Claim OwnershipThe Supreme Court: Oral Arguments
Subscribed: 79Played: 1,138
Subscribe
© Unprotected Under 17 U.S. Code § 105
Description
A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening! Patreon
1025 Episodes
Reverse
Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312
25A312 TRUMP V. COOK
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE
COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026.
JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:
M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 23-1209
23-1209 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC V. TRUSTEES OF THE IAM PENSION FUND
DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 316
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act imposes "withdrawal liability"
when an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan. This
withdrawal liabilty covers the employer's share of the plan's underfunding. Because a
plan's amount of underfunding hinges on projections about its projected liabilities and
assets decades into the future, withdrawal liability computations are partly a product of
actuarial assumptions about anticipated interest rates and other predictions. Withdrawal
liability must be computed "as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in
which the employer withdraws."
E.g.,
29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)(E)(i). The question
presented is:
Whether 29 U.S.C. 1391's instruction to compute withdrawal liability "as of the
end of the plan year" requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial
assumptions to which its actuary subscribed at the end of the year, or allows the plan to
use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after the end of the year
.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-7157, 22-7158, 23-7028
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER
29
U. S. C. §
1391
’
S INSTRUCTION TO
COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
“
AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR
”
REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL
ASSUMPTIONS TO WHICH ITS ACTUARY SUBSCRIBED AT THE END OF THE
YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR.
Order of July 3, 2025:
The order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari is amended as follows. THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. §1391
’
S INSTRUCTION TO
COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
“
AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR
”
REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL
ASSUMPTIONS MOST RECENTLY ADOPTED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR,
OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT
WERE ADOPTED AFTER, BUT BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF, THE
END OF THE YEAR.
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
Wolford v. Lopez | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 24-1046
24-1046 WOLFORD V. LOPEZ
DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 959
LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen
, 597 U.S. 1, 33 (2022), holds that
"the Second Amendment guarantees a general right to public carry" of arms, meaning ordinary,
law-abiding citizens may "'bear' arms in public for self-defense." In this case, the Ninth Circuit
sustained a Hawaii law that makes it a crime for a concealed carry permit holder to carry a
handgun on private property unless he has been "given express authorization to carry a firearm
on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." H.R.S. § 134-9.5.
That holding is in acknowledged direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in
Antonyuk v.
James
, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), a decision that struck down an
identical
State law in the
same procedural posture as this case.
The Ninth Circuit also sustained a multitude of other location bans on carry by permit
holders, relying solely on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws. That doctrinal approach is in
direct conflict with the Third Circuit's decision
in Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State
Police
, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Connelly
, 117
F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Worth v. Jacobson
, 108 F.4th 677 (8th
Cir. 2024), and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in
NRA v. Bondi
, No. 21-
12314, 2025 WL 815734 at *5 (11th Cir. March 14,2025) (en banc), all of which hold that
primary focus must be on Founding generation laws and tradition in applying the text, history
and tradition test
Bruen
mandates.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit,
that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry
permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively
gives express permission to the handgun carrier?
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later
laws in applying
Bruen
's text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the
Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-16164
Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | 01/14/26 | Docket #: 24-1021
24-1021 GALETTE V. NJ TRANSIT CORP.
DECISION BELOW: 332 A.3d 776
THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED, LIMITED TO
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE NEW JERSEY TRANSIT
CORPORATION IS AN ARM OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR INTERSTATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PURPOSES.
CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH
24-1113
.
ORDER OF SEPTEMBER
19,2025
:
THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER
15
,
2025
, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY, IS THEREFORE STAYED PENDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN
NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL.
V.
COLT, JEFFREY, ET AL.
, CASE NO.
24-
1113
, AND
GALETTE, CEDRIC
V.
NJ TRANSIT CORP.
, CASE NO.
24-1021
.
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is entitled to interstate sovereign
immunity under the Federal Constitution, as held by the highest court of Pennsylvania in
square conflict with the highest court of New York.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 4 EAP 2024
West Virginia v. B. P. J. | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-43
24-43 WEST VIRGINIA V. B.P.J.
DECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 542
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Like everywhere else, West Virginia schools offer separate sports teams for boys
and girls. The West Virginia Legislature concluded that biological boys should compete
on boys' and co-ed teams but not girls' teams. This separation made sense, the
Legislature found, because of the "inherent physical differences between biological
males and biological females."
