Walden Pod

The core theory, weak and strong emergence, micro-reductionism, and Sean Carroll’s skeptical argument against everything. Is Dr. Carroll correct in holding that physics has ruled out the afterlife, the soul, fundamental consciousness, parapsychology, and other immaterialist claims?  Linktree  Sean Carroll speaking to the Freedom From Religion Foundation https://youtu.be/40eiycH077A?si=xgg4KC0JPYWnH0fU Philip Goff: Is physics different in the brain? https://www.youtube.com/live/wlyKdirhOa4?si=RRYXSUbW8As7sRLw Papers:  Carroll: Consciousness and the Laws of Physics (2021) https://philarchive.org/archive/CARCAT-33 Goff’s response to critics: https://philpapers.org/archive/GOFPCF.pdf The Quantum Field Theory on Which the Everyday World Supervenes (2021) https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.07884 Relevant blog posts from Carroll:  https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-world-of-everyday-experience-in-one-equation/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/23/the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-are-completely-understood/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/09/29/seriously-the-laws-underlying-the-physics-of-everyday-life-really-are-completely-understood/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2010/10/01/one-last-stab/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/07/18/the-effective-field-theory-of-everyday-life-revisited/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/ https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2008/02/18/telekinesis-and-quantum-field-theory/

I recently asked for your questions, and I posted my responses on YouTube here. We touch on compatibilism, NDEs, aliens, euthanasia, abortion, death anxiety as an atheist, idealism, incest, Islam, Mormonism, subjectivism, psychophysical harmony, and more. (For those listening via podcast, I left the introduction in to preserve the timestamps for those who want to skip around to different sections.) 00:00 Intro 00:46 Atheistic platonism? 01:22 Why are you gay? 01:30 Are you still a naturalist? 05:47 What kind of compatibilist are you? 09:41 If I settle your debt with PragerU, will you become a libertarian? 10:12 What’s your biggest gripe with physicalism? 12:42 On the abortion debate, when do you think personhood / full moral status begins? 17:22 Do twinks make better philosophers? 17:56 Are you agnostic about anything in philosophy? 19:37 Why are you such a sucker for spooky stuff? 30:49 Who makes those guitar transitions? 32:34 Favorite music? 34:30 Who are some of your favorite Eastern philosophers? 35:03 Which religion would you choose to be true? 40:54 Who are your favorite theist and atheist philosophers? 42:18 Arguing for dualism from mereological nihilism? 45:48 Euthanasia? 48:43 What are your thoughts on each general era of philosophy? 55:00 Thoughts on Jordan Peterson? 58:55 Have you looked into Islam? 1:03:57 Does your mother know you spend so much time talking to strangers on the internet? 1:04:04 What is your opinion on the resurrection? 1:08:23 The best argument against veganism? 1:21:18 What is the primary goal of adopting panpsychism? 1:23:20 Best defenses of objective morality? 1:24:34 How would aliens affect theism and atheism? 1:30:53 Are you a dualist or a physicalist? 1:31:31 Isn’t solipsism simpler than panpsychism? 1:33:37 Thoughts on idealism? 1:35:41 Which political system do you think is right? 1:39:34 Thoughts on metaethical naturalism? 1:41:52 Is incest wrong? 1:45:27 When will you have some Mormons back on your show? 1:46:34 Why atheist and not agnostic? Where can I find good philrel content? 1:49:54 Would necessitarianism defeat fine-tuning and psychophysical harmony? 1:57:38 Do you accept physical causal closure? 2:00:00 How do you explain psychophysical harmony? 2:02:34 Kant’s transcendental idealism and free will? 2:07:56 Are we obligated to refute false beliefs even if they’re meaningful? 2:13:01 Is there any profound nugget of wisdom that Christianity has first or exclusive ownership of? 2:15:17 Analytic/Continental divide? 2:18:05 “Emmerson” 2:19:03 Does the phenomenal powers view weaken psychophysical harmony? 2:22:04 Is time necessary for consciousness? 2:28:49 If you did reconvert, would you be a Christian or a generic theist? 2:32:20 Finite theism? 2:36:22 Top three philosophers who are wrong about everything? 2:37:57 Moral subjectivism with normally functioning humans as the (collective) observer(s) morality is stance-dependent upon? 2:48:52 Are you afraid of death? How do you cope with death anxiety as an atheist? Linktree

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states have no effect on anything. The feeling of pain, counterintuitively, does not cause your aversion, mentally or physically. Beliefs don’t cause behavior. None of our actions occur in virtue of our thoughts, feelings, or sensations. Inspired by Matthew Adelstein’s post defending epiphenomenalism, I want to explain my opposition to the view. A few times, he referenced a podcast episode / blog post of mine from 2020, which I hadn’t read since it was first posted. I found a few things to disagree with in my own episode, so I thought I’d respond to Matthew and try to offer an updated critique of epiphenomenalism in the process. While epiphenomenalism is probably less wrong than physicalism, the causal efficacy of our mental states is as evident as anything, so the view should still be rejected in favor of panpsychism or interactionist dualism. As Paul Draper once put it, “wild ideas are needed” to explain consciousness, but I don’t think epiphenomenalism is the right wild idea. After responding to a few key points from Matthew, I offer a few reasons to reject epiphenomenalism: Epiphenomenalism is self-defeating. The evidence that supports the causal influence of mental states is the exact same kind of evidence for causal influence in other cases. This not only supports mental causation, but also raises the threat of undermining the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the physical has causal powers. The phenomenal powers view as defended by Mørch (2017, 2020) is plausible and entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. In short, there are plausible examples of causal necessity in the mind. Among metaphysical theories of consciousness, epiphenomenalism is the most vulnerable to the problem of psychophysical harmony. Transcript YouTube Linktree

