Sefer Hachinuch

The final of the 613 Misvot, as listed by the Sefer Ha’hinuch, is the command to write a Sefer Torah. This Misva is introduced in Parashat Vayelech (Debarim 30:19), where Hashem commands, “Ve’ata Kitbu Lachem Et Ha’shira Ha’zot” (“And now, write for yourselves this song”). The Gemara teaches that it is “praiseworthy” to write a Sefer Torah oneself, if he can, and that one who does is considered as though he stood at Mount Sinai and received the Torah. If, however, one is not capable of writing his own Sefer Torah, then he may hire a Sofer (scribe) to write one for him. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah commanded writing for oneself a Sefer Torah for the simple reason that this ensures access to a Sefer Torah from which to study. Since everyone is commanded to write a Sefer Torah, everyone will have a Sefer Torah to learn from, without having to go borrow one, and this will help ensure that a person spends time learning. The more accessible something is, the more likely one is to use it, and so the Torah wanted that we all have access to a Sefer Torah, as this will helps guarantee that we learn Torah. Halacha requires one to write his own Sefer Torah even if he inherited one from his father, and the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this provision serves to ensure a plethora of Sifreh Torah. Not everybody can afford a Sefer Torah, and so the Torah wanted everyone – even those who already have a Sefer Torah – to write one, such that there would be Sifreh Torah available for those who do not have one. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, Sifreh Torah gradually wear out, and the ink fades, and so the Torah wanted people to write their own Sifreh Torah, in order for the Torah scrolls to be new and in good condition. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although the Biblical command refers specifically to the writing of a Sefer Torah, there is certainly value also in having other works of Torah literature written. Even if one received such books from his predecessors, it is a Misva to have more Torah books produced. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it was customary among righteous people to allocate a room in their home where scribes, whom they hired, would write Torah books. (Of course, the Sefer Ha’hinuch lived before the invention of the printing press, and thus all books had to be handwritten.) In discussing this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch presents a number of Halachot relevant to the way a Sefer Torah should be written. He writes that a space the size of the letter Yod must be left in between each pair of adjacent words, and an empty space the size of a line of text must be left in between the lines. Each line should consist of thirty letters. The allusion given for this practice is the word “Le’mishpehotechem” (“according to your families”) written three times. This word consists of ten letters, and so three times this word teaches us the total of number of letters that should be written on each line of the Sefer Torah. The Rabbis of the Mussar movement taught that this allusion expresses the notion that if a person, his son and grandson all learn Torah, then he is guaranteed that Torah will remain in his family for all time. The Sages inferred this concept from the verse in the Book of Yeshayahu (59:21), “And these words, which I have placed in your mouth, shall not be removed from your mouth, from the mouth of your offspring, or from the mouth of your offspring’s offspring…from now and forever” – indicating that once Torah is studied by three generations, it remains in that family for eternity. The three instances of “Le’mishpehotechem” hint to this concept, that after three generations of Torah study, the family is assured of having the Torah remain with it forever. A line in the Sefer Torah should not consist of fewer than thirty letters, as this would resemble an “Iggeret” (formal letter), and the Sefer Torah is to be a book. A line should not consist of more than thirty letters, as it would then be difficult to find the next line, since the beginning and end of the lines would be very far apart. If a word at the end of the line has five letters, but there’s room for only three letters, then the extra two letters may be written outside the column. If there is room for only two letters, then those two spaces should be left empty, and the word should be written on the next line. Although two letters may be written outside the column in the case described above, a two-letter word should not be written outside the column. Tradition requires writing certain letters larger or smaller than the rest of the text. Also, certain letters are written with specific numbers of “Tagin” (“crowns”) above the letters. These laws apply only “Le’chatehila” (optimally). If the “Tagin” were not placed correctly, or if the lines were too close or too far from one another, or too lengthy or too short, the Sefer Torah is nevertheless valid, as long as the letters were written properly. This Misva applies in all places and in all time periods. The Sefer Ha’hinuch maintains that this Misva is binding only upon men, because this obligation is linked to the obligation to study Torah – as discussed above – and women are exempt from the Misva of Torah study. One who was able to write a Sefer Torah but failed to do so has neglected this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch warns that such a person is deserving of harsh punishment, as fulfilling this Misva is necessary for learning Torah. Conversely, one who fulfills this Misva is rewarded with blessing and will be enriched by the ability to study. Many Rabbis addressed the question of why most people do not write a Sefer Torah, or even hire somebody to write a Sefer Torah for them. If, as we have seen, writing a Sefer Torah constitutes a Biblical obligation, then why do otherwise G-d-fearing people not write Torah scrolls for themselves? A famous answer to this question is given by the Rosh (Rabbenu Asher Ben Yehiel, Germany-Spain, 1250-1327). He notes that whereas in earlier generations, people would use Sifreh Torah as their texts of Torah study, nowadays, we study from other books. Sifreh Torah are used only for the public reading in the synagogue, and we learn from printed Humashim and other Torah texts. Therefore, the Rosh writes, nowadays, we fulfill this Misva by obtaining texts of Torah literature to learn. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, as mentioned earlier, commented that having such books fulfills the spirit of the Misva of writing a Sefer Torah, but according to the Rosh, this is how we fulfill the actual Misva, since these texts are what we use for learning. According to the Rosh, then, we all fulfill this Misva by having works of Torah literature in our homes. We find among later Poskim different opinions as to how to understand the Rosh’s position. The Perisha (commentary to the Tur by Rav Yehoshua Falk, Poland, 1555-1614) maintained that according to the Rosh, one who writes a Sefer Torah nowadays, but does not acquire other texts, does not fulfill the Biblical obligation. Since we do not use Sifreh Torah for learning, one cannot satisfy his obligation through the writing of a Sefer Torah, and he must acquire texts from which to study. The Perisha went even further, stating that having only a Sefer Torah is an insult to the Torah. Since we no longer have the tradition of how to interpret the “Tagin” and other features of the Torah text, one who has only a Torah scroll, and no works of Torah literature, is bound to misunderstand the Torah. The Bet Yosef (commentary to the Tur by Maran Rav Yosef Karo, Spain-Israel, 1488-1575), however, disagreed. In his view, the Rosh concedes that the primary Misva is to write a Sefer Torah, but he also allows fulfilling the Misva by acquiring works of Torah literature. The Sha’agat Aryeh (Rav Aryeh Leib Ginzburg, c. 1695-1785) offers an entirely different reason for why it is not customary for everyone to write a Sefer Torah. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (30) states that some minor elements of the tradition for writing a Sefer Torah have been lost. We cannot definitively ascertain the precise spelling of a small number of words, whether they should be written with or without the letter “Vav.” Therefore, the Sha’agat Aryeh writes, we cannot fulfill the Torah obligation of writing a Sefer Torah, since we lack the knowledge necessary to ensure that the text is written correctly. The Torah reading in the synagogue is not a Biblical obligation, but rather a practice enacted by the prophets, and so we can observe this practice even if the text of the Sefer Torah is not precisely accurate. But writing a Sefer Torah constitutes a Biblical obligation, and it thus cannot be fulfilled, due to our lack of knowledge regarding the precise spelling of all the words. For this reason, the Sha’agat Aryeh avers, it is not customary for everyone to write a Sefer Torah. Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Iggerot Moshe, disputes this line of reasoning. A famous Halachic principle establishes that “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra” – when it comes to Torah obligations, we must act stringently in situations of uncertainty. Therefore, Rav Moshe argues, we should be required to write a Sefer Torah despite the uncertainties that we have regarding certain words, because of the possibility that we write them correctly. As long as there is a chance that we can fulfill the Torah obligation by writing a Sefer Torah, we should be required to do so, in accordance with the rule of “Safek De’Orayta Le’humra.” Rav Moshe therefore suggests a different reason for why people do not write a Sefer Torah, explaining that Halacha does not require incurring an exceedingly large expense for the fulfillment of a Misva. Although one must be willing to spend all the money he has if necessary to avoid transgressing a Misvat Lo Ta’aseh (Biblical prohibition), one is not required to spend more than one-fifth of his assets to fulfill a Misvat Aseh (affirmative command). 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The Torah in Parashat Vayelech (Debarim 31:12) commands that the entire nation – men, women and children – must assemble in Jerusalem for a special ceremony, called “Hakhel” (“assemble”), every seven years. This ceremony, which featured the public reading of certain sections of the Torah by the king, would take place after the conclusion of the Shemita year, on the first day of Hol Ha’moed Sukkot. The Gemara in Masechet Kiddushin (34) comments that as Hakhel constitutes a Misvat Aseh She’ha’zman Gerama – an affirmative command which applies at a particular time – it should, in principle, apply only to men. As a general rule, women are exempt from these kinds of Misvot. However, Hakhel marks an exception to this rule, as the Torah explicitly commands assembling the men, women and children. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the entire essence of the Jewish Nation lies in the Torah. It is the Torah that distinguishes us from all other peoples. Other nations perform acts of kindness, and have houses of prayer, but the Torah is unique to Am Yisrael. And, it is the Torah that enables us to earn eternal life and the unprecedented delights of the next world. Therefore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, it is worthwhile for the nation to come together at certain times in order to reaffirm its identity, to be reminded that the core essence of Am Yisrael is our commitment to the Torah. Once in seven years, a major assembly is held, and everybody will know that this assembly is being held for the purpose of conducting a public Torah reading. This will leave a profound impression on the people, reminding them of the primary importance of Torah in our lives. This awareness will arouse within the people a fierce desire to learn the Torah, and as a result of this desire, they will commit to learn the Torah intensively, thus becoming worthy of Hashem’s blessings. The king would read the Torah at Hakhel in the Ezrat Nashim section of the courtyard of the Bet Ha’mikdash. He was permitted to read the Torah while sitting, though he was deemed praiseworthy if he stood for the reading. He would read from the beginning of the Book of Debarim through the first paragraph of Shema, in Parashat Va’et’hanan, and then skip to the second paragraph of Shema, in Parashat Ekeb. He would then read from the section of “Aser Te’aser” in Parashat Re’eh through the end of the sections of the blessings and curses. Trumpets would be sounded throughout the city of Jerusalem announcing the event of Hakhel, and a large wooden stage would be erected in the middle of the Ezrat Nashim. The king would step up onto the stage, where he would be visible to the entire crowd, and everyone would assemble around the stage. The Sefer Torah would be passed around the nation’s leaders (from the “Hazan Ha’kenesset,” to the “Rosh Ha’kenesset,” to the deputy Kohen Gadol, and then to the Kohen Gadol), until it was finally handed to the king. This was done as an expression of honor for the king. The king opens the Sefer Torah, recites the Berachot, and reads the aforementioned sections. After the reading, he recites seven additional Berachot. A man or woman who was able to attend Hakhel and failed to do so, or a king who refuses to read the Torah at Hakhel, transgresses this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that those who neglect this Misva are liable to grave punishment, because Hakhel constitutes a “strong pillar” that upholds our religion, and thus failing to fulfill this Misva threatens the perpetuation of our faith. The Misva of Hakhel, as mentioned, is linked to the Misva of Shemita, as it is conducted during Sukkot after the conclusion of the Shemita year. As such, it applies only when the Misva of Shemita applies, meaning, when the majority of the Jewish Nation resides in the Land of Israel. A number of writers raised the question of why the Sages did not enact any commemoration of the Misva of Hakhel. Many other laws that apply during times of the Bet Ha’mikdash are required even nowadays, at least in some form, in commemoration of the Misva that was observed in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. Hakhel is an exception, as the Sages did not require any form of ceremony for us to conduct to commemorate this Misva. The Aderet (Rav Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim, 1845-1905) suggested that the Rabbis instituted commemorations for Misvot that applied during the times of both the first and second Bateh Mikdash. The Misva of Hakhel, however, requires a king, and thus it was not observed in the latter part of the Second Commonwealth, after the Jews lost sovereignty and they did not have a king. Therefore, the Sages did not enact a commemoration of Hakhel. Another explanation is that the custom observed in some communities to remain awake on the last night of Sukkot (Hoshana Rabba) reading the Book of Debarim commemorates Hakhel, the king’s reading of Debarim during Sukkot. Yet a third theory is that the custom of “Hatan Torah,” calling a distinguished member of the congregation for the reading of the final section of the Torah on Simhat Torah, commemorates Hakhel. We might add that in a certain sense, the concept of Hakhel is commemorated each and every Shabbat, when Jews congregate in the synagogue and hear the Torah reading and the Rabbi’s speech. Like during Hakhel, a large assembly gathers for the purpose of hearing and learning Torah, which reinforces our appreciation of the importance of Torah, and its centrality in our lives. The children see the tumult and excitement, as everyone has come together in the synagogue, and they understand that all this is done for the purpose of learning the Torah. They thus grow up recognizing and appreciating the singular significance of Torah, which is the core essence of Jewish identity.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 28:9) commands, “Ve’halachta Bi’drachav” – “You shall walk in his ways.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this verse introduces the obligation to follow G-d’s example, to conduct ourselves in accordance with the qualities that He models for us. The Gemara, in several places (including Sota 14), teaches that just as G-d is merciful, kind and compassionate, we must be merciful, kind and compassionate in our interactions and dealings with other people. Although we human beings are limited and imperfect, and are thus incapable of attaining G-d’s pristine perfection, this verse commands us to strive to follow His example. This includes performing acts of kindness for other people, just as G-d provided Adam and Hava with clothing, visited Abraham Abinu when he was ill, comforted Yishak when his father passed away, and buried Moshe Rabbenu after his death. We are to follow G-d’s example and perform these and other acts of kindness. The reason for this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, is obvious, as we are to constantly strive to improve our character, by working to follow the example set for us by G-d Himself. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this Misva affects everything we do, governing the way we eat, conduct our financial affairs, our interactions with other people, and our prayers and Torah study. Everything we do should be done in accordance with the character traits modeled for us by the Almighty. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, the Rambam taught that this Misva includes the obligation to follow the “middle way,” meaning, to avoid extremes, and conduct ourselves reasonably and moderately. We must be neither stingy nor overly generous. We need to find the “happy medium” with regard to our character traits. This Misva requires us to constantly scrutinize our conduct, and evaluate ourselves, to determine whether we behave with proper Middot (character traits). The Sages inferred this concept from the verse (Tehillim 50:23), “Ve’sam Derech,” which could be read as “Ve’sham Derech” – “and assessing the way,” alluding to the requirement to introspect and evaluate one’s behavior. One who lives this way, the Sages teach, will earn a portion in the world to come, and will have the privilege of beholding the Shechina. This Misva applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One transgresses this command by failing to work to improve his character and to suppress his Yeser Ha’ra (evil inclination) so that he faithfully abides by the Misvot. Rav Moshe Cordovero (Safed, 1522-1570) wrote a famous work, Tomer Debora, which presents a detailed, step-by-step guide for how to follow G-d’s thirteen attributes of mercy which He pronounced to Moshe (Shemot 34:6-7). In the context of the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s discussion of this Misva, he addresses an important philosophical question relevant to the attribution of human character traits to G-d. Although we find that G-d is described in the Torah and by the prophets as having various qualities, we must not make the mistake of attributing to Him human properties. For example, one of the thirteen attributes of mercy is “Erech Apayim” (patience, being slow to anger), which seems to imply that G-d experiences anger which He then restrains. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that it is preposterous to think of G-d as actually experiencing anger. After all, one feels anger because of frustration, His inability to control the situation in the way He wants. G-d, of course, has unlimited power over the universe, and can do anything He wishes. He thus never has any reason to feel angry. And, anger is a sign of a faulty character, whereas G-d, quite obviously, is perfect. Necessarily, then, the descriptions of G-d’s anger must be understood allegorically. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that since there is a great deal of evil in the world, and many people worship other deities, the world deserves annihilation. G-d’s allowing the world to continue existing is depicted as His restraining His anger, in that He refrains from punishing the world the way it deserves to be punished. The Gemara (Berachot 7a) comments that G-d is angry for one moment each day (“Ve’Kel Zo’em Be’chol Yom”), and the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains this as a reference to the moment each day when the world’s sins “tip the scales,” exceeding its merits. At that moment, G-d is “angry” in the sense that the world deserves to be annihilated. G-d Himself, as explained, does not actually become angry, but the world becomes deserving of G-d’s anger, and this is the meaning of those passages which depict G-d as angry. The Misva of “Ve’halachta Bi’drachav” is the 611 th Misva, and 611 is the Gematria of the word “Torah.” This alludes to the singular importance of this Misva, as it is all-encompassing, calling upon us to conduct all our affairs, throughout the entire day, in accordance with the values and character traits taught to us by G-d. A beautiful example of the significance of this Misva is a story told of a wealthy woman who was passing by a department store, and she noticed several children peering into the store window. She discovered that these were underprivileged orphans, who longingly stared at all the beautiful clothing for sale in the store, which they could never purchase. The woman brought them inside the store and purchased for them complete outfits, from head to toe. As they were leaving, one of the children turned to her and asked, “Who are you? Are you G-d?” “No,” the woman replied, “I am one of His children.” “That makes sense,” the children said. “You are related to Him, so you act like Him.” The Jewish People are called G-d’s children. When we act kindly and compassionately, we show the world that G-d, our Father, is kind and compassionate, and we thus bring honor and glory to not only ourselves, but also to Hashem.

