business cycle, and in that scenario, we'd expect stocks to struggle. Importantly, bonds may not provide the same diversification benefit if inflation remains sticky as a consequence of all of this. We could see stock and bond prices move in the same direction. That could challenge traditional balanced portfolios. Ariana Salvatore: And what are we seeing specifically in U.S. Treasury markets? Michael Zezas: So, as Matt Hornbach and our global macro strategy team have pointed out here, you've got two competing forces in the U.S. Treasury market. There's been some demand for safety, but investors are also focused on the risk that higher oil prices would lift inflation. So far, inflation concerns have taken precedence over growth concerns. How long that balance holds – that might depend on incoming data, especially labor market data. If you get weaker labor market data suggesting that growth could weaken, then you could see treasuries rally more meaningfully and yields come down. If you don't see that and inflation concerns dominate, then maybe you're not going to see yields come down as much. And bonds rally as much. Ariana Salvatore: So, stepping back, it seems like the key variables remain tanker traffic, longer dated oil prices and duration of the conflict itself. Michael Zezas: I think that's right. Ariana, thanks for speaking with me. Ariana Salvatore: Always a pleasure, Mike. Michael Zezas: And thanks to our listeners for joining us. We'll continue tracking developments and what they mean for markets. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen and share the podcast with a friend or colleague.Important note regarding economic sanctions. This report references jurisdictions which may be the subject of economic sanctions. Readers are solely responsible for ensuring that their investment activities are carried out in compliance with applicable laws.

Our Hong Kong/China Transportation & Infrastructure Analyst Qianlei Fan discusses how China’s travel industry is shifting from a post-pandemic rebound to a multi-year expansion.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Qianlei Fan, Morgan Stanley’s Hong Kong / China Transportation Analyst. Today, I'll share my thoughts on why travel is quickly emerging as one of [the] key drivers of China's economic rebalancing.It’s Tuesday, March the 3rd, at 2pm in Hong Kong. I've just gotten back from my Lunar New Year trip to mainland China. With the longest Chinese New Year break in history, people were out roaming, exploring, laughing, and the whole country felt like it was buzzing with people on a mission to enjoy every minute. According to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, total domestic tourism spending recorded a robust 19 percent year-on-year growth during the holiday. In fact, China’s tourism industry isn’t just rebounding after the pandemic. It’s entering a structurally stronger phase, supported by policy tailwinds, demographic shifts, and a clear pivot toward experience-driven consumption. By 2030, tourism revenue could reach RMB 12 trillion – equal to roughly USD $1.7 trillion – implying 11 percent annual growth from the mid-2020s. Over the next five years, cumulative domestic and inbound revenue may approach RMB 50 trillion, or USD $7.2 trillion. That scale makes travel more than a cyclical recovery – it’s becoming a core pillar of China’s consumption-led growth. We expect tourism’s share of GDP to rise to about 6.7 percent by 2030, up from 4.8 percent in 2024.Domestic travel remains the backbone.  People aren’t just traveling again; they’re traveling more than before. Policy is reinforcing demand. Extended public holidays, new school breaks, and event-driven tourism are boosting activity. In 2025 alone, around 3,000 large-scale performances attracted more than 43 million attendees. And spending reflects that shift. Domestic tourism spending reached RMB 6.3 trillion in 2025, about 11 percent above pre-COVID levels. Even with slightly lower spend per trip, more frequent travel is lifting overall revenue.International travel is emerging as a second growth engine. By 2030, inbound travel could represent 16 percent of total tourism revenue. In late 2025, inbound visitor growth in major cities was up about 30–50 percent year-over-year, supported by expanded visa-free access, which now accounts for the majority of foreign arrivals. These visitors often stay longer and spend more. Outbound travel is strengthening too. International air traffic grew 22 percent in 2025, far outpacing domestic growth, and now contributes a meaningful share of airline revenue. Demographics and technology are reinforcing the trend. Younger consumers prioritize travel, while older households – with substantial savings – are beginning to spend more as services improve. At the same time, smart hotels, virtual reality attractions, and data-driven operations are enhancing engagement and willingness to pay. This isn’t just pent-up demand. It’s policy, demographics, technology, and supply aligning at once. – with travel at the center of China’s consumption story.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur and U.S. Head of Credit Strategy Vishwas Patkar discuss the implications of private credit’s exposure to the software industry.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist. Vishwas Patkar: I'm Vishwas Patkar, Morgan Stanley's U.S. Head of Credit Strategy. Vishy Tirupattur: While potential disruption from AI has been a key driver for markets [in the] last few weeks, the focus of investor agenda has been in the software sector. On today's podcast, we will talk about software in the credit markets and its implications. It's Monday, March 2nd at 10am in New York. Vishwas, let's start by understanding how the exposure in software manifests in the credit markets. How does it compare to software, say, in the equity market? Vishwas Patkar: Yeah, so the software exposure in credit markets is large, and understandably that's why investors are closely watching what's happening with software in the equity market. But what's interesting and important for investors to note is the exposure in credit is very different from what it is in equities. So, for instance, a good chunk of exposure in the credit market is around private issuers. So, we estimate about 80 percent of companies are private in the whole sample set that we looked at. And that's largely a function of the fact that software is not a big part of the more liquid spaces like Investment Grade and High Yield. But it is heavily represented in the more opaque parts of the market, like leveraged loans, CLOs, and, you know, BDCs. So, our analysis found that about 25 percent of BDC portfolios are in software, closely followed by private credit CLOs. And leveraged loan market was about 16 percent. So, that's an important distinction to keep in mind versus the equity market. The second thing I would flag is – because the software sector grew a lot in the loan market through the LBO wave of 2020 and 2021, it has a weaker credit quality skew to it than the overall market. So about 50 percent of borrowers in the sector are rated B - or lower. So, that's the lowest rungs of the rating spectrum. Many of these software deals were underwritten with higher leverage than the broad market. And as a result of that you also have more front-loaded maturities in the sector, which brings the risks of refinancing, if some of this disruption persists. But Vishy, that's a nice segue to you. Over the past couple of years, you looked at the private credit market in depth and that's where I think the exposure we found is the highest in BDCs, you know, which is the public face of private credit. So, in your assessment, what is the risk of software to private credit, given all of the headlines that are popping up? Vishy Tirupattur: Public face of private credit – Vishwas, that's a great line. BDCs – business development corporations for those who are not familiar – are companies that invest in the debt of small and medium sized companies, sourced through non-bank channels. BDCs fund themselves through equity and debt issuance. So, if you look at the portfolios of BDCs to look at their exposure to software, there's a wide variation across the various BDC portfolios. What makes the assessment of these software risks in BDCs challenging is that many of these companies are private companies without the reporting obligations of public companies. So, no earnings reports, no 10-Ks or cues or broadly publicly available financials look at. So, in effect, these companies need to be re underwritten to evaluate which of these companies would be disrupted from AI; and which companies could actually