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The Minefield

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In a world marked by wicked social problems, The Minefield helps you negotiate the ethical dilemmas, contradictory claims and unacknowledged complicities of modern life.
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While there is nothing necessarily new about anti-government hostility in Western democracies, there is growing evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic fuelled its spread and intensification. And as we’ve seen, Australia is not immune.According to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), since 2020 there has been a four-fold increase in the number of threats made against political representatives and protected institutions — such as police and the courts — and some of these threats have translated into overt acts of violence.A particularly virulent strain of this form of hostility is the sovereign citizen movement. Though it has its origins in white supremacist, religious extremist and anti-government militia circles that are peculiar to the United States, the Global Financial Crisis and the pandemic saw its ideas and tactics attract adherents internationally. As Harry Hobbs puts it, the movement rests on a central premise:“the law does not work the way we have been told. Courts, governments, police and tax authorities supposedly only have power because we unwittingly consent to them. By using the right words or right documents, a person can withdraw that consent and step outside ordinary legal obligations.”We’ve seen that this way of thinking lends itself to a more conspiratorial view of the world, casting politicians, law enforcement and public officials as illegitimate and corrupt. Does this entail that sovereign citizens and other such “pseudolaw” movements are inherently politically violent? And when so many of their arguments are predicated on conspiratorial thinking and profound levels of institutional distrust, are there effective ways of counteracting their appeal?Guest: Harry Hobbs is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law and Justice at the University of New South Wales and the Director of the Pseudolaw Project in the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law. He is the co-author (with Stephen Young) of Outlawed: Responding to the Global Rise of Sovereign Citizens and Legal Conspiracies.
The decade straddling the First World War was a period of unusual brilliance and fecundity in British culture. There were the great formal innovators of literary modernism: Virginia Woolf, Dorothy Richardson, D H Lawrence and E M Forster. But then there were those more closely associated with mass culture, who enjoyed a degree of commercial success as well as cultural influence: Rudyard Kipling, Bernard Shaw, H G Wells, Arthur Conan Doyle, J M Barrie, Agatha Christie, P G Wodehouse, G K Chesterton, Jerome K Jerome, even Charlie Chaplin.Many of these authors moved in the same circles, crossed paths with one another and promoted each other’s work. Indeed, most of the male writers, at one point or another, belonged to an amateur cricket team founded by Barrie — best known as the author of Peter Pan — named “the Allahakbarries” (evidently on the basis of the misapprehension that the Arabic phrase Allahu Akbar denotes something like a general petition for divine help, the equivalent of “Heaven help us”).Perhaps the unlikeliest member of this generation of famed writers was a self-deprecating, somewhat reclusive detective story writer and occasional columnist for the satirical weekly magazine Punch, named Alan Alexander Milne. Having enjoyed some modest success as a playwright after the war, on 21 August 1921 Milne purchased a nondescript brown teddy bear from Harrods at Knightsbridge as a birthday present for his infant son, Christopher Robin. Gradually, the nursery would be populated with a small society of stuffed animals: a drooping donkey for Christmas that same year; a tiny piglet the following year from a next-door neighbour in London; later on, a green-eyed tiger, a kangaroo and her joey. It was Milne’s wife, Daphne, who brought the menagerie to life for her son, supplying the voices, the dispositions, the relationships.Observing their play, a couple years later A A Milne penned poem called “Teddy Bear” in which the first glimpses of his most famous creation can be seen:A bear, however hard he tries,Grows tubby without exercise.Our Teddy Bear is short and fat,Which is not to be wondered at;He gets what exercise he canBy falling off the ottoman,But generally seems to lackThe energy to clamber back …Though originally known as “Big Bear” or “Edward Bear”, Christopher Robin’s “inseparable companion” eventually acquired the name “Winnie-the-Pooh” — a strange amalgam derived from the boy’s favourite animal at Regent’s Park Zoo, a tame female