Claim OwnershipThe Supreme Court: Oral Arguments
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Reverse
Trump, President of U.S. v. Barbara | 04/01/26 | Docket #: 25-365
25-365 TRUMP V. BARBARA
DECISION BELOW:
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that those
"born * * * in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," are U.S. citizens. U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV, § 1. The Clause was adopted to confer citizenship on the newly freed slaves and their
children, not on the children of aliens temporarily visiting the United States or of illegal aliens.
On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160,
Protecting the
Meaning and Value of American Citizenship
, which restores the original meaning of the
Citizenship Clause and provides, on a prospective basis only, that children of temporary visitors
and illegal aliens are not U.S. citizens by birth. The Citizenship Order directs federal agencies
not to issue or accept citizenship documents for such children born more than 30 days after the
Order's effective date.
The question presented is whether the Executive Order complies on its face with the
Citizenship Clause and with 8 U.S.C. 1401(a), which codifies that Clause.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-1861
Pitchford v. Cain | 03/31/26 | Docket #: 24-7351
24-7351 PITCHFORD V. CAIN
DECISION BELOW: 126 F.4th 422
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70009
QUESTION PRESENTED:
District Attorney Doug Evans convicted Terry Pitchford, aged 18 years at the time of the
crime, of capital murder and secured a death verdict in the Grenada Circuit Court before Judge
Joseph Loper on February 9, 2006, with the entirety of jury selection and opening arguments
taking place on February 6.
After direct and collateral reviews in state court, the Northern District of Mississippi
granted habeas corpus relief upon concluding that the trial court failed to determine the
plausibility of the prosecutor
’
s proffered reasons for peremptorily striking four Black venire
members or otherwise consider the full circumstances bearing upon whether Mr. Evans
’
s
reasons for striking any and each of these four venire members was pretextual and in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the District Court ruled the state supreme court
’
s
reliance on its waiver jurisprudence improperly foreclosed consideration of pretext
under
Batson v. Kentucky
, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Judge Loper implicitly made determinations for
each of the four strikes, trial counsel waived argument of pretext, and the Supreme Court of
Mississippi
’
s waiver jurisprudence comports with
Batson.
This opinion in
Pitchford v. Cain
confirmed the Fifth Circuit
’
s disavowal of earlier circuit
jurisprudence recognizing, inter alia, that since
Miller-El v. Dretke
, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (
Miller-El
II
), capital petitioners had been unable to
“
waive[] any
Batson
claim based on a comparison
analysis,
”
Woodward v. Epps
, 580 F.3d 318, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), deepening the Fifth Circuit
’
s
split, joined by two other circuits, with the majority of courts of appeals in the application of
Batson
.
This petition presents the following questions:
1. Does clearly established federal law determined by this Court and applied in six other
circuits require reversal of a state appellate court
’
s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor
’
s
discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the
trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine
“
the plausibility of the reason in light
of all evidence with a bearing on it
”?
Miller-El II
, 545 U.S at
251–52.
2. Does Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review
arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defy this Court
’
s clearly established federal
law under
Batson
?
3. Does a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing
Batson
objections, defense
counsel efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court
’
s express assurance the issues were
preserved, constitute an unreasonable determination of facts?
GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER, UNDER THE STANDARDS SET
FORTH IN AEDPA,
28
U. S. C. §
2254
(d), THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT UNREASONABLY
DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REBUT THE PROSECUTOR'S ASSERTED
RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR EXERCISING PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST FOUR BLACK
JURORS.
ORDER OF MARCH
30
,
2026
:
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED.
CERT. GRANTED 12/15/2025
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-83
25-83 JULES V. ANDRE BALAZS PROPERTIES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 1201914
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, a party may apply to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award. But federal courts have limited jurisdiction over Section 9 and 10
applications. In
Badgerow v. Walters
, 596 U.S. 1, 4, 9-11 (2022), this Court held that a federal
court may exercise jurisdiction only if the application establishes diversity or federal-question
jurisdiction on its face. A federal court may not exercise jurisdiction merely on the basis that
the underlying dispute, save for the arbitration agreement, would have been justiciable in
federal court.
See id
.
But what happens when a court initially exercises jurisdiction over the underlying
dispute, stays the case pending arbitration, and is later faced with an application to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award in the same case? The courts of appeals have sharply divided on
the appropriate jurisdictional analysis. Several courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit
below, have held that the initial exercise of jurisdiction creates a "jurisdictional anchor" that
confers jurisdiction over a subsequent Section 9 or 10 application to confirm or vacate, even if
jurisdiction would otherwise be absent. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court
must establish an independent basis for jurisdiction over a Section 9 or 10 application to
confirm or vacate.
