Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

There is a debate regarding whether apple juice can be used to leaven the dough for the two mincha offerings that are required to be chametz. In Mishna Terumot 10:2, it is explained that apples of teruma that leaven a dough are significant and cannot be nullified; this is because leavening is considered a transformative action that fundamentally alters the dough. While it may initially appear that the Mishna supports the position that apple juice is a valid leavening agent for these offerings, the text can also be reconciled with the opposing view. One can distinguish between different levels of leavening, suggesting that the "leavening" mentioned in the Mishna may be chametz nukshe, which does not satisfy the specific leavening requirements for the mincha offerings. Rabbi Ila and Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi debate whether the mincha of a sinner, which is offered without oil, may contain water. Initially, the Gemara assumes the root of this debate is whether we determine the measurement of an item that has changed form based on its original state or its current state. If we follow the current size, water may be added because the kometz (handful) is measured based on the substance in its present form. However, if it must be measured by its original size, adding water would mean the handful no longer contains the required amount of flour, as the volume has been altered by the liquid. Ultimately, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that both sages agree items are measured by their current state; their actual debate concerns how to interpret the requirement for a sinner's mincha to be "dry"—whether this means it must be completely dry of all liquid, or merely dry of oil. The Gemara continues to delve into whether the halakhic measurements of items that have changed in size are determined by their present state or their original state. A Mishna in Uktzin 2:8 is cited regarding the laws of ritual impurity (tumah) for a piece of meat that has shrunk to less than the size of an egg (kebeitzah)—the minimum volume required to transmit impurity. Two groups of sages disagree over the correct version of this Mishna: one asserting that we assess the item based on its original size, and the other maintaining we assess it by its current size. The Gemara raises a difficulty against the opinion that items are measured by their original size; specifically, in a case where meat expanded to exceed the size of an egg, it is ruled to transmit impurity. This challenge is resolved by explaining that the law in that specific source is Rabbinic in nature, rather than a Torah law. A second difficulty is raised from a braita discussing the opposite case: if meat shrinks below the required volume, it no longer transmits impurity. However, Raba rejects this proof, explaining that all would agree an item cannot transmit impurity if its current state is too small. He clarifies that the sages were only stringent in cases where an item was originally too small but later expanded to the requisite volume. The true point of disagreement, according to Raba, is a case where the item originally met the requirement, shrunk, and then expanded again. The question is whether the item was "rejected" (nidcheh) during its middle stage - thereby losing its ability to transfer impurity permanently - or if it regains its ability to transmit impurity upon re-expanding. A difficulty is then raised against the position that it remains pure even after re-expanding. A challenge from Tosefta Terumot 4:2 is brought against Raba's premise that everyone agrees a shrunken item is measured by its current state. This challenge involves the laws of separating tithes from fresh figs for dried ones; however, the difficulty is ultimately resolved by explaining that the case does not concern standard tithes, but rather terumat ma'aser (the tithe of the tithe). Unlike regular ma'aser, terumat ma'aser does not require an exact measurement, and it is considered preferable to err on the side of generosity by giving more to the Kohen.

Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether the communal sin offering is paid for by the Temple treasury or if there is a new dedicated collection from the people. Two different versions are brought regarding who held which position, and the Gemara assumes that they switched their positions at some point and concludes that Rabbi Shimon holds it is paid for by the Temple treasury, and Rabbi Yehuda by a new collection. Rabbi Yochanan asked about the situation described in the Mishna that the kohen gadol died and there is no one yet appointed and a full issaron is brought. Is this brought twice daily in both the morning and afternoon, or only once a day? Rava brings a proof that it is brought twice daily, which is mentioned to Rabbi Yirmia, and he scoffs at it, insulting Rava as a "Bavlai tipshai" (stupid Babylonian). Rava then brings a different proof from a verse in the Torah that calls it tamid, comparing it to the tamid sacrifice which is brought twice daily. The Gemara concludes that Rava is correct, as can be seen from a braita that says so explicitly. In a regular case where a kohen gadol brings one issaron and divides it between the morning and afternoon, there is a debate between Abba Yosi ben Dostai and the rabbis about whether two handfuls of frankincense are brought or only one. Rabbi Yochanan asks whether the frankincense would be doubled according to the rabbis in a case when the community or heirs bring it (if the kohen gadol had died) and whether the oil would be doubled according to both opinions. A braita is brought from which they understand that neither is doubled, according to both opinions. Most mincha offerings are matza, other than the special sacrifice brought on Shavuot and ten of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering which are chametz. How was the leavening agent measured in the measuring of the flour for the offering?  

