Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

After the Mishna discusses which kohanim are entitled to portions of sacrificial meat, Reish Lakish derives from the verse "the kohen who offers it shall eat it" that only those who perform the service may partake, excluding a tvul yom and mechusar kipurim. The Gemara challenges this, noting that priests on weekly rotation receive a share even if they did not offer that sacrifice, and that minors also eat despite being unfit for service. The verse is therefore reinterpreted to mean that those "fit for service" may receive a portion, though others, such as children, may still partake in eating. This raises a difficulty regarding blemished priests, who are unfit for offering yet still receive a share. To resolve this, the verse "all male kohanim" is understood to include them, and the Gemara analyzes why a tvul yom is excluded while a blemished priest is included. Reish Lakish further asks whether a blemished kohen who is also impure may receive a portion. Raba cites the case of the kohen gadol who, while an onen (mourner on the day of a relative's death), works in the Temple but cannot eat, and does not receive a share to eat later - showing that eligibility requires fitness for eating. Rav Oshaya raises a similar question about a kohen who is impure in a situation where impurity is permitted for communal offerings, and Ravina responds with the same proof from the kohen gadol, again affirming that fitness for eating is required. The Mishna states that an onen may touch sacred items, which contradicts a Mishna in Chagiga 21a requiring immersion for sacrificial items (kodashim). Three resolutions are offered: first, that our Mishna refers to before immersion, though this is rejected since immersion does not remove aninut; second, distinguishing between one who was careful to avoid impurity that conveys tumah but not impurity that disqualifies, versus one who was careful in all respects; and third, that our Mishna refers to touching, while Chagiga refers to eating. A source is brought to prove that there could be situations where one is careful about one type of impurity and not another, a distinction that carries halakhic consequences. Since the Mishna rules that an onen does not receive a share, it seems to imply that he may nevertheless eat sacrificial meat. Yet this conflicts with Pesachim 91b, which teaches that an onen may immerse and eat the Passover sacrifice at night but not other offerings. The resolution distinguishes between Passover, where eating is permitted due to its unique requirements, and other sacrifices throughout the year. This leads to mention of a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over whether nighttime aninut is biblical or rabbinic, since the permission for the onen to eat the Passover sacrifice rests on Rabbi Shimon's view that it is rabbinic. However, a braita suggests that Rabbi Shimon holds aninut at night to be a Torah law. Two possible resolutions are offered to reconcile this apparent contradiction.  

If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the resulting food assumes the status of the more stringent offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. Although this law is presented in the context of the sin offering, a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 7:37 which juxtaposes various types of offerings, teaches that this principle applies to all sacrifices. Each offering mentioned in that verse serves to transmit a particular law to the others. A braita quoted in the name of Rabbi Akiva derives the law of foods cooked together from the word 'mincha' in that verse, since the same rule appears in the context of the meal offerings in Vayikra 6:11. The sin offering in the verse, however, is used to teach other laws. While the braita derives three laws from the sin offering - that it cannot be purchased with second tithe money, must be offered during the day, and that all actions must be performed with the right hand - the Gemara limits this to two, and possibly even to one, since the other laws are taught explicitly regarding different offerings. Rava raises two questions concerning blood on a garment: one about the Temple laws of laundering blood from a sin offering, and the other about chatzitza (interposition) in the mikveh. He resolves the first question, but the second remains unanswered. The Mishna lists cases where kohanim do not receive a portion of the meat. If they are unable to perform the sacrifice due to impurity or similar disqualifications, they cannot receive a share. However, blemished kohanim, though not permitted to sacrifice the sacrifices, but are nevertheless entitled to receive a portion of the meat.  

Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa of metal utensils that were used for cooking sacrificial meat are necessary daily during the holidays, or whether on the holidays one also needs to perform it only after the holiday ends. What is the basis of Rabbi Tarfon's position to be lenient on the holiday? The time for performing merika and shetifa is after the time for eating the sacrifice has passed. From where is this derived? Rebbi and the Rabbis disagree about whether merika and shetifa are both done with cold water, or whether merika is with hot water and shetifa with cold. Even according to Rebbi, who holds that both are with cold water, one would still be required beforehand to boil the pot with hot water to remove the taste of the meat that has now become notar, left beyond the time the sacrifice can be eaten. If mixtures of an offering are cooked together with those of another offering of a different status, or with non-sacred food, the food takes on the status of the more severe offering, as stated in Vayikra 6:20. This law is only applicable if flavor is imparted. The details of this law are analyzed. A question is asked: why does the positive commandment to eat sacrificial meat not override the negative commandment not to eat disqualified meat? Rava answers that this principle does not apply in the Temple. Rav Ashi answers that there is both a negative and a positive commandment not to eat the meat, which is why the positive commandment to eat it does not override. The verse relating to this law is mentioned in the context of the sin offering. From the verse in Vayikra 7:37, which mentions various different offerings, the sages learned that the laws of each type apply to all the other types as well. From the sin offering in that verse, they derive that this law applies to all sacrifices. What is derived from the other words in that verse?   

The Gemara raises two difficulties with the conclusion that earthenware vessels can be koshered by placing fire inside them. First, why does the Torah command that earthenware vessels in which sanctified meat was cooked must be broken, if they could simply be put into a kiln? The answer given is that kilns could not be used in Jerusalem, as they would blacken the walls and mar the beauty of the city. Second, why were the Temple ovens made of metal if earthenware ovens could have been used and koshered? The assumption behind this question is flawed, since the ovens needed to serve as a sanctified vessel in certain cases (such as the two loaves on Shavuot and the showbread), and sanctified vessels cannot be made of earthenware. Rav Yitzchak bar Yehuda left the study hall of Rami bar Hama and joined that of Rav Sheshet. Rami bar Hama was offended, assuming Rav Yitzchak sought greater honor. Rav Yitzchak explained that he had not received satisfactory answers from Rami bar Hama, who relied on logical reasoning rather than tannaitic sources. Rami bar Hama challenged Rav Yitzchak to send him a question, promising to answer with a tannaitic source. Rav Yitzchak asked about merika and shtifa (scouring and rinsing) of a vessel in which only part was used for cooking sacrificial items: does the entire vessel require cleansing, or only the part that was used? Rami bar Hama answered logically that only the part used requires cleansing, as in the case of blood on clothing. Rav Yitzchak rejected this reasoning and cited a braita proving the opposite, thereby refuting Rami bar Hama completely. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about whether the requirement of merika and shtifa applies to both kodshei kodashim and kodashim kalim, or only to kodshei kodashim. From where do they derive this distinction? They both agree that merika and shtifa do not apply to truma. The Gemara raises a challenge to this from a braita, and three answers are offered.

The same issue raised on the previous page regarding laundering vessels removed from the Azara is now applied to breaking earthenware vessels and performing merika (scrubbing) and shetifa (rinsing) of metal vessels. If these vessels are punctured and lose their status as valid utensils, how can the mitzva of breaking or cleaning them be fulfilled? Reish Lakish teaches how to handle a priestly garment that becomes impure, since it cannot be torn. Rav Adda bar Ahava challenges his suggestion, but the Gemara resolves the difficulty. The Gemara raises a difficulty with the obligation of laundering: how can blood be laundered in the Azara if Rav Nachman, quoting Raba bar Avuha, rules that blood of a sin offering and stains from nega'im require cleansing with the seven prescribed detergents, one of which is urine? According to a braita, urine may not be brought into the Temple. The resolution is to bring the urine mixed with saliva (rok tafel). The Mishna teaches that vessels in which sacrificial meat was cooked, or into which boiling liquid was poured, require merika and shetifa, whether from kodashei kodashim or kodashim kalim. Rabbi Shimon disagrees, exempting kodashim kalim from this requirement. A braita explains that the words in the verse in Vayikra 6:21, "that which was cooked in it," extend the law to include pouring boiling liquid into a vessel. Rami bar Chama raises the question of whether meat suspended in the air of the oven counts as cooking for the purposes of requiring breaking the oven. Rava brings a source to answer this question, but it is rejected. A statement of Rav Nachman in the name of Raba bar Avuha is also cited to answer the question, but it too is rejected. A practical case is cited where an oven was plastered with fat, and Raba bar Ahilai forbade eating bread baked in it forever, lest one come to eat it with dairy dip (kutach). This ruling is challenged by a braita that prohibits kneading dough with milk or plastering an oven with fat, but allows use once the oven is reheated (as koshering removes the flavor). Raba bar Ahilai's ruling is therefore rejected. Ravina asks Rav Ashi why, if Raba bar Ahilai was refuted, Rav ruled that pots on Pesach must be broken. Rav Ashi explains that Rav understood the braita to be referring to metal vessels. Alternatively, one can distinguish between earthenware ovens, whose heat is on the inside (so koshering works), and earthenware pots, which are heated from the outside and cannot be properly koshered.