The question presented is:
Whether a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending
arbitration maintains jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where
jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1253, 23-1283
Abouammo v. United States | 03/30/26 | Docket #: 25-5146
25-5146 ABOUAMMO V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 122 F.4th 1072
GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 12/5/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
As part of an investigation into a scheme to disclose nonpublic Twitter account
information to foreign actors, San Francisco-based FBI agents visited Petitioner Ahmad
Abouammo at his home in Seattle. While they were there, Mr. Abouammo went upstairs and
emailed them an allegedly falsified document. Mr. Abouammo's only interaction with the
agents occurred in Seattle.
A grand jury in the Northern District of California indicted Mr. Abouammo for (among
other things) falsifying documents with the intent to impede an investigation. The parties then
agreed to toll the statute of limitations for other uncharged offenses. On the day the tolling
agreement expired, the government filed a superseding
information
adding various felony
counts. Mr. Abouammo never waived prosecution by indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Four
months after the limitations period had expired, the government dismissed this placeholder
information and replaced it with a superseding
indictment
containing the same charges.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether venue is proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as
the statute's intent element "contemplates" effects that could occur there.
2.
Whether a criminal information unaccompanied by a waiver of indictment is an
"information charging a felony" that allows the government to unilaterally extend the statute
of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-10348
Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | 03/25/26 | Docket #: 24-935
24-935 FLOWER FOODS, INC. V. BROCK
DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 753
CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce-but who do
not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross
borders-"transportation workers" "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" for purposes of
the Federal Arbitration Act's § 1 exemption?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1182
Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado | 03/24/26 | Docket #: 25-5
25-5 NOEM V. AL OTRO LADO
DECISION BELOW: 138 F.4th 1102
CERT. GRANTED 11/17/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101
et seq
. , provides that an alien who
"arrives in the United States" may apply for asylum and must be inspected by an immigration
officer. 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(A), 1225(a)(1) and (3). The question presented is whether an alien
who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border "arrives in the United States"
within the meaning of those provisions.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55988, 22-56036
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | 03/24/26 | Docket #: 25-6
25-6 KEATHLEY V. BUDDY AYERS CONSTRUCTION, INC.
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 673434
CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed '"to protect the integrity of the
judicial process' by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions"' to gain an unfair
advantage.
New Hampshire v. Maine
, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). The doctrine targets those
who "'deliberately"' mislead courts, not those whose inconsistent positions stem from
"inadvertence or mistake."
Id
. at 750, 753.
Courts regularly apply judicial estoppel when a debtor-plaintiff pursues a claim he failed
to disclose to the bankruptcy court. The Eleventh, Ninth, Seventh, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits
require courts to look at the totality of the circumstances and find that a debtor subjectively
intended to mislead the bankruptcy court before applying judicial estoppel to bar a claim
outside of the bankruptcy. In stark contrast, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have embraced a
"rigid" and "unforgiving" judicial estoppel rule in the bankruptcy context that bars claims
regardless of whether there is evidence that a plaintiff actually intended to mislead. App. 55a.
In those circuits, a debtor's failure to disclose a lawsuit to a bankruptcy court triggers judicial
estoppel whenever the debtor knew the facts relevant to the undisclosed claim and had a
potential
motive for concealment-which is virtually always present in the bankruptcy context.
The question presented is:
Whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to
disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a
potential
motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in
fact acted in bad faith.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60025
Watson v. RNC | 03/23/26 | Docket #: 24-1260
24-1260 WATSON V. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 200
CERT. GRANTED 11/10/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The federal election-day statutes-2 U.S.C. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 1-set the
Tuesday after the first Monday in November in certain years as the "election" day for federal
offices. Like all other States, Mississippi requires that ballots for federal offices be cast-marked
and submitted to election officials-by that day. And like most other States, Mississippi allows
some of those timely cast ballots (mail-in absentee ballots, in Mississippi's case) to be counted
if they are received by election officials a short time after election day (in Mississippi, within 5
business days after election day). Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15- 637(1)(a). In the decision below, the
Fifth Circuit held that the federal election-day statutes require that ballots be both cast by
voters and received by election officials by election day and thus preempt Mississippi's law.
The question presented is whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law
that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after
that day.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-60395
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | 03/04/26 | Docket #: 24-1238
24-1238 MONTGOMERY V. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC
DECISION BELOW: 124 F.4th 1053
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The common law permits a cause of action for negligent selection. For example, a
person injured in a truck crash has a cause of action against someone that negligently selected
the truck driver to transport property.
A federal statute expressly preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service of
any motor carrier ... or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to
the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The statute has a safety exception,
providing that the statute "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with
respect to motor vehicles."
Id
. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
The question presented is:
Does§ 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently
selecting a motor carrier or driver?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1192
Hunter v. United States | 03/03/26 | Docket #: 24-1063
24-1063 HUNTER V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 5003582
CERT. GRANTED 10/10/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This Court has recognized that "no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all
appellate claims."
