Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

R.B.-C., an Iranian citizen in Canada on a post-graduation work permit, was convicted for sexual assault. More than 14 months after conviction, a conditional sentence of two years less a day plus probation was ordered. R.B.-C. applied for a stay of proceedings as a remedy for unreasonable delay during the sentencing phase of proceedings in breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge applied R. v. Charley, 2019 ONCA 726, which adopted the framework set out in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and which set a five-month presumptive ceiling for post-verdict delay. After calculating total delay and deductions, the motions judge derived a net delay below the presumptive five-month ceiling and dismissed the motion to stay proceedings. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal. It held post-conviction delay exceeded the five-month presumptive ceiling and the appropriate remedy was to reduce the sentence to 20 months. Argued Date 2026-01-16 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Remedies — What is the test for unreasonable delay in the sentencing phase — What is the appropriate remedy for unreasonable delay in the sentencing phase? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-26 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-25 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-24 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Act respecting the laicity of the State was passed and assented to on June 16, 2019. Its purposes include affirming the laicity of the state in Quebec and specifying the general obligations arising therefrom, prohibiting the listed persons from wearing religious symbols in the exercise of their functions and requiring those persons to perform their functions with their face uncovered. The Act also contains provisions through which the legislature exercises the override power granted to it by s. 52 of the Quebec Charter and s. 33 of the Canadian Charter and permits the Act to apply notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms.Once the Act came into force, a number of persons, groups of persons and organizations brought separate proceedings challenging the constitutionality of the Act or certain of its provisions. They raised constitutional grounds, some of which were related to the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter. The Superior Court largely dismissed the challenge, except on two points. The Court of Appeal arrived at the same conclusions except as regards the educational language rights that s. 23 of the Canadian Charter guarantees to Canadian citizens belonging to Quebec’s English linguistic minority. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that the Act does not infringe s. 23. Argued Date 2026-03-23 Keywords Constitutional law — Constitutional validity — Division of powers — Pre-Confederation legislation — Constitutional architecture and unwritten principles — Charters of rights — Notwithstanding clauses — Rights guaranteed equally to both sexes — Minority language educational rights — Democratic rights of citizens — Enumerations — Whether grounds raised to challenge constitutional validity of Act respecting the laicity of the State should be accepted — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 3, 23, 28 and 33 — Charter of human rights and freedoms, ss. 50.1 and 52 — Act respecting the laicity of the State, CQLR, c. L-0.3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On March 19, 2019, the respondent, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada received a complaint under s. 11(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”) which raised concerns about the appellant Facebook’s compliance with the PIPEDA. The concerns were related to Facebook’s practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on its platform. The complaint was filed in the context of reports related to a professor at the University of Cambridge, U.K., Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, who launched an application through Facebook’s Platform titled “thisisyourdigitallife” (“TYDL”) in November 2013. Presented to users as a personality quiz, Dr. Kogan could access the personal information of installing users and installing users’ friends. In December 2015, it was reported that user data obtained by TYDL was sold to a corporation named Cambridge Analytica and a related entity, Strategic Communication Laboratories Elections Ltd. (SCL), who, in turn, used the data purchased from Dr. Kogan to help their clients target political messaging to potential voters in the then upcoming presidential election in the United States. When TYDL was launched in 2013, it agreed to Facebook’s Platform Policy and Terms of Service. In 2014, Facebook issued a version 2 (v.2) of its communication protocol, Graph API, under which third party developers could no longer request permission to access installing users’ friends unless the app developer, through an expanded access to additional personal information request, can demonstrate that the data would be used to “enhance the user’s in-app experience”. The process for consideration of expanded access requests was introduced alongside Graph API v.2 as “App Review.” Although Graph API v.2 took effect in 2014, existing apps were given a one-year grace period before complying with the new iteration. When Graph API v.2 was announced, Dr. Kogan’s request for expanded access to additional personal information was denied by Facebook because his intended use, research, would not enhance user experience. Nonetheless, Dr. Kogan continued to collect data under Graph API v.1 with no additional scrutiny from Facebook. As a result, though only 272 Canadians ever installed the TYDL app, Facebook estimates that these installations lead to the potential disclosure of the data of over 600,000 Canadians. In 2015, when the reports became public, Facebook removed TYDL from Platform and asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the user data it had obtained. Facebook did not notify the affected users that their Facebook data had been collected and sold. It was not until 2018 that Facebook suspended Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica from Platform. After receiving the complaint, the Privacy Commissioner investigated and concluded that Facebook failed to obtain valid and meaningful consent for its disclosures to applications and failed to safeguard its users’ information. As a result, in February 2020, the Privacy Commissioner filed a notice of application in the Federal Court claiming that Facebook was in breach of its obligations set out in Schedule 1 pursuant to s. 5(1)(a) of PIPEDA through its practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on the Facebook Platform.The Federal Court dismissed the application. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the Privacy Commissioner’s application in part. Argued Date 2026-03-19 Keywords Privacy — Online social media platform — Obligation to safeguard users’ data — Obligation to obtain meaningful consent from users for disclosure of personal data — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner of Canada did not prove that Facebook failed to get meaningful consent to disclose personal information to third-party apps — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner did not prove that Facebook failed to maintain adequate security safeguards to protect personal information in its possession or custody? — Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 3, 5(1), 6.1 and ss. 4.3 (principle 3) and 4.7 (principle 7) of schedule 1. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On March 19, 2019, the respondent, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada received a complaint under s. 11(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”) which raised concerns about the appellant Facebook’s compliance with the PIPEDA. The concerns were related to Facebook’s practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on its platform. The complaint was filed in the context of reports related to a professor at the University of Cambridge, U.K., Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, who launched an application through Facebook’s Platform titled “thisisyourdigitallife” (“TYDL”) in November 2013. Presented to users as a personality quiz, Dr. Kogan could access the personal information of installing users and installing users’ friends. In December 2015, it was reported that user data obtained by TYDL was sold to a corporation named Cambridge Analytica and a related entity, Strategic Communication Laboratories Elections Ltd. (SCL), who, in turn, used the data purchased from Dr. Kogan to help their clients target political messaging to potential voters in the then upcoming presidential election in the United States. When TYDL was launched in 2013, it agreed to Facebook’s Platform Policy and Terms of Service. In 2014, Facebook issued a version 2 (v.2) of its communication protocol, Graph API, under which third party developers could no longer request permission to access installing users’ friends unless the app developer, through an expanded access to additional personal information request, can demonstrate that the data would be used to “enhance the user’s in-app experience”. The process for consideration of expanded access requests was introduced alongside Graph API v.2 as “App Review.” Although Graph API v.2 took effect in 2014, existing apps were given a one-year grace period before complying with the new iteration. When Graph API v.2 was announced, Dr. Kogan’s request for expanded access to additional personal information was denied by Facebook because his intended use, research, would not enhance user experience. Nonetheless, Dr. Kogan continued to collect data under Graph API v.1 with no additional scrutiny from Facebook. As a result, though only 272 Canadians ever installed the TYDL app, Facebook estimates that these installations lead to the potential disclosure of the data of over 600,000 Canadians. In 2015, when the reports became public, Facebook removed TYDL from Platform and asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the user data it had obtained. Facebook did not notify the affected users that their Facebook data had been collected and sold. It was not until 2018 that Facebook suspended Dr. Kogan and Cambridge Analytica from Platform. After receiving the complaint, the Privacy Commissioner investigated and concluded that Facebook failed to obtain valid and meaningful consent for its disclosures to applications and failed to safeguard its users’ information. As a result, in February 2020, the Privacy Commissioner filed a notice of application in the Federal Court claiming that Facebook was in breach of its obligations set out in Schedule 1 pursuant to s. 5(1)(a) of PIPEDA through its practice of sharing Facebook users’ personal information with third-party applications hosted on the Facebook Platform.The Federal Court dismissed the application. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the Privacy Commissioner’s application in part. Argued Date 2026-03-19 Keywords Privacy — Online social media platform — Obligation to safeguard users’ data — Obligation to obtain meaningful consent from users for disclosure of personal data — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner of Canada did not prove that Facebook failed to get meaningful consent to disclose personal information to third-party apps — Whether application judge erred in finding Privacy Commissioner did not prove that Facebook failed to maintain adequate security safeguards to protect personal information in its possession or custody? — Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, ss. 3, 5(1), 6.1 and ss. 4.3 (principle 3) and 4.7 (principle 7) of schedule 1. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

One evening in October 2021, the applicant was driving in rural southwestern Ontario. The sun had set and it was dark. The posted speed limit on the highway the applicant was using was 80km/h; he was travelling at least 116km/h. A horse-drawn buggy entered the roadway at an intersection. The applicant did not see the buggy in time to stop; his vehicle collided with it. Both occupants of the buggy died from injuries sustained in the collision. During the police investigation that night, the applicant admitted to being a chronic marijuana smoker and consented to providing two samples of his blood. Evidence established that the applicant’s blood drug concentration (“BDC”) exceeded the prescribed limit at the time of the collision. The parties agreed at trial that there was no evidence of a causal nexus between the applicant’s BDC and the collision. The applicant was charged with operating a conveyance with an excess BDC under s. 320.14(1)(c), two counts of committing an offence under s. 320.14(1)(c) causing death under s. 320.14(3), and two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death under s. 320.13(3).The trial judge held that it is insufficient that the applicant had a prohibited BDC and was operating a conveyance at the time he caused a death; a conviction for offences under s. 320.14(3) requires a causal nexus between an accused’s BDC and the death of a victim. As the parties have agreed that there is no causal nexus between the applicant’s BDC and the death of the victims, the applicant was acquitted on those counts.