Here's my interview on Shannon Q's YouTube channel where we discuss dualism, panpsychism, personal identity, and other topics in the philosophy of mind!  Linktree 

Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to defend interactionist substance dualism, the view that the mind and body are composed of different substances and can exert causal influence over each other.  Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy  Linktree 

Wouldn’t aliens manage to avoid crashing their ships, given how advanced they’d have to be? Aren’t the distances between life-supporting planets too vast to feasibly travel? If figures in the government actually knew something, wouldn’t a cover-up involve too many people to keep the secret for long?  I’m joined by Jimmy Akin to answer ten common objections to UFO phenomena and alien visitations. In the wake of recent news stories about unidentified aerial phenomena, I heard the same skeptical talking points trotted out over and over again as if UFO believers had never considered them and had no response to them at all. So I’d like to play whatever small part I can in improving the quality of the discourse by advancing the conversation past the initial thoughts that are commonly offered into more interesting territory. This should make skeptics better skeptics, and help agnostics like myself better appreciate the skeptical position. Right now, the skeptics are not sending their best. Jimmy Akin's Mysterious World Linktree 

Today I’m speaking with Dr. Dale Allison, historian and author of Encountering Mystery: Religious Experience in a Secular Age. The subtitle of the book notwithstanding, the unusual experiences we discuss are not explicitly religious. They’re usually interpreted through a religious lens (often without any reflection), but almost all of them needn’t be, which is something we return to quite a bit. Flatly disputing the phenomenon is not the only option available to the nonreligious.  We talk about paranormal and parapsychological phenomena, and two major sources of skepticism towards things that fall into those categories. On the one hand, of course, there’s materialism, conservative naturalism, skepticism (as in, the skeptic community), etc. But Protestant Christianity, I was surprised to learn, has also been a skeptical force in history due to their drive to debunk Catholic miracle stories, or even just extraordinary events documented by the Catholic Church that explicitly or implicitly were used as evidence for Catholicism.  Since we’re exploring new terrain that involves some quite unusual topics (e.g., clairvoyance, levitation, visions of dead loved ones, etc.) there’s a lot more I want to say, even in this little description box, but I’ll save it for the interview.  One thing I forgot to mention during the interview: In addition to Dr. Allison’s book, there are a couple podcasts that regularly discuss cases like the ones that came up today in greater depth. “Otherworld” and “Jimmy Akin’s Mysterious World” come highly recommended from me.  Linktree 

Today, we discuss Agrippa's trilemma and look at our hands.  Epistemology Playlist  Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer Linktree 

Today, we discuss the idea that understanding a concept is not a matter of knowing a definition. As philosopher Michael Huemer argues, our main access to a concept comes “not through directly reflecting on the concept, but through activating the dispositions that constitute our understanding.”  The Wittgensteinian view of concepts explains how it’s possible that we know how to competently use terms even though it is so hard to successfully analyze them. I can’t provide a perfect conceptual analysis of knowledge (no one can), and yet I have no issue using the term and understanding what it means. Not only can I competently use words that I can’t analyze, I can reject proposed analyses as insufficient, like the justified true belief analysis. That’s because I understand the meaning of the concept, despite the fact that I can’t define it.  “Indefinability of words is perfectly normal," Huemer argues, "since understanding is not constituted by knowledge of definitions. The best way to convey a word’s meaning is through examples.”  Language & Meaning: Crash Course Philosophy Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer Linktree One note from Huemer on the Wittgensteinian view of concepts and the contrasting Lockean view: "I think what I have to say about concepts is like some stuff that Wittgenstein said, but I don’t actually care how well it matches Wittgenstein’s views. I also don’t care, by the way, whether the 'Lockean theory' matches Locke’s views. You have to add in caveats like this whenever you mention a major philosophical figure, because there are always people who have devoted their lives to studying that figure and who, if you let them, will give you all sorts of arguments that the famous philosopher has been completely misunderstood and never really said the things they’re famous for saying." 