Garza v. Idaho
, 586 U.S. 232, 238 (2019). But the Court has "ma[de] no
statement ... on what particular exceptions [to appeal waivers] may be required."
Id
. at 238-39
& n.6.
In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its precedent, holding that there are
only two grounds on which defendants who sign general appeal waivers may challenge their
sentence on appeal: (1) claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) claims that the
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopt a
similarly narrow view of the exceptions to general appeal waivers. In stark conflict, the First,
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits permit defendants who sign general appeal waivers to raise
a broad range of constitutional challenges to their sentences beyond the limited exceptions
recognized by the Fifth Circuit and the other courts on its side of the circuit split.
The Fifth Circuit below also reaffirmed its precedent holding that an appeal waiver
applies even when the sentencing judge advises the defendant that he has a right to appeal
and the government does not object to that advice. Although other circuits agree with the Fifth
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit squarely holds otherwise, releasing defendants from appeal waivers in
identical circumstances.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the only permissible exceptions to a general appeal waiver are for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
2. Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant
that he has a right to appeal and the government does not object.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-20211
United States v. Hemani | 03/02/26 | Docket #: 24-1234
24-1234 UNITED STATES V. HEMANI
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 354982
CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of
firearms by a person who "is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,"
violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-40137
Pung v. Isabella County | 02/25/26 | Docket #: 25-95
25-95 PUNG V. ISABELLA COUNTY, MICHIGAN
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 318222
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Isabella County confiscated the Pung Estate's private home for approximately $2,200 in
taxes and fees (that were never actually owed). The lower courts used the artificially depressed
auction sale price rather than the property's fair market value as the starting point for its
damages calculation. The Sixth Circuit and others have held that the "fair market value" taken
is not what is owed to begin to fulfill the constitutional compensatory obligation imposed by
the Fifth Amendment. That defies this Court's precedents. And if it is not taken within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, it is otherwise an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment by imposing a punishment by pilfering far more than ever needed to satisfy a
small debt.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and
keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
when the compensation is based on the artificially depressed auction sale price rather than the
property's fair market value?
2.
Whether the forfeiture of real property worth far more than needed to satisfy a
tax debt but sold for fraction of its real value constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment, particularly when the debt was never actually owed?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1919, 22-1939
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel | 02/24/26 | Docket #: 24-783
24-783 ENBRIDGE ENERGY, LP V. NESSEL
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 958
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time
limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1671
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. | 02/23/26 | Docket #: 24-699
24-699 EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. CORPORACION CIMEX
DECISION BELOW: 111 F.4th 12
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the property of American nationals and
transferred it to state-owned enterprises. After years without a diplomatic resolution, Congress
enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which created a damages action for American nationals against
"any person ... that traffics in" such confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act
defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," id. § 6023(11),
and expressly contemplates "judgment[s] against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban
Government,"
id
. § 6082(d). The question presented is:
Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against
Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an
exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020
Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises | 02/23/26 | Docket #: 24-983
24-983 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. V. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES
DECISION BELOW: 119 F.4th 1276
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The LIBERTAD Act is an essential pillar of United States foreign policy toward Cuba's
hostile and anti-American regime. Title III of that Act creates a private right of action for United
States nationals who have a claim to property confiscated by that regime against persons who
traffic in that property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act specifies that such trafficking
"undermines the foreign policy of the United States" by, among other things, "provid[ing] badly
needed financial benefit" to the Cuban regime.
Id
. § 6081(6).
The question presented here applies in every case brought under Title III, and will
determine whether that provision continues to advance U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba:
whether a plaintiff must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the
Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim (as the statute requires), or instead
that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the
time of trafficking in a counterfactual world "as if there had been no expropriation" (as the
divided Eleventh Circuit panel held below).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10151, 23-10171
Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook | 01/21/26 | Docket #: 25A312
25A312 TRUMP V. COOK
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 2654786
THE APPLICATION FOR STAY PRESENTED TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND BY HIM REFERRED TO THE
COURT IS DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT IN JANUARY 2026.
JURISDICTION NOTED 10/1/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:
M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 23-1209
23-1209 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC V. TRUSTEES OF THE IAM PENSION FUND
DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 316
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act imposes "withdrawal liability"
when an employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan. This
withdrawal liabilty covers the employer's share of the plan's underfunding. Because a
plan's amount of underfunding hinges on projections about its projected liabilities and
assets decades into the future, withdrawal liability computations are partly a product of
actuarial assumptions about anticipated interest rates and other predictions. Withdrawal
liability must be computed "as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in
which the employer withdraws."