In the Vidui Ma’aser proclamation that a farmer was required to make every several years, avowing compliance with the various tithing obligations, he declares, “Ve’lo Natati Mimenu Le’met” (Debarim 26:14) – that he did not use the Ma’aser (tithe) for the needs of a dead body. This refers to the misuse of the money of Ma’aser Sheni, meaning, the funds onto which one had transferred the sanctity of Ma’aser Sheni, the tithe of one’s produce which is to be eaten in Jerusalem. This money must be brought to Jerusalem and used to purchase food and beverages, which are then to be eaten there in Jerusalem. This verse – “Ve’lo Natati Mimenu Le’met” – establishes a Biblical prohibition against using Ma’aser Sheni money for any other purpose. The Torah speaks of using the money for a “dead body,” referring to any purpose that does not sustain life, meaning, anything other than food or beverage. Thus, one may not use the money for utensils or jewelry. One may, however, use the money for skin ointments. This Halacha forms the basis of the general rule that applying ointment onto one’s skin is considered in a certain sense like eating. It is forbidden to use Ma’aser Sheni money even for Misva purposes, such as for a coffin or shrouds for a dead body. One who violated this prohibition, and used Ma’aser Sheni money for something other than food or drink, must take that sum of money and purchase food or drinks, which he must then consume in Jerusalem. This prohibition thus falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which one can rectify by paying money, and for which one is therefore not liable to Malkut. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when the obligation of Ma’aser Sheni applies.

After the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, a farmer is required to make a proclamation avowing his compliance with the various tithing obligations, as dictated by the Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:13-15). In this declaration, the farmer specifies several laws that he obeyed, including, “Ve’lo Bi’arti Mimenu Be’tameh” (26:14), which means that he did not eat his Ma’aser Sheni in a state of Tum’a (impurity). The Ma’aser Sheni tithe must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, and the Torah here informs us that it is forbidden to partake of this produce in a state of Tum’a. The fact that the farmer declares that he did not eat the produce while Tameh (impure), and that he concludes, “I have done in accordance with all that You commanded me,” shows that this is prohibited. This verse thus establishes a Biblical prohibition against eating Ma’aser Sheni produce while impure. This command forbids both eating Ma’aser Sheni while one is himself Tameh, and eating Ma’aser Sheni which has become Tameh, even though he is not Tameh. The Torah prohibition refers only to eating Ma’aser Sheni in Jerusalem, where it is to be consumed. If, for whatever, one ate Ma’aser Sheni outside Jerusalem, while he or the produce was Tameh, he does not transgress this Torah prohibition. Nevertheless, this is forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment. One who eats Ma’aser Sheni in a state of Tum’a is liable to Malkut; if he does so outside Jerusalem, then he receives Malkut for violating the Rabbis’ edict. This command is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when tithing produce is required on the level of Torah law.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo presents the text of the “Vidui Ma’aser” proclamation which a farmer must make every three years, avowing his compliance with the various tithing obligations. This text includes the pronouncement, “Lo Achalti Ve’oni Mimenu” (Debarim 26:14) – that the farmer did not partake of the hallowed Ma’aser Sheni produce in a state of Aninut, meaning, immediately after a family member’s death, before the burial. The Ma’aser Sheni tithe, which is brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, has Halachic sanctity, and the Torah here establishes that, due to its sanctity, an Onen (person in a state of Aninut) is forbidden from eating it. An Onen is forbidden also from eating other hallowed foods, meaning, the meat of Korbanot (sacrifices). This is deduced from the story told in Parashat Shemini (10) of the events that transpired on the first day when Aharon and his sons served as Kohanim in the Mishkan. Two of Aharon’s sons tragically died that day, and Aharon and his remaining sons refrained from eating the meat of a sacrifice which would normally be eaten. Moshe asked why they did not eat the meat, and Aharon explained that as he was in a state of Aninut, he was not permitted to partake of the sacrifice. Aharon said, “Ve’achalti Hatat Hayom, Hayitab Be’eneh Hashem” (“If I would eat a sin-offering today, what this be pleasing in G-d’s eyes?” – Vayikra 10:19). The Sefer Ha’hinuch offers two explanations for why the Torah forbade an Onen from eating hallowed food. First, he writes, a person eating sacrificial food of Ma’aser Sheni is considered as though he eats “from the table of G-d,” as G-d’s guest, and it is disrespectful to sit at a king’s table in a state of sorrow and anguish. As we read in Megilat Ester (4:2), “En La’bo El Sha’ar Ha’melech Bi’lbush Sak” – it was not allowed to appear in the area in front of King Ahashverosh’s palace wearing sackcloth, the garments worn by mourners. In the king’s presence, one must appear happy and cheerful. If this was true of King Ahashverosh, then it is certainly true – and much more so – of Hashem, the King of the universe. Therefore, the Torah commanded that a person who just suffered the loss of a family member is not permitted to eat “at the King’s table,” meaning, to eat sacred food. Secondly, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the Gemara teaches that “Kohanim Ochelim U’be’alim Mitkaperim” – a person bringing a sacrifice achieves atonement through the Kohanim’s consumption of the sacrifice. Therefore, when the Kohanim partook of sacrifices, they needed to have certain intentions so that their consumption of the sacrifice would have the desired effect. A person in a state of Aninut is distraught, and thus unable to concentrate and have the proper focus when he eats. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch suggests, the Torah forbade an Onen from eating sacrifices. On the level of Torah law, a person is considered an Onen on the day of a family member’s passing and burial. The night after that day, he is considered an Onen by force of Rabbinic enactment, and must therefore continue refraining from hallowed food. The status of Aninut remains throughout the period from the family member’s passing, until the burial. This prohibition is binding upon both men and women, and applies during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash, when sacrifices were brought, and when Ma’aser Sheni and other tithes were required on the level of Torah law. One who eats a Ke’zayit of Ma’aser Sheni or sacrificial food on the day of a family member’s passing is liable to Malkut. On the night after the death and burial, when Aninut is extended by force of Rabbinic enactment, one who transgresses receives Malkut for violating the law imposed by the Sages.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:12-15) commands one to make a verbal declaration after “the third year,” avowing his compliance with his various tithing obligations. Each year, a farmer must give a portion of his produce – Teruma – to a Kohen, as well as one-tenth – Ma’aser Rishon – to a Levi. In addition, on the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle, he must take another tenth – Ma’aser Sheni – to Jerusalem and eat it there. On the third and sixth years, this tithe is substituted with Ma’aser Ani – a tithe for the poor. (During the Shemita year, all the produce is declared ownerless, and thus no tithing obligations apply.) The Torah here commands that after each year of Ma’aser Ani – meaning, after the third and sixth years – one must make a proclamation avowing his having satisfied these requirements. This verbal proclamation is commonly known as “Vidui Ma’aser” – “the tithing confession.” Normally, the term “Vidui” (“confession”) refers to the confession of sin; in this instance, it denotes avowing having done the right thing. In explaining the reason behind this Misva, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that what distinguishes the human being from all other creatures is the faculty of speech. Even animals have some degree of intelligence, but none of them have the power of verbal communication. For this reason, the Sefer Ha’hinuch observes, many people are especially careful about how they speak, even more careful than they are about how they act. Keenly aware of the special importance of this defining human characteristic, they exercise particular caution in regard to their speech. Therefore, the Torah commanded a farmer to verbally affirm his meeting his Terumot and Ma’aserot obligations, as this will ensure his compliance with these laws. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that giving Terumot and Ma’aserot is an especially important responsibility, as these donations support those who serve Hashem in the Bet Ha’mikdash. Thus, in order to help enforce these obligations, the Torah requires farmers to make the Vidui Ma’aser proclamation. One who knows he will have to verbally affirm compliance with these requirements will likely comply with them, in order not to compromise his speech through a false declaration. The Misva of Vidui Ma’aser thus helps ensure that one meets his obligations. One must declare Vidui Ma’aser specifically during the day. It is done in the Bet Ha’mikdash, as the Torah commands making this declaration “Lifneh Hashem Elokecha” – “before Hashem your G-d” (26:13). Nevertheless, the Rambam rules that one who declared Vidui Ma’aser somewhere else, outside the Bet Ha’mikdash, has fulfilled his obligation. As mentioned, one must declare Vidui Ma’aser after the third and sixth years of the seven-year Shemita cycle. Specifically, it is done on the final day of Pesach the following year, meaning, in the fourth year, and in the Shemita year. This Misva is binding only upon men, and only during the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. The Aderet (Rav Eliyahu David Rabinowitz-Teomim, 1843-1905), who served as the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, maintained that the Vidui Ma’aser proclamation should be made even nowadays, when there is no Bet Ha’mikdash. This position was disputed by the Hazon Ish (Rav Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz, 1878-1953).