benefit from AI and see their margins expand. So, in the context of BDCs, liability spreads are something we are watching closely. BDC liability spreads have widened but we think more needs to happen there. The clearing levels need to wait for the full resolution of the companies that benefit and that get hurt by disruption that is still awaited. So, we expect credit spreads of BDCs to remain volatile for some time to come. Vishwas Patkar: Okay. So, seems like this is a significant, or at least a non-trivial risk factor for credit markets, given the growth of the sector, leverage, the skew and quality. But Vishy, do you think this could be systemic for risk markets at large? Vishy Tirupattur: So, I do think that this is a significant risk, but I don't think it's a systemic risk. The amount of leverage in BDC is fairly small. About 2x is the kind of leverage. You compare that to the kind of leverage that existed in the financial system before the financial crisis – that’s orders of magnitude smaller risk. And also the linkage to the banking system comes through the back leverage provided to the non-bank lenders. But this leverage is substantially risk remote with very high subordination levels. So, my conclusion here is this is a significant risk but not a systemic risk. So let me turn the same question to you, Vishwas. Taking on a sort of historical perspective as well as a macro perspective, how do you see this risk manifesting in the broader credit space? Vishwas Patkar: Yeah, so I would agree with you Vishy, that we need to see a valuation reset. We think spreads should go wider because of disruption concerns, even if they affect a relatively narrow part of the market. But a lot of that's happening against issuance that's rising. But I would say the risk of systemic concerns really emerging is relatively low. if you look at historical cycles where credit has been the weak link in the economy, those are typically characterized by a lot of corporate re-leveraging. So, think about the late 1990s or from 2004 to 2007 or the early 2000-teens. These are all cycles where corporates were being very aggressive, adding a lot of debt. And you know, when the economy slowed, credit became the source of some default and downgrade concerns. We haven't really seen that type of credit cycle play out at all in the past few years. If you look at corporate debt to GDP, for example, it's gone down each of the last five years. Balance sheet corporate leverage has been flat or actually gone lower in spots. M&A activity, which is usually a good indicator of corporate aggressiveness, still remains below trend. So, I think we have had a fairly restrained credit cycle where in place fundamentals are quite strong. And that's why I think the systemic contagion from any credit spread weakness, I think could be relatively muted. Vishy Tirupattur: So, the key takeaway from us is that software and credit is a significant risk but is not quite systemic risk. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the podcast, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Deputy Head of Global Research Michael Zezas and Stephen Byrd, Global Head of Thematic and Sustainability Research, discuss how the U.S. is positioning AI as a pillar of geopolitical influence and what that means for nations and investors.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Morgan Stanley's Deputy Head of Global Research.Stephen Byrd: And I'm Stephen Byrd, Global Head of Thematic and Sustainability Research.Michael Zezas: Today – is AI becoming the new anchor of geopolitical power?It's Wednesday, February 27th at noon in New York.So, Stephen, at the recent India AI Impact Summit, the U.S. laid out a vision to promote global AI adoption built around what it calls “real AI sovereignty.” Or strategic autonomy through integration with the American AI stack. But several nations from the global south and possibly parts of Europe – they appear skeptical of dependence on proprietary systems, citing concerns about control, explainability, and data ownership. And it appears that stake isn't just technology policy. It's the future structure of global power, economic stratification, and whether sovereign nations can realistically build competitive alternatives outside the U.S. and China.So, Stephen, you were there and you've been describing a growing chasm in the AI world in terms of access to strategies between the U.S. and much of the global south, and possibly Europe. So, from what you heard at the summit, what are the core points of disagreement driving that divide?Stephen Byrd: There definitely are areas of agreement; and we've seen a couple of high-profile agreements reached between the U.S. government and the Indian government just in the last several days. So there certainly is a lot of overlap. I point to the Pax Silica agreement that's so important to secure supply chains, to secure access to AI technology. I think the focus, for example, for India is, as you said; it is, you know, explainability, open access. I was really struck by Prime Minister Modi's focus on ensuring that all Indians have access to AI tools that can help them in their everyday life.You know, a really tangible example that really stuck with me is – someone in a remote village in India who has a medical condition and there's no doctor or nurse nearby using AI to, you know, take a photo of the condition, receive diagnosis, receive support, figure out what the next steps should be. That's very powerful. So, I'd say, open access explainability is very important.Now, the American hyperscalers are very much trying to serve the Indian market and serve the objectives really of the Indian government. And so, there are versions of their models that are open weights, that are being made freely available for health agencies in India, as an example; to the Indian government, as an example.So, there is an attempt to really serve a number of objectives, but I think this key is around open access, explainability, that I do see that there's a tension.Michael Zezas: So, let's talk about that a little bit more. Because it seems one of the concerns raised is this idea of being captive within proprietary Large Language Models. And maybe that includes the risk of having to pay more over time or losing control of citizen data. But, at the same time, you've described that there are some real benefits to AI that these countries want to adopt.So, what is effectively the tension between being captive to a model or the trade off instead for pursuing open and free models? Is it that there's a major quality difference? And is that trade off acceptable?Stephen Byrd: See, that's what's so fascinating, Mike, is, you know, what we need to be thinking about is not just where the technology is today, but where is it in six months, 12 months, 24 months? And from my perspective, it's very clear. That the proprietary American models are going to be much, much more capable.So, let's put some numbers around that. The big five American firms have assembled about 10 times the compute to train their current LLMs compared to their prior LLMs, and that's a big deal. If the scaling laws hold, then a 10x increase in training compute to result in models are about twice as capable.Now just let that sink in for a minute, twice as capable from here. That's a big deal. And so, when we think about the benefit of deploying these models, whether it's in the life sciences or any number of other disciplines, those benefits could start to get very large. And the challenge for the open models will be – will they be able to keep up in terms of access to compute, to training, access to data to train those models? That's a big question.Now, again, there's room for both approaches and it's very possible for the Indian government to continue to experiment and really see which approach is going to serve their citizens the best. And I was really struck by just how focused the Indian government is on serving all of their citizens. Most notably, you know, the poorest of the poor in their nation. So, we'll just have to see.But the pure technologist would say that these proprietary models are going to be increasing capability much faster than the open-source models.So, Mike, let's pivot from the technology layer to the geopolitical layer because the U.S. strategy unveiled at the summit goes way beyond innovation.Michael Zezas: Yeah, it's a good point. And within this discussion of whether or not other countries will choose to pursue open models or more closely adhere to U.S. based models is really a question about how the United States exercises power globally and how it creates alliances going forward.Clearly some part of the