Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)

The appellant, Bank of Nova Scotia (“taxpayer”), filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) later audited the taxpayer’s 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, the taxpayer and the Minister entered into a settlement agreement which required additional amounts to be included in the taxpayer’s 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the taxpayer wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision that requires that, for a specified period of time, interest is calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignores the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, taking the position that s. 161(7)(b)(iv) did not apply because the Minister’s reassessment of its tax for 2006 was not “as a consequence” of its request to carryback losses from 2008 to offset its 2006 tax liability. The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal. Argued Date 2026-01-21 Keywords Taxation — Income tax — Computation of interest payable — Minister’s reassessment taking into account audit adjustment and carryback requested by taxpayer to offset a loss — Minister applying s. 161(1)(b)(iv) of Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) to compute taxpayer interest up until day taxpayer requested loss carryback — Taxpayer appealing applicability of provision Minister relied on — Courts dismissing taxpayer’s appeal — Whether the event set out in s. 161(7)(b)(iv) occurred when the Minister reassessed taxpayer’s previous taxation year at a later date — What is the proper construction of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) and the words “where, as a consequence of a request in writing, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer’s tax for [a previous year] to take into account the deduction” of a loss? — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 161(7)(b)(iv). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-20 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7. Argued Date 2026-01-19 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-15 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Argued Date 2026-01-14 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Two fictitious advertisements were published by the police on Internet sites offering escort services; the text of the advertisements highlighted the youthfulness of the people. Mr. Denis communicated with someone who turned out to be a police officer acting in an undercover capacity. She stated that she mentioned the young girl’s age at least four times but that Mr. Denis did not react to that information. He was arrested by the police when he entered the room where the “escort” was.Following the trial, Mr. Denis was convicted of the offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code (communication for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration from a person under the age of 18 years). He brought a motion to have the mandatory minimum sentence declared invalid and of no force or effect. The trial judge, considering the six month minimum sentence to be appropriate, did not conduct the Charter analysis. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to rule on the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence and declare it invalid and of no force or effect, in accordance with s. 52(1) of the Charter. Argued Date 2026-01-13 Keywords Criminal law — Abuse of process — Entrapment — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — Mandatory minimum sentence — Commodification of sexual activity as regards person under age of 18 years — Whether s. 286.1(2)(a) of Criminal Code breaches s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 286.1 — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12, 24(1) and 52(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-12 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Indigenous respondent pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault of his Indigenous common law partner. He had a significant criminal record and a history of serious mental illness. The sentencing judge concluded the respondent’s incarceration was required to protect the public. The respondent was sentenced to five years in prison for the aggravated assault and eight months’ incarceration for breaches of release orders. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to three years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault. The dissenting justice would have granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-11 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Considerations — Aboriginal offender and Aboriginal female victim — Sentencing of Aboriginal offender for aggravated assault — Offence against vulnerable person — What does the deferential standard of review mean in terms of weighing sentencing factors and making factual findings? — How should courts approach sentencing when ss. 718.04, 718.201, and 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code apply? Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation entered into a contract with Mellon Trust Financial pursuant to which it provided market pricing data for various types of securities. Mellon Trust Financial merged with Bank of New York to form Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation succeeded to the rights and duties under the contract. Mellon Trust Financial and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation breached the contract by redistributing market pricing data to affiliates. Upon learning of the breach of contract, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation’s counsel demanded an accounting and that Bank of New York Mellon Corporation preserve all related communications, documents, and files. Records including records created after the preservation demand were destroyed. SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation commenced an action against Bank of New York Mellon Corporation seeking damages for breach of contract. Based on spoliation, SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation in part asked the trial judge to draw an adverse inference that its data had been shared with 65 affiliates and it has lost the opportunity to enter into 65 additional agreements on substantially the same terms as the contract. The trial judge found Bank of New York Mellon Corporation liable for breach of contract. The trial judge did not accept SS&C Technologies Canada Corporation’s proposed adverse inference but did draw an adverse inference that all data usage was by Bank of New York Mellon Corporation’s affiliates. He awarded damages of CAD $922,887 and USD $5,696,850. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the finding of liability and allowed a cross-appeal on liability. It allowed an appeal from the damages award in part and set aside the award of CDN $922,887. Argued Date 2025-12-10 Keywords Civil procedure — Evidence — Spoliation — What is the appropriate remedy for spoliation — What should the appropriate remedy have been in this case? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-09 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group’s action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge’s order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga’a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent Gitanyow Nation asserts Aboriginal rights and title over certain lands in British Columbia, and has advanced claims against the federal and provincial Crown. Another Aboriginal group with a modern treaty covering an overlapping geographic area, the appellant, the Nisga’a Nation, sought to be added as a defendant in the Gitanyow action. A case management judge at the Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s application to be added as a defendant. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Nisga’a Nation’s appeal from the first decision. Argued Date 2025-12-08 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal title — Aboriginal rights — Treaty rights — Aboriginal group advancing rights and title claims against Crown — Second group seeking to join action as defendant, given its modern treaty governing rights in overlapping territory — Case management judge declining to add second group as defendant in first group’s action — Court of Appeal upholding case management judge’s order — What is potential effect of declaration of Aboriginal title in favour of Indigenous claimant in respect of lands over which different Indigenous nation has existing section 35 rights under modern treaty, including modified Aboriginal title? — Did courts below incorrectly interpret Nisga’a Treaty by ruling that Treaty Party Provisions were not engaged in action and would not become operative until only after Plaintiffs established Aboriginal title within Claimed Lands? — Did courts below err in concluding that, while tests for joinder under Rule 6-2(7) of Supreme Court Civil Rules are met in respect of competing assertion of Aboriginal title, same tests are not met in respect of competing Aboriginal title and other rights that are recognized under modern treaty? — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, S.C., 2000, c. 7, ss. 3, 4, 5, 20 — Nisg_a’a Final Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1999, c. 2, ss. 2, 3, 5, 8 — Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, r. 6-2(7). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents, Robert Vrbanic and Sarah Josipovic, were jointly charged with possession of significant quantities of four different drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime. They sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. The appellant Crown did not dispute that the delay in this case was over the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, but argued that this delay was justified by the complexity of the case. The application judge concluded that the delay was not justified as an exceptional circumstance on the basis of the complexity of the case, and ordered a stay of proceedings. The Crown appealed the application judge’s order. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the application judge’s assessment of the complexity of the case was free of legal error and entitled to deference. Roberts J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings on the basis that the application judge’s miscalculation of the net delay and misapplication of the governing principles respecting exceptional circumstances materially affected his ultimate decision as to whether the delay was unreasonable. Argued Date 2025-12-04 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Exceptional circumstances — Complexity of case — Remedy — Stay of proceedings — Whether the application judge misapplied the governing principles on s. 11(b) Charter litigation by miscalculating the net delay and failing to properly assess complexity — Whether the determination of complexity, for the purposes of an exceptional circumstance under the s. 11(b) framework, ought to be evaluated within the context of the case as a whole — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant was acquitted at trial of transmitting sexually explicit material to a person under the age of 16 for the purpose of facilitating the commission of either a sexual assault or the indecent act of exposing his genital organs to a person under 16 years of age for a sexual purpose. The trial judge accepted that the appellant sent sexually explicit material to a minor, but he was left with a reasonable doubt on two elements : the identity of the appellant in a sexually explicit video and the specific intent to transmit the material for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an enumerated offence. The trial judge concluded that the transmission of the material could have been “flirtation” and was left with a doubt as to whether the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences.The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in acquitting the appellant. The Crown was not required to prove the identity of the appellant in the transmitted video, nor was it required to prove that the appellant personally intended to commit one of the enumerated offences. The conduct referred to by the trial judge as “flirtation” is a tool used to facilitate the commission of sexual offences against children. In its view, but for the trial judge’s errors, the appellant would have been convicted. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction. Argued Date 2025-11-14 Keywords Criminal Law —Transmit sexually explicit material to a person under age of 16 for purpose of facilitating commission of sexual assault or indecent act — Elements of offence — Powers of Court of Appeal — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by allowing appeal and quashing acquittal under Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 171.1(1)(b), because alleged errors were errors of fact — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded jurisdiction by substituting conviction for acquittal under s. 171.1(1)(b) based on its own findings of fact. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, SGS Canada Inc. (SGS), is a subsidiary of a foreign company that offers inspection, analysis, certification and quality control services with respect to Canadian grain destined for interprovincial trade and international export. On November 22, 2019, the intervener Syndicat des travailleuses et travailleurs des industries manufacturières – CSN filed a petition for certification with the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT) under the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C 27. The union wanted to represent inspectors and grain graders employed by SGS in Quebec, who work mainly at grain elevators located in Quebec ports along the St. Lawrence River. In December 2019, SGS notified the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, that it intended to challenge the ALT’s jurisdiction. It argued that the certification of the employees in question did not fall under provincial jurisdiction, but rather under direct federal jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of labour relations because the employment relates to a work, undertaking or business within the legislative authority of Parliament within the meaning of the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada and therefore that it was up to the Canada Industrial Relations Board to dispose of the petition for certification in accordance with the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L 2. In July 2020, SGS gave its agreement on the composition of the proposed bargaining unit, whose representative character was also established. On February 26, 2021, the ALT refused the petition for certification under the Labour Code. The ALT found that the unit contemplated in the union’s petition for certification was subject to derivative federal legislative jurisdiction and that consequently the petition was refused. The Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-12-02 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Labour relations — Direct and derivative federal jurisdiction — Works declared “for the general advantage of Canada” — Company operating “elevators” within meaning of Canada Grain Act — Whether SGS’s labour relations fall directly under federal jurisdiction over works declared for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to s. 92(10)(c) of Constitution Act, 1867 by reason of its inspection activities — Whether SGS’s labour relations fall derivatively under federal jurisdiction over works declared for the general advantage of Canada pursuant to s. 92(10)(c) of Constitution Act, 1867 by reason of its inspection activities — Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G 10, s. 55 — Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(29) and 92(10)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent was accused of beating a person to death with an axe. Prior to his death, the deceased socialized with the respondent and a number of other persons. At some point, many people left to another venue but the respondent and the deceased remained. The deceased made a phone call to a third party in which he referred to having to fight someone. That person testified to the time of the phone call and the words used by the deceased; she also testified to hearing sounds consistent with the deceased having been beaten to death.The respondent was convicted of second-degree murder following a trial by judge alone. The trial judge referred to the statement of the deceased by phone in her decision. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly used the statement for a hearsay purpose rather than only the fact that the statement was made. The majority allowed the appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial. Crighton J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge did not err in her treatment of the statement of the deceased. Argued Date 2025-11-12 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Hearsay — Statement of deceased shortly before death — Use of statement of the deceased by trial judge — Whether statement by deceased was used for a hearsay purpose — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in holding that trial judge improperly admitted statement for truth of its content —Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in setting aside conviction for murder Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Jacques-Taylor and a co-accused were jointly charged with firearms offences. On July 6, 2022, each co-accused’s defence counsel, Crown counsel, and a trial coordinator appeared in court to set a trial date. Mr. Jacques-Taylor’s counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022 or for any date in August but was not available in September. Crown counsel was available for the first available court date of August 8, 2022. Counsel for Mr. Jacques-Taylor’s co-accused was not available for any date in August. Counsel agreed on trial dates from October 2 to 4, 2022. Time from laying of charges to the anticipated start of trial was 22 months and 2 weeks. Mr. Jacques-Taylor filed a motion to stay the proceedings against him for unreasonable delay in breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time guaranteed by s. 11 (b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The motions judge, after attributing delay, calculated net delay to be 2 