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Tabo (Debarim 26:5) introduces the Misva known as “Mikra Bikkurim,” which requires a farmer to make a special proclamation upon bringing his Bikkurim – first ripened fruits – to the Bet Ha’mikdash. In this proclamation, the farmer recalls the story of Beneh Yisrael’s enslavement in Egypt and the miracles of the Exodus. He then expresses his gratitude for the land which G-d has given him, from which he produced quality fruit. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah requires the farmer to not only bring his first fruits, but also to make this proclamation, because verbally expressing one’s feelings has a stronger impact than the feelings themselves. By pronouncing with one’s mouth G-d’s kindnesses, and his feelings of gratitude, those feelings become even stronger. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d wants the farmer to feel deep appreciation for the fruits themselves, and for the ability he was given to bring these fruits to Jerusalem, the good health and strength that G-d has granted him. And once he is expressing his gratitude for these blessings, he expresses gratitude also for what G-d has done for the Jewish People, miraculously redeeming them from Egyptian bondage, and bringing them to the Land of Israel. Through these expressions of gratitude, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, the farmer becomes worthy of continued blessing. It is because G-d wants us to earn His abundant blessings that He gives us this Misva, though which we become worthy of His kindness and grace. In the Mikra Bikkurim proclamation, the farmer expresses gratitude for the fruits he produced from “Ha’adama Asher Natata Li Hashem” – “the land which You, Hashem, have given me” (26:10). Therefore, this proclamation is made only by those who are given a portion of the land. Women, who do not receive a portion, do not recite Mikra Bikkurim, even though they are required to bring Bikkurim if they have agricultural land and produce fruit. Likewise, a Tumtum and Adroginus – people whose gender cannot be ascertained – do not recite Mikra Bikkurim. Additionally, an Apotropus – administrator of an estate on behalf of the deceased’s orphans – does not recite Mikra Bikkurim when he brings Bikkurim on the orphans’ behalf from the land left by their father. Since this land does not belong to him, he cannot recite, “Ha’adama Asher Natata Li Hashem,” and so he does not recite Mikra Bikkurim. An interesting exception to this rule is a convert, who recites Mikra Bikkurim despite the fact that he does not receive a portion of Eretz Yisrael. The reason is that Eretz Yisrael was given to the descendants of Abraham Abinu, who is called an “Ab Hamon Goyim” – “the father of a multitude of nations” (Bereshit 17:5). Abraham is considered the “father” of not only his biological descendants, but also members of other nations who join Am Yisrael. Therefore, a convert is able to refer to the Land of Israel as “Ha’adama Asher Natata Li Hashem,” because he is regarded as an heir of Abraham Abinu, to whom G-d promised the land. The Sefer Ha’hinuch raises the question of why a woman is excluded from the Misva of Mikra Bikkurim simply because there is one phrase in the proclamation which is not relevant to her. Wouldn’t we assume that it is worth making this proclamation, given that the vast majority of the text is applicable to a woman no less than to a man? The Sefer Ha’hinuch answers that this Halacha shows the importance of precision when we pray and speak to Hashem. We must ensure never to say to G-d anything which is not perfectly accurate. Indeed, if even one phrase in a proclamation is inaccurate, then the proclamation should not be made, because when we speak to G-d, we must adhere to the strictest standards of precision. This Misva, of course, applies only when the Misva of Bikkurim applies – meaning, only in the times of the Bet Ha’mikdash. It applies specifically in the Land of Israel, and, by force of Rabbinic enactment, in the areas of Syria which King David conquered and annexed into his kingdom. One who brings his Bikkurim and fails to recite this declaration has transgressed this affirmative command.

In the final verses of Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:17-19), the Torah introduces three Misvot relevant to the evil nation of Amalek. The first is the command to always remember Amalek’s attack on Beneh Yisrael soon after the Exodus from Egypt. The significance of Amalek’s attack can be understood in light of a verse in Parashat Balak (Bamidbar 24:20), in which Bilam proclaims, “Reshit Goyim Amalek” – that Amalek was “the first among the nations.” Targum Onkelos explains this to mean that Amalek was the first nation to wage war with Beneh Yisrael after they left Egypt. The Sages compare Amalek’s attack to somebody who jumps into a bath of scalding water, into which nobody else had dared to enter. This fellow was badly burned, but he had the effect of cooling the water somewhat, so that others could enter. Similarly, after the miracles of the Exodus and the splitting of the sea, all the nations of the world feared Beneh Yisrael, and did not dare initiate hostilities against them. Amalek was defeated after attacking Beneh Yisrael, but the attack had the effect of exposing Beneh Yisrael’s vulnerability, “cooling” the fear that the rest of the world had felt, thus paving the way for future offensives by other peoples. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that Amalek launched this unprovoked attack due to its “evil heart and evil nature.” The Torah wants us to remember this event, the Sefer Ha’hinuch adds, so that we realize that anybody who causes to harm to Am Yisrael is despised by G-d. Furthermore, the Sefer Ha’hinuch explains, the downfall of the enemy nations is commensurate with the extent of their efforts to cause us harm and destroy us. The harder they try to fight against us, the greater the devastation that they will suffer as a result. This notion is relevant to our time, as well, when we have enemies who are expending an enormous amount of effort to wage war against the Jewish People. The Kabbalists teach that the concept underlying this Misva refers not only to the actual nation of Amalek, but to all those who follow Amalek’s evil example, and fight viciously against Am Yisrael. We must firmly believe that the modern-day “Amalekites” are despised by Hashem, and He will bring retribution for the pain and harm that they cause to the Jewish Nation. The Sefer Ha’hinuch notes that the Torah did not specify when or how often we are to fulfill this Misva to remember Amalek’s attack. As opposed to the Misva to remember the Exodus from Egypt, which, as the Sages inferred from the text of the Torah, requires mentioning the Exodus each day and night, the Misva to remember Amalek’s assault is not given any time-frame. However, the accepted custom is to fulfill this Misva once a year, on the Shabbat before Purim, by reading these verses from the Torah in the synagogue. This is done because on Purim, we read the Megilla, which tells of the destruction of Haman and his sons, who belonged to the nation of Amalek. In advance of the reading of the destruction of Amalek, then, we fulfill the Misva to remember what Amalek did to us. Later, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one transgresses this affirmative command by going his entire life without ever verbally remembering Amalek’s attack. It appears that in his view, the Torah obligation requires verbally recalling Amalek’s attack just once at some point in one’s life. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command applies in all places and in all time-periods, and is binding only upon men. He explains that since women do not generally go out to war, they are exempt from the obligation to remember Amalek’s attack, which is linked to the Misva of waging war to annihilate Amalek. Later scholars raised the question of how to reconcile the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s comments with the Gemara’s teaching that in the case of a Milhemet Misva (a war which there is a Misva to wage), everyone must participate, including brides and grooms. The Gemara clearly assumes that when it comes to obligatory wars, the responsibility falls upon even women. The answer given is that women fulfill non-combat roles, such as preparing and delivering food and other supplies for the soldiers. They do not, however, participate in the actual fighting, and therefore, in the view of the Sefer Ha’hinuch, they are not included in the Misva to remember Amalek’s attack, since they do not fight against Amalek. In the next verse, the Torah introduces the command, “Timheh Et Zecher Amalek Mi’tahat Ha’shamayim” – to eradicate Amalek from the face of the earth. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Batra relates that King David’s general, Yoab, waged war against Amalek, and killed only the males. When he returned, David asked him why he did not kill also the women, and Yoab replied by citing the phrase “Timheh Et Zecher Amalek.” His schoolteacher, Yoab recalled, taught him that the word “Zecher” in this verse should be pronounced, “Zechar” – “the males of,” such that the obligation is to kill only the men. This is a mistake, as the correct pronunciation is “Zecher,” which means “memory of,” and the Misva requires killing even the women. According to some views, this schoolteacher was tracked down and punished for the grave mistake that was made when teaching this command. The Gemara in Masechet Sanhedrin teaches that upon entering the Land of Israel, Beneh Yisrael became obligated in three Misvot: appointing a king, building the Bet Ha’mikdash, and annihilating the nation of Amalek. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that this command is binding upon all those who have the practical ability to kill Amalekites. Fundamentally, this Misva applies in all times and places. In practice, of course, we are unable to identify anybody as a member of the nation of Amalek. The Assyrian emperor Sanhedrib captured much of the ancient world and transferred entire populations from their lands, such that residents of a country cannot be assumed to be the descendants of the original nations who lived there. Hence, nobody can be identified as a member of the nation of Amalek, and we are thus unable to fulfill this Misva. The final words of Parashat Ki-Teseh are “Lo Tishkah” – “Do not forget,” introducing a third command, forbidding us from forgetting what Amalek did to our ancestors. In addition to the affirmative command to remember Amalek’s attack, we are also prohibited from doing anything that would cause us to forget what they did. The Gemara understood that the affirmative command requires verbally recalling Amalek’s attack, whereas the prohibition forbids us from forgetting it in our minds.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:13-16) forbids having in one’s possession inaccurate weights and measures, meaning, instruments which give incorrect readings of weight, volume or size, and could thus cheat either the seller or the buyer. Using such instruments, the Torah states, is considered “To’abat Hashem” – “an abomination to G-d.” The Torah here forbids having inaccurate weights and measures in one’s possession even if they are not being used. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that possessing such instruments is forbidden “Pen Yiheyeh Le’mokesh” – “lest it becomes a trap,” meaning, because it might lead to sinful conduct. The Rambam writes that other people, who do not realize that the instrument is not accurate, might innocently use it, and will unknowingly end up stealing, by overcharging or underpaying for merchandise. From the Sefer Ha’hinuch’s formulation, however, it appears that he understood the concern to be for the person himself. Even though he knows that the instrument is imprecise, he might nevertheless be tempted to use it in order to steal. The Gemara in Masechet Baba Batra (89) establishes that this prohibition applies even if it can be assumed that the instrument will never be used. For example, if the instrument had been used as a bedpan, for urine, such that we cannot conceive of people using it later to measure food or beverages, nevertheless, one may not keep it in his home. The Torah speaks of the various instruments in this context with repetitive phrases – “Eben Va’aben”; “Efa Ve’efa.” The Rambam writes that although the Torah repeats these phrases, this command is to be listed as a single Biblical prohibition, and not as two prohibitions. One might have assumed that the extra words imply additional commands, such that one who transgresses this prohibition is actually guilty of multiple violations. The Rambam writes that this is not the case, as the Torah occasionally repeats itself for emphasis, and thus one violates only a single prohibition by having inaccurate weights or measures in his possession. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who keeps a faulty scale or measuring device in his home violates this command, but is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch gives two reasons why one is not liable to Malkut for this violation. Firstly, and more obviously, this falls under the category of “Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh” – a prohibition which one transgresses passively, without performing a forbidden act. One violates this command simply by keeping the forbidden instrument in his home, and failing to bring it out of his home. As no action is performed, the violator is not liable to Malkut. The Sefer Ha’hinuch then adds a second reason, explaining that this prohibition falls under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” – a violation which one can rectify by paying money. If one uses an inaccurate instrument to weigh or measure merchandise, and thereby steals, he corrects his misconduct by repaying the person from whom he stole. Malkut are not administered for a violation that can be rectified, and so one is not subject to Malkut for violating the prohibition against faulty weights and measures. Later writers raised the question of how the Sefer Ha’hinuch could apply the rule of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin” to the prohibition against possessing faulty weights or measures. As explained earlier, this command forbids not only using these instruments, but even just having them in one’s home. This violation thus does not entail any theft, and, as such, it cannot be rectified through payment. How, then, does the Sefer Ha’hinuch classify this prohibition under the category of “Lav Ha’nitan Le’tashlumin”? The Minhat Hinuch (Rav Yosef Babad, 1801-1874) and the Or Same’ah (Rav Meir Simcha Ha’kohen of Dvinsk, 1843-1926) answer this question based on the aforementioned explanation of the command not to even possess faulty weights and measures. As we saw, the Torah issued this command in order to prevent the use of these instruments, which entails theft. Now if somebody actually uses inaccurate weights and measures, to the detriment of the other party to the transaction, then he is not liable to Malkut, because he repays the amount that he stole from his fellow. It stands to reason that if this violation is not punishable by Malkut, then the possession of faulty weights and measures, which is forbidden only as a safeguard against the actual use of such devices, cannot be punishable by Malkut. The prohibition enacted as a safeguard against theft cannot be treated more seriously than theft itself. Therefore, since one does not receive Malkut for using inaccurate instruments, one does not receive Malkut for having them in his possession, either. This prohibition should remind us of the importance of exercising caution with regard to what we allow into our possession. If the Torah forbids keeping in storage an old, broken scale, as it may possibly lead to forbidden activity, then certainly we must ensure not to allow in our homes things that people use and which could lead to misconduct. We must be careful with regard to the literature that enters our home, and also not allow unfiltered internet access, which poses far greater spiritual danger than an old scale in the basement. The Torah’s command teaches us of the diligence required when building and maintaining a Torah home, that we must not keep in the home anything which could cause people to stumble and act improperly.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:10-11) addresses the case of an argument that erupts between two men, and the wife of one of the men violently attacks the other, reaching for his private area. Since she endangered the man fighting with her husband, the Torah commands, “Ve’kasota Et Kapah” – “You shall cut off her hand.” This command is understood as a general obligation to rescue somebody who is pursued or has come under assault, by attacking the person who threatens him. The verse continues, “Lo Tahos Enecha,” adding a prohibition against having compassion for the attacker. The Torah thus introduces both an affirmative command to rescue the pursued, and a prohibition against turning away and allowing the pursuer to continue. If one can stop the pursuer by inflicting an injury – as in the case described by the Torah, where the woman’s hand could be severed – then this should be done. If the only way to stop the pursuer is by killing him, then he must be killed. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that G-d wants us to maintain law and order in society, and so the Torah commands us not to allow the strong to take advantage of the weak. Moreover, the weak and vulnerable tend to be humbler and more devoted to G-d, and the Torah thus wants us to protect them against the violent elements of society who have no regard for Torah values. This Misva applies even if the Rodef (pursuer) is an adult who pursues a young child. The child’s life must be protected by stopping the adult pursuer. If one was able to rescue the pursued by injuring the Rodef, but nevertheless killed him, he is considered a murderer, as he killed unnecessarily. It is only if the pursuer cannot be stopped without being killed that one is allowed – and thus required – to kill the pursuer. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 49a) applies this rule to the story told in the Book of Shemuel II (chapter 2) of Abner, who killed Asah’el, who was chasing after him. Abner was considered guilty of murder because he could have protected himself by injuring Asah’el, and he did not need to kill him. If a woman is in labor, and, due to complications, she becomes dangerously ill, the doctor may kill the fetus in order to save the woman, as the fetus is considered to be “pursuing” the mother, in that it threatens the mother’s life. However, once the baby’s head has exited the mother’s body, then this situation is treated as the natural process of childbirth, and the infant may not be killed, even if the mother’s condition is life-threatening. The obligation to rescue somebody who is pursued applies also in the case of a man pursuing a woman with whom relations are forbidden, with the intent to violate her. This man, too, is considered a Rodef, and must be stopped, even if this necessitates killing him. This applies also if a man pursues another man for the purpose of committing a homosexual act with him. If somebody makes his way to commit a different capital offense, however, one may not kill or injure the fellow to stop him from committing the violation. Instead, Bet Din is assigned the task of trying the sinner after the fact. These two Misvot – the affirmative command to the rescue the pursued, and the prohibition against refraining from doing so – apply in all times and places, and are binding upon both men and women. One who is able to rescue the pursued but fails to do so transgresses these two commands as well as the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta’amod Al Dam Re’echa” (Vayikra 19:16), which forbids sitting idly instead of rescuing somebody whose life is in danger.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:7-10) commands that if someone’s married brother died without children, and he chooses not to marry the widow in fulfillment of the Misva of Yibum, then he must perform a special ceremony called Halisa. Once a married man dies without children, the widow is bound to the deceased’s brother (a relationship called “Zika”), such that she is not permitted to marry anybody else. The deceased’s brother bears an obligation to perform Halisa to release the widow from this bond if he does not want to marry her. The Halisa ceremony involves the brother wearing a special shoe which the widow unties and removes from his foot, after which she spits in front of him. The concept underlying the Halisa ceremony is that the widow demonstrates to the brother her willingness to be subservient to him, as represented by her removing his shoe, an act which a servant would perform for a master. She was prepared to serve him if he would marry her in order to perpetuate her deceased husband’s legacy. But since he has refused to marry her, she no longer gives him respect, to the extent that she now spits in his presence. This obligation applies only if the brother was born before the husband passed away. If the husband died and his parents then begot a child, the widow is not bound to this brother, since the brothers were not alive at the same time. The Misva applies only to paternal brothers, meaning, brothers who share the same father. If the deceased had only a brother from the same mother, but not a brother from the same father, then there is no Misva of Yibum in such a case. The Torah writes that Yibum or Halisa is required if a husband dies without a “son” (“U’ben En Lo”), but this refers to either a son or a daughter. If the deceased has a son or a daughter, then there is no obligation of Yibum or Halisa. If the deceased had a son or daughter who has since passed away, and has a grandchild from that son or daughter, then there is no obligation of Yibum or Halisa, since the deceased has living offspring. When Halisa is to be performed, three judges are chosen to oversee the process, which involves certain texts which both the widow and her brother-in-law must recite. In order to publicize the Halisa, an additional five Rabbis are brought to observe. Before the Halisa, the Rabbis instruct the widow and brother-in-law, “Go to such-and-such place,” as the location of the Halisa must be designated in advance. The Rabbis then ask the brother-in-law a series of questions, ascertaining that he is at least thirteen years of age, and that this woman is indeed his deceased brother’s widow. The judges also ask the widow if she had eaten that day, as she should not eat anything on the day of the Halisa before the ceremony. The reason is that the woman is required to spit her own saliva, and not fluid from anything she had eaten. The shoe used for Halisa must be made from leather, and optimally should be placed on the brother’s right foot. This special shoe has laces and straps tied up the brother’s leg. He must wear the shoe directly on his foot, without socks, as nothing may come in between the shoe and his foot. The widow unties the shoe and removes it. The brother must keep his foot on the ground throughout the process, and may not assist at all in the untying or removal of the shoe. She then spits in front of the brother, enough for the Rabbis to see. The Rabbis of the Bet Din then announce three times, “Halutz Ha’na’al,” and write her a “Get Halisa,” a text that pronounces her release from the bond to the brother-in-law. The widow is then permitted to marry anyone she wishes. Torah law permits a woman to marry a Kohen after Halisa, as she is not considered a Gerusha (divorcee), who is forbidden from marrying a Kohen. However, the Sages enacted that a woman who has performed Halisa may not then marry a Kohen, as though she had been divorced. If the deceased’s brother does not wish to marry the widow, and he refuses to perform Halisa, then he has violated this affirmative command. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that he is considered a “Ro’a Leb” – an “evil-hearted person,” as he keeps his widowed sister-in-law trapped and unable to marry.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh that if a married, childless man dies, and he has a brother, then the brother must perform “Yibum,” meaning, he must marry the widow. If he does not wish to marry her, then he performs a ceremony called Halisa, which is listed as a separate Misva. In explaining the reason behind the Misva of Yibum, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that when a couple marries, they are considered a single unit. This idea is rooted in the very first married couple – Adam and Hava – in that Hava was created from a part of Adam’s body. This shows that a wife is, in a sense, regarded as part of the husband. Now when a husband dies without leaving behind a spiritual legacy in the form of children who inherit his devotion to serving G-d, the Torah creates a method by which the deceased husband can be considered to beget children, such that he leaves a legacy. His brother marries the widow – who is considered part of the deceased – and their children will be considered the children of the deceased. The Misvot they perform will be partially credited to the deceased, thus elevating his soul. Of course, the biological father – the deceased’s brother – also shares in these merits, as he is the one who actually produces and raises the children. But in this way, the deceased can be considered to partially leave behind a spiritual legacy, and this is why the Torah introduced the concept of Yibum. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains on this basis the story of Onan, Yehuda’s second son, who married the widow of his older brother, Er, in fulfillment of the Misva of Yibum. However, although Onan married the widow, the Torah (Bereshit 38:9) tells that Onan refused to impregnate her, because he knew “Ki Lo Lo Yiheyeh Ha’zara” – “that the offspring would not be his.” The Sefer Ha’hinuch interprets this to mean that the child he would produce would not be attributed entirely to him, as he would be “sharing” this child with his deceased brother. Onan was not interested in only a partial share of the child, and so he refused to produce children with the widow. In any event, according to the Sefer Ha’hinuch, the concept underlying the Misva of Yibum is that it enables the deceased to leave a spiritual legacy here in the world through his brother’s marriage to his wife. The Misva of Yibum applies regardless of whether the husband died after he married his wife, or he died after Erusin (betrothal), before the completion of the marriage. Only a paternal brother is required to perform Yibum; a brother who shares only a mother with the deceased, and not a father, is not required to marry the widow. If the deceased was married to several wives, and had no children with any of them, then one of his brothers performs Yibum or Halisa to any of the deceased’s wives. The oldest surviving brother has first rights to perform Yibum, before the younger brothers. Once a brother performs Halisa, the widow may then not marry him. If the deceased also had other wives, they are also forbidden for marriage to the brother who performed Halisa, and also to all the other brothers, by force of Rabbinic enactment. Yibum should not be performed immediately after the husband’s death. The brother must wait ninety days – including the day of death and the day of the Yibum – as it must first be ascertained that the widow is not pregnant with the deceased’s child. If she is, then there is no Misva of Yibum, and thus the brother-in-law may not marry her. Therefore, a waiting period is required to ensure she is not pregnant before the deceased’s brother marries her. If a husband died while his wife was pregnant with his only child, but she miscarried, then she requires Yibum, because the deceased did not leave any children. The deceased’s brother fulfills this Misva by having relations with the widow. He fulfills the Misva even if he did not have intention at the time of the relations to fulfill the obligation. However, the Sages enacted that the brother should formally betroth the widow before having relations. This special betrothal before Yibum is referred to as a “Ma’amar.” The Misva of Yibum applies in all times and places. Even today, the brother of a childless husband who dies is required to perform Yibum, but it is customary to instead perform Halisa. If the brother performed neither Yibum nor Halisa, then he is in violation of this affirmative command.