strategy is that the U.S. assumes that if it has technology that's alluring to its partners, that they'll want to align with the U.S.’ broad goals globally. And that they'll want to be partners in supporting those goals, which of course are tied to AI development.So, the Pax Silica [agreement], which you mentioned earlier, is an interesting point here because this is clearly part of the U.S. strategy to develop relationships with other countries – such that the other countries get access to U.S. models and access to U.S. AI in general. And what the U.S. gets in return is access to supply chain, critical resources, labor, all the things that you need to further the AI build out. Particularly as the U.S. is trying to disassociate more and more from China, and the resources that China might have been able to bring to bear in an AI build out.Stephen Byrd: So, Mike, the U.S. framed “real AI sovereignty” as strategic autonomy rather than full self-sufficiency. So, essentially the. U.S. is encouraging nations to integrate components of the American AI stack. Now, from your perspective, Mike, from a macro and policy standpoint, how significant is that distinction?Michael Zezas: Well, I think it's extremely important. And clearly the U.S. views its AI strategy as not just economic strategy, but national security strategy.There are maybe some analogs to how the U.S. has been able to, over the past 80 years or so, use its dominance in military and military equipment to create a security umbrella that other countries want to be under. And do something similar with AI, which is if there is dominant technology and others want access to it for the societal or economic benefits, then that is going to help when you're negotiating with those countries on other things that you value – whether it be trade policy, foreign policy, sanctions versus another country. That type of thing.So, in a lot of ways, it seems like the U.S. is talking about AI and developing AI as an anchor asset to its power, in a way that military power has been that anchor asset for much of the post World War II period.Stephen Byrd: See, that's what's so interesting, Mike, [be]cause you've highlighted before to me that you believe AI could replace weaponry as really the anchor asset for U.S. global power. Almost a tech equivalent of a defense umbrella.So how durable is that strategy, especially given that some countries are expressing unease about dependency?Michael Zezas: Yeah, it's really hard to know, and I think the tension you and I talked about earlier, Stephen, about whether countries will be willing to make the trade off for access to superior AI models versus open and free models that might be inferior, that'll tell us if this is a viable strategy or not. And it appears like this is still playing out because, correct me if I'm wrong, it's not like we've received some very clear signals from India or other countries about their willingness to make that trade off.Stephen Byrd: No, I think that's right. And just building on the concept of the trade-offs and, sort of, the standard for AI deployment, you know, the U.S. has explicitly rejected centralized global AI governance in favor of national control aligned with domestic values.So, what does that signal about how global technology standards may evolve, particularly as in the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST, works to develop interoperable standards for agentic AI systems.Michael Zezas: Yeah, Stephen, I think it's hard to know. It might be that the U.S. is okay with other countries having substantial degrees of freedom with how they use U.S.-based AI models because they could use U.S. law to, at a later date, change how those models are being used – if there's a use case that comes out of it that they find is against U.S. values. Similar in some way to how the U.S. dollar being the predominant currency and, therefore, being the predominant payment system globally, gives the U.S. degrees of freedom to impose sanctions and limit other types of economic transactions when it's in the U.S. interest.So, I don't know that to be specifically true, but it's an interesting question to consider and a potential motivation behind why a laissez-faire approach might

Our Global Commodities Strategist Martijn Rats discusses the geopolitical drivers behind the recent spike in oil prices and outlines four Iran scenarios.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Martijn Rats, Morgan Stanley’s Global Commodities Strategist.Today – what’s fueling the latest oil market rally.It’s Thursday, February 26th, at 3pm in London.What happens when oil prices jump, even though there’s no actual shortage of oil? That’s the situation we’re in right now. Tensions between the U.S. and Iran have escalated again. Naturally, markets are paying attention.Over the past week, Brent crude rose about $3 to around $72 per barrel. WTI climbed into the mid-$60s. Shipping costs surged. And traders have started paying a premium for protection against a sudden oil spike – the levels we haven’t seen since the early days of the Ukrainian invasion.But here’s the key point: there’s no clear evidence that global oil supply has tightened. Exports are still flowing. Tankers are still moving. And some near-term indicators of physical tightness have actually softened. When oil is truly scarce, buyers scramble for immediate barrels and short-term prices spike relative to future delivery. Instead, those spreads have narrowed, and physical premiums have eased.This isn’t a supply shock. It’s a risk premium. In simple terms, investors are buying insurance. So what could happen next? We see four broad scenarios.Before I outline them though, here’s something we do not see as a core case: a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly 15 million barrels per day of crude and another 5 million of refined product moves through that corridor. A sustained shutdown would be enormously disruptive. But we think the probability is very low.Now coming back to our four scenarios. The first is straightforward. A negotiated settlement; conflict is avoided. Iranian exports continue and shipping lanes remain open. In that scenario, what unwinds is the geopolitical risk premium – which we estimate at roughly $7 to $9 per barrel. If that fades, Brent could drift back to the low-to-mid $60s, similar to past episodes where prices spiked on fear and then retraced once supply proves unaffected.Second, we could see short-lived frictions – shipping delays, higher insurance costs, temporary logistical issues. That might remove a few hundred thousand barrels per day for, say, a few weeks.. Prices could briefly spike into the $75–80 range. But balancing forces would kick in relatively quickly. For example, China has been building inventories at a steady pace. At higher prices, that stockbuilding would likely slow, helping offset temporary disruptions. That points to some further upside in prices – but then normalization.The third scenario is more serious, but still contained: localized export losses of perhaps 1 to 1.5 million barrels per day for a month or two. Prices would stay elevated longer, but spare capacity and demand adjustments could eventually stabilize the market.Now our last scenario is the more serious and considers a potential shipping shock. The real risk here isn’t wells shutting down – it’s shipping disruption. Global trade of crude oil depends on efficient tanker movement. If transit times were extended even modestly, effective shipping capacity could fall sharply, creating what amounts to a temporary tightening of about 2 to 3 million barrels per day – or about 6 percent of global seaborne supply. That is a logistics shock, not a production outage – but it would push prices toward early-2022-type levels, at least briefly.Now let’s zoom out. Beyond geopolitics, the fundamentals look weak. OPEC+ supply is rising, and our forecasts show a sizable surplus building in 2026. Even if some of that oil ends up in China’s stockpiles, a lot would still likely flow into core OECD inventories. Historically, when the market looks like this, prices tend to fall, not rise.Which brings us back to the central point. Oil isn’t rallying because the world has run out of barrels. It’s rallying because markets are pricing geopolitical risk. And unless that risk turns into actual, sustained disruption, insurance premiums tend to expire.Thank you for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.This podcast references jurisdiction(s) or person(s) which may be the subject of economic sanctions. Readers are solely responsible for ensuring that their investment activities are carried out in compliance with applicable laws.