Study Guide The Gemara examines the debate between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda regarding whether leather garments stained with blood from a sin offering require laundering. A braita cites verses in the Torah as the source for each position, with the disagreement hinging on how to interpret the term "beged." Rabbi Yehuda understands "beged" to include any material potentially capable of receiving impurity, while according to Rabbi Elazar it includes sackcloth and other types of clothing that are actually susceptible to impurity. Abaye and Rava identify three practical differences that emerge from their interpretations. Another braita establishes that only the specific area of a garment where blood lands requires laundering, not the entire garment. The Gemara then derives from the Mishna that hides are subject to laundering, but cites a conflicting source related to Shabbat observance, which rules that rinsing a hide with water is not considered laundering. Abaye resolves the contradiction by attributing one view to the Rabbis and the other to "others," who include hides in laundering. Rava challenges this, citing verses that explicitly mention leather, and concludes that the distinction lies between soft and hard hides. After raising two difficulties with his own explanation, Rava proposes a third approach: differentiating between scrubbing, which constitutes laundering, and merely pouring or soaking with water, which does not. The Gemara then cites a braita deriving from verses that laundering, breaking earthenware vessels, and rinsing copper vessels must all be performed in the Azara. The Mishna rules that laundering is the only stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other offerings, though the Gemara questions this in light of other possible stringencies. The Mishna further teaches that if a garment with blood, an earthenware vessel, or a copper vessel in which meat was cooked leaves the Azara and becomes impure, the impurity must first be removed - by tearing, making a hole, or otherwise invalidating the vessel - and then the item is returned to the Azara to be laundered, broken, or rinsed. Ravina challenges the ruling that an impure garment is torn outside and then laundered inside: if tearing removes its status as a garment, how can the obligation to launder be fulfilled? The Gemara clarifies that the case refers to tearing along the length without splitting it into two pieces, which is sufficient to remove impurity while still leaving it with the status of a garment for laundering.    

Study Guide Rami bar Hama asks Rav Chisda whether blood that splashes onto a garment already impure requires laundering. Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua explains that the question hinges on whether laundering is unnecessary only when impurity and disqualification occur sequentially, or even when they occur simultaneously. Rav Chisda connects the issue to a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis regarding the status of mei chatat that became impure, as interpreted by Abaye. To clarify Abaye's understanding, the Gemara presents a broader disagreement among Raba, Abaye, and Rava about the nature of the disagreement between Rabbi Elazar and the rabbis. A braita teaches that only blood fit for sprinkling requires laundering, excluding blood already disqualified. Rabbi Akiva rules that blood which had a moment of fitness and was later disqualified does require laundering, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that disqualified blood never requires it. The Mishna rules that blood splashed from the neck of the animal, or from the altar's corner or base, does not require laundering, nor does blood spilled on the floor and later gathered, since only blood received in a vessel and fit for sprinkling requires laundering. Two braitot are cited to demonstrate how these laws are derived from verses in the Torah. The Gemara further clarifies that the requirement of being "capable of sprinkling" excludes cases where less than the requisite measure was received in each vessel. Rava explains that this principle is rooted in a drasha on the verse in Vayikra 4:6. After presenting several drashot on the different words of that verse, the Gemara analyzes them both in relation to one another - explaining why each was necessary - and in relation to other statements. The Mishna continues with blood splashed on the hide: before flaying it does not require laundering, but after flaying it does. Rabbi Elazar limits laundering to the place of the blood and only where the material is susceptible to impurity. A braita extends laundering obligations to garments, sackcloth, and hides, and specifies that laundering, breaking of earthenware vessels, and rinsing of copper vessels must all be performed in a sacred place. Laundering is a stringency unique to the sin offering compared to other kodshei kodashim.