A debate exists between a braita and Rav regarding communal peace offerings brought on Shavuot for the sake of rams instead of sheep; the braita deems the sacrifice ineffective, while Rav holds it is. Rav Chisda and Raba disagree on the specific nature of this case. Their dispute centers on whether the laws of "intent for the wrong sacrifice" apply when a kohen mistakenly misidentifies the animal's original purpose. Two objections, one from Mishna Gittin 54a and one from a braita, are raised against Raba's position that a sacrifice offered for the wrong purpose by mistake remains valid. In both instances, the Gemara resolves the objections. The Mishna explains that the daily tamid and the special mussaf sacrifices of Shabbat and festivals do not preclude one another. However, the precise meaning of the Mishna is initially unclear. The Gemara introduces a question posed by Rabbi Chiya bar Avin to Rav Chisda: if only one animal is available, should it be used for today's mussaf or saved for tomorrow's tamid? Initially, our Mishna is cited to prove that there is no specific preference between the two, but this proof is rejected as inconclusive. A different source is brought to resolve the question, but it is also dismissed, as the Gemara determines it refers to a case irrelevant to the current discussion.

Study Guide

The braita explains that there is no way to test techelet (blue dye), and therefore one should only purchase it from an expert. Initially, the Gemara suggested this meant there was no way to distinguish between authentic techelet and kala ilan (a vegetable-based fake). However, this was rejected because there are indeed chemical tests available, as the Gemara explains. Ultimately, the conclusion is that there is no way to test if the strings were dyed "for the sake of the mitzva" (l'shma) or merely "for a tasting" (to test the color). The Gemara then addresses: From whom may one buy tzitzit and assume they are valid? And why is it forbidden to sell tzitzit to a non-Jew? There is also a dispute regarding whether tzitzit is a "time-bound positive commandment" (mitzvat aseh she'hazman grama). Rav Yehuda would place tzitzit on his wife's garments. However, Rabbi Shimon holds that it is time-bound and women are therefore exempt. The rabbis disagree with him, believing that nighttime is also a time for tzitzit. Rabbi Shimon derives from the words "And you shall see it" that the obligation only applies during the day. The Gemara brings many other drashot (interpretations) on this verse, most of which relate to the profound importance of the mitzva of tzitzit. What is unique about the color techelet that this specific color was chosen for the mitzva? It serves as a reminder of the heavenly throne.   

The rabbis disagree on the required length of tzitzit strings, which implies that a specific length is necessary. However, this appears to contradict a ruling by the elders of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel that there is no requisite amount. This contradiction is reconciled by explaining that their statement refers to the maximum length. A braita emphasizes the importance of the strings hanging down, as proven by the usage of the word "tzitzit" in a different context (Yechezkel 8:3). How are tzitzit prepared? Specifically, how far from the garment's edge should they be, and how many strings are inserted and in what manner? There are various opinions on these matters. Is a bracha recited when preparing tzitzit? Can a non-Jew prepare them? Rav Chisda believed these two questions were connected and challenged Rav based on that premise; however, Rav Chisda's understanding was ultimately rejected. Which part of the process must be performed "for the sake of" the mitzva? Some maintain that the strings must be spun for the sake of the mitzva, while others hold that only the final preparation of the tzitzit must be done with this intent.