The Torah in Parashat Ki-Seseh (Debarim 25:5) commands that when a married man dies without children, the widow may not have relations with another man until Yibum or Halisa. The term Yibum refers to the marriage of the deceased’s brother to the widow, and Halisa is a ceremony which the brother and widow perform if the brother does not wish to marry her. The Torah here commands that until Yibum or Halisa is performed, the widow may not have relations with any man, as the “Zika” (Halachic link) to her brother-in-law forbids her for all other men. If the widow does have relations with another man before Yibum or Halisa, then both she and the man violate this prohibition, and are liable to Malkut. The Rambam implies that this prohibition is violated only if the widow marries another man. The Sefer Ha’hinuch, however, writes that this command forbids relations with the widow even outside the context of marriage. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains the reason for this command in his discussion of the next Misva, the obligation upon the deceased’s brother to perform Yibum.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 25:4), “Lo Tahsom Shor Be’disho” – “You shall not muzzle an ox as it threshes.” This establishes a prohibition against preventing an animal from eating as it works outside in the field. The Torah gives the example of an ox on the threshing floor, but this command applies to all animals. It applies even to non-kosher animals, as the animal’s status vis-à-vis human consumption is of no relevance to this prohibition. It also applies to any form of work outside in the field, and not only to threshing. Anytime a person has an animal perform work in the field, he may not prevent the animal from eating. It makes no difference whether the animal wishes to eat produce that is still attached to the ground, or produce that has already been harvested. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah introduced this prohibition in order to engender within a person a kind, compassionate, sensitive character. Although G-d created animals to serve human beings, He commanded us to show sensitivity to the animals who work for us so that we accustom ourselves to show sensitivity to the people who work for us, pay them fairly, and care for their needs and for their wellbeing. This command refers only to animals; the laws regarding the rights of human workers is addressed in other contexts. One violates this prohibition even if he muzzled the animal before it started working and then kept the muzzle on as the animal worked. This prohibition applies in all times and places, and is binding upon both men and women. One who muzzled an animal while it was working in the field has transgressed this command and is liable to Malkut. Even if one did not muzzle the animal, but he shouted at the animal when it tried to eat, thus preventing it from eating, he is liable to Malkut. With respect to this prohibition, moving one’s lips to shout qualifies as an “action” such that the violator is regarded as having transgressed by committing a forbidden act, and is thus liable to Malkut. If somebody leased his fellow’s animal and muzzled it while it worked in the field, then in addition to receiving Malkut, the violator must compensate the owner for failing to feed the animal. One who leases someone’s animal accepts responsibility to feed it, and thus if he prevents the animal from eating, he owes the owner money for failing to meet this obligation. Normally, if a person commits an act for which he is liable to both Malkut and payment, he receives the Malkut and does not need to pay (“En Adam Lokeh U’meshalem”). In this instance, however, the violator must compensate the animal’s owner, because the financial obligation is incurred not by the forbidden act of muzzling the animal, but rather by the failure to feed the animal as required.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh that when somebody is found guilty of a violation, he must be given Makut (lashes). The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that this command is actually intended for the benefit of the transgressor. The afflictions that sinners endure in this world have the effect of cleansing their record, such that they can be worthy of the eternal rewards in the next world. In G-d’s great love for Am Yisrael, whom He treats as His precious children, He prescribed a system of punishment in this world so that violators can have the opportunity to receive great rewards in the world to come. Before the Malkut were administered, the violator would have his hands tied to a pole. The court official would tear the violator’s shirt until his chest was exposed, and stand on a stone behind him. The whip was made from the hide of a calf. One-third of the prescribed lashes were directed to the front of the violator’s body, and the other two-thirds struck his back. This command applies only in Eretz Yisrael, and only when there are courts consisting of judges who had received the official Semicha (ordination) that originated with Moshe Rabbenu. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a court failed to administer Malkut when this was required, they were deserving of severe punishment, because it is the threat of punishment that deters prospective sinners and thereby ensures compliance with the Torah’s laws. In this same verse, the Torah introduces a prohibition against lashing the convicted sinner more than the prescribed number of lashes. The Sages understood this command as establishing a general prohibition against striking a fellow Jew. This is inferred from the repetitious phrase in this verse – “Lo Yosif, Pen Tosif” – which implies that this prohibition is directed not only to the court official administering Malkut, but to all of us, forbidding striking our fellow. The Torah here states that a violator is given forty Malkut, but tradition explains this to mean thirty-nine. The Rambam writes that in truth, the verse should be understood literally, as referring to forty lashes, but tradition lowered the number to thirty-nine as a safeguard, to ensure that the court official does not exceed forty lashes. The Sefer Ha’hinuch questions why the Rambam advanced this novel theory, when the Gemara explicitly states that the word “Arba’im” (“forty”) in this verse means “one less than forty.” In any event, these thirty-nine lashes are the maximum amount the violation would receive. An assessment would be made by physicians beforehand to determine how many lashes the sinner could endure, based on his age and physical condition. If he could not tolerate even three lashes, then he would not receive any. The number of lashes needed to be a multiple of 3. Thus, for example, if the doctors determined that the violator could handle twenty lashes, then he would receive eighteen lashes. If, as the sinner is whipped, he lost control of his bodily functions, then he was not whipped anymore. If the whip was torn at some point after the court official began administering the Malkut, then he was required stop, without giving more lashes. If, however, the whip broke before the official began lashing the sinner, then he would repair the whip and proceed. If the sinner’s hands were not tied well to the pole, and he was able to escape, then he was not given lashes thereafter. It is forbidden not only to strike one’s fellow, but even to merely lift one’s hand and threaten to strike him. This Halacha is inferred from the story told in Parashat Shemot (2:13) of Moshe approaching two men whom he saw fighting. He turned to the “wicked one” and asked why he was striking his fellow. The Sages understood that Moshe saw this man lift his hand to strike the other, and so this person is called “the wicked one,” as it is forbidden even to lift one’s hand to strike somebody. This second aspect of the prohibition, which forbids striking one’s fellow, applies in all times and places, and to both men and women. The first aspect of this command, of course, applies only in the Land of Israel, during times when courts are authorized to administer punishment. One who strikes his fellow must make a series of payments to compensate him for the harm inflicted. As such, the violator is not liable to Malkut, as one is not liable to Malkut if he incurred a financial obligation by committing the transgression. If, however, one struck his fellow and the harm inflicted was worth less than a “Peruta” (the smallest unit of currency), then since there is no obligation to pay, he is liable to Malkut for violating this prohibition.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:19) that if one forgets sheaves of grain during the harvest, they must be left for the poor. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah required leaving these sheaves for the poor because when the underprivileged see the landowners harvesting their produce, they say to themselves, “These folks have such an abundance of a grain! If only we could have just several sheaves!” Out of compassion for the impoverished, G-d granted their request by giving them rights to the sheaves of grain that are forgotten during the harvest. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, leaving these sheaves for the poor will help the owner engender within himself the qualities of compassion and sensitivity, as a result of which he will be worthy of Hashem’s blessings. This requirement applies only to small sheaves of grain, specifically, sheaves amounting to one Se’a or less. If larger sheaves are forgotten, one may go back to retrieve them. Furthermore, the sheaves must be left for the poor only if they are forgotten by everybody. If the owner forgot about them but the workers did not, or vice-versa, then they may be retrieved. Even if some stranger saw that these sheaves were forgotten and informed the workers or owner, the sheaves may be retrieved. This Misva applies only in areas where the Teruma obligation applies – meaning, in Eretz Yisrael, and in regions near Eretz Yisrael. It is binding upon both men and women alike. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that one who violates this command by retrieving forgotten sheaves shows that he has a bad character, as he withholds that which ought to be given to the needy. In this same verse, the Torah adds a prohibition against going back to retrieve forgotten sheaves (“Lo Tashub Le’lekahto”). Thus, one is bound by both an affirmative command to leave the sheaves for the poor, and a prohibition forbidding him from taking it. One who transgresses this prohibition by retrieving forgotten sheaves is not liable to Malkut, because he can rectify his violation by bringing it back and leaving it for the poor, and one is not liable to Malkut for a violation which can be rectified (“Lav Ha’nitak”). According to some opinions, however, one would be liable to Malkut if, after unlawfully retrieving forgotten sheaves, the sheaves are lost and destroyed. Since he can no longer rectify his transgression by returning them, he is liable to Malkut.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:17), “Ve’lo Tahabol Beged Almana” – that one who lends money to a widow may not take something from her as collateral in lieu of payment. This applies regardless of whether the widow is needy or wealthy. Even if she is rich, it is forbidden for a lender to take one of her possessions as collateral. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah issued this prohibition in order to accustom us to act mercifully and compassionately. Widows are generally downtrodden and vulnerable, and taking collateral from a widow would make her feel taken advantage of. The Torah wants us to show particular compassion and sensitivity to widows, and so a creditor may not seize collateral from her. It is forbidden for a lender to take collateral from a widow even if she agrees to give one. This prohibition applies at all times and in all places, and is binding upon both men and women. One violates this command by taking collateral from a widow once the debt is due and she has not paid. It is permissible to take collateral from a widow as security at the time the loan is given. If a lender took collateral from a widow in violation of this command, he must return it. For this reason, he is not liable to Malkut, because Malkut are not administered when one committed a violation which he can rectify through payment. However, the Rambam maintains that if the lender took collateral and it was subsequently lost or destroyed, then he is liable to Malkut, since he can no longer rectify the violation by returning the object. The Sefer Ha’hinuch questions this ruling, noting that the value of the lost collateral will be deducted from the sum of the debt owed by the widow. Hence, the creditor is considered to have repaid for what he unlawfully took, and should therefore not be liable to Malkut even if the original object is lost or destroyed.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 24:17), “Lo Tateh Mishpat Ger Yatom” – forbidding judges from “swaying” a trial involving a litigant who is either a foreigner or an orphan. A judge might tilt the decision in one of two opposite directions in a such a case. First, since foreigners and orphans are, generally, weaker and more vulnerable, the judge might not take their arguments seriously, and might have a natural bias in favor of the other litigant, who is likely wealthier and more well-known. Conversely, the judge might tilt the decision in favor of the foreigner or orphan, out of pity for this litigant’s disadvantaged condition. The Torah commands that a judge must be honest and impartial when handling such cases, without showing bias toward the foreigner or orphan, or to the opposing litigant. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that if a litigant is both a foreigner and an orphan, then the judge who sways the decision in either direction violates this prohibition twice – as he sways the judgment of both a foreigner and an orphan. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch notes, the judge violates the separate prohibition of “Lo Ta’asu Avel Ba’mishpat” (Vayikra 19:15), which forbids judges from ruling unjustly. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that although this command is generally applicable to men – as only men serve as judges – it can, in some instances, be relevant even to women. If the litigants agree to bring their dispute to a female judge, and have her try the case, then she becomes bound by this prohibition, and would thus transgress this command if she sways the judgment against or in favor of a foreigner or orphan.

The Torah commands in Parashat Ki-Teseh (Debarim 2416), “Lo Yumtu Abot Al Banim, U’banim Lo Yumtu Al Abot” – “Fathers shall not be killed because of their sons, and sons shall not be killed because of their fathers.” This verse is understood to mean that a court is not permitted to put a defendant to death based on the testimony of his parent or child. Although the Torah speaks here specifically of testimony regarding a capital crime, this command in truth includes all court cases, even cases involving financial disputes. A Bet Din is forbidden by force of this command from acting upon testimony given by a witness about a family member. The Torah gives the example of a capital case because one might have assumed that a person would not testify untruthfully about his family member’s capital offense, which would lead to his or her execution. Since we would have thought to accept testimony incriminating one’s family member of a capital crime, the Torah introduced this command specifically in the context of an offense incurring the death penalty. Likewise, although the Torah speaks here of a parent testifying about a child, and a child testifying about a parent, this prohibition actually applies to testimony about any family member. The example of a parent and child is given because of the strong feelings of love and affection that exist between parents and children. We might have thought to accept incriminating testimony about one’s parent or child, because it is difficult to imagine that one would falsely testify against one’s parent or child. The Torah therefore gave this particular example, but the prohibition applies also to other family members. The Sefer Ha’hinuch explains that the Torah forbade accepting testimony about family members in order to help ensure the veracity of testimony accepted in courts of law. A stable society requires a functioning judicial system, and so it is imperative that courts act upon testimony which cannot be questioned. Therefore, the Torah forbade accepting testimony on behalf of family members, as family members might lie in order to help one another. The Sefer Ha’hinuch writes that the Torah extended this prohibition to include also incriminating testimony against family members as a safeguard against accepting testimony given on behalf of family members. If the Torah allowed accepting incriminating testimony, courts might then begin accepting even testimony on behalf of family members, and so the Torah disqualified all testimony about the witness’ family members. Additionally, the Sefer Ha’hinuch writes, family members generally live with one another, which frequently gives rise to tensions and fighting. When friction arises, a person might decide to come to court and falsely testify about his family member towards whom he feels resentment. He will then later regret having brought the false accusation, once his anger subsides. The Torah therefore commanded that testimony about family members must not be accepted. On the level of Torah law, this disqualification applies only to paternal relatives – father and son, grandfather and grandson, paternal brothers, the sons of brothers, and a man with his brother’s son. The Rabbis extended this prohibition to include also family members related maternally, or through marriage. According to some opinions, however, even these relationships are included in the Biblical prohibition. Regardless, it is clear that brothers and first cousins may not testify about one another. Second cousins, however, may testify about one another. A second cousin may testify about his second cousin’s parent, and vice-versa. According to some opinions, although one may not testify about a grandparent or grandson, one may testify about a great-grandparent or great-grandson. Others, however, maintain that when it comes to a family’s direct line, testimony is invalid even about somebody three or more generations removed. Anytime a person is ineligible to testify about a woman due to a familial relationship, he is also ineligible to testify about her husband. Likewise, if someone cannot testify about a man due to their familial relationship, he may not testify about his wife. Thus, for example, just as one cannot testify about his wife’s sister, he may not testify about her husband. However, one may testify about that husband’s family members. If a man betrothed a woman (Erusin), they may not testify about one another, even before they marry. At my wedding, two Rabbis served as witnesses – Rabbi Max Maslaton and Rabbi David Ozeri. It was later determined that since Rabbi Maslaton and Rabbi Ozeri’s wife are first cousins, they are considered relatives, and are thus disqualified to serve as witnesses together. As such, the betrothal ceremony needed to be repeated with different witnesses. This is an example of the Halacha mentioned above, that a disqualifying familial connection with a woman is applied also to her husband. This prohibition applies even today, when witnesses are brought before a Bet Din in cases involving financial disputes. It applies to the judges of the Bet Din, forbidding them from accepting the testimony of a litigant’s family member. Of course, they are not liable to Malkut for this transgression, as it is committed without performing an action (“Lav She’en Bo Ma’aseh”).