Shmuel holds that, according to Rabbi Akiva, wine may be brought as a voluntary offering, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, a braita records that Rabbi Akiva maintained the wine was poured into cups at the top of the altar, which raises a difficulty for Shmuel's position. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon, while the braita reflects Rabbi Yehuda's view regarding whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome (davar sh'aino mitkaven). In this case, pouring wine on the altar partially extinguishes the fire, which is forbidden by Torah law, though the intention is not to extinguish it. A further difficulty is raised: Shmuel himself rules like Rabbi Yehuda in prohibiting extinguishing a wood coal found in the public domain. This is resolved by distinguishing between the two cases. Shmuel aligns with Rabbi Shimon regarding davar she'eino mitkaven (an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibited action), but with Rabbi Yehuda regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa (performing a forbidden action not for its typical purpose). If the blood of a sin offering is sprinkled on a garment before the blood is presented on the altar, that garment requires laundering in the Azara. This applies both to sin offerings brought on the outer altar and those brought on the inner altar, but not to bird sin offerings. This distinction is derived from a drasha on Vayikra 6:18, which both expands and limits the law. Why are bird offerings excluded while inner sin offerings are included? Three answers are given. Two questions were asked about bird sin offerings. The answer to the second was supplied from a braita related to this topic, but ultimately both questions remain unresolved. Levi asked whether blood that transferred from one garment to another also requires laundering. Rebbi answers that it does and explains the reasoning.  

If one sacrifice is more frequent (tadir), but another is more sanctified, which takes precedence? Three cases are brought from the first Mishna of the chapter (Zevachim 89) to prove that frequency takes precedence, but each is rejected in the same manner. A Mishna relating to the order of blessings in kiddush and a statement of Rabbi Yochanan are also cited to support the principle of frequency, but these too are rejected. Finally, an inference is drawn from the Mishna in Zevachim 90, which implies that if a peace offering and a guilt or sin offering were before the kohen, and both were from that day, the guilt or sin offering would take precedence - even though peace offerings are more common. To reject this proof, Rava distinguishes between "frequent" and "common." Rav Huna challenges Rava's distinction from a source about brit mila and Pesach, where brit mila is considered tadir. His difficulty, however, is resolved in two possible ways. Another question arises: if a less frequent sacrifice is slaughtered first and then they realize their error, should someone mix the blood (to prevent coagulation) while the more frequent sacrifice is offered first, or should they complete the one already begun? Four sources are brought to address this issue (three of which were also cited earlier), but all attempts are rejected. In the Mishna, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Tarfon disagree about whether oil can be offered in the Temple as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Tarfon, who permits it, only a kmitza (handful) is burned on the altar, while the remainder is given to the kohanim to eat. Rabbi Zeira supports Shmuel's view from the Mishna, while Abaye presents an alternative opinion: that a voluntary oil offering is burned in its entirety, also citing proof from the Mishna. A Tosefta raises a difficulty for Shmuel, but it is resolved. The Gemara then suggests that this is a tannaitic debate; after an attempt to refute the suggestion, it is upheld. Regarding wine, there is likewise a debate about whether it can be brought as a voluntary offering. Shmuel explains that according to Rabbi Akiva, it may be offered, with the wine sprinkled on the altar. However, this raises the issue of partially extinguishing the altar's fire, which is forbidden by Torah law. Others maintain that the wine is poured into the cups at the top of the altar. The Gemara concludes that this debate parallels the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda (usually in the context of melacha on Shabbat) about whether one is liable for an act intended for one purpose that incidentally results in a prohibition - even when one has no interest in the prohibited outcome.

Ravina bar Shila holds that the imurim, parts of kodashim kalim designated for burning, that are taken out of the Azara before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. The Gemara explores whether this aligns with a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, but Rav Papa clarifies that their disagreement pertains to a different case. The Gemara examines the order of precedence in the Mishna, which places bird offerings before meal offerings, and sin-related meal offerings before voluntary ones. Although one could argue for reversing the order, the Mishna's reasoning is deemed stronger and thus upheld. A sin offering, even of a bird, takes precedence over any burnt offering, even of an animal. This hierarchy is supported by three verses addressing different scenarios. Although three tannaitic sources appear to challenge this principle, the Gemara resolves these contradictions. Sin offerings also precede guilt offerings, except the guilt offering for a metzora (leper), because it comes to purify the leper. This offering, along with the guilt offering of a nazir, differs from other guilt offerings in two distinct ways. The order of precedence for sacrifices also applies to the consumption of their meat. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir disagree about whether spices of teruma may be added when cooking sacrificial meat. Rabbi Shimon permits it, while Rabbi Meir prohibits it due to the risk of disqualifying the teruma, which would then require burning.  

Study Guide There are two general principles employed by the Mishna to determine the order of precedence among sacrifices: A sacrifice offered more frequently takes priority. A sacrifice of greater sanctity takes priority. The Mishna elaborates on which sacrifices are considered more frequent and which are deemed more sanctified. In its discussion of sanctity, it emphasizes the unique attributes of each type of sacrifice and provides examples illustrating the precedence of one sacrifice over another. However, certain situations are not explicitly addressed, and the Gemara raises questions about the law in those cases, attempting to infer the answers from the Mishna's examples. The Gemara further examines each ruling of precedence in the Mishna, suggesting that the order could, in fact, be reversed. In every instance, the Gemara explains why the Mishna chose its particular order and not the alternative.

The Gemara makes one final attempt to answer the question of whether the airspace of the altar can sanctify disqualified items just as the altar does. The attempt is rejected. The Mishna teaches that liquid sacred vessels sanctify liquids, and vessels used for dry ingredients sanctify dry items. Liquid vessels cannot sanctify dry items, nor vice versa. If sacred vessels are punctured, they only sanctify if they can still perform their original function and remain whole. All sanctification occurs only within the Azara. Shmuel limits the first ruling of the Mishna to measuring utensils, but bowls and similar items can sanctify even dry ingredients. His proof is a verse regarding flour mixed with oil that was placed into a bowl generally used for liquids (Bamidbar 7:13). Rav Acha questions this proof since flour mixed with oil is not exactly a solid, and Shmuel provides two possible answers. Shmuel further rules that sacred vessels sanctify only when they are whole, filled with the entire amount needed for the offering, and can only sanctify items from within. Variants of this teaching differ slightly, as one version reads "from inside the Azara" instead of "from within the vessel" and another includes both. The difference between two of these versions is whether overflow is sanctified. Rabbi Yohanan qualifies the ruling that if there is not a complete amount, the item inside will not be sanctified. He explains that this applies only when there was no intent to reach the full amount, but if one intends to add enough to reach the requisite measure, each portion becomes sanctified as it is placed inside. A braita is brought to support this. Rav or Rav Asi qualifies the Mishna's ruling that dry vessels do not sanctify liquids and vice versa. This applies to sanctification for offering on the altar, but they are sanctified to the extent that the contents can become disqualified. Some say his statement was made regarding a different braita about meal offerings brought from orla and diverse kinds. A braita teaches that damaged sacred vessels cannot be repaired by melting or patching. Similarly, knives with defects cannot be sharpened to remove the blemish, and if a blade slips out, it cannot be reattached. This ruling reflects the principle that there is "no poverty in a place of affluence," referring to the Temple as a place of affluence. Abba Shaul recalls a defective knife in the Temple that was buried so that is would not be used. Another braita, based on the same principle, explains that the clothes of the kohanim must be woven, not stitched, and if they become soiled, they cannot be washed with cleaning agents such as natron or soap. Abaye clarifies that they can be laundered if only mildly dirty, but if cleaning them would require agents, they cannot be cleaned even with water alone. Some say they may never be washed at all. A braita describes the kohen gadol's robe as entirely blue, with hem decorations resembling unopened pomegranates and children's buttons. Bells were attached, either seventy‑two in total or thirty‑six according to differing opinions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson notes that this dispute parallels disagreements about the number of shades in leprous afflictions. Rabbi Anani bar Sasson explains that the Torah juxtaposes sacrifices with priestly garments to teach that just as sacrifices atone, so too do the garments. Each garment corresponds to atonement for a specific sin: the tunic for murder, the pants for sexual immorality, the turban for arrogance, the belt for improper thoughts, the breastplate for judicial errors, the ephod for idolatry, the robe for lashon hara, and the tzitz for brazenness. The Gemara raises a difficulty from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who taught that murder and lashon hara have no atonement through sacrifices, only through other means - egla arufa for murder and ketoret, incense, for slander. The difficulty is resolved by distinguishing between situations: when the murderer is known, the tunic atones; when unknown, the egla arufa atones. Regarding lashon hara, they distinguish between public lashon hara, which is atoned by the robe with its bells, and private lashon hara, atoned by the ketoret, which is offered in the sanctuary, a private space.