What is knowledge? What does it mean to know something? Today, we discuss the defeasibility theory, which adds a fourth condition to the famous "justified true belief" analysis of knowledge. We also touch on Gettier cases, certainty, and what contemporary analytic philosophy is all about (the answer may surprise you!).  For even more epistemology, check out the new series on Counter Apologetics about mistakes atheists often make about epistemology.  Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer Linktree

We take a short break from our epistemology series to talk about the hypothesis of indifference, a limited God, natural teleology, pan-agentialism, and how value-orientation in the universe is not binary but rather comes on a continuum. For reference, Paul Draper (1989) characterizes the hypothesis of indifference as follows: “neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by non-human persons.”  If the audio sounds different than usual, that's because I recorded this as a video and edited it slightly differently as a result. You can watch the video on YouTube here  Check out the series on atheism and epistemology over on Counter Apologetics here Linktree 

This is part one of a series about epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge and justification. When does something count as knowledge? How can we be justified in accepting mathematical truths, moral truths, and truths about the external world? Can I trust my perceptual faculties, my memory, my ability to reason? Can I know anything at all?  Today, we're discussing internalism vs. externalism about knowledge and justification. We also touch on the person-based nature of justification, giving others the benefit of the doubt, and empathy on the epistemic landscape. Understanding Knowledge - Michael Huemer  Linktree 

Perspective Philosophy and I speak about metaethics, intervening in wild animal suffering, veganism, the toll of working in a slaughterhouse, ethical intuition, moral disagreement, and a few metaphysical questions about contingency and necessity.  Full interview here Linktree

“On panpsychism, how can there ever be unconsciousness, like in the case of dreamless sleep?” As far as objections go, this is a pretty weak one, but I decided to take the opportunity to talk about death, sleep, states of unconsciousness, and how panpsychists see the mind and its place in nature.  YouTube Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Transcript Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism linktr.ee/emersongreen

Philip Goff and Dustin Crummett debate psychophysical harmony, God, axiarchism, pan-agentialism, natural teleology, and explore some neglected terrain between theism and the hypothesis of indifference. What are our options in explaining the fine-tuning of consciousness?  Subscribe on YouTube Twitter @waldenpod @Philip_Goff @dustin_crummett Dustin's Channel Mind Chat Music by ichika Nito & Whalers. Used with permission. linktr.ee/emersongreen 

When did consciousness first evolve? If physicalism is true, we’d expect it to have evolved gradually, just as other complex biological phenomena evolved gradually. But the transition from feeling nothing to feeling something couldn’t have been gradual. No matter how minimal a conscious experience is, if it’s “like something” to exist – anything at all – it’s not like nothing at all. On reflection it seems hard to imagine anything other than a sharp border between non-experiential reality and experiential reality. On the other hand, complex physical states are not sharp: they admit borderline cases. If we remove one atom at a time from a given brain state, it will eventually be vague or indeterminate whether or not the organism is still in that physical brain state. So if consciousness is just a kind of physical state, we’d expect consciousness to follow suit. Since it seems impossible that there could be a borderline case of consciousness – it’s either like something for a creature or like nothing – we have reason to think that physicalism is false.  Michael Tye - Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness David Papineau’s review of Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness in NDPR Nino Kadic - Phenomenology of Fundamental Reality YouTube Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Support at patreon.com/counter or patreon.com/waldenpod  Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Transcript  Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism linktr.ee/emersongreen / timestamps / 00:00 The vagueness argument 04:18 Which creatures are conscious? 06:18 The sharpness of consciousness 10:09 The vagueness of biological phenomena 12:41 The sharpness of consciousness (cont.) 20:14 Weak emergence 21:42 The advantage of vagueness arguments

In many ways, I'm the ideal audience for apologists of capital punishment. I believe in free will, I think human beings are responsible for their actions, I’m not opposed to retribution in all cases, I believe there are virtuous qualities to revenge, and I think some people deserve to die. However, none of that is enough to justify the death penalty system.  First, arguing that some people deserve to die is not sufficient to show that any particular institution (e.g. the state) should have the power and legitimacy to carry out executions. Second, capital punishment is not reconcilable with the principle of remedy: when mistakes are inevitably made, the punishment for the wrongly convicted cannot be brought to an end and they cannot be given damages. Third, the application of the death penalty will inevitably be morally arbitrary in some cases – either due to the morally arbitrary nature of the laws themselves, the enforcement of the law, or the imperfect determination of guilt. Since this is unavoidable, we cannot have the death penalty without murdering innocents. And since saving innocent life is far more important than ending the lives of the guilty, this should dissuade us from maintaining a death-penalty system. Finally, the virtuous qualities of revenge are absent in the death penalty system. linktr.ee/emersongreen Support at patreon.com/waldenpod & patreon.com/counter YouTube Transcript Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Twitter @waldenpod

linktr.ee/emersongreen Subscribe on YouTube Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Full interview on the Sentientism podcast Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

linktr.ee/emersongreen Subscribe on YouTube Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here Listen to our sister show, Counter Apologetics here Music by ichika Nito and used with permission. Full interview on the Sentientism podcast Twitter @waldenpod @OnPanpsychism

Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy.  Ethical Intuitionism  Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy  William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg  Linktree / The Five Metaethical Positions /  Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions. Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false. Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it. Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically. Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively. / Timestamps / 00:00 Introduction 01:05 Objective vs. Subjective 06:45 Five Metaethical Views 36:45 Fictionalism 50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism 1:15:00 Moral Disagreement 1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism 1:41:00 Companions in Innocence 1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 2:00:00 Huemer’s soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan