Helm Talks - energy climate infrastructure & more

The news is very much about gas price shocks, but this is to misunderstand the fundamental difference between temporary shocks and long-term trends. Gas prices spike when major geopolitical events occur (e.g. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz), but then often fall sharply afterwards. Such fluctuations are nothing new and should be expected, but they don’t prove that gas is inherently unstable or that the UK can simply “get out of gas” by relying more on wind, solar, and some nuclear. Despite two decades of expanding renewables, the UK still depends on gas for about 35% of its energy, with heating and industry making full exit impossible anytime soon. At the same time, the UK is not making good use of its own North Sea gas. Current policy effectively discourages domestic production through limited licences and heavy windfall taxes, while simultaneously encouraging imports, even though imported LNG is more polluting and exposes the UK to foreign supply risks. The claim being made that domestic gas always has to follow world prices is misleading – long-term contracts once gave the UK stable, predictable gas supplies, and could do so again, if the government required such contracts as a licensing condition. Moreover, the UK’s energy system is more exposed to global gas prices than other countries because electricity prices feed gas costs straight through, industrial electricity prices are the highest in the developed world, and the UK has very little gas storage. A more balanced, practical approach is essential to manage the gas we will inevitably continue to use, to prioritise domestic production over polluting imports, and to build proper storage and contract structures that improve security, environmental outcomes, and industrial competitiveness.

Britain is facing a deep industrial energy price crisis, with many major industries collapsing or shrinking because UK electricity costs are among the highest in the world. Recent closures—from refineries to steel, fertilizer, and fibreglass plants—show how uncompetitive energy prices have already pushed firms out, long before the latest geopolitical price spikes made things worse. The core issue isn’t temporary shocks but a long‑term cost problem baked into the UK’s electricity system costs. To restore industrial competitiveness, Britain needs permanent, structural reform to electricity pricing—not short-term fixes. This requires three big changes: charge industry based on long‑run marginal system costs rather than loading full network costs onto them; reform the electricity market by moving away from gas‑set wholesale prices towards a capacity‑based “equivalent firm power” system that properly accounts for intermittency; and index carbon prices inversely to oil and gas prices to stabilise overall energy costs. Together with improvements in gas storage and long‑term gas supply contracts from the North Sea, these reforms would deliver predictable, globally competitive energy prices to support both existing industries and the more electricity‑intensive sectors of the future.

The International Energy Agency, at its recent ministerial meeting (Feb 18th/19th), agreed on one top priority: energy security. Hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks and the ease with which modern energy infrastructure can be disrupted underscore the urgency of the issue. The UK’s current approach – reducing domestic gas production, increasing reliance on imported LNG (liquefied natural gas), depending heavily on undersea cables, and an overwhelming emphasis on intermittent technologies – is making the country more vulnerable, not less. Two key factors are weakening the UK’s industrial resilience and national defence capability: its strategic dependencies, particularly on Chinese supply chains for renewable technologies; and the rising costs and intermittency of its energy mix. Despite the scale of this challenge, there are significant opportunities to rebuild a more secure, resilient energy system. UK energy is neither "home-grown" nor cheaper. High-cost energy, dependent on foreign supply chains, raises the cost of defence and the exposure to shocks, political or otherwise.

Several key industries have fallen back to production levels last seen in the 1950s. Car production has dropped to its 1952 level at around 700,000 vehicles a year—down by nearly 1 million in a decade—while steel is a shadow of its former output. Even cement is falling back, being increasingly switched to imports. Housebuilding is far below its 1950s’ and 1960s’ levels. The fertiliser industry has closed. Net zero technology is overwhelmingly imported (e.g. the batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, critical minerals and now EVs ), now mostly from China. Why? Deindustrialisation has multiple causes, exacerbated by the highest industrial electricity prices in the developed world. New digital technologies and data centres are highly energy‑intensive and need reliable, non-intermittent, round‑the‑clock electricity. The idea that we can simply become Singapore-on-Thames, relying on finance, law, tech, and hospitality, is at best naive. Traditional service sectors face rising costs from recent tax and wage policies, and global finance is becoming more fragmented and less open. Meanwhile, the UK continues to rely heavily on foreign investors to fund essential infrastructure, from water and energy to roads. The UK needs to focus on three big areas: competitive business taxes; affordable and globally competitive energy prices; and major investment in skills. Raising employers' national insurance, raising the minimum wage, increasing workers’ rights and signing ever-higher contracts for offshore wind leave what is left of UK industry reaching for the exit. Instead, we need a switch from business costs and taxes to consumers. It isn’t sustainable for voters to enjoy 21st‑century living standards with 1950s’ outputs. It will take a brave politician to tell the public some of these basic facts of life.

Many people in the Labour Party support bringing utilities like water (in particular, Thames Water) and electricity transmission back into public ownership. Supporters often present nationalisation as a simple fix: no greedy investors, no dividends, and lower bills. But, in reality, nationalisation is far more complicated and involves real trade-offs that are often glossed over. Financial risks of running these industries do not disappear when the state takes over. Under private ownership, investors bear the risk and expect returns through dividends and interest. Under nationalisation, that risk shifts to customers and taxpayers instead. If the government still borrows to fund investment, interest payments remain. If it wants to avoid borrowing, then customers would have to pay higher bills now to fund upgrades and maintenance — a return to the “pay-as-you-go” model used after the Second World War. Nationalisation also wouldn’t automatically improve how these industries are run. The state once had strong expertise in managing utilities, but that capacity largely no longer exists. There is a risk that governments use nationalised industries for political goals, such as freezing prices, which can lead to underinvestment and reduce service quality. Anyone arguing for nationalisation needs to be honest that it likely means higher bills today, real financial risk for the public, and no guarantee of better performance.

As 2026 begins, and people look ahead to what it might bring, this podcast focuses on the likely, more profound, economic and geopolitical shifts expected by 2030 – now less than five years’ away. Immediate questions revolve around UK elections, leadership changes, and ongoing conflicts like Ukraine and Taiwan, but infrastructure, technology and economic planning require a longer-term perspective. By 2030, the world is likely to be more fragmented into economic and political blocs, with China, Russia, and the US reinforcing self-sufficiency, and emerging economies like India and Indonesia gaining prominence. Climate change progress is expected to remain minimal, and technological revolutions in AI and quantum computing may either transform industries or deliver incremental changes. Of the possible shifts in the next five years, a significant global financial correction before 2030 appears the most likely, driven by unsustainable market valuations, private equity vulnerabilities, and mounting government debt. The aftermath could involve serious inflation and currency debasement, as governments resort to aggressive monetary interventions. This scenario would reshape political and economic models, potentially leading to more state intervention and less private sector influence. Looking ahead, three possible trajectories for the UK and similar economies are outlined: continued muddling through with incremental adjustments; a radical re-set akin to a “Thatcher moment” to curb public spending and debt; or a protectionist “fortress Britain” approach emphasising self-sufficiency. Each path carries profound implications for trade, growth, and political stability. But financial markets seem most likely to act as the catalyst for systemic change before 2030.

Why is it that this government, and its predecessors, find economic growth so hard to attain? In the UK, growth remains stubbornly low for a number of reasons, and these are not the ones that the government is currently blaming. First, governments avoid hard choices and spread resources too thinly. As Tony Blair said to me many years ago, politicians prefer to have "and" over "or" – in his case, nuclear and renewables. Political instinct favours doing “everything” to please all parts of politicians’ constituencies, but this dilutes investment and prevents large-scale, coordinated programmes. Instead of comprehensive strategies like those seen in China or France, the UK pursues piecemeal, case-by-case projects, resulting in high costs and inefficiencies, such as probably the most expensive nuclear plants in the world (at c. £12 billion per gigawatt). Without focused, long-term infrastructure programmes, growth cannot accelerate. Beyond this, structural issues compound the problem. Western economies, especially the UK, prioritise consumption over production, rely heavily on welfare spending, and maintain incentive systems that discourage work. High taxes and borrowing further stifle growth, while domestic savings – critical for funding investment – are minimal. Unlike post-war economic miracles in Germany, Japan and China, driven by savings and production, the UK depends on foreign capital and supply chains, leaving its economy vulnerable. A fundamental shift towards production, supported by domestic savings and programme-driven investment, is a prerequisite for sustainable growth.

There are five major lessons from COP30. They are not the ones the climate community has highlighted, but they really matter and will shape the post-COP30 climate change negotiations. First up is the realisation that it is no longer a European (and UK) game. The shifts in world political and economic power for the first time sidelined the Europeans. There was no UK “climate change leadership” to be taken seriously. It is India, China, Russia and the US that pulled the strings, whether present or not. Second, no major oil and gas producer or coal-burning nation wants to stop. Brazil set the tone: it announced that it wants to be the world’s fourth-largest oil producer, with drilling to start in the mouth of the Amazon. Third, no one wants to cut their carbon consumption, personally or nationally. The Brazilian carbon footprint includes the flights, the new road through the rainforest, the cruise liners for accommodation, as well as the commitment to its own fossil fuels. Fourth, the real action was on the bottom-up trade issues, notably the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and the emerging coalition of the willing with the extension of carbon pricing. The fifth lesson is that the temperature is going to go on rising: 30 COPs so far haven’t made a dent in the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, and another 30 COPs probably won’t.

As the Chancellor gears up to deliver the Autumn Budget next week, let’s look behind the headlines at the reality of what is going on with the UK’s economy and lack of growth. Despite what the current government argues (not very different from the previous incumbents), the UK’s economic stagnation is not so much due to a lack of new infrastructure projects or excessive regulation, but rather the chronic failure to maintain existing assets. Essential networks—such as railways, roads, water systems, and mobile connectivity—are in poor condition, creating inefficiencies and costs that ripple through the economy. Instead of prioritising glamorous projects like HS2, the focus should be on ensuring that current systems actually work. Well-maintained infrastructure provides resilience and reduces the disproportionate costs of failures, making it a cornerstone for productivity and growth. This is not a technical challenge but a matter of political priorities and regulatory focus. Current fiscal rules and political incentives distort spending decisions. The government re-labels maintenance as “investment” to justify borrowing, shifting costs to future generations and encouraging flashy enhancements over essential upkeep. True maintenance should be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis through current bills, ensuring intergenerational fairness and system reliability. Capital maintenance comes first, second, and third, with new projects only after existing infrastructure is robust.

British energy policy, once heralded as a pathway to cheap, secure and decarbonised power, has instead resulted in some of the highest energy costs globally. Despite the optimism of Ed Miliband and before him, Boris Johnson, Britain’s energy system is heavily dependent on foreign supply chains, finance and ownership. The shift to intermittent renewables like wind and solar has doubled infrastructure needs, while long-term contracts lock in elevated prices until at least 2045. Offshore wind, particularly in Scotland, suffers from grid constraints, leading to payments for unused generation. The government’s approach to nuclear, with its “let’s try one and see if it works” perspective, rather than a fully fledged nuclear programme, has followed an inefficient and costly path, further entrenching high costs. This trajectory poses serious risks to the UK economy. Energy-intensive industries are closing, and few new ones are emerging, as high energy prices deter investment. Britain’s apparent success in reducing carbon emissions masks a growing reliance on imported carbon-intensive goods. Without radical policy reform – renegotiating contracts, restructuring pricing, and rethinking energy strategy – Britain faces a future of permanently high energy costs and diminished industrial competitiveness. What is needed now is not our politicians flying off to yet another COP, this time in Brazil (with access by a new road cut through the Amazon rainforest), but honesty and humility in global climate discussions, urging leaders to learn from Britain’s missteps rather than emulate them.

The UK’s infrastructure costs are amongst the highest globally, making ambitious projects—like new nuclear plants, HS2, and airport expansions—extremely expensive. Hinkley and Sizewell nuclear stations together may end up costing more than the original full costs of HS2, and a new Heathrow runway could reach £40 billion. Even basic upgrades, like sewage tanks and reservoirs, are far pricier than elsewhere. While some projects, such as the Elizabeth Line and Thames Tideway, have been delivered efficiently, these are rare exceptions. The main drivers of high costs are higher costs of capital (due to high interest rates and inflation), low labour productivity, and fragmented project delivery. The UK often builds infrastructure as isolated projects rather than as part of coordinated programmes, which prevents investment in supply chains and skills. France’s programme of nuclear power stations building in the 1980s is an example of how things could be done. Unlike countries that use the state’s balance sheet or commit to long-term programmes, the UK’s piecemeal approach keeps costs high, discourages investors, and limits what can actually be delivered. Without smarter regulation and better planning, these high costs will continue to hold back progress.

Few people have much good to say about the water industry, and the blame game is fully engaged. But what to do? There are four possible options: continue with minimal reform; implement the recommendations of the recent Independent Commission on Water, led by Sir Jon Cunliffe; nationalise the industry; or adopt a catchment-based regulatory model. The Cunliffe Commission advocates: abolishing Ofwat, merging its functions with the Environment Agency, and introducing a supervision model akin to banking regulation. The former is not thought through, not least its neglect of the EA. The latter adds even more layers of regulation. It will be costly and there is a serious risk of regulatory capture, all the while not addressing the core issues of public distrust and investor reluctance. The right approach is Catchment Regulation Model, using digital mapping and AI-enhanced data to guide environmental interventions. It encourages participation by all the parties, including through competitive bidding for projects (as opposed to financial engineering). It is the one route that can create a sustainable, transparent, and inclusive framework for the next 35 years. However, as the government reflects on the recommendations in the final Cunliffe Commission report, continued superficial reforms, particularly in the case of Thames Water, sadly look more likely, kicking the problems down the road.

Why when solar and wind are supposed to be nine times cheaper than gas are electricity prices in the UK amongst the highest in the world? Why when the UK is supposed to be a fast track to this promised cheap net zero electricity by 2030 are large industrial users struggling? Why is Grangemouth in trouble? Why is the steel industry in such bad shape that it has be bailed out and nationalised? Why have fertiliser and petrochemical companies and now biofuels all reached for the exit? The UK’s dash for renewables is supposed to be creating a clean-energy superpower, based upon “home-grown” energy, whereas in fact almost all of the supply chain is imported. Renewables are not cheap when their system costs are properly measured. Marginal costs might be near zero, but a renewables-based system already needs almost twice the capacity as the old coal plus gas plus nuclear system, even though demand has fallen. To produce roughly the same amount of firm power, a renewables-based system already requires lots of new transmission lines, which were not needed in the past for the same demand, as well as a host of upgrades. It requires batteries and storage and lots of back-up gas standing mostly idle, as well relying heavily on imported electricity via the interconnectors to keep the lights on. Renewables are not like-for-like and the wholesale price for firm power should not be compared with the contract for differences (CfD) price for intermittent generation. The nine times cheaper claim relies on leaving almost all the relevant costs out of the comparison. It's time for some energy and climate realism and some honesty about the costs and consequences of the net zero 2030 target.

In the mid-2030s, historians may look back and note that, despite numerous COP meetings and agreements like the Paris Agreement, global carbon emissions continued to rise, with significant contributions from countries like India, China, and Indonesia. The world failed to meet the 1.5°C target, making 2°C and even 3°C more likely. In this podcast, Dieter Helm looks at why the COP process has not delivered the desired outcomes, and the immediate imperative to shift strategies to tackle climate change from territorial net zero targets in the UK to more realistic approaches to reducing global emissions. Renewable energy sources like wind and solar, despite their growth, still contribute a small fraction to global energy supplies compared to fossil fuels. The increasing demand for electricity – in particular, from new technologies and data centres – and the intermittent nature of renewables have led to higher system costs, with nuclear power emerging (once again), but this time as a more viable option for stable and continuous energy supply. Looking ahead, more radical measures, including geoengineering, might be necessary to address climate change effectively. Whatever strategy is adopted, the net zero path being pursued in the UK is unlikely to be successful, as our historians in 2035 will no doubt have discovered.

The UK’s national debt now stands at around 100% of GDP, meaning that the country has borrowed the equivalent of an entire year’s economic output. Under current fiscal rules, the government aims to stop borrowing for day-to-day spending by 2030, but borrowing for investment is exempt from these limits. This creates a loophole: by reclassifying current spending as “investment”, the Chancellor can continue borrowing without breaching her fiscal rules. Even routine maintenance of infrastructure – fixing potholes, school buildings or bridges – is being labelled as investment, when in fact it’s simply capital maintenance. This accounting sleight of hand allows for open-ended borrowing while giving the illusion of fiscal discipline. Beyond these reclassifications, a deeper fiscal fiddle is the long-standing trend of moving public spending off the government’s books through privatisation and private finance initiatives (PFIs). Infrastructure once funded and owned by the state—like power stations, water systems, and telecoms—has been shifted to private hands, masking the true scale of national indebtedness. While this may reduce the official debt-to-GDP ratio, the financial burden still falls on the public, now as utility customers rather than taxpayers. With rising interest rates and growing infrastructure needs, the cost of this hidden debt is mounting. What is needed now is honesty, through greater transparency of public finances. Without it, future generations will bear the brunt of the current delusion, and the fact that we are living beyond our means.

The economic outlook for the UK is bleaker than the government would have us believe. The government's ambition to be the fastest-growing economy in the G7 by 2030 faces significant challenges. Starmer and Reeves blame the Conservatives for the current economic mess, citing a £20–£22 billion gap. They argue that, once constraints are addressed, the government will push towards net zero and build 1.5 million new homes, with growth solving public expenditure problems through increased tax revenue. If only… The IMF predicts 1.1% GDP growth, but even this meagre number overstates the prospects, for three reasons. First, it is flattered by increasing population, with GDP per head lower. Second, borrowing is larger than expected, with a debt-to-GDP ratio already at around 100%, making the cost of debt a significant constraint. Third, the Autumn Budget increased the cost of labour and capital, and savings taxes were increased. More fundamentally, the government's balance sheet is damaged by consuming capital rather than investing in infrastructure. Core infrastructure is not fit for purpose, and building houses and achieving net zero are not the panaceas they are claimed to be. Accounting ruses such as more PFI-type schemes and treating capital maintenance as if it is investment to push stuff off the government’s books do not make the problems go away. True national debt should add all this back, painting a very different and even more unsustainable picture. A fundamental rethink is needed to put the economy on a sustainable consumption and sustainable economic growth path, and thereby reduce the burden on future generations.