Original Release Date: Feb 6, 2026Our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets and Global Chief Economist Seth Carpenter unpack the inner workings of the Federal Reserve to illustrate the challenges that Fed chair nominee Kevin Warsh may face.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley. Seth Carpenter: And I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research. Andrew Sheets: And today on the podcast, a further discussion of a new Fed chair and the challenges they may face. It's Friday, February 6th at 1 pm in New York. Seth, it's great to be here talking with you, and I really want to continue a conversation that listeners have been hearing on this podcast over this week about a new nominee to chair the Federal Reserve: Kevin Warsh. And you are the perfect person to talk about this, not just because you lead our economic research and our macro research, but you've also worked at the Fed. You've seen the inner workings of this organization and what a new Fed chair is going to have to deal with. So, maybe just for some broad framing, when you saw this announcement come out, what were some of the first things to go through your mind? Seth Carpenter: I will say first and foremost, Kevin Warsh's name was one of the names that had regularly come up when the White House was providing names of people they were considering in lots of news cycles. So, I think the first thing that's critically important from my perspective, is – not a shock, right? Sort of a known quantity. Second, when we think about these really important positions, there's a whole range of possible outcomes. And I would've said that of the four names that were in the final set of four that we kept hearing about in the news a lot. You know, some differences here and there across them, but none of them was substantially outside of what I would think of as mainstream sort of thinking. Nothing excessively unorthodox at all like that. So, in that regard as well, I think it should keep anybody from jumping to any big conclusions that there's a huge change that's imminent. I think the other thing that's really important is the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve really is made by a committee. The Federal Open Market Committee and committee matters in these cases. The Fed has been under lots of scrutiny, under lots of pressure, depending on how you want to put it. And so, as a result, there's a lot of discussion within the institution about their independence, making sure they stick very scrupulously to their congressionally given mandate of stable prices, full employment. And so, what does that mean in practice? That means in practice, to get a substantially different outcome from what the committee would've done otherwise… So, the market is pricing; what's the market pricing for the funds rate at the end of this year? About 3.2 percent. Andrew Sheets: Something like that. Yeah. Seth Carpenter: Yeah. So that's a reasonable forecast. It's not too far away from our house view.  For us to end up with a policy rate that's substantially away from that – call it 1 percentage, 2 percentage points away from that. I just don't see that as likely to happen. Because the committee can be led, can be swayed by the chair, but not to the tune of 1 or 2 percentage points. And so, I think for all those reasons, there wasn't that much surprise and there wasn't, for me, a big reason to fully reevaluate where we think the Fed's going. Andrew Sheets: So let me actually dig into that a little bit more because I know our listeners tune in every day to hear a lot about government meetings. But this is a case where that really matters because I think there can sometimes be a misperception around the power of this position. And it's both one of the most public important positions in the world of finance. And yet, as you mentioned, it is overseeing a committee where the majority matters. And so, can you take us just a little bit inside those discussions? I mean, how does the Fed Chair interact with their colleagues? How do they try to convince them and persuade them to take a particular course of action? Seth Carpenter: Great question. And you're right, I sort of spent a bunch of time there at the Fed. I started when Greenspan was chair. I worked under the Bernanke Fed. And of course, for the end of that, Janet Yellen was the vice chair. So, I've worked with her. Jay Powell was on the committee the whole time. So, the cast of characters quite familiar and the process is important. So, I would say a few things. The chair convenes the meetings; the chair creates the agenda for the meeting. The chair directs the staff on what the policy documents are that the committee is going to get. So, there's a huge amount of influence, let's say, there. But in order to actually get a specific outcome, there really is a vote. And we only have to look back a couple weeks to the last FOMC meeting when there were two dissents against the policy decision. So, dissents are not super common. They don't happen at every single meeting, but they're not unheard of by any stretch of the imagination either. And if we go back over the past few years, lots going on with inflation and how the economy was going was uncertain. Chair Powell took some dissents. If we go back to the financial crisis Chair Bernanke took a bunch of dissents. If we go back even further through time, Paul Volcker, when he was there trying to staunch the flow of the high inflation of the 1970s, faced a lot of resistance within his committee. And reportedly threatened to quit if he couldn't get his way. And had to be very aggressive in trying to bring the committee along. So, the chair has to find a way to bring the committee along with the plan that the chair wants to execute. Lots of tools at their disposal, but not endless power or influence. Does that make sense? Andrew Sheets: That makes complete sense.  So, maybe my final question, Seth, is this is a tough job. This is a tough job in… Seth Carpenter: You mean your job and my job, or… Andrew Sheets: [Laughs] Not at all. The chair of the Fed. And it seems especially tricky now. You know, inflation is above the Fed's target. Interest rates are still elevated. You know, certainly mortgage rates are still higher than a lot of Americans are used to over the last several years. And asset prices are high. You know, the valuation of the equity market is high. The level of credit spreads is tight. So, you could say, well, financial conditions are already quite easy, which can create some complications. I am sure Kevin Warsh is receiving lots of advice from lots of different angles. But, you know, if you think about what you've seen from the Fed over the years, what would be your advice to a new Fed chair – and to navigate some of these challenges? Seth Carpenter: I think first and foremost, you are absolutely right. This is a tough job in the best of times, and we are in some of the most difficult and difficult to understand macroeconomic times right now. So, you noted interest rates being high, mortgage rates being high. There's very much an eye of the beholder phenomenon going on here. Now you're younger than I am. The first mortgage I had. It was eight and a half percent. Andrew Sheets: Hmm. Seth Carpenter: I bought a house in 2000 or something like that. So, by those standards, mortgage rates are actually quite low. So, it really comes down to a little bit of what you're used to. And I think that fact translates into lots of other places. So, inflation is now much higher than the committee's target. Call it 3 percent inflation instead core inflation on PCE, rather than 2 percent inflation target. Now, on the one hand that's clearly missing their target and the Fed has been missing their target for years. And we know that tariffs are pushing up inflation, at least for consumer goods. And Chair Powell and this committee have said they get that. They think that inflation will be temporary, and so they're going to look through that inflation. So again, there's a lot of judgment going on here. The labor market is quite weak. Andrew Sheets: Hmm. Seth Carpenter: We don't have the latest months worth of job market data because of the government shutdown; that'll be delayed by a few days. But we know that at the end of last year, non-farm payrolls were running well below 50,000. Under most circumstances, you would say that is a clear indication of a super weak economy. But! But if we look at aggregate spending data, GDP, private-domestic final purchases, consumer spending, CapEx spending. It's actually pretty solid right now. And so again, that sense of judgment; what's the signal you're going to look for? That's very, very difficult right now, and that's part of what the chair is going to have to do to try to bring the committee together, in order to come to a decision.  So, one intellectually coherent argument is – the main way you could get strong aggregate demand, strong spending numbers, strong GDP numbers, but with pretty tepid labor force growth is if productivity is running higher and if productivity is going higher because of AI, for example, over time you could easily expect that to be disinflationary. And if it's disinflationary, then you can cut it. Interest rates now. Not worry as much as you would normally about high inflation. And so, the result could be a lower path for policy rates. So that's one version of the argument that I suspect you're going to hear. On the other hand, inflation is high and it's been high for years. So what does that mean? Well. History suggests that if inflation stays too high for too long, inflation psychology starts to change the way businesses start to set. Andrew Sheets: Mm-hmm. Seth Carpenter: Their own prices can get a little bit loosey-goosey. They might not have to wo

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explains why he still believes in a growth cycle for equity markets, even as investors show growing concerns around AI.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Mike Wilson: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast, I'll be discussing recent concerns around AI disruption. It's Tuesday, February 24th at 1pm in New York. So, let's get after it. Last week you could feel it, that anxious undercurrent in the market. The headlines were noisy, volatility ticked higher, and AI disruption, once again, dominated investor conversations. But beneath the surface level unease something important happened. The S&P 500 Equal Weight Index pushed to a new relative high, keeping our broadening thesis alive and well. On one hand, investors are worried about AI driven disruption, CapEx intensity, and potential labor force reductions. On the other hand, capital is still flowing into formerly lagging areas of the market, just as the median stock is seeing its strongest earnings growth in four years. Let's unpack this. First, there's concern AI will lead to job losses. But even if that's the case, there's typically a phase-in period. Companies don't just eliminate labor overnight. Importantly, before these productivity gains are fully realized, we need broad enterprise adoption. That means building out the agentic application layer, integrating AI into workflows, retraining systems and processes. That takes time, and it is still early days in that regard. Second, what we're seeing now is typical of a major investment cycle. Volatility increases as markets challenge the pace of unbridled spending. Dispersion increases as investors debate winners and losers. Leadership rotates, sometimes sharply. There's also something different this time compared to the internet bubble of the late 1990s. Today we're in an early cycle earnings backdrop. We've just emerged from what was effectively a rolling recession between 2022 and 2025. So, as capital rotates out of the perceived structural losers, it's not just chasing long-term AI beneficiaries, it's also finding classic cyclical winners. On the losing side is long duration services-oriented sectors, particularly software. These areas are more sensitive to uncertainty around longer term cash flows. This area also has a large overhang of private capital deployed over the last 10 to 15 years. There are other forces at play too. Small cap growth, arguably the longest duration segment of the market, began breaking down in late January around the time Kevin Warsh was nominated as Fed chair. While major indices barely reacted, more speculative areas may be responding to expectations of tighter liquidity given Warsh’s, reputation as a balance sheet hawk. Finally, equity markets are typically more volatile when new Fed chairs assume office. Bottom line, our broader thesis of an early cycle rolling recovery remains intact. Market internals are supportive even if index level action feels choppy. That said, near term volatility is likely to persist as we enter a weaker seasonal window for retail demand, while liquidity remains ample, but far from abundant. With this backdrop, a quality cyclical barbell with healthcare makes sense. In small caps, the higher quality S&P 600 looks more attractive than the Russell 2000. And any short-term volatility could present opportunities to add exposure in preferred cyclical areas like Consumer Discretionary Goods, Industrials, and Financials. Of course, risks remain. AI adoption could accelerate faster than expected, pressuring labor markets more abruptly. Pricing power could erode as efficiency spread, and policy makers could react in ways that slow the CapEx cycle while crowded momentum positioning remains vulnerable. Nevertheless, the signal from the internals is clear. Beneath the volatility this looks less like a market rolling over, and more like one that is confirming an early cycle economic expansion. Thanks for tuning in. I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out.

