Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer’s ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer’s ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Confidentiality order)Following the Canadian general election held on April 28, 2025, and the subsequent judicial recount, the respondent Tatiana Auguste became a member of Parliament for the electoral district of Terrebonne. Only one vote in her favour separated her from her closest rival, the appellant, Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné. One voter then notified the media that her special ballot, mailed within the prescribed time, had been returned to her after the polling day, marked [translation] “Moved or unknown – return to sender”. In fact, there was an error in the postal code that the returning officer placed on the prepaid envelope sent to the voter in that the last three characters of the postal code were for somewhere other than the polling station. But that voter maintained that she voted for Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.The Superior Court found that there was no irregularity within the meaning of s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act. It therefore dismissed the application to contest the election filed by Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné. Argued Date 2026-02-13 Keywords Elections — Application to contest election — Irregularity — Allegations of irregularities that affected result of election made by candidate defeated by single vote in federal election — Whether trial judge erred in interpretation of notion of irregularity — Whether trial judge erred in determination of consequences of irregularity on integrity of electoral system — Whether trial judge erred in imposing burden much greater than that under Canada Elections Act on voter — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 524(1)b), 531(2). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Maxime Bergeron was expelled from a mock parliament organized by one of the respondents, the Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc. Some participants said that they were afraid of him because of his [TRANSLATION] “disruptive behaviour”. His father, Jean Bergeron, a lawyer, quickly became involved in the situation, seeking to have the expulsion decision revoked and to obtain reparation for the damage sustained by his son. The respondents filed a motion to have J. Bergeron declared disqualified.The Superior Court found that exceptional circumstances warranted declaring J. Bergeron disqualified. A reasonably informed member of the public knowing the facts of the case would be satisfied that he did not have the distance he was required to have. The Court of Appeal found that there was no reviewable error. Public confidence in the proper administration of justice could be compromised if M. Bergeron’s father were authorized to continue representing him in the particular circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2026-02-12 Keywords Civil procedure — Motion to have lawyer declared disqualified — Whether principles applicable with regard to conflict of interest since MacDonald Estate apply by analogy in context of disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance — Criteria and factors to be weighed by trial judge considering application for disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance to balance lawyer’s obligations as officer of court — Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, art. 193. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the respondent Scarborough Hospital (hereafter, the “Hospital”).The appellants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minors by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings, commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging that their negligence had caused Sophia’s injuries. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability.At trial, Lloyd Gregory Padmore, Dr. Neil Thomas Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-02-10 Keywords Torts – Professional liability – Negligence – Causation – Mother suffering severe brain injury following cardiac arrest during delivery of child by caesarian section – Application of law of causation by Canadian courts – How principles of causation to be applied in the context of women’s healthcare in Canada – What is required to show factual causation and how Courts should engage with counterfactual analyses – What is required to show legal causation and demonstrate meaningful contemplation of applicable test Civil procedure –Trial – Judgments – Reasons for judgment – Appeals – What is the permissible nature and extent of appellate courts’ power to review trial record when assessing sufficiency of reasons that are, on their face, deficient Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Gaétan Ouellet, was acquitted by Judge Garneau of the Court of Québec of a charge of sexual assault relating to three distinct incidents. On appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, the prosecutor raised four grounds of appeal.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judgment gave insufficient reasons. The majority were of the opinion that for that same reason, it was extremely difficult and speculative to assess the well foundedness of the two first grounds raised by the prosecutor, but they were nevertheless of the view that with respect to the second incident, the judge made a finding in the absence of evidence, which was an added reason for ordering a new trial. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, being of the opinion that the trial judge’s reasons were not so insufficient so as to undermine the validity of the judgment and that the other grounds of appeal were unfounded. Argued Date 2025-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Appeal — Sufficiency of reasons — Evidence — Absence of evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Whether trial judge’s reasons were so insufficient so as to undermine validity of his decision — Scope of error of law described in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, as “finding of fact for which there is no supporting evidence”. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Robert Joseph DeSutter, was charged with various sexual offences and one charge of assault, in relation to three different complainants, M.H., S.H. and J.R. The trial judge acquitted the respondent of all charges except the assault charge, finding insufficient evidence of a sexual purpose in the respondent’s actions and the lack of an exploitative relationship. The appellant Crown appealed the acquittals in relation to two counts of sexual exploitation (counts 3 and 14), alleging that the trial judge erred in law by excluding from evidence images of women found on a USB stick and concluding that the respondent was not in an exploitative relationship with one of the complainants, J.R. The majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing an error of law on the part of the trial judge justifying appellate intervention. In contrast, Derrick J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on counts 3 and 14. She found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of the USB images’ probative value and prejudicial effect. She also found that the trial judge failed to properly assess the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R., given the power imbalance and J.R.’s vulnerability. In her view, these errors could have materially affected the verdicts, warranting a new trial on the two counts of sexual exploitation. Argued Date 2025-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Assessment — Whether the trial judge erred in her analysis of the admissibility of the images on the USB — Whether the trial judge erred in her assessment of the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Bank of Nova Scotia (“taxpayer”), filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) later audited the taxpayer’s 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, the taxpayer and the Minister entered into a settlement agreement which required additional amounts to be included in the taxpayer’s 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the taxpayer wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision that requires that, for a specified period of time, interest is calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignores the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, taking the position that s. 161(7)(b)(iv) did not apply because the Minister’s reassessment of its tax for 2006 was not “as a consequence” of its request to carryback losses from 2008 to offset its 2006 tax liability. The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal. Argued Date 2026-01-21 Keywords Taxation — Income tax — Computation of interest payable — Minister’s reassessment taking into account audit adjustment and carryback requested by taxpayer to offset a loss — Minister applying s. 161(1)(b)(iv) of Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) to compute taxpayer interest up until day taxpayer requested loss carryback — Taxpayer appealing applicability of provision Minister relied on — Courts dismissing taxpayer’s appeal — Whether the event set out in s. 161(7)(b)(iv) occurred when the Minister reassessed taxpayer’s previous taxation year at a later date — What is the proper construction of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) and the words “where, as a consequence of a request in writing, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer’s tax for [a previous year] to take into account the deduction” of a loss? — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 161(7)(b)(iv). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-20 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-19 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-15 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-14 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Two fictitious advertisements were published by the police on Internet sites offering escort services; the text of the advertisements highlighted the youthfulness of the people. Mr. Denis communicated with someone who turned out to be a police officer acting in an undercover capacity. She stated that she mentioned the young girl’s age at least four times but that Mr. Denis did not react to that information. He was arrested by the police when he entered the room where the “escort” was.Following the trial, Mr. Denis was convicted of the offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code (communication for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18 years). He brought a motion to have the mandatory minimum sentence declared invalid and of no force or effect. The trial judge, considering the six month minimum sentence to be appropriate, did not conduct the Charter analysis. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to rule on the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence and declare it invalid and of no force or effect, in accordance with s. 52(1) of the Charter. Argued Date 2026-01-13 Keywords Criminal law — Abuse of process — Entrapment — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — Mandatory minimum sentence — Commodification of sexual activity as regards person under age of 18 years — Whether s. 286.1(2)(a) of Criminal Code breaches s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 286.1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12, 24(1) and 52(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-12 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-11 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation entered into a contract with Mellon Trust Financial pursuant to which it provided market pricing data for various types of securities. Mellon Trust Financial merged with Bank of New York to form Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation succeeded to the rights and duties under the contract. Mellon Trust Financial and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation breached the contract by redistributing market pricing data to affiliates. Upon learning of the breach of contract, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation’s counsel demanded an accounting and that Bank of New York Mellon Corporation preserve all related communications, documents, and files. Records including records created after the preservation demand were destroyed. SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation commenced an action against Bank of New York Mellon Corporation seeking damages for breach of contract. Based on spoliation, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation in part asked the trial judge to draw an adverse inference that its data had been shared with 65 affiliates and it has lost the opportunity to enter into 65 additional agreements on substantially the same terms as the contract. The trial judge found Bank of New York Mellon Corporation liable for breach of contract. The trial judge did not accept SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation’s proposed adverse inference but did draw an adverse inference that all data usage was by Bank of New York Mellon Corporation’s affiliates. He awarded damages of CAD $922,887 and USD $5,696,850. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the finding of liability and allowed a cross-appeal on liability. It allowed an appeal from the damages award in part and set aside the award of CDN $922,887. Argued Date 2025-12-10 Keywords Civil procedure — Evidence — Spoliation — What is the appropriate remedy for spoliation — What should the appropriate remedy have been in this case? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-09 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group’s action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge’s order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga’a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-08 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group’s action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge’s order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga’a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents, Robert Vrbanic and Sarah Josipovic, were jointly charged with possession of significant quantities of four different drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime. They sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. The appellant Crown did not dispute that the delay in this case was over the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, but argued that this delay was justified by the complexity of the case. The application judge concluded that the delay was not justified as an exceptional circumstance on the basis of the complexity of the case, and ordered a stay of proceedings. The Crown appealed the application judge’s order. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the application judge’s assessment of the complexity of the case was free of legal error and entitled to deference. Roberts J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings on the basis that the application judge’s miscalculation of the net delay and misapplication of the governing principles respecting exceptional circumstances materially affected his ultimate decision as to whether the delay was unreasonable. Argued Date 2025-12-04 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Exceptional circumstances — Complexity of case — Remedy — Stay of proceedings — Whether the application judge misapplied the governing principles on s. 11(b) Charter litigation by miscalculating the net delay and failing to properly assess complexity — Whether the determination of complexity, for the purposes of an exceptional circumstance under the s. 11(b) framework, ought to be evaluated within the context of the case as a whole — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was acquitted at trial of transmitting sexually explicit material to a person under the age of 16 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of either a sexual assault or the indecent act of exposing his genital organs to a person under 16 years of age for a sexual purpose. The trial judge accepted that the appellant sent sexually explicit material to a minor, but he was left with a reasonable doubt on two elements : the identity of the appellant in a sexually explicit video and the specific intent to transmit the material for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an enumerated offence. The trial judge concluded that the transmission of the material could have been “flirtation” and was left with a doubt as to whether the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in acquitting the appellant. The Crown was not required to prove the identity of the appellant in the transmitted video, nor was it required to prove that the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences. The conduct referred to by the trial judge as “flirtation” is a tool used to facilitate the commission of sexual offences against children. In its view, but for the trial judge’s errors, the appellant would have been convicted. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction. Argued Date 2025-11-14 Keywords Criminal Law —Transmit sexually explicit material to a person under age of 16 for purpose of facilitating commission of sexual assault or indecent act — Elements of offence — Powers of Court of Appeal — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by allowing appeal and quashing acquittal under Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 171.1(1)(b), because alleged errors were errors of fact — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by substituting conviction for acquittal under s. 171.1(1)(b) based on its own findings of fact. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).