E.g.,
29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)(E)(i). The question
presented is:
Whether 29 U.S.C. 1391's instruction to compute withdrawal liability "as of the
end of the plan year" requires the plan to base the computation on the actuarial
assumptions to which its actuary subscribed at the end of the year, or allows the plan to
use different actuarial assumptions that were adopted after the end of the year
.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-7157, 22-7158, 23-7028
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER
29
U. S. C. §
1391
’
S INSTRUCTION TO
COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
“
AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR
”
REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL
ASSUMPTIONS TO WHICH ITS ACTUARY SUBSCRIBED AT THE END OF THE
YEAR, OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS
THAT WERE ADOPTED AFTER THE END OF THE YEAR.
Order of July 3, 2025:
The order granting the petition for a writ of certiorari is amended as follows. THE
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER 29 U. S. C. §1391
’
S INSTRUCTION TO
COMPUTE WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
“
AS OF THE END OF THE PLAN YEAR
”
REQUIRES THE PLAN TO BASE THE COMPUTATION ON THE ACTUARIAL
ASSUMPTIONS MOST RECENTLY ADOPTED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR,
OR ALLOWS THE PLAN TO USE DIFFERENT ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT
WERE ADOPTED AFTER, BUT BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF, THE
END OF THE YEAR.
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
Wolford v. Lopez | 01/20/26 | Docket #: 24-1046
24-1046 WOLFORD V. LOPEZ
DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 959
LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen
, 597 U.S. 1, 33 (2022), holds that
"the Second Amendment guarantees a general right to public carry" of arms, meaning ordinary,
law-abiding citizens may "'bear' arms in public for self-defense." In this case, the Ninth Circuit
sustained a Hawaii law that makes it a crime for a concealed carry permit holder to carry a
handgun on private property unless he has been "given express authorization to carry a firearm
on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." H.R.S. § 134-9.5.
That holding is in acknowledged direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in
Antonyuk v.
James
, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), a decision that struck down an
identical
State law in the
same procedural posture as this case.
The Ninth Circuit also sustained a multitude of other location bans on carry by permit
holders, relying solely on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws. That doctrinal approach is in
direct conflict with the Third Circuit's decision
in Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State
Police
, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Connelly
, 117
F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Worth v. Jacobson
, 108 F.4th 677 (8th
Cir. 2024), and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in
NRA v. Bondi
, No. 21-
12314, 2025 WL 815734 at *5 (11th Cir. March 14,2025) (en banc), all of which hold that
primary focus must be on Founding generation laws and tradition in applying the text, history
and tradition test
Bruen
mandates.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit,
that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry
permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively
gives express permission to the handgun carrier?
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later
laws in applying
Bruen
's text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the
Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-16164
Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | 01/14/26 | Docket #: 24-1021
24-1021 GALETTE V. NJ TRANSIT CORP.
DECISION BELOW: 332 A.3d 776
THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED, LIMITED TO
THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THE NEW JERSEY TRANSIT
CORPORATION IS AN ARM OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY FOR INTERSTATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PURPOSES.
CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH
24-1113
.
ORDER OF SEPTEMBER
19,2025
:
THE TRIAL SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER
15
,
2025
, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, NEW YORK COUNTY, IS THEREFORE STAYED PENDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MANDATE OF THIS COURT IN
NJ TRANSIT CORP., ET AL.
V.
COLT, JEFFREY, ET AL.
, CASE NO.
24-
1113
, AND
GALETTE, CEDRIC
V.
NJ TRANSIT CORP.
, CASE NO.
24-1021
.
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation is entitled to interstate sovereign
immunity under the Federal Constitution, as held by the highest court of Pennsylvania in
square conflict with the highest court of New York.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 4 EAP 2024
West Virginia v. B. P. J. | 01/13/26 | Docket #: 24-43
24-43 WEST VIRGINIA V. B.P.J.
DECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 542
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Like everywhere else, West Virginia schools offer separate sports teams for boys
and girls. The West Virginia Legislature concluded that biological boys should compete
on boys' and co-ed teams but not girls' teams. This separation made sense, the
Legislature found, because of the "inherent physical differences between biological
males and biological females."
A parent sued on behalf of her child, B.P.J., arguing that the State must allow
biological boys who identify as girls to compete on girls' teams. After extensive
discovery, the district court disagreed, entering summary judgment for the State on
claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. Yet a divided Fourth Circuit panel
granted an injunction pending appeal. B.P.J. then beat and displaced hundreds of girls
in track and field.
Ultimately, the same divided panel ruled in B.P.J.'s favor on the Title IX claim and
vacated the district court's judgment for the defendants on the equal-protection claim.
Judge Agee dissented, criticizing the majority for "inappropriately expand[ing] the scope
of the Equal Protection Clause and upend[ing] the essence of Title IX." App.44a. He
hoped this Court would "take the opportunity with all deliberate speed to resolve these
questions of national importance." App.74a
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether Title IX prevents a state from consistently designating girls' and boys'
sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
2.
Whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state from offering separate boys'
and girls' sports teams based on biological sex determined at birth.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1078, 23-1130
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