The Supreme Court's latest ruling on tariffs has thrown existing trade agreements into uncertainty. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore and Arunima Sinha, from the U.S and Global Economics teams break down the fallout.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research. Arunima Sinha: And I am Arunima Sinha on the U.S. and Global Economics teams. Ariana Salvatore: Today we'll be talking about the recent Supreme Court decision on tariffs, what it means for existing trade deals, and where trade policy is headed from here. It's Monday, February 23rd at 9am in New York. On Friday, the Supreme Court ruled that the president could not use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, to impose broad-based tariffs. The ruling didn't give a clear signal on what it could mean for potential refunds, but the Trump administration said it plans to replace the existing tariffs, which is something that we'd long expected – first leveraging Section 122 to impose 15 percent tariffs for 150 days. The president is simultaneously going to launch a few new Section 301 investigations to eventually replace those Section 122 tariffs, since they're only allowed to be in place temporarily. So Arunima, let's start by breaking down some of this tariff math. What does this mean for the headline and effective rate given where we are now versus before? Arunima Sinha: Before the decision, Ariana, we were at a headline tariff rate of about 13 percent. What this decision does is that with the move, especially to 15 percent, for other countries, we think that it takes about a percentage point off of the headline tariff rate. So, we would go to about 12 percent, and then we have another percentage point coming off just because of the shifts in trade patterns. And so instead of a headline tariff rate of about 13 percent, we think that we're going to be at a headline tariff of just about 11 percent. But that's really just related to the Section 122s. And as you noted, this is only going to apply for the next 150 days. So how should we be thinking about trade policy going forward? Ariana Salvatore: I think we should view the 15 percent as probably a likely ceiling for these rates in the medium term; in particular because this 150-day period expires some time around the summer, so even closer to the midterm elections. And as we've been saying politically speaking, it's unpopular to impose high levels of tariffs. We've also been saying that the president will continue to lean on trade policy as his real, only way to address the affordability issue for voters, which is something that we've actually seen on the policy side for the past few months with the imposition of exemptions, more trade framework agreements, et cetera.So really, I think this is just another way for him to continue leaning on this policy avenue. But in that vein, let's talk about specific pockets of relief. What are we thinking about some of their findings on a sector level? Arunima Sinha: So, let's tie this into the affordability aspect that you mentioned, Ariana, and specifically using the consumer goods sector. What we think is that with, just in the near-term period, with the Section 122s applying, for different consumer goods categories, we could see tariff rate differentials go down. So, they could be anywhere between 1 to 4 percentage points lower across different categories. But what we also think could happen is that once we get beyond the 150-day period, and there are no additional sector tariffs that go on. So, the 232s or the 301s, particularly for this particular sector, we could see some of the largest tariff relief that we're expecting to see. So, for example, apparel and accessories could see something like a 16 to 17 percentage point tariff drop. So that particular part I think is important. Just the upside risks to consumer goods. But that of course brings us to the question of bilateral trade deals and how they come into play. What do you think about that, Ariana? Ariana Salvatore: Yeah. So, I think when it comes to the bilateral deals, as we mentioned, there's some opportunities for relief depending on the sectors and the type of tariff exposure by country. As you mentioned, the consumer goods are a good example of this. So, in general, I think that trading partners will have little incentive to abandon the existing deals or framework agreements, just given that the president and the administration have messaged this idea of continuity. So, replacing the IEEPA tariffs with a more durable, legitimate, legal authority. But what's notable is that many of our trading partners are actually now facing potentially even lower levels than they were before. Even with the increase to 15 percent on the 122s from 10 percent over the weekend. In particular, many countries in Southeast Asia are actually now facing lower tariff levels since there were somewhere in the range of 20 or maybe even 25 percent before. But as I mentioned, the export composition of these countries matters a lot. So, Vietnam, for example, most exports are subject to the 20 percent tariff because of the IEEPA exposure. This ruling is more meaningful than somewhere like South Korea, where the exports are more exposed to the Section 232 tariffs. Based on the export composition – and that's a level, remember, that's not changing as a result of this ruling. So that's how we're trying to disaggregate the impact here. Now, my last question to you, Arunima, what does this all mean for the macro-outlook? As we mentioned, refunds weren't addressed in this ruling. We've sketched out a few different scenarios, most of which leaned toward a long lead time to eventually paying back the money – if and when the administration is actually, in fact, mandated to do that. But safe to say in the near term that we aren't going to see much action on that front. That probably means status quo. But why don't you put a finer point on what this means for the macroeconomic outlook? Arunima Sinha: That's absolutely right, Ariana, for the very near term and the second quarter, we don't think we're going to be very different from what our baseline expectation is. In the third quarter and in the last part of this year, there could be some upside risks, especially once the timeline on the 122s run out, they're not extended. And the different sector and country investigations take longer to implement. So, there could be some upside risks to demand. Consumer goods, for example. If there were to be some sort of an incremental tailwind to corporate margins that might lead to better labor demand from these companies. There could be additional goods disinflation; that would support just purchasing power. So, both of those things could be some incremental uplift to demand, relative to our baseline outlook. But then the last thing I think just to emphasize from our perspective, is that we do think that there is some sort of a near-term ceiling about how high effective tariff rates can go. We don't think that we're going to be going back to Liberation Day tariff rates in the near-term or even in the latter half of this year. Because if history is any guide, many of these investigations are going to take time and that full implementation may not actually occur before early 2027. Ariana Salvatore: Makes sense. Arunima, thanks for joining. Arunima Sinha: Thanks so much for having me.Ariana Salvatore: And thank you for listening. As a reminder, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen, and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Head of European Sustainability Research Rachel Fletcher talks about how AI’s is quickly reshaping employment and productivity across key industries and regions.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Rachel Fletcher: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I am Rachel Fletcher, Head of European Sustainability Research at Morgan Stanley. Today, how AI is shaking up the global job market. It's Friday, February 20th at 2pm in London. You've probably asked yourself when all the excitement around AI is going to move beyond demos and headlines, and start showing up in ways that matter to your job, your investments, and even your day-to-day life. Our latest global AlphaWise AI survey suggests that the turning point may already be unfolding – especially in the labor market where AI is beginning to influence hiring, productivity, and workplace skills. Our survey covered the U.S., UK, Germany, Japan, and Australia, across five sectors where we see a significant AI adoption benefit. Consumer staples, distribution in retail, real estate, transportation, healthcare, equipment and services, and autos. We found that AI contributed to 11 percent of jobs being eliminated over the past 12 months, with another 12 percent not backfilled. These job cuts were partially offset by 18 percent new hires, which results in a net 4 percent global job loss. It's important to note that the survey focused on companies that had already been adopting AI for at least a year. In fact, most of the companies in our survey had been adopting AI for more than two years. So, this is likely the most significant downside case in terms of the impact of AI on jobs, but it is still an early signal of potential job disruption. In Europe, the picture is nuanced. The UK saw the highest net job loss at 8 percent. This was primarily driven by a lower level of new hires in the UK compared to other countries that we surveyed, as well as a high level of positions not backfilled. This compares to Germany, which posted a 4 percent net job loss in line with the all-country average. There could be some other factors amplifying the impact in the UK. For example, broader labor market weakness driven by higher labor costs and higher levels of unemployment amongst younger workers. Ultimately, disentangling AI from macro forces remains challenging. Moving to sector impacts in Europe, autos experience the largest net job loss at 13 percent, and this compares to a 10 percent global average for the sector. It's possible these numbers reflect persistent sales weakness, and AI driven cost cutting. Transportation was least affected at 3 percent, whilst other sectors clustered around 6 to 7 percent. If we look at the top quintile of European companies reducing headcount, they've outperformed other companies that are more actively hiring. This suggests that investors are rewarding efficiency. On the downside, staffing firms face potential growth risks from AI displacement. On productivity, European firms report 10 to 11 percent gains from AI, close to the 11.5 percent global average, and the U.S. at 10.8 percent. It's worth noting that whilst Europe lags the U.S. in exposure to AI enablers, adopters and adopter enablers make up more than two-thirds of the MSCI Europe Index. However, European AI adopters have traded at a material discount versus their equivalent U.S. AI adoption peers. So, turning AI adoption into real ROI and defending pricing power is crucial for European companies. If we shift our focus to the U.S., there's a contrast. Whilst the global net job change was a 4 percent loss, the U.S. actually saw a 2 percent net gain, driven by AI related hiring. Our U.S. strategists have lifted expectations for S&P 500 margin expansion by 40 basis points in 2026 and 60 basis points in 2027. In our survey, the most frequently cited goals of AI deployment in the U.S. are boosting productivity, personalizing customer interactions, and accelerating data insights. Other common use cases include search, content generation, dashboards, and virtual agents. What's becoming clear is AI is no longer theoretical. Our survey data suggests that it is reshaping hiring, productivity and margins. The investor question is not whether AI matters, but who captures the value. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Global Head of FX and EM Strategy James Lord and Global Chief Economist Seth Carpenter discuss what’s driving the U.S. policy for the dollar and the outlook for other global currencies.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----James Lord: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m James Lord, Global Head of FX and EM Strategy at Morgan Stanley. Seth Carpenter:  And I'm Seth Carpenter, Morgan Stanley's Global Chief Economist and Head of Macro Research. James Lord: Today we're talking about U.S. currency policy and whether recent news on intervention and nominations to the Fed change anything for the outlook of the dollar. It's Thursday, February 19th at 3pm in London. So it's been an interesting few weeks in currency markets. Plenty of dollar selling going on But then, we got  news that Kevin Warsh is going to be nominated to  Chair of the Board of Governors. And that sent the dollar back higher, reminding everybody that monetary policy and central bank policy still matter.    So, in the aftermath of the dollar-yen rate check, investors started to discuss whether or not the U.S. might be starting to target a weaker currency. Not just be comfortable with a weaker currency, but actually explicitly target a weaker currency, which would presumably be a shift away from the stronger strong dollar policy that Secretary Bessent referenced. So, what is your understanding? What do you think the strong dollar policy actually means? Seth Carpenter: Strong dollar policy,  that's a phrase, that's a term; it's a concept that lots of Secretaries of the Treasury have used for a long time. And I specifically point to the Secretary of the Treasury because at least in the recent couple of decades, there has been in  standard Washington D.C. approach to things, a strong dichotomy that currency policy is the policy of the Treasury Department, not of the central bank. And that's always been important. I remember when I was working at the Treasury Department, that was still part of the talking points that the secretary used. However, you also hear Secretaries of the Treasury say that exchange rates should be market determined; that that's a key part of it. And with the back and forth between the U.S. and China, for example, there was a lot of discussion: Was the Chinese government  adjusting or manipulating the value of their currency? And there was a push that currencies should be market determined. And so, if you think about those two things, at the same time – pushing really hard that the dollar should be strong, pushing really hard that currencies should be market determined – you start to very quickly run into a bit of an intellectual tension. And I think all of that is pretty intentional. What does it mean?  It means that there's no single clear definition of strong dollar policy. It's a little bit of the eye of the beholder. It's an acknowledgement that the dollar plays a clear key role in global markets, and it's good for the U.S. for that to happen. That's traditionally been what it means. But it has not meant a specific number relative to any other currency or any basket of currency. It has not meant a specific value based on some sort of long run theoretical fair value. It is always meant to be a very vague,  deliberately so, very vague concept. James Lord: So, in that version of what the strong dollar policy means,  presumably the sort of ambiguity still  leaves space for the Treasury to conduct some kind of intervention in dollar-yen, if they wanted to. And that would still be very much consistent with that definition of the strong dollar policy. I also, in the back of my head, always wonder whether the strong dollar policy has anything to do with the dollar's  global role. And the sort of foreign policy power that gives the Treasury in sanctions policy. And other areas where, you know, they can control dollar flows and so on. And that gives the U.S. government some leverage. And that allows them to project strength in foreign policy. Has that anything to do with the traditional versions of the strong policy?  Seth Carpenter: Absolutely. I think all of that is part and parcel to it. But it also helps to explain a little bit of why there's never going to be a very crisp, specific numerical definition of what a strong dollar policy is.So, first and foremost, I think the discussion of intervention; I think it is, in lots of ways, consistent, especially if you have that more expansive definition of strong dollar, i.e. the currency that's very important, or most important in global financial markets and in global trade. So, I think in that regard, you could have both the intervention and the strong dollar at the same time. I will add though that the administration has not had a clear, consistent view in this regard, in the following very specific sense. When now Governor Myron was chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, he penned a piece on the Council of Economics website that said that the reserve currency status of the dollar had brought with it some adverse effects on the U.S., and in terms of what happened in terms of trade flows and that sort of thing.So again, this administration has also tried to find ways to increase the nuance about what the currency policy is, and putting forward the idea that too strong of a dollar in the FX sense. In the sense that you and your colleagues in FX markets would think about is a high valuation of the dollar relative to other currencies – could have contributed to these trade deficits that they're trying to push back against. So, I would say we went from the previous broad, perhaps vague definition of strong dollar. And now we're in an even murkier regime where there could be other motivations for changing the value of the dollar. Seth Carpenter:  So, James, that's been our view in terms of the Fed, but let me come back to you because there are lots of different forces going on at the same time. The central bank is clearly an important one, but it's only one factor among many. So, if you think about where the dollar is likely to go over the next three months, over the next six months, maybe over the next year, what is it that you and your team are looking for? Where are the questions that you're getting from clients? James Lord: Yeah, so when we came into the start of this year, we did have a bearish view on the dollar. I would say that the drivers of it, we'd split up into two components. The first component was a lot more of the conventional stuff about growth expectations, what we see the Fed doing. And then there was another component to it where – what we defined as risk premia, I suppose. The more unconventional catalysts that can push the dollar around, as we saw, come very much to market attention during the second quarter of last year, when the Liberation Day tariffs were announced and the dollar weakened far in excess of what rate differentials would imply. And so, I would say so far this year, the majority of the dollar move that we've seen, the weakening in the dollar that we've seen, has been driven by that second component. What we've kind of called risk premia. And the conversations that, you know, investors have been having about U.S. policy towards Greenland, and then more recently, the conversations that people have been having around FX intervention following the dollar-yen rate check. These sorts of things have been really driving the currency up until , when the Kevin Warsh nomination was announced. When we look at the extent of the risk premia that we see in the dollar now, it is pretty close to the levels that we saw in the second quarter of last year, which is to say it's pretty big. Euro dollar would probably be closer to 1-10, if we were just thinking about the impact of rate differentials and none of this risk premia stuff over the past year had materialized. That's obviously a very big gap. And I think for now that gap probably isn't going to widen much further, particularly now that  market attention is much more focused on the impact that Kevin Warsh will have on markets and the dollar. We also have, you know, the ECB and the Bank of England;  , house call for those two central banks is for them to be cutting rates.    That could also put some downward pressure on those currencies, relative to the dollar. So all of that is to say for some of the major currencies within the G10 space, like sterling, like euro against the dollar, this probably isn't the time to be pushing a weaker dollar. But I think there are some other currencies which still have some opportunity in the short term, but also over the longer run as well. And that's really in emerging markets. So all of that is to say, I think there is a strong monetary policy anchor for emerging market currencies. This is an asset class that has been under invested in for some time. And we do think that there are more gains there in the short term and over the medium term as well. Seth Carpenter: So on that topic, James, would you then agree? So if I think about some of the EM central banks, think about Banxico, think about the BCB – where the dollar falling in value, their currency gaining in value – that could actually have a couple things go on to allow the central bank, maybe to ease more than they would've otherwise. One, in terms of imported inflation, their currency strengthening on a relative basis probably helps with a bit lower inflation. And secondly, a lot of EM central banks have to worry a bit about defending their currency, especially in a volatile geopolitical time. And you were pointing to sort of lower volatility more broadly. So is this a reinforcing trend perhaps, where if the dollar is coming down a little bit, especially against DM currencies, it allows more external stability for those central banks, allowing them to just focus on their domestic mandates, which could also lead to a further reduction in their domestic rates, which might be good for investors. Jame

More Americans are blaming the AI infrastructure expansion for rising electricity bills. Our Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore explains how the topic may influence policy announcements ahead of the midterm elections.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Ariana Salvatore: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research for Morgan Stanley. Today I'll be talking about the relationship between affordability, the data center buildout, and the midterm elections. It's Wednesday, February 18th at 10am in New York. Markets and voters continue to grapple with questions on AI, including its potential scope, impact, and disruption across industries. That's been a clear theme on the policy side as voters seem to be pushing back against AI development and data center buildout in particular. In key states, voters are associating the rise in electricity bills with AI infrastructure – and we think that could be an important read across for the midterm elections in November. Now to be sure, electricity inflation has stayed sticky at around four to 5 percent year-over- year, and our economists expect it to remain in that range through this year and next. Nationally the impact of data centers on electricity prices has been relatively modest so far, but regionally, the pressure has been more visible. To that point, a recent survey in Pennsylvania found that nearly twice as many respondents believe AI will hurt the economy as it will help. More than half – 55 percent – think AI is likely to take away jobs in their own industry, and 71 percent said they're concerned about how much electricity data centers consume. But this isn't just a Pennsylvania story. In other battleground states like Arizona and Michigan, voters have actually rejected plans to build new data centers locally. So, what could that mean for the midterm elections? Think back to the off-cycle elections in November of last year. Candidates who ran on this theme of affordability and actually pushed back against data center construction tended to do pretty well in their respective races. Looking ahead to the midterm elections later this year, we see two clear takeaways from a policy perspective. First, it's important to note that more of the policy action here will actually continue to be at the local rather than federal level. Some states with heavy data center build out – so Georgia, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas among others – are now debating who should pay for grid upgrades. Federal proposals on this topic are still pretty nascent and fragmented. Meanwhile, public utility commissions in states like Georgia, Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana have adopted or proposed large load tariffs. These require data centers to shoulder more upfront grid costs; or can reflect conditional charges like long-term contracts, minimum demand charges, exit fees or collateral requirements – all of which are designed to prevent costs from spilling over to households. And secondly, because of that limited federal action, we expect the Trump administration to continue leaning on other levers of affordability policy, where the president actually does have some more unilateral control. We've been expecting the administration to continue focusing on broader affordability areas ranging from housing to trade policy, as we've said on this podcast in the past. That dynamic is especially relevant this week as the Supreme Court could rule as soon as Friday on whether or not the president has the authority under IEEPA to impose the broad-based reciprocal tariffs. The administration thus far has been projecting a message of continuity. But we've noted that a decision that constrains that authority could give the president an opportunity to pursue a lighter touch tariff policy in response to the public's concerns around affordability. That's why we think the AI infrastructure buildout debate will continue to be a flashpoint into November, especially in the context of rising data center demand. Next week, when the president delivers his State of the Union address, we expect to hear plenty about not just affordability, but also AI leadership and competitiveness. But an equally important message will be around the administration's potential policy options to address its associated costs. That tension between AI supremacy and rising everyday costs for voters will be critical in shaping the electoral landscape into November. Thanks for listening. As a reminder, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen; and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Our Head of U.S. Internet Research Brian Nowak joins U.S. Small and Mid-Cap Internet Analyst Nathan Feather to explain why the future of agentic commerce is closer than you think.Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript -----Brian Nowak: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Brian Nowak, Morgan Stanley's Head of U.S. Internet ResearchNathan Feather: And I'm Nathan Feather, U.S. Small and Mid-Cap Internet Analyst.Brian Nowak: Today, how AI-powered shopping assistants are set to revolutionize the e-commerce experience.It's Tuesday, February 17th at 8am in New York.Nathan, let's talk a little bit about agentic commerce. When was the last time you reordered groceries? Or bought household packaged goods? Or compared prices for items you [b]ought online and said, ‘Boy, I wish there was an easier way to do this. I wish technology could solve this for me.’Nathan Feather: Yeah. Yesterday, about 24 hours ago.Brian Nowak: Well, our work on agentic commerce shows a lot of these capabilities could be [coming] sooner than a lot of people appreciate. We believe that agentic commerce could grow to be 10 to 20 percent of overall U.S. e-commerce by 2030, and potentially add 100 to 300 basis points of overall growth to e-commerce.There are certain categories of spend we think are going to be particularly large unlocks for agentic commerce. I mentioned grocery, I mentioned household essentials. We think these are some of the items that agentic commerce is really going to drive a further digitization of over the next five years.So maybe Nathan, let's start at the very top. Our work we did together shows that 40 to 50 percent of consumers in the U.S. already use different AI tools for product research, but only a mid single digit percentage of them are actually really starting their shopping journey or buying things today. What does that gap tell you about the agentic opportunity and some of the hurdles we have to overcome to close that gap from research to actual purchasing?Nathan Feather: Well, I think what it shows is that clearly there is demand from consumers for these products. We think agentic opens up both evolutionary and revolutionary ways to shop online for consumers. But at the moment, the tools aren't fully developed and the consumer behavior isn't yet there. And so, we think it'll take time for these tools to develop. But once they do, it's clear that the consumer use case is there and you'll start to see adoption.And building on that, Brian, on the large cap side, you've done a lot of work here on how the shopping funnel itself could evolve. Traditionally discovery has flowed through search, social or direct traffic. Now we're seeing agents begin to sit in the start of the funnel acting as the gatekeeper to the transaction. For the biggest platforms with massive reach, how meaningful is that shift?Brian Nowak: It is very meaningful. And I think that this agentic shift in how people research products, price compare products, purchase products, is going to lead to even more advertis[ing] and value creation opportunity for the big social media platforms, for the big video platforms. Because essentially these big platforms that have large corpuses of users, spending a lot of time on them are going to be more important than ever for companies that want to launch new products. Companies that want to introduce their products to new customers.People that want to start new businesses entirely, it's going to be harder to reach new potential customers in an agentic world. So, I think some of these leading social and reach based video platforms are going to go up in value and you'll see more spend on those for people to build awareness around new and existing products.On this point of the products, you know, our work shows that grocery and consumer packaged goods are probably going to be one of the largest category unlocks. You know, we already know that over 50 percent of incremental e-commerce growth in the U.S. is going to come from grocery and CPG. And we think agentic is going to be a similar dynamic where grocery and CPG is going to drive a lot of agentic spend.Why do you think that is? And sort of walk us through, what has to happen in your mind for people to really pivot and start using agents to shop for their weekly grocery basket?Nathan Feather: I think one of the key things about the grocery category is it's a very high friction category online. You have to go through and select each individual ingredient you want [in] the order, ensure that you have the right brand, the right number of units, and ensure that the substitutions – when somebody actually gets to the store – are correct.And so for a user, it just takes a substantial amount of time to build a basket for online grocery. We think agentic can change that by becoming your personal digital shopper. You can say something as simple as, ‘I want to make steak tacos for dinner.’ And it can add all of the ingredients you want to your order. Go from the grocery store you like. And hey, it'll know your preferences. It'll know you already like a certain brand of tortillas, and it'll add those to the cart. And so it just dramatically reduces the friction.Now, that will take time to build the tools. The tools aren't there today, but we think that can come sooner than people expect. Even over the next one to two years that you start to get this revolutionary grocery experience.And so, it's coming. And from your perspective, Brian, once agentic grocery shopping does start to work, how does that impact the broader e-commerce adoption curve? Does it pull forward agentic behavior in other categories as well?Brian Nowak: I think it does. I think it does lead to more durable multi-year, overall e-commerce growth. And potentially in some of our more bull case scenarios, we've built out – even an acceleration in e-commerce growth, even though the numbers and the dollars added are getting larger. But there is some tension around profitability.We are in a world where a lot of e-commerce companies, they generate an outsized percentage of their profit from advertising and retail media that is attached to current transactions. Agentic commerce and agents wedging themself between the consumer and these platforms potentially put some of these high-margin retail media ad dollars at risk.So talk us through some of the math that we've run on that potential risk to any of the companies that are feeding into these agents for people to shop through.Nathan Feather: Well, in our work for most e-commerce companies, a majority – or sometimes even all – of their e-commerce profitability comes from the advertising side. And so this is the key profit pool for e-commerce. To the extent that goes away, there is one potential offset here, which is the lower fee that agentic offers for companies that currently have high marketing spend. To the extent that agentic offers a lower take rate, that could be an offset.But we think it's going to be very important for companies to monitor the retail media landscape and ensure they can try to keep direct traffic as best as possible. And things like onsite agents could be really important to making sure you're staying top of mind and owning that customer relationship.Now, on the platform side, search today captures an implied take rates that are 5-10 times higher than what we're seeing in the early agentic transaction fees. If this model does shift from CPC – or cost per click – towards a more commission based model, Brian, how do you think search platforms respond?Brian Nowak: I think the punchline is the percentage of traffic and transactions that retailers or brands or companies selling their items online that's paid is going to go up. You know, while search is a relatively more expensive channel on a per transaction basis, search works because there's a very large amount of unpaid and direct traffic that retailers benefit from post the first time they spend on search.Just some math on this. We're still at a situation where 80 percent of retailers' online traffic is free. Or direct. And so if we do get into a situation where there's a transition from a higher monetizing per transaction search to a lower monetizing per transaction agent, I would expect the search platforms to react by essentially making it more challenging to get free and direct and unpaid traffic. And we'll have that transition from more transactions at a lower rate; as opposed to fewer transactions at a higher rate, which is what we have now,Nathan, in our work, we also talked about a Five I’s framework. We talked about inventory, infrastructure, innovation, incrementality and income statement, sort of a retailer framework to assess positioning within the agentic transition. Maybe walk us through what your big takeaways were from the Five I’s framework and what it means that retailers need to be mindful of throughout this agentic transition.Nathan Feather: Well, for retailers, I think it's going to be very important that you're winning by differentiation. Having unique, competitively priced inventory with infrastructure that can fulfill that quickly to the consumer and critically staying on the leading edge of innovation.It's one thing to have the inventory. It's another thing to be able to be actively plugged into these agentic tools and make sure you're developing good experiences for your customers that actually are on this cutting edge. In addition, it's one thing to have all of that, but you want to make sure there's also incrementality opportunity.So [the] ability to go out, expand the TAM and gain market share. And of course what we just talked about with the margin risk, I think all of those are going to be very important. And so on balance for retailers, we do see a lot of opportunity. That's balanced with a lot of risk. But this is one of those key transition moments that we think companies that really execute and perform well should be able to perform nicely.Now fi

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