North American black bear named “Winnipeg”, and a black swan they encountered during a family vocation at Pooling, near Sussex, whom they referred to as “Pooh”. (Milne later reported that, when he and Christopher farewelled the swan on the lake for the final time, “we took the name with us, as we didn’t think the swan would want it any more”.)Partly inspired by Kenneth Grahame’s 1908 children’s novel Wind in the Willows (which he had been commissioned to adapt into a play in 1921), Milne published his first “Pooh” story in the Evening News on Christmas Eve in 1925. It was a story about an escapade with bees, honey and a balloon, in which Pooh’s voice is fully realised: “If there’s a buzzing-noise, somebody’s making a buzzing-noise, and the only reason for making a buzzing-noise that I know of is because you’re a bee … And the only reason for being a bee that I know of is making honey … And the only reason for making honey is so as I can eat it.”The following year, off the back of the remarkable success his 1924 book of children’s poems, When We Were Very Young, Milne signed a contract for Winnie-the-Pooh, and promptly secured the services of the illustrator E H Shephard to supply the “decorations”. In the meantime, the Milne family had relocated from London to Cotchford Farm in East Sussex, a property that butted up against Ashdown Forest which would supply the inspiration for the companion’s enchanted habitat, the Hundred Acre Woods.Winnie-the-Pooh was finally published on 14 October 1926. It was a slim book, little more than 20,000 words, made up of ten chapters detailing the mishaps and adventures of Pooh, Piglet, Eeyore, Rabbit, Owl, Kanga and Baby Roo, all presided over by the benevolent and knowledgeable character of Christopher Robin. (Tigger would only be introduced in a subsequent book.)As a work of children’s literature, Winnie-the-Pooh is a miracle. It holds untrammelled innocence, care, seemingly insurmountable danger and ever-so-slightly-out-of-reach wordplay together in a delicate balance. The undeveloped longings and exaggerated fears that compel Pooh and Piglet, in particular, are immediately recognisable to parents and children alike, as are the somewhat more grown-up desires for reassurance. Take the exchange at the end of the futile Woozle hunt. Pooh laments: “I have been Foolish and Deluded … and I am a Bear of No Brain at All.” To which Christopher Robin replies, soothingly, “You’re the Best Bear in All the World.” But it is Pooh’s response that bears the emotional charge: “‘Am I?’ said Pooh hopefully.” It is a question that is, at last, answered, at book’s end, when a valedictory party is thrown to praise Pooh for his friendship and unwitting bravery.Each one of the characters of the book is given over to some sort of excess: appetite (Pooh), fear (Piglet), moroseness (Eeyore), practicality (Rabbit), impracticality/verboseness (Owl), overprotectiveness (Kanga) and excitability (Roo). It is the character of Pooh, however, that provides a kind of emotional ballast the stories need, the capacity for companionability and unselfconscious decency. Again, take Pooh’s response upon learning that Eeyore has lost his tail: “Pooh felt that he ought to say something helpful about it, but didn’t quite know what. So he decided to do something helpful instead. ‘Eeyore’, he said solemnly, ‘I, Winnie-the-Pooh, will find your tail for you’. ‘Thank you, Pooh’, answered Eeyore. ‘You’re a real friend’, said he. ‘Not like Some’, he said.”There has been a tendency to try to discern in Winnie-the-Pooh a deeper conversation with psychology and philosophy — perhaps most famously, Benjamin Hoff’s The Tao of Pooh and The Te of Piglet. Such readings can be instructive in their own right, but they are no substitute for the tenderness and gentle moral instruction on the conditions of sociability and friendship present on every page of Milne’s 1926 original.Moreover, these “deeper” readings can tend to overlook the role that the character of Christopher Robin plays. Stuffed companions or cherished toys are among our first objects of love. It is over them that we learn to exercise other-focused care, the sense that we have obligations beyond the satisfaction of our own wants or the avoidance of our fears.But by narrating the words and care of a character named “Christopher Robin” purportedly to a child named Christopher Robin, not as information but as recollection, it is as though Winnie-the-Pooh is demonstrating the inner capacities for love and friendship that young people already possess. These are not capacities to be aspired to, but simply to acknowledge.One hundred years after its publication, perhaps it’s time to retrieve A A Milne’s masterpiece from Disney and experience its delights afresh by reading it with those we love.Guest: Elizabeth Hale is Associate Professor of English Literary Studies at the University of New England.