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his interpretation of s. 320.14(3). A plain reading establishes that the elements are made out simply by operating a vehicle with excess BDC, and causing the death of a person. No causal nexus between the excess BDC and the cause of death is required. Accused persons retain the benefit of the basic legal causation standard: the Crown must prove that the applicant’s actions were a significant contributing cause of death. Because of the trial judge’s erroneous interpretation of s. 320.14(3), he did not make any finding as to whether the Crown had proven legal causation on this standard. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered a new trial on these counts. Argued Date 2026-03-17 Keywords Criminal law — Causing death while operating conveyance with excess blood drug concentration — Causation — Whether causal nexus required between blood drug concentration and death of victim — Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to life, liberty and security of person — Whether s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code violates s. 7 of the Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.14(3) Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Aphria Inc. (“tenant”), entered into a ten-year lease for commercial office premises with the respondent landlords and successors (collectively, “landlord”). The tenant served a notice of repudiation on the landlord and vacated the premises. The landlord did not accept the tenant’s repudiation of the lease. Ultimately, the landlord sued the tenant for rents owing.The motion judge in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the landlord summary judgment for the rent owing plus interest. The motion judge declined to grant the landlord judgment for future rent. The motion judge dismissed the tenant’s cross-motion for summary judgment for a declaration that if rent was owing, the amount was capped at rent owing for two years from the date of default pursuant to the lease. The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the tenant’s appeal. It held that the motion judge did not err by refusing to depart from Highway Properties Ltd. v. Kelly, Douglas and Co. Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 562, in order to recognize a duty to mitigate on commercial landlords who reject a repudiation of a lease by the tenant. The court also held that the motion judge did not err in his interpretation of the lease. Argued Date 2026-02-18 Keywords Contracts — Commercial leases — Repudiation — Duty to mitigate — Stare decisis — Interpretation — Are commercial landlords exempt from the duty to mitigate damages? — If the common law is able to grow and adapt to changing conditions, when and how should lower courts depart from Supreme Court of Canada decisions on common law? — Should courts apply the plain meaning of the words chosen by the parties in interpreting a contract, in the absence of any factual matrix evidence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ms. Korduner was a motor vehicle driver involved in a two-vehicle accident. A responding police officer questioned her at the scene for approximately three minutes, during which she stated that she should not have been driving because she was drunk. Ms. Korduner was arrested for impaired operation of a motor vehicle. She refused to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device and was charged for refusing to provide a breath sample. In voir dire proceedings to determine the admissibility of Ms. Korduner’s statements, the trial judge held that Ms. Korduner’s statements were compelled by the Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, and were inadmissible pursuant to the use immunity principle; reliance on s. 320.31(9) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as a basis for admitting the statements would breach Ms. Korduner’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and Crown counsel failed to prove the breach was justified pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The charges were dismissed. The Court of King’s Bench of Alberta dismissed a summary conviction appeal. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed an appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2026-02-17 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Principles of fundamental justice — Self-incrimination — Criminal law — Evidence — Use immunity — Remedies — Police officer responding to motor vehicle accident questioning driver involved in accident — Statements by driver causing officer to demand breath samples in order to administer approved roadside screening device — Trial judge declaring statements to officer compelled by Traffic Safety Act — Section 320.31(9) of Criminal Code setting out that a statement to a peace officer including statement compelled under provincial Act admissible in evidence for purpose of justifying demand to provide breath sample — Whether s. 320.31(9) infringes s. 7 of Charter — If so, whether limit reasonable and demonstrably justified pursuant to s. 1 of Charter — If not, appropriate remedy — Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, ss. 69(1), 71(1) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 320.21(9). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer’s ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents in these applications for leave to appeal, Mr. Walter and Mr. Gobeil, were recognized as representative plaintiffs for the class covered by a class action brought against the applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, that is, the Québec Major Junior Hockey League, now doing business as the Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League Inc., and the impleaded hockey teams that are members of the League. In the class action, the respondents submitted that the applicants/interveners were refusing to recognize major junior hockey players as having employee status, with the result that the players had no access to the protection provided by legislation governing working conditions. Two other similar class actions were authorized, one in Ontario against the Ontario Hockey League and one in Alberta against the Western Hockey League. In total, 4,286 major junior hockey players, including 1,702 in Quebec, are