  Raba and Rav Chisda disagree on two issues. If items were not completely consumed on the altar, removed before midnight, and returned after midnight, at what point are they considered "consumed" such that they no longer need to be put back on the altar if removed again (assuming they have not yet turned to ash, in which case they would not need to be returned)? Raba rules that they are considered consumed at midnight of the following night, while Rav Chisda holds that the cutoff is dawn. If the items were not returned until after dawn, Raba still maintains that midnight of the next night renders them consumed, whereas Rav Chisda insists they can never be rendered consumed. Rav Yosef challenges the premise of both opinions, which assume that items not on the altar at midnight cannot be rendered consumed. He argues instead that midnight itself renders all items consumed, even if they were removed before midnight and not yet returned to the altar. Rava asked Raba: If items remain at the top of the altar all night, does that prevent them from becoming disqualified through lina (remaining overnight)? Raba answered that they are not disqualified, but Rava did not accept this response. A braita is cited, providing a source in the Torah that the ramp and sanctified vessels also sanctify disqualified items. If such items are placed on the ramp or the altar, they do not need to be removed. Reish Lakish posed a question to Rabbi Yochanan regarding disqualified items placed in sanctified vessels. Initially, Rabbi Yochanan thought the question was whether they were sanctified to the extent that they could not be redeemed. Reish Lakish clarified that he was asking whether items placed in sanctified vessels could be brought ab initio on the altar. Rabbi Yochanan answered yes, based on the Mishna, but this answer was rejected since the Mishna could be read differently. The Gemara then asks: Does the airspace of the altar sanctify items? At first, it attempts to prove that the airspace does sanctify from the Mishna's statement: "Just as the altar sanctifies, so does the ramp." Items sanctified by the ramp must be carried through the altar's airspace to reach it. If the airspace does not sanctify, then carrying them would be akin to removing them, and once removed, they could not be returned. However, this proof is rejected, since it is possible to bring them to the altar by dragging rather than lifting. Rava bar Rav Chanan then attempts to prove the opposite from the case of a bird burnt offering brought at the top of the altar. If the airspace sanctifies, then there could be no case of pigul (disqualification due to improper intent), because as long as the offering remains on the altar, it could be sacrificed even the next day. Thus, a thought to offer it the next day would not constitute pigul. Rav Shimi rejects this argument, explaining that one could still have a pigul thought to remove the offering and then put it back on the altar the next day, which would indeed be disqualifying.

  According to the Mishna, in a burnt offering, items that are connected to the meat but not the meat itself—such as bones, hooves, horns, and sinews—are left on the altar if they remain attached to the meat. However, if they are detached, they must be removed from the altar. This ruling is derived from two different verses in the Torah: in Vayikra 1:9 it says that everything is burned on the altar, while in Devarim 12:27 it specifies that in burnt offerings, meat and blood are brought on the altar. This opinion in the Mishna is attributed to Rebbi, while another tannaitic view interprets "everything" more broadly to include these parts, with the limiting verse excluding bones, sinews, etc. only once they have already been consumed by the fire and separated from it. Rabbi Zeira qualifies Rebbi's opinion, explaining that if these parts became separated from the meat but moved closer to the pyre, they are to remain on the altar. The Gemara rejects this explanation, and Rabba offers a different interpretation of Rabbi Zeira's qualification. He explains that the qualification was not on Rebbi's words themselves but on an inference drawn from them—that if they separate, they must be removed from the altar, though they still retain sanctity and cannot be used for personal benefit. Rabba then distinguishes between items that separated before the blood was placed on the altar and those that separated afterward. If they were still attached at the time of the blood sprinkling and later separated, they are considered sanctified items that became disqualified, which are forbidden for benefit. But if they were already detached at the time of sprinkling, they were never destined for the altar and are therefore permitted for the kohanim's use, as derived from a gezeira shava from the guilt offering. Rabbi Elazar takes the opposite approach. If they were still attached when the blood was sprinkled, the sprinkling permits them, so there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property, though they remain prohibited by rabbinic law. However, if they were already detached, the sprinkling has no effect on them, and they remain in their original consecrated state, making one liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Mishna further explains that if any of the disqualified offerings that are meant to remain on the altar (as mentioned in Zevachim 84a) fall off the altar, or if an ember of wood falls off, they do not need to be returned. The Mishna also rules that if parts of the sacrifice that are to be burned on the altar fall off, they must be put back on if this occurs before midnight. After midnight, however, they do not need to be returned. The Gemara limits this ruling to items that have hardened but not yet reduced to ash. Items not yet consumed to that state must be returned regardless of the time, while items already reduced to ash do not need to be returned. Rav brings a source for the significance of midnight in this law from a drasha on the verses in Vayikra 6:2–3. Rav Kahana raises a difficulty on this braita from a Mishna in Yoma 20a, and Rabbi Yochanan brings a different drasha to explain the Mishna.