There is something reassuring about the predictability of midterm elections in the United States. In the twenty midterms that have taken place since the end of the Second World War, the party of the sitting president has seen a swing against it in all but two instances. It’s not unusual for the governing party to lose control of one or both Houses of Congress, even when the president is relatively popular.This reflects something of the reactive nature of modern democratic politics. Voters overwhelmingly tend to rebuke rather than reward — and midterm elections are an effective way of communicating their grievances or their sense of the unresponsiveness of the sitting government.But the 2026 midterm elections did not just “send a message” to the Trump administration. The size and extent of the swing against the Republican Party represents as thoroughgoing a repudiation of the first two years of a presidency as we’re likely to see.The Democratic Party, which was decimated and demoralised after the 2024 election, saw a swing in the popular vote of 13 points, delivering a huge majority in the House of Representatives. More importantly, this voter surge flipped seven states that were overwhelmingly Republican — five of which (North Carolina, Ohio, Iowa, Texas and Kansas) were carried by Trump in 2024 by more than 10 points — delivering them a larger than expected majority in the Senate.In the aftermath, Trump has claimed, defiantly: “I wasn’t on the Ballot and if I was, we would have won IN A LANDSLIDE!” But it’s hard to interpret these midterms as anything other than a referendum on Trump himself. After all, 47 times over the course of the campaign, he told rallies to “pretend I’m on the ballot”. Voters were clearly fed up with high fuel prices due to the ongoing war in Iran, the heavy-handed and sometimes lethal conduct of ICE agents, the economic effects of tariffs and the reports of indecent profiteering and outright corruption on the part of Trump, his family and his closest associates — to say nothing of Trump’s obsession with certain vanity projects in Washington, DC. Voters did regard Trump as being on the ballot and voted accordingly.The scale and size of the Democratic victory presents some difficult questions, however. Was this really a vote for Democrats, or simply a vast repudiation of Trump? If the latter, does this give any guidance for how Democrats should use their congressional majorities? Should they seek to prosecute Trump, once again, for his corruption and conduct in office? Or given the success of moderate Democrats, should they suppress such an overtly partisan stance and focus instead on addressing cost-of-living pressures, healthcare, data-centres, unemployment, and so on?After all, given the reactive nature of contemporary democratic politics, the majority that was given to them in 2026 could just as easily be taken away in 2028.Guest: Brendon O’Connor is a Professor of US Politics and US Foreign Relations at the University of Sydney, where he holds a joint appointment in the United States Studies Centre.
Over the last decade, large majorities of voters in advanced democracies like the United States, the UK, France, Germany and Australia have come to feel that their elected representatives are not responsive to their needs, do not put the interests of people over politics, are not capable of delivering on their promises, are not truthful, and are, generally speaking, “corrupt”, or at least “in it for themselves”. (Compare, for instance, the remarkably similar findings in the OECD’s 2026 “Trust in Government” survey, the recent “Australian attitudes towards government and democracy” report commissioned by the Centre for Policy Development, and ANU’s “Political and policy attitudes in an age of pessimism” report from March this year.)This trend has led even some democratic theorists to conclude that the problem with modern politics is, well, politicians. It’s an easy sentiment to sell, and its appeal has been a boon for those “political entrepreneurs” who are particularly adept at harnessing underlying popular resentment and disrupting the status quo, only to find themselves subject to the same laws of electoral gravity when in government.Before taking the leap and advocating for citizen rule by means of “lottocracy” or some other form of sortition, it is worth asking ourselves what we actually want from politicians. Is competence and effectiveness in the delivery of vital public services enough? Or do we both expect and need more? For there seems to be a troubling paradox lying beneath the popular discontent: either politicians function as idées fixes, as mere things upon whom the people can obsessively heap blame for all that has gone wrong, who are exempt from ordinary human consideration and thus “fair game” for harassment, abuse, even violence; or politicians bear a weight popular expectation that verges on the messianic. In other words, there is a tendency to view politicians as either sub-human or super-human.This is where the fraught question of the nature of political charisma comes to bear. While there have been occasions where voters have reverted to normalcy, stability, a “safe pair of hands” after a period of mercurial or chaotic governance — the obvious examples here would be Joe Biden in 2020, Anthony Albanese in 2022 and Keir Starmer in 2024 (with the pandemic being a major factor in each case) — by and large the direction of electoral traffic has gone toward the more strident, passionate, “authentic”, disruptive, norm-busting, in a word, charismatic candidate. In so doing, what is often being chosen is not so much political idolatry and political participation: the charismatic figure holds out the possibility of connection with the voters, whereby, by voting for this figure, they