weeks over the 18-month presumptive ceiling. The motions judge declined to attribute 25 days of the delay following the appearance to schedule trial dates that were caused only by the unavailability of counsel for the co-accused as defence delay. Had those 25 days been attributed to the defence, the net delay would have been below the presumptive ceiling. The motions judge granted a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-07 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Co-accused being tried jointly — Delay for accused, including period of delay caused only by unavailability of co-accused’s counsel for available court dates, exceeding presumptive Jordan ceiling — Where it is in the interests of justice to pursue a joint prosecution, how is the Jordan framework to be applied as to each accused — What is the scope and proper application of the contextual approach to delay set out in R. v. Hanan, 2023 SCC 12? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

On the advice of the Prime Minister of Canada, the Privy Council Office recommended that the Governor General issue an Order in Council appointing a Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick who was not bilingual. At trial, that appointment was found inconsistent with the bilingualism requirements in ss. 16(2), 16.1(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal set aside that decision on the basis that the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor who was not bilingual did not infringe ss. 16(2), 16.1(1), 18(2) and 20(2) of the Charter. Argued Date 2025-11-13 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Language rights — Role of Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Language requirement for Lieutenant Governor in New Brunswick — Whether Order in Council 2019 1325 dated September 4, 2019, infringes ss. 16(2), 16.1, 18(2) and 20(2) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, what would be appropriate remedy. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada’s appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-06 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament’s power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution’s own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (the “Act”) creates a committee of Parliamentarians (the “Committee”) appointed by the Governor-in-Council who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing reports for the Prime Minister on the matters it inquires into.Where a proceeding is brought against a Committee member, based on the alleged improper disclosure of information obtained as a consequence of membership on the Committee, s. 12 of the Act expressly excludes any claim for parliamentary immunity. Statements made in Parliament or in a committee of Parliament can be the subject of a charge under the Act, or related statutory provisions, and statements made by Committee members in Parliament or in committee are admissible against the member to prove the alleged improper disclosure.Appellant Ryan Alford, a law professor, sought and was granted public interest standing to bring a challenge to the constitutionality of s. 12. He brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12 was ultra vires Parliament. A judge of Ontario’s Superior Court of Justice granted the application and declared s. 12 ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and constitutionally invalid. The Court of Appeal for Ontario unanimously allowed Canada’s appeal. Argued Date 2025-11-05 Keywords Constitutional law — Canadian institutions — Parliament — Parliamentary privilege — National security — Parliament enacting legislation authorizing committee of parliamentarians to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence — Legislation prohibiting committee members from disclosing protected information and eliminating immunity claims based on parliamentary privilege in proceedings arising from disclosure — Whether s. 12 of National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act ultra vires Parliament’s power to enact legislation defining parliamentary privileges – Whether s. 12 abrogating privilege that is part of Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which states that amendments to Constitution can only be made in accordance with Constitution’s own exclusive and explicit provisions for amendment — National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15, s. 12 — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 18 — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents are owners of lots that border three lakes in Ville d’Estérel. Following the renewal of the cadastre of Ville d’Estérel in 2016, the respondents discovered that they were not owners of a submerged strip of land that goes around each of the lakes and is situated in front of their respective lots. The appellant claimed to own that strip of land, immatriculated separately in the cadastre as several lots, whereas the respondents stated that they own it. Through an application for a declaratory judgment, the respondents sought a declaration confirming that they are respectively owners of the submerged lots adjacent to the lands they own. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed their application, finding that the submerged lots are the property of the appellant. The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeal in part. It found that the submerged strip of land is accessory to the riparian lots pursuant to the doctrine of accessory. Argued Date 2025-11-10 Keywords Property — Immovables — Submerged lots — Extent of right of ownership near watercourses and lakes — Doctrine of accessory — Whether doctrine of accessory is applicable to lots submerged as result of construction of dam — If so, whether doctrine should apply only in residual manner, if doubt persists as to common intention of parties — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interfering, without identifying palpable and overriding error, with findings at trial concerning interpretion of words [TRANSLATION] “bounded by the lake” and common intention of parties. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).