Rabbi Yochanan rules that one who slaughters an animal at night and offers it outside the Azara is liable for bringing an offering outside the Temple. This is despite the general principle that one is only liable for offering outside if the slaughtering was performed in a mostly valid manner. Rabbi Yochanan reasons that this case is no worse than one who slaughters outside and offers outside, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if one slaughters at night and places the offering on the altar, it must be removed. Rav Chiya bar Avin raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan's comparison, citing the case of slaughtering a bird inside the Azara. Some understand this as an unresolved challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, while others distinguish between slaughtering a bird inside and slaughtering an animal outside: the act of slaughtering a bird in the Temple is completely invalid, since melika rather than slaughter is required. Ulla rules that the imurim (the fatty parts burned on the altar) of kodashim kalim that were placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled remain there, even though they are only sanctified after the blood is applied. Rabbi Zeira attempts to prove Ulla's ruling from a braita in Zevachim 84a, where the blood spilled and could no longer be placed on the altar. If in that case the imurim remain on the altar, all the more so in Ulla's case, when the blood could still be applied. His proof, however, is rejected: perhaps the braita there refers only to kodashei kodashim, which are sanctified before the blood is applied. A difficulty is raised against this rejection, but it is resolved. A further attempt to support Ulla comes from an inference in the Mishna from the sentence that live animals are taken down from the altar. One might infer that if they were slaughtered, the imurim would remain - even for kodashim kalim. This inference is rejected, and the Gemara explains that the case teaches about a blemished animal with an eye defect. Even according to Rabbi Akiva, who permits such a blemish if the animal has already been brought on the altar, here, since the animal is still alive, it must be removed. Two difficulties are raised against the assumption that the Mishna refers to disqualified animals, but both are resolved. There are two versions of a question posed by Rabbi Yochanan, related to Ulla's case of imurim placed on the altar before the blood was sprinkled. Rabbi Yochanan further limits Rabbi Akiva's leniency regarding blemished animals already on the altar to minor blemishes - those that do not constitute disqualifications in birds.

Study Guide In the dispute among the five Tannaim regarding which items remain on the altar even if they have become invalid, Reish Lakish points out cases where there is a practical halakhic difference between the various opinions. According to the Gemara, his novelty lies in one specific case, where he wanted to emphasize that Rabbi Shimon still maintains his position in a case of libations that accompany the sacrifice but were not brought on the same day the sacrifice was offered. There is also a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding which types of disqualifications fall under the rule of "if they have ascended [the altar], they do not descend." The Gemara cites a braita that explains the textual basis for their respective opinions.

Study Guide Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim - is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in? Or taken out and brought to the altar and then back to the parochet?   Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding sacrifices whose blood is brought into the Sanctuary. Is the offering disqualified merely by the act of bringing the blood inside, or only if the blood is actually presented on the altar? The Gemara cites sources for each opinion and explains the underlying basis of their debate. Rabbi Yehuda rules that blood brought into the Sanctuary accidentally is exempt from disqualification. But what would he say if the blood was brought in intentionally, would it be disqualified only if it was presented? Rabbi Yirmia introduces a braita to address this question. Items that are disqualified are not meant to be placed on the altar. Yet if they are placed there, the altar sanctifies them and they must remain. However, there is a tannaitic dispute regarding which types of items are not removed once placed on the altar. Five different opinions are presented, and the Gemara explores the reasoning behind each of these views and why they disagree.