A parent sued on behalf of her child, B.P.J., arguing that the State must allow
biological boys who identify as girls to compete on girls' teams. After extensive
discovery, the district court disagreed, entering summary judgment for the State on
claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Yet a divided Fourth Circuit panel
granted an injunction pending appeal. B.P.J. then beat and displaced hundreds of girls
in track and field.
Ultimately, the same divided panel ruled in B.P.J.'s favor on the Title IX claim and
vacated the district court's judgment for the defendants on the equal-protection claim.
Judge Agee dissented, criticizing the majority for "inappropriately expand[ing] the scope
of the Equal Protection Clause and upend[ing] the essence of Title IX." App.44a. He
hoped this Court would "take the opportunity with all deliberate speed to resolve these
questions of national importance." App.74a
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether Title IX prevents a state from consistently designating girls' and boys'
sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
2.
Whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from offering separate boys'
and girls' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1078, 23-1130
Little v. Hecox | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-38
24-38 LITTLE, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO V. HECOX
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 1061
ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 2025:
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST THAT THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE AS MOOT IS DEFERRED PENDING
ORAL ARGUMENT. SEE
ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER
, 601 U. S. 1, 4 (2023).
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Women and girls have overcome decades of discrimination to achieve a more
equal playing field in many arenas of American life-including sports. Yet in some
competitions, female athletes have become bystanders in their own sports as male
athletes who identify as female have taken the place of their female competitors-on the
field and on the winners' podium.
The Idaho Legislature addressed that injustice by enacting the Fairness in
Women's Sports Act, which ensures that women and girls do not have to compete
against men and boys no matter how those men and boys identify. The Act-one of 25
such state laws around the country-is consistent with longstanding government policies
preserving women's and girls' sports due to the "average real differences" between the
sexes.
Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n,
695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.
1982).
Breaking with this Court's precedents, its own caselaw, other circuit decisions,
and biological reality, the Ninth Circuit panel here upheld an injunction against the Act
because it prevents "transgender women and girls"-meaning males who identify as
women and girls-from competing in "women's student athletics." App.4a-5a.
The question presented is:
Whether laws that seek to protect women's and girls' sports by limiting
participation to women and girls based on sex violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-35813, 20-35815
Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | 01/12/26 | Docket #: 24-813
24-813 CHEVRON USA INC. V. PLAQUEMINES PARISH
DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 324
January
8
,
2026
JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE.
CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This petition arises from Louisiana parishes' efforts to hold petitioners liable in
state court for,
inter alia
, production of crude oil in the Louisiana coastal zone during
World War II. Petitioners removed these cases from state court under 28 U.S.C. §1442
(a)(1), which as amended in 2011 provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against
"any person acting under [an] officer" of the United States "for or relating to any act
under color of such office." The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that petitioners satisfy the
statute's "acting under" requirement by virtue of their WWII-era contracts to supply the
federal government with high-octane aviation gasoline ("avgas"). But the panel divided
on the "relating to" requirement, with the two-judge majority holding that petitioners'
wartime production of crude oil was "unrelated" to their contractually required refinement
of that same crude into avgas because the contracts did not contain any explicit
"directive pertaining to [petitioners'] oil production activities." App.38. Judge Oldham
dissented, explaining that the majority's approach reinstates a variant of the "causal
nexus" requirement that multiple circuits (and the U.S. Congress) have expressly
rejected. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 7 to 6.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011
amendment to the federal-officer removal statute.
2.
Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for
oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-30294, 23-30422
FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-345
24-345 FS CREDIT CORP. V. SABA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD.
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 3174971
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The courts of appeals have split 2-1 over whether Congress created an implied
private right of action in Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which
provides:
(1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this
subchapter ... is unenforceable by either party ....
(2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1) has been performed, a
court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that
under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result
than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1)-(2).
The Third and Ninth Circuits, relying on statutory text and structure, hold that
Section 47(b) does
not
create an implied private right of action, and a panel of the
Fourth Circuit has agreed in an unpublished opinion. Only the Second Circuit-where
plaintiffs may be able to sue most investment funds subject to the ICA, given New York's
and the New York Stock Exchange's roles in financial operations- holds the opposite
based on an "inference": parties may bring a lawsuit under Section 47(b), even though
Congress never said so.