How have investors managed to turn Thames Water, despite its extraordinary debt, inefficiency and poor performance, into a company that offers rich financial rewards, at least for some? The roots of this began with the privatisation of water in England and Wales in 1989. At the time, the sector was in need of significant repairs to its infrastructure, and privatisation promised renewed assets and improved efficiency. Since then, with weak regulation, practices like gearing up balance sheets and extracting dividends have led some (not all) water companies to undertake financial engineering, without proper regulatory checks on balance sheets and corporate plans. To some, Thames Water appears to have prioritised financial gains, possibly to the expense of capital maintenance and the interests of customers and the environment. It has become the unacceptable face of water privatisation. Regulatory neglect is linked to broader public dissatisfaction and the erosion of the social licence to operate. Distressed debt players have taken control, with a £3billion loan to keep Thames Water afloat and at very high interest and associated “costs”. They are planning to sell out the equity to a sole preferred bidder, KKR, for around £4 billion. This move raises serious questions about the terms and the interests of the A-class bondholders versus the public interest, about transparency and public accountability. It is likely to be profitable all round, given the value of the Thames Water regulatory asset base is around £20 billion. The irony is that it probably will not save Thames Water, and there is the possibility that it could lead eventually to the nationalisation the government has been so determined to try to head off.

The recent fire at an electricity substation shut Heathrow Airport for 24 hours, causing chaos in the skies and across international airports. In doing so, it highlighted the broader critical condition of the UK’s major infrastructure and its lack of resilience. “Just in time” and “just enough” have replaced secure, ready and prepared. The incident at Heathrow prompted calls for inquiries, in the search to find someone to blame – not the more obvious economic regulator of the airport, the CAA, but instead the National Energy System Operator (NESO). The key lesson to be learned from this is that robust systems are needed to support modern requirements, including from all the new data centres that depend on continuous electricity supply, before such failures become normalised. To ensure the future stability of the economy, proactive measures need to be taken to reinforce these essential systems, prioritising investment and innovation that can cope with the evolving demands of our modern society.

Retreats on manifesto promises (electric vehicles and gas boilers), alongside the plans for carbon-intensive housebuilding and airport expansion, as well as renewal of the DRAX subsidy, are putting the UK’s ambition to achieve net zero electricity by 2030 at serious risk. Additionally, the cost of capital for renewable energy projects has increased, making it more challenging to meet the promised targets for offshore wind, solar, and nuclear energy. All of the above mean that the UK will almost certainly miss the 2030 target. That is before the big new challenge to net zero – defence. The sector is highly carbon-intensive. Think of all those missiles, submarines, tanks and all the infrastructure that goes with the sector. Decarbonising the defence industry is impractical; it relies on firm power and high-grade materials such as steel – no good if your tank needs recharging in the middle of the battlefield. The UK's energy infrastructure, including offshore wind farms and interconnectors, is also highly vulnerable to attacks, highlighting the need for a robust energy defence strategy. Achieving a strong defence capability requires reindustrialisation, which will in turn mean more carbon emissions and reverse the UK’s progress towards net zero territorial emissions. Integrating defence costs into the energy sector will significantly increase overall costs, necessitating a reassessment of current energy policies.

The UK government and the Climate Change Committee (CCC), with its 7th Carbon Budget, are keen to portray a "cakeism" narrative, suggesting that economic growth and net zero emissions are easily achievable together, without net costs and us having to change our lifestyles. The CCC even claims that it can reduce electricity bills by £700 by 2050. How would it know the prices in 25 years' time? This misleading narrative downplays the significant costs and consumption changes necessary to really address climate change. The political framing of the net zero targets on territorial emissions rather than consumption-based emissions pretends that when net zero is attained we will no longer be causing climate change. Politicians claim progress while potentially worsening the overall climate impact by shifting polluting industries overseas. Not only is this approach ineffective but it’s also dishonest, as it avoids confronting the public with the real costs and lifestyle adjustments required. Time for an end to this spin surrounding climate change. We need to acknowledge the difficult realities of climate change and increased costs. Cakeism, “win-win” narratives and the avoidance of inconvenient truths will not lead to meaningful reductions in carbon consumption.