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree regarding the law of a sadin (a linen garment) in the context of tzitzit. While Beit Shammai exempts a linen garment from the obligation of tzitzit to avoid the prohibition of shaatnez (mixing wool and linen), Beit Hillel holds it is obligated. Their reasoning is based on the textual juxtaposition of the laws of shaatnez and tzitzit, which teaches that the positive commandment (aseh) of tzitzit overrides the negative prohibition (lo taaseh) of shaatnez. Although the halakha follows Beit Hillel, Rabbi Eliezer ben Rabbi Tzadok testifies that anyone who attached tchelet (wool) to a linen garment in Jerusalem was viewed with wonder - as it caused onlookers to mistakenly believe shaatnez was generally permitted. Rabbi explains that the Sages eventually prohibited this practice because people did not know about the drasha permitting shaatnez and would come to think that shaatnez was permitted in general. Since difficulties were raised against Rabbi's explanation, Rava and Rabbi Zeira offer four alternative reasons for why the Sages prohibited wool tzitzit on linen garments: Decree of "kala ilan": There is a concern that one might use a dye that looks like techelet but is not the authentic wool dyed with snail secretions. In such a case, the wearer violates the prohibition of shaatnez (wool and linen) without having fulfilled the mitzvah that allows it. Decree of "teima" (testing): A concern regarding the validity of the tzitzit - lest the techelet used was dyed during the "testing" of the color, which is invalid because it was not dyed specifically for the sake of the mitzva (lishma). Concern of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui ": Rava and Rabbi Zera explain a concern that if the linen garment tears within three fingerbreadths of its edge, a person might sew it back up and leave the sewing threads to serve as tzitzit. This would be invalid because the Torah requires the mitzva to be actively made by attaching the strings to the garment, rather than utilizing threads that were already there for a different purpose. Decree of night garments: Since a garment worn exclusively at night is exempt from tzitzit, wearing wool strings on a linen night garment would constitute a shaatnez violation without any mitzva to permit it. The Gemara discusses the definition of a garment obligated in tzitzit regarding a hybrid garment made of leather and fabric. Rava rules that we follow the primary material of the garment: if the body of the garment is fabric and the corners are leather, it is obligated; if the body is leather and the corners are fabric, it is exempt. Rav Achai disagrees, arguing that the status follows the material of the corners themselves. Regarding the construction of the tzitzit, Rav Huna rules that if one attached tzitzit to a garment while it only had three corners and then completed the fourth corner afterward, the tzitzit is invalid due to "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" (Make it, and not from that which is already made). The Gemara challenges this from the practice of the "Early Pious Ones," who would attach techelet after weaving only three fingerbreadths of the garment (when only two corners were in existence). The Gemara resolves this by understanding the custom of the pious ones to be performed at the end, when there were only three fingerbreadths left to weave (when the four corners were already in existence). Finally, the Gemara challenges the invalidation of "ta'aseh ve'lo min he-asui" based on Rabbi Zera's ruling, which validates attaching new tzitzit onto a garment that already has tzitzit (and then removing the old ones). Rava suggests that because of the prohibition of "bal tosif" (do not add to the mitzvot), the act of attaching the strings before the obligation exists is not considered a significant "act." However, Rav Papa challenges Rava's reasoning, explaining that it depends on human intent: if one intends to cancel the first set of strings and replace them with the new ones, it is considered a significant act. This raises the question: if intent makes it a valid act, why was the case of attaching tzitzit before the garment was finished invalid in light of Rabbi Zeira permitting the case of the extra strings?

Rava explains that the top knot on the tzitzit (after all the windings) must be of Torah origin. If it were not, the attachment would be considered temporary, and there would be no need for the Torah to permit the use of mixed types (shatnez—wool and linen) in tzitzit. Raba bar Rav Ada transmitted in the name of Rav that if a single thread is torn at its base (the top of the tzitzit), the tzitzit are no longer valid. When Rav Nachman taught this, Rava raised a challenge from a braita, but Rav Nachman reinterpreted the source in a way that resolved the contradiction. Raba stated in the name of Rav that the specific thread used for the windings counts as one of the required threads of the tzitzit. Rav Yosef corrected the attribution, noting that the statement actually originated from Shmuel. Raba taught in the name of Shmuel that if the techelet thread was mostly consumed by the windings, leaving only a small amount of string to hang down, the tzitzit remain valid. Rav Yosef again corrected him, clarifying that this statement came from Rav. Rav is quoted by another source as establishing the halakha on three points: a minimum of set of one windings is necessary, and the ideal tzitzit consists of one-third windings and two-thirds hanging string. According to Rebbi, each winding (chulya) should of one thread wound at least three times. However, a different braita states there should be between seven and thirteen windings, representing the seven firmaments and the spaces between them. One should also begin and end the windings with a white string, as derived from the biblical verse. Rav and Raba bar bar Hana disagree about whether a garment with only windings and no loose strings hanging is valid. Their debate is rooted in different ways of understanding the purpose of the terms petil and gedilim used in the Torah. Shmuel says in the name of Levi that even the white threads can be made of wool when placed on a linen garment. A question is then raised as to whether a woolen garment can have linen threads; Rav Yehuda's statement is cited to answer this, as he explicitly permits linen strings in a woolen garment. He even permits using both wool and linen strings in a silk garment. Rav Nachman disagrees with this last point and exempts a silk garment from tzitzit entirely. Rava challenges Rav Nachman's position, but Rav Nachman resolves the difficulty. Their underlying dispute is whether the word beged (clothing) in the Torah refers to all materials or only to those made of wool or linen.