The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46
(b), creates an implied private right of action.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-8104, 24-79, 24-80, 24-82, 24-83, 24-116, 24-189
Hamm v. Smith | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-872
24-872 HAMM, COMMISSIONER AL DOC V. SMITH
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4793028
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER AND HOW COURTS MAY CONSIDER THE
CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MULTIPLE IQ SCORES IN ASSESSING AN ATKINS
CLAIM.
CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Like most States, Alabama requires that offenders prove an IQ of 70 or less to
satisfy the intellectual-functioning prong of
Atkins v. Virginia
. This case was not close:
Smith scored 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74 on five full-scale IQ tests. There is no way to
conclude from these five numbers that Smith's true IQ is
likely
to be 70 or below. So the
courts below required Smith to prove only that his IQ "
could be
" 70 and required the
State to bring evidence "strong enough" to "foreclose" and "rule out the possibility" of
intellectual disability. The first question presented is:
1.
Whether, under a proper application of
Atkins
, a State can require a claimant to
prove an IQ of 70 or less by a preponderance of the evidence.
Evaluating multiple IQ scores is "complicated," and "this Court has not specified
how" to do it. In the State's view, five scores are more accurate than one, and there are
ways to account for that fact. The courts below disagree. The district court relied on
Smith's 72 ± 3 to find that his IQ "could be" 69. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit's
"holistic approach" asked whether Smith had scores of "about" 75 or less. Counting four
out of five scores between 72 and 75, the court found "consistent evidence" that Smith
"may" qualify as mildly disabled. Thus, the court "followed the law's requirement," in its
view, to "move on" to Smith's adaptive deficits. The second question presented is:
2.
Whether courts evaluating multiple IQ scores must find that every valid score of
"about" 75 or less supports an
Atkins
claim.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-14519
NRSC v. FEC | 12/09/25 | Docket #: 24-621
24-621 NRSC V. FEC
DECISION BELOW: 117 F.4th 389
Order of July 1, 2025:
ROMAN MARTINEZ, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF
AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT
BELOW.
Order of December
5
,
2025
:
THE MOTION OF COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IS GRANTED.
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
A political party exists to get its candidates elected. Yet Congress has severely
restricted how much parties can spend on their own campaign advertising if done in
cooperation with those very candidates. 52 U.S.C.
§ 30116(d).
In an opinion by Chief Judge Sutton, a 10-judge majority of the en banc Sixth
Circuit agreed that these so-called "coordinated party expenditure limits" stand in
serious tension with recent First Amendment doctrine. App.10a-15a. It nevertheless
upheld them as constitutional, both on their face and as applied to coordinated political
advertising ("party coordinated communications"), believing the case to be controlled by
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
, 533 U.S. 431 (2001)
(
Colorado II
). In doing so, the majority acknowledged that in the 23 years since
Colorado II
, this Court "has tightened the free-speech restrictions on campaign finance
regulation," that "tension has emerged between the reasoning of
Colorado II
and the
reasoning of later decisions of the Court," and that relevant facts have "changed, most
notably with 2014 amendments" to the limits and "the rise of unlimited spending by
political action committees." App.3a-4a, 11a. But it thought "any new assessment of the
validity of the limits" remained this Court's "province, not ours." App.14a-15a.
The question presented is:
Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate
the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection
with "party coordinated communications" as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3051
Trump, President of United States v. Slaughter | 12/08/25 | Docket #: 25-332
25-332 TRUMP V. SLAUGHTER
DECISION BELOW:
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM
REFERRED TO THE COURT IS GRANTED. THE JULY
17,2025
ORDER OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NO.
25
–
CV
–
909
, ECF DOC.
52
, IS STAYED. THE APPLICATION IS ALSO TREATED AS A
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION
IS GRANTED.
THE STAY SHALL TERMINATE UPON THE SENDING DOWN OF THE
JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT.
EXPEDITED BRIEFING.