Study Guide There are varying opinions on several issues relating to blood that is meant to be brought on the outer altar but becomes disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. From what verse is this derived? Does it apply to all sacrifices, or only to sin offerings? And does it apply only if one actually sprinkled the blood there, and not merely by walking inside with the blood? If the blood of one sin offering is placed in two cups, and one is brought outside or one is brought into the Sanctuary, is the other cup (that remains in the Azara) disqualified? Rabbi Yosi HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree. Rabbi Yosi presents logical arguments to counter the Rabbis' position, while the Rabbis respond with verses from the Torah. It is also forbidden to bring the blood of sin offerings into the Kodesh HaKodashim, as this too is derived from a verse in the Torah. Blood from a sin offering is disqualified if it is brought into the Sanctuary. But what about sin-offering blood that was designated to be presented in the Sanctuary and was instead brought into the Kodesh HaKodashim, is it similarly disqualified? And if it is, what about blood that was supposed to go into the Kodesh HaKodashim but was taken out and then brought back in?    

The final difficulty from our Mishna against Rav Ashi's explanation of Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishna in Parah - that Rabbi Eliezer maintains we do not view any given drop of the mixture as containing elements of both (no bila) - cannot be resolved in the same way as the earlier difficulties. To address this challenge, Rava offers an alternative explanation for the Mishna and braita cited against Rav Ashi. He clarifies that these sources are not discussing a case of blood that became mixed together, but rather cups of blood that became intermingled. Therefore, they are not relevant to the question of how to regard a portion of blood drawn from a mixture of bloods. The Gemara then raises a difficulty on Rava's approach, citing a braita in which Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states that Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis do, in fact, disagree about blood that was mixed together. In conclusion, the Gemara suggests that this is a tannaitic dispute regarding whether or not they disagreed about mixed blood. One of the cases in the Mishna involves a mixture of bloods designated for placement on the top of the altar together with bloods designated for the bottom. Rabbi Eliezer permits the blood to be offered above and then below, while the rabbis forbid it. Abaye limits this debate to blood from a sin offering mixed with blood from a burnt offering, but not to blood from a burnt offering mixed with the remainder of blood from a sin offering, since the location for pouring the remainder is the same as that of the burnt offering. Therefore, even the rabbis would permit it. Rav Yosef disagrees, maintaining that the remainder is not poured on the side of the altar like the burnt offering, but rather placed on the surface of the base (a protrusion one cubit wide). Reish Lakish aligns with Abaye, while Rabbi Yochanan (or Rabbi Elazar) aligns with Rav Yosef. Three difficulties are raised against the position of Rav Yosef and Rabbi Yochanan, but each is resolved. The Mishna teaches that there is no dispute in a case where blood from a sin offering designated for the outer altar becomes mixed with blood from an offering designated for the inner altar. All agree that such a mixture is disqualified. If it was nevertheless offered, what are the rules—does the order of placement, inside first or outside first, make a difference?

Study Guide When different bloods are mixed together, how are they brought on the altar? If both sacrifices require the same number of placements, that number is performed, with the assumption that the blood placed on the altar represents a combination of both offerings. However, if the mixture includes blood from a sacrifice requiring one placement and another requiring four, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree on the proper procedure. Why does the Mishna introduce the case of blood from blemished animals mixed with valid blood, when it has already discussed a similar case regarding limbs of blemished animals mixed with valid limbs? The Gemara then cites a Mishna in Parah 9:1, which deals with waters of the red heifer that became mixed with ordinary water. Rabbi Eliezer and the rabbis dispute whether such water can be used, and if so, in what manner. Three possible explanations are offered to clarify Rabbi Eliezer's position. The Gemara proceeds to challenge these explanations: first, a difficulty is raised against Reish Lakish's interpretation, which remains unresolved. Then, five difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi's explanation, drawn from various braitot and our Mishna. Each of these is resolved through the method of ukimta, limiting the ruling to specific circumstances. Finally, one additional difficulty is raised later in the sugya, which remains unresolved.