Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Nielsen v. Watanabe Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 9, 2026. Petitioner: Francis Nielsen.Respondent: Kekai Watanabe . Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kekai Watanabe was a federal detainee at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu when, in July 2021, rival gang members attacked him during a prison riot. After staff restored order, prison officials documented his visible injuries and placed him on sick call. Later that day, Watanabe told correctional officers he had headaches and pain and asked to see medical staff. He eventually described his condition to Francis Nielsen, a staff nurse at the facility, who denied his request to go to the hospital. Officials gave Watanabe over-the-counter pain medication. Months later, doctors diagnosed Watanabe with a fractured coccyx with bone chips in surrounding soft tissue, and prison officials agreed to refer him to a specialist. Watanabe then filed a pro se lawsuit alleging that Nielsen and others violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him adequate medical care and refusing to send him to the hospital, seeking $3 million in damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed Watanabe’s complaint, holding that his claim arose in a new Bivens context distinct from Carlson v. Green because he had access to an alternative administrative remedy—the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program—that the Supreme Court had not considered in Carlson, and because his non-fatal injury differed meaningfully from the fatal asthma emergency in Carlson. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the availability of alternative remedies did not render the context new and that Carlson governed; the Ninth Circuit then denied rehearing en banc over eleven judges’ dissents. Question Can a federal prisoner sue prison officials for money damages under the Bivens doctrine for deliberate indifference to a non-life-threatening injury?

Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2026. Petitioner: Leonard W. Hoffmann.Respondent: WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. is a private natural gas company that holds a federal certificate authorizing it to use eminent domain to build and operate a natural gas pipeline. WBI used that authority to condemn an easement across ranchland in McKenzie County, North Dakota, owned by Leonard Hoffmann, Margaret Hoffmann, Denae Hoffmann, Rocky & Jonilla Farms, LLP, and Randall Stevenson. After roughly three years of litigation over the value of the taken property, the parties settled that question but expressly reserved the issue of whether the landowners could recover their attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The landowners argued that North Dakota law governed compensation and that state law entitles condemnees to recover those costs. WBI argued that federal law controlled and capped compensation at the constitutional minimum set by the Fifth Amendment, which does not include attorney’s fees. The district court agreed with the landowners, applied a federal choice-of-law framework, concluded that North Dakota law governed, and ordered WBI to reimburse the landowners $383,375.76 in fees and litigation expenses. WBI appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that private companies exercising eminent domain power under the Natural Gas Act stand in the federal government’s shoes and owe only the constitutional minimum of just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, expressly splitting with the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. Question When a private company uses the Natural Gas Act to seize someone’s land for natural gas infrastructure, does state law determine how much compensation the landowner receives?

Guerrero v. Johnson Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2026. Petitioner: Eric Guerrero.Respondent: Dexter Johnson. Advocates: William R. Peterson (for the Petitioner) Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jeremy Schepers (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dexter Johnson kidnapped, raped, and murdered Maria Aparece in June 2006, years after the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing intellectually disabled people. At trial, Johnson’s own defense expert tested his IQ between 74 and 88, concluded he showed no obvious adaptive deficits, and opined that he was not intellectually disabled. Johnson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in June 2007. Johnson did not raise an Atkins claim in his initial state habeas application or his initial federal habeas petition filed in 2011. Instead, he argued that the Atkins principles should extend to the mentally ill. In May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association published the DSM-5, which substantially revised intellectual disability diagnosis by de-emphasizing IQ score cutoffs and recognizing that individuals with scores above 70 could still qualify. Johnson's federal habeas petition was denied in August 2013—just months after the DSM-5’s publication. Johnson’s counsel, aware of the DSM-5, chose not to develop an Atkins claim, citing concerns about unfavorable Texas state court standards and his strategic focus on other claims. With an execution date set for 2019, Johnson obtained new expert evaluations under the DSM-5 standards; those experts diagnosed him as intellectually disabled. Johnson then sought authorization to file a successive federal habeas petition, arguing that the DSM-5 had made his Atkins claim newly viable and therefore “previously unavailable” during his earlier habeas proceedings. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit authorized the successive petition in 2019, the district court denied the State's motion to dismiss and found Johnson’s Atkins claim was previously unavailable under the Fifth Circuit’s “futility exception” from In re Cathey. The district court certified that ruling for interlocutory appeal, the Fifth Circuit accepted, and a panel affirmed in July 2025, reaffirming Cathey’s holding that a claim is not “previously available” unless it had “some possibility of merit” at the time of the earlier petition. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a 9-7 vote in January 2026. Question Does a claim rely on a “previously unavailable” new rule of constitutional law, permitting a successive habeas petition, when the prisoner could have raised a claim based on that rule in an earlier petition?

St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy Justia · Docket · oyez.org · YouTube Argued on Nov 3, 2026. Petitioner: St. Mary Catholic Parish, Littleton, Colorado.Respondent: Lisa Roy, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Early Childhood. Advocates: Nicholas R. Reaves (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Helen Norton (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Colorado voters established the Universal Preschool Program (UPK) to provide free preschool services through a “mixed delivery system” of public and private providers. To receive state funds, providers must sign a nondiscrimination agreement that requires them to enroll students regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Two Catholic parishes and the Archdiocese of Denver sought to participate in the program but refused to sign the agreement. They argued that their religious tenets require them to consider the sexual orientation and gender identity of families during admissions to maintain their religious environment. The schools specifically challenged the program’s “preference system,” which uses an algorithm to match families with schools based on categories like sibling enrollment or congregation membership. They also highlighted a “temporary waiver” provision that allows the state to grant providers extra time to meet certain quality standards. The schools argued that these features create a system of “individualized exemptions” where the state exercises discretion to favor secular interests. Because the state allows these secular preferences while denying a religious exemption to the nondiscrimination rule, the schools contended the program unconstitutionally penalizes them for their religious character. The district court denied the schools’ request for a permanent injunction, ruling that the nondiscrimination requirement is a neutral and generally applicable law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision, holding that the state’s program does not grant the type of unfettered discretion that would trigger strict scrutiny. Question Does a law lack general applicability under the Free Exercise Clause only if it permits unfettered discretion or secular exemptions, and does the rule against excluding religious institutions from public benefits apply only to explicit government bans on participation?

Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2026. Petitioner: Jasmine Younge.Respondent: Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, Georgia . Advocates: Eric Schnapper (for the Petitioner) Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In April 2019, Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard — an elected official — hired Dr. Jasmine Younge as Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy and Programs at a salary of $120,282. Younge ranked third in the office's chain of command, reported exclusively to Howard, supervised more than thirty employees, and worked so closely with Howard that he described her as a "key member" and his "go-to person for almost everything." About two months into her tenure, Younge told Howard she was pregnant. After that announcement, Howard stopped meeting with Younge, excluded her from meetings, treated her dismissively, and reassigned some of her duties — then fired her two weeks later. Younge sued the Fulton County District Attorney's Office for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII. In its answer, the DA's Office raised several affirmative defenses but did not plead the Title VII personal-staff exemption — which excludes from Title VII's coverage persons chosen to serve on an elected official's "personal staff." The DA's Office did not recognize the exemption as relevant until it began preparing its summary judgment motion, after discovery had already closed. The district court allowed the DA's Office to raise the personal-staff exemption for the first time at summary judgment, finding no prejudice to Younge from the late assertion, and granted summary judgment to the DA's Office on that basis; Younge then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed. Question May a defendant raise an affirmative defense it never pleaded in its answer as the sole basis for a summary judgment motion — without seeking to amend its answer — and does it matter that the court's scheduling order deadline would have barred any such amendment?