CERT. GRANTED 9/22/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions:
(1) Whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission
violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether
Humphrey
’
s Executor v. United States
, 295
U. S. 602 (1935), should be overruled.
(2) Whether a federal court may prevent a person
’
s removal from public office, either through
relief at equity or at law.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5261
Olivier v. City of Brandon | 12/03/25 | Docket #: 24-993
24-993 OLIVIER V. BRANDON, MS
DECISION BELOW: 2023 WL 5500223
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow
citizens. After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting "protests"
outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its
enforcement against him in the future.
The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court's decision in
Heck
v. Humphrey
, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier's prior conviction barred his § 1983
suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior
conviction. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the "friction" between its decision and those
of this Court and other circuits. Over vigorous dissents, the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing
en banc by one vote.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether, as the Fifth Circuit holds in conflict with the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, this Court's decision in
Heck v. Humphrey
bars § 1983 claims seeking purely
prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged
as unconstitutional.
2.
Whether, as the Fifth Circuit and at least four others hold in conflict with
five other circuits,
Heck v. Humphrey
bars § 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they
never had access to federal habeas relief.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60566
First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin | 12/02/25 | Docket #: 24-781
24-781 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. V. PLATKIN
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5088105
CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
New Jersey's Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice
Women's Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it
turn over most of its donors' names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42
U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce
it in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General's motion to enforce the
Subpoena but expressly did
not
decide First Choice's federal constitutional challenges.
The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the
district court held that First Choice's constitutional claims were not ripe in federal court.
The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided per curiam decision. Judge Bibas would
have held the action ripe as indistinguishable from
. Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Banta
, 594 U.S. 595, 618-19 (2021). But the majority concluded First
Choice's claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could litigate its constitutional
claims in state court. In doing so, the majority followed the rule of the Fifth Circuit and
split from the Ninth Circuit. It did not address the likely loss of a federal forum once the
state court rules on the federal constitutional issues.
The question presented is:
Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably
objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action
deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3124
Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-777
24-777 URIAS-ORELLANA V. BONDI
DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 327
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that noncitizens on American
soil are generally eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)
(A). A refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
Id.
§
1101(a)(42). Noncitizens are presumptively eligible for asylum if they have "suffered
persecution in the past." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
If ordered removed by an immigration judge (IJ), noncitizens may appeal the
removal order-and with it, the denial of asylum-to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). From there, "judicial review" is available in "an appropriate court of appeals." 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The INA mandates judicial deference on "findings of fact" and three
other kinds of administrative decisions.
Id.
§ 1252(b)(4). The statute also explicitly
provides for judicial review of the BIA's decisions on "questions of law," but does not
establish a deferential standard of review for such decisions.
Id.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9).
The question presented is:
Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA's judgment that a given
set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute
"persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1042
Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-171
24-171 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT
DECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 222
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright
infringement when it "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster
infringement."
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
,
Ltd
., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling,
developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service
provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users.
Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for
"materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people
were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that
the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote
it?
2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and
subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high
risk that its
own
conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its
subscribers
'
conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was
illegal.
Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct
infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1168
Rutherford v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-820
24-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360
CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860
CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's
sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an
"extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy
statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
id
.; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the
defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28
U.S.C. § 994(t).
Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain
drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals
sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act.
The question presented is:
Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may
consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing
law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904
Fernandez v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-556
24-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF
“
EXTRAORDINARY AND
COMPELLING REASONS
”
THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE
REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT
MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER
28 U. S. C. §2255.
CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce
the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that
discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the
defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In
reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the
Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered
evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity
in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were
cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth
Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to
matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by
Congress. The question presented is:
Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what
information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary
and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)
(A).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122
GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 24-758
24-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCAL
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184
CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately
appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such
"collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and
state sovereign immunity.
The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order
denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately
appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409
Landor v. LA DOC | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 23-1197
23-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
DECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337
CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb
et seq
., and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
2000cc
et seq
. In
Tanzin v. Tanvir
, 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an
individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for
violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical.
The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in
his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686
Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S. | 11/05/25 | Docket #: 24-1287
24-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMP
DECISION BELOW:
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED
WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET
FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.
CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701
et seq.
("IEEPA")
permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest[.]"
Id.
§ l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has
ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to
the executive orders challenged here.
The question presented is:
Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202
Comments
Download from Google Play
Download from App Store
United States