are themselves taking part in some larger project, whether that be of restoration, reclamation, purification, regeneration or “Justice”.As Richard Sennett argues, political charisma is necessarily performative and unpredictable insofar as the figure seems to embody and obey some “higher” (or at least “other”) law. Proof of their charisma is their ability to defy the ordinary laws of political propriety. The problem comes, of course, when charisma gets “routinised”, flattened out, rendered predictable, and when the figure becomes “human, all too human”. (Though the attendant problem arises when their charismatic authority effectively authorises lawlessness, such as political violence.)But another danger is that political charisma gets reduced either to provocation (“speaking one’s mind” or the “telling of unpopular truths”), on the one hand, or to mere “rizz” (or what has been called “aura farming”), on the other. Which is to say, what does political charisma amount to in a social media saturated age? After Keir Starmer’s terminal lack of charisma contributed massively to his own demise — much like Friedrich Merz now in Germany — UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has constructed a sophisticated social media persona design to achieve something of the connection with the public that his predecessor lacked. But does such visibility either so trivialise or personalise political office that it ceases being a “trust”, a vocation, and becomes something more like a gig? Does the same risk apply to Anthony Albanese’s decision, in his second term, to frequent skits, comedy podcasts and influencer streams?Charisma suggests a degree of passion, of commitment — it invites others, not just to believe, but to believe in the charismatic figure’s belief. There can be no democratic politics that doesn’t enjoy some connection between the people and their representatives (for what does connection denote other than responsiveness, answerability?). How, then, to balance that reciprocity with Max Weber’s unglamourous sense of the vocation of politics as like a “strong and slow boring of hard boards” which demands “both passion and perspective”?Guest: Ben Wellings is Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Monash University. His most recent book is English Nationalism and British Disintegration.
The alleged attack on independent MP Helen Haines outside her electorate office in regional Victoria came as a shock to a nation with so little history of violence directed at elected representatives. The driver of the Toyota LandCruiser that pinned Haines against her car, causing her to lose both legs, has been charged with several offences, and appeared on Wednesday before the Wangaratta Magistrates’ Court. He remains in custody.The police are continuing their investigations into the driver’s mental health and motivations. But regardless of whether his actions were politically motivated, the alleged attack has had an immediate effect on Australian politics. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reiterated his plea to “lower the temperature” of political debate. Opposition leader Angus Taylor insisted “that political violence must never be accepted as part of public life”.One by one, politicians came forward with their own accounts of the abuse, harassment and violent threats that are part of the “new reality” of Australian politics. Only last week, Labor front-bencher Anne Aly reported receiving 19 death threats on social media following comments by Liberal MP Angie Bell that she and the prime minister be “shamed and stoned in the square” over an Australian Tax Office decision (comments that Bell has since described as “regrettable”). ASIO chief Mike Burgess gave a sober warning about the “permissive environment of violence” in this country. Meanwhile, Governor-General Sam Mostyn appealed to the way that Helen Haines herself modelled civility and dedication to her community, urging Australians to:“ensure that we are in fact disagreeing well, not fighting with one another, not descending into violence and chaos and division. Most importantly, that we learn or relearn to exercise our muscle of decency.”While the alleged attack may be unprecedented in Australia’s history, and its life-altering consequences for a figure as respected and admired as Haines is appropriately arresting, there is something about the litany of responses that feels troublingly familiar.Earlier this year, following the gruesome killing of former UK politician Ann Widdecombe, the widower of Jo Cox, the Labour MP who was murdered in 2016 at the height of the Brexit debate, admittedly to feeling “much less optimistic” about the UK’s political culture:“In the aftermath of Jo’s murder, I think there was a real sense of shock, of horror across the political spectrum and the whole country did come together for a moment to say this is not how we want to conduct our politics. But I think in the years that followed we have gone further into our tribes.”Attacks on representative figures, whatever their motivation, cannot help but be experienced as an attack on the protected institutions that govern our common life. And they necessarily have profound consequences for the way we practice democratic politics — from reluctance to express political convictions that might attract online threats to a more general unwillingness to be accessible to one’s constituents.Threats of violence and abuse should not simply be accepted as “part of the job” for politicians. But given the “permissive environment” cultivated by the social media, what can be done to ameliorate the likelihood of violence?Guest: Rob Manwaring is an Associate Professor of Politics and Public Policy at Flinders University.
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