covered by the class actions. On March 31, 2020, the parties to the three class actions reached a settlement agreement. The agreement was submitted to the superior courts in each of the three provinces through a joint hearing. The superior courts rejected the agreement in October 2020 solely on the basis that the scope of the release provided for was overly broad. In June 2023, after the releases were renegotiated, all of the parties, including the respondents, signed an amendment to the initial settlement agreement in order to replace the release provisions. However, it appears that, shortly after the signing, the respondents disavowed their signature and announced that they would oppose the submission of the amended agreement for judicial approval. Despite the instructions given by the respondents, Mr. Savonitto, a member of one of the firms that are applicants/interveners in these applications for leave to appeal, nevertheless submitted the amended settlement agreement to the Superior Court judge for her approval. In response, the respondents filed notices with the Superior Court formally revoking the mandate of the law firms that are applicants/interveners in this case and announced that they were retaining the services of other lawyers. The applicant/intervener law firms opposed the notices of revocation and asked the Superior Court to determine the conditions for approving the amended settlement agreement. The Superior Court recorded the revocation of the mandate of the applicants/interveners as far as the respondents were concerned, but it confirmed that the applicants/interveners still continued to represent the members of the class covered by the class action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the Superior Court’s decision. Argued Date 2026-02-16 Keywords Civil procedure – Class action – Lawyer client relationship in context of class action –Lawyer’s ethical obligations to client in context of class action – Protection for class members – Revocation of legal mandates given to firms by class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in ordering that agreement to settle authorized class action be submitted to court by applicants/defendants for approval, thereby placing their lawyers in conflict of interest and in situation that compromised their ethical obligations – Whether Court of Appeal erred in ruling that lawyer who acts for plaintiffs in class action: (i) has lawyer client relationship only with class representative; (ii) does not represent class members; and (iii) has no duty to act in best interests of class where those interests conflict with instructions of class representative – Whether Court of Appeal erred in breaching its own duty to protect interests of absent members, especially where those interests conflict with interests of class representatives – Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that art. 2633 of Civil Code of Québec and art. 528 of Code of Civil Procedure concerning homologation of transaction under ordinary law apply to process for approval of transaction in class action, and thus in asking defendants to submit amended settlement agreement for approval if Mr. Gobeil and Mr. Walter refused to do so – Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, arts. 87, 528, 571, 575, 586, 589 and 590 – Code of Professional Conduct of Lawyers, CQLR, c. B 1, r. 3.1, ss. 20, 23, 71, 72 and 120. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Confidentiality order)Following the Canadian general election held on April 28, 2025, and the subsequent judicial recount, the respondent Tatiana Auguste became a member of Parliament for the electoral district of Terrebonne. Only one vote in her favour separated her from her closest rival, the appellant, Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné. One voter then notified the media that her special ballot, mailed within the prescribed time, had been returned to her after the polling day, marked [translation] “Moved or unknown – return to sender”. In fact, there was an error in the postal code that the returning officer placed on the prepaid envelope sent to the voter in that the last three characters of the postal code were for somewhere other than the polling station. But that voter maintained that she voted for Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.The Superior Court found that there was no irregularity within the meaning of s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act. It therefore dismissed the application to contest the election filed by Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné. Argued Date 2026-02-13 Keywords Elections — Application to contest election — Irregularity — Allegations of irregularities that affected result of election made by candidate defeated by single vote in federal election — Whether trial judge erred in interpretation of notion of irregularity — Whether trial judge erred in determination of consequences of irregularity on integrity of electoral system — Whether trial judge erred in imposing burden much greater than that under Canada Elections Act on voter — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 524(1)b), 531(2). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Maxime Bergeron was expelled from a mock parliament organized by one of the respondents, the Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc. Some participants said that they were afraid of him because of his [TRANSLATION] “disruptive behaviour”. His father, Jean Bergeron, a lawyer, quickly became involved in the situation, seeking to have the expulsion decision revoked and to obtain reparation for the damage sustained by his son. The respondents filed a motion to have J. Bergeron declared disqualified.The Superior Court found that exceptional circumstances warranted declaring J. Bergeron disqualified. A reasonably informed member of the public knowing the facts of the case would be satisfied that he did not have the distance he was required to have. The Court of Appeal found that there was no reviewable error. Public confidence in the proper administration of justice could be compromised if M. Bergeron’s father were authorized to continue representing him in the particular circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2026-02-12 Keywords Civil procedure — Motion to have lawyer declared disqualified — Whether principles applicable with regard to conflict of interest since MacDonald Estate apply by analogy in context of disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance — Criteria and factors to be weighed by trial judge considering application for disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance to balance lawyer’s obligations as officer of court — Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, art. 193. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the respondent Scarborough Hospital (hereafter, the “Hospital”).The appellants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minors by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings, commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging that their negligence had caused Sophia’s injuries. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability.At trial, Lloyd Gregory Padmore, Dr. Neil Thomas Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-02-10 Keywords Torts – Professional liability – Negligence – Causation – Mother suffering severe brain injury following cardiac arrest during delivery of child by caesarian section – Application of law of causation by Canadian courts – How principles of causation to be applied in the context of women’s healthcare in Canada – What is required to show factual causation and how Courts should engage with counterfactual analyses – What is required to show legal causation and demonstrate meaningful contemplation of applicable test Civil procedure –Trial – Judgments – Reasons for judgment – Appeals – What is the permissible nature and extent of appellate courts’ power to review trial record when assessing sufficiency of reasons that are, on their face, deficient Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Gaétan Ouellet, was acquitted by Judge Garneau of the Court of Québec of a charge of sexual assault relating to three distinct incidents. On appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, the prosecutor raised four grounds of appeal.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judgment gave insufficient reasons. The majority were of the opinion that for that same reason, it was extremely difficult and speculative to assess the well foundedness of the two first grounds raised by the prosecutor, but they were nevertheless of the view that with respect to the second incident, the judge made a finding in the absence of evidence, which was an added reason for ordering a new trial. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, being of the opinion that the trial judge’s reasons were not so insufficient so as to undermine the validity of the judgment and that the other grounds of appeal were unfounded. Argued Date 2025-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Appeal — Sufficiency of reasons — Evidence — Absence of evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Whether trial judge’s reasons were so insufficient so as to undermine validity of his decision — Scope of error of law described in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, as “finding of fact for which there is no supporting evidence”. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Robert Joseph DeSutter, was charged with various sexual offences and one charge of assault, in relation to three different complainants, M.H., S.H. and J.R. The trial judge acquitted the respondent of all charges except the assault charge, finding insufficient evidence of a sexual purpose in the respondent’s actions and the lack of an exploitative relationship. The appellant Crown appealed the acquittals in relation to two counts of sexual exploitation (counts 3 and 14), alleging that the trial judge erred in law by excluding from evidence images of women found on a USB stick and concluding that the respondent was not in an exploitative relationship with one of the complainants, J.R. The majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing an error of law on the part of the trial judge justifying appellate intervention. In contrast, Derrick J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on counts 3 and 14. She found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of the USB images’ probative value and prejudicial effect. She also found that the trial judge failed to properly assess the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R., given the power imbalance and J.R.’s vulnerability. In her view, these errors could have materially affected the verdicts, warranting a new trial on the two counts of sexual exploitation. Argued Date 2025-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Assessment — Whether the trial judge erred in her analysis of the admissibility of the images on the USB — Whether the trial judge erred in her assessment of the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Bank of Nova Scotia (“taxpayer”), filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) later audited the taxpayer’s 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, the taxpayer and the Minister entered into a settlement agreement which required additional amounts to be included in the taxpayer’s 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the taxpayer wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision that requires that, for a specified period of time, interest is calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignores the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, taking the position that s. 161(7)(b)(iv) did not apply because the Minister’s reassessment of its tax for 2006 was not “as a consequence” of its request to carryback losses from 2008 to offset its 2006 tax liability. The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal. Argued Date 2026-01-21 Keywords Taxation — Income tax — Computation of interest payable — Minister’s reassessment taking into account audit adjustment and carryback requested by taxpayer to offset a loss — Minister applying s. 161(1)(b)(iv) of Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) to compute taxpayer interest up until day taxpayer requested loss carryback — Taxpayer appealing applicability of provision Minister relied on — Courts dismissing taxpayer’s appeal — Whether the event set out in s. 161(7)(b)(iv) occurred when the Minister reassessed taxpayer’s previous taxation year at a later date — What is the proper construction of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) and the words “where, as a consequence of a request in writing, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer’s tax for [a previous year] to take into account the deduction” of a loss? — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 161(7)(b)(iv). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-20 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-19 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).