Link to Ptil Techelet website. The Gemara brings two different versions of the incident involving Mar bar Rav Ashi, whose tzitzit were torn on Shabbat while he was walking home. This raises the subject of "kevod haberiyot" (human dignity), which overrides a "lo ta'aseh" (negative commandment) in the Torah. Both versions bring the explanation of Rav bar Shaba, who explained that this law refers specifically to the negative commandment of "lo tasur" (do not stray from the words of the Sages), meaning that it only overrides Rabbinic prohibitions. For tzitzit, one must place two strings of techelet and two white strings. The Mishna rules, however, that this is not essential – one can have only white or only techelet. Also regarding the tefillin of the hand and the tefillin of the head - they are two independent mitzvot and do not hinder one another; someone who has only one of them puts it on and recites the blessing over it. The Gemara suggests that the Mishna does not follow the view of Rebbi, who holds that the techelet and the white do hinder one another. He learns this from the verse "And you shall see him" (u're-item oto), which teaches that both must be together, while the rabbis learn that it is possible to see each kind separately. However, two other suggestion were brought to explain the Mishna according to the view of Rebbi: Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav: The law in the Mishna (that they do not hinder) was stated regarding the order of precedence. It is a mitzva to first place the white (since the white is the color of the "corner" of the garment, which appears in the verse first), but if one placed techelet before white, one has fulfilled the obligation, though the mitzva has not been performed in the most ideal way. Rava: The Mishna is speaking about gerdumin (remnants) of one of the colors - strings that were torn after they were already placed in the garment - the tzitzit remains valid. His words rely on the words of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, who said that remnants of techelet are valid. The minimum measure that must remain in a string to maintain its validity is "enough to tie them" (kedei le'anvan), meaning a length sufficient to make a slipknot. From the statement of the sons of Rabbi Chiya, Rava concludes that one must tie a knot on each and every "chulya" (group of windings) in the tzitzit. The reason for this is that if one does not tie a knot at every chulya, if just a short strand is permitted, the moment the string is severed above the first knot, all the windings will unravel and disappear. The knots between the chulyot ensure that even if part of the string is cut off, the structure of the rest of the tzitzit will be preserved and it will remain valid under the law of gerdumin. However, Rava's assumption is rejected as the sons of Rabbi Chiya may only permit gardumim when there are knots at every chulya.  

There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin on the left hand. However, left-handed people wear them on the right. There are three different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel yad on the upper part of the arm. There are two different ways that Tannaim derive the source for wearing tefillin shel rosh on the top of the head. There is a Tannatic debate between Rabbi Yishmael and the rabbis about whether each tzitzit is a distinct mitzva (Rabbi Yishmael), or if one cannot fulfill the mitzva without having tzitzit on all four corners. The Gemara brings three practical ramifications of their debate. There are three examples brought of changes one can make to a four-cornered garment which, while it may no longer look like a four-cornered garment, would still be obligated in tzitzit. Shmuel ruled like Rabbi Yishmael, but the Gemara states that the halakha is not like that and brings a story with Mar bar Rav Ashi and Ravina to prove it.

Rav Chisda explains that if one speaks between placing the tefillin shel yad and the tefillin shel rosh, an additional blessing must be recited upon the shel rosh. From this, one can infer that if no interruption occurs, only one blessing is required. However, this poses a difficulty in light of Rabbi Yochanan's statement that there are separate blessings for the shel yad and shel rosh. Abaye and Rava resolve this conflict, yet their resolution is interpreted differently by Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam, resulting in two distinct customs. The tefillin shel yad is placed first, followed by the shel rosh. When removing them, the order is reversed: the shel rosh is removed first, then the shel yad. This specific sequence is derived from the verse in Devarim 6:8. If one dons tefillin early in the morning before the proper time has arrived, the blessing is recited the moment the obligation begins. As stated in Berakhot 9b, this occurs when it becomes light enough to recognize an acquaintance from a distance of four cubits. There are three opinions regarding how late one may wear tefillin: until sunset, until the last people leave the market, or until one goes to sleep. Two versions of Rav Nachman's ruling exist - either supporting or opposing the middle position. This ruling either aligns with or contradicts the practice of Rav Chisda and Raba bar Rav Huna, who would pray Maariv while still wearing tefillin. A challenge is raised against Raba bar Rav Huna's practice based on his own statement implying that tefillin must be removed as darkness falls. This is resolved by explaining that his statement referred specifically to Shabbat. There are two different derivations for the exemption of tefillin on Shabbat: one links it to the exemption of wearing tefillin at night, while the other does not. Is it forbidden to don tefillin at night? If so, does one transgress a positive commandment or a negative one? One should touch the tefillin while wearing them to maintain constant awareness of them. This is derived via a kal v'chomer (a fortiori argument) from the tzitz (the Kohen Gadol's forehead plate). Tefillin are worn on the left hand, as derived from various verses indicating that the word "yad" refers specifically to the left hand.