Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Oral argument for Trump, President of U.S. v. Cook, argued on January 21, 2026. Once a transcript is available on oyez.org, the recording and this description will be replaced by more detailed information.

Wolford v. Lopez Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 20, 2026. Petitioner: Jason Wolford.Respondent: Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii. Advocates: Alan A. Beck (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2023, Hawaii and California enacted new laws, Act 52 and Senate Bill 2, respectively, that significantly restrict the public carry of firearms. Both laws prohibit individuals with carry permits from bringing firearms into numerous specified “sensitive places.” Hawaii’s list includes fifteen categories, such as bars, restaurants serving alcohol, parks, beaches, and banks. California’s list is broader, covering more than two dozen types of property, including hospitals, public transit, playgrounds, libraries, museums, places of worship, and casinos. Both states also changed the default rule for private property open to the public, generally banning firearms unless the property owner expressly permits them. Hawaii allows owners to consent verbally, in writing, or via a posted sign. California’s rule is stricter, permitting consent only through the posting of a specific, state-mandated sign. Plaintiffs in both states include individuals who hold concealed-carry permits and various gun-rights organizations. They filed lawsuits alleging that these new restrictions violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Plaintiffs in both actions sued their respective state attorneys general, and federal district courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking enforcement of many of the new provisions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases, affirming the injunctions in part but reversing them in large part. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling allowed many of the challenged restrictions to remain in effect but agreed with the district courts that the states could not, for example, ban firearms in banks or hospitals. Question Does a law that makes it a crime for a licensed concealed carry permit holder to bring a handgun onto private property open to the public—such as a store or restaurant—unless the property owner gives “express authorization” violate the Second Amendment?

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 20, 2026. Petitioner: M & K Employee Solutions, LLC.Respondent: Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund. Advocates: Michael E. Kenneally, Jr. (for the Petitioners) John E. Roberts (for the Respondent) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) M&K Employee Solutions operated three facilities that participated in the IAM National Pension Fund, a retirement plan jointly funded by multiple employers whose workers were represented by the International Association of Machinists union. In late 2017, the Fund’s actuary valued the plan’s unfunded obligations at about $448 million. Shortly after, in January 2018, the actuary met with the Fund’s trustees and decided to change key financial assumptions used to calculate how much departing employers owed the Fund. Most importantly, they lowered the assumed investment return rate from 7.5% to 6.5%, a change that would significantly increase the bills for employers leaving the plan. M&K had already begun pulling out of the Fund when two of its facilities stopped participating in 2017. When M&K completely withdrew in 2018, the Fund calculated what M&K owed based on financial data from December 31, 2017, but used the new assumptions adopted in January 2018. This resulted in a withdrawal liability bill of over $6 million. Ohio Magnetics, another company in the Fund, faced a similar situation when it withdrew in mid-2018 and received a bill for about $447,000 calculated the same way. Both companies challenged their bills through arbitration and won, with arbitrators ruling the Fund could not use assumptions created after the December 31, 2017 measurement date. The Fund then sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to overturn these arbitration decisions. The district court sided with the Fund, ruling that actuaries could adopt new assumptions after the measurement date as long as they were based on information available at that time. The court remanded the cases to the arbitrators for reconsideration. Both employers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Question When a pension plan calculates how much a departing employer owes “as of the end of the plan year,” must the plan use the financial assumptions it had already adopted by that date, or can it use new assumptions created after that date if they are based on information that was available at year-end?

Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2026. Petitioner: Cedric Galette.Respondent: New Jersey Transit Corporation. Advocates: Michael Zuckerman (for New Jersey Transit Corp., et al. (Respondent in No. 24-1021, Petitioners in No. 24-1113)) Michael B. Kimberly (for Galette and Colt, et al. (Petitioner in 24-1021, Respondents in 24-1113)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2018, Cedric Galette was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on Market Street in Philadelphia when it was struck by a vehicle operated by the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit). Galette suffered physical injuries as a result of the collision and brought a negligence lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court against both the vehicle’s driver, Julie McCrey, and NJ Transit. NJ Transit responded by asserting that it was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and therefore immune from private suit in Pennsylvania under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied NJ Transit’s motion to dismiss, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that NJ Transit qualifies as an arm of the state and is therefore immune under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. Question Is the New Jersey Transit Corporation an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes?

Little v. Hecox Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al.Respondent: Lindsay Hecox, et al. Advocates: Alan M. Hurst (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Kathleen R. Hartnett (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which categorically barred transgender girls and women from participating on female athletic teams in public schools—from elementary school through college. Prior to the law’s passage, Idaho’s high school athletic association and the NCAA allowed transgender women to compete on women’s teams after a year of hormone therapy. At the time, there were no known instances of transgender girls competing in Idaho athletics under those existing rules. Nonetheless, Idaho lawmakers passed the Act, citing concerns about “fairness” and biological differences attributed to testosterone and other factors. The law allowed any individual to challenge a female athlete’s gender, triggering a mandatory medical verification process that could include analysis of reproductive anatomy, genetic make-up, or testosterone levels. Cisgender women, including those perceived as more masculine, could also be subjected to these checks. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wished to join the women’s cross-country team, filed suit alongside a cisgender high school athlete known as Jane Doe. They alleged that the Act violated their constitutional rights, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hecox had undergone hormone therapy, significantly lowering her testosterone levels, but was still categorically excluded under the law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the law in August 2020, finding it likely unconstitutional. After several rounds of appeal and remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the injunction as applied to Hecox but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the scope of the injunction, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Labrador v. Poe. Question May a state, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, categorically require sports participants to compete based on their biological sex, rather than gender identity?

West Virginia v. B.P.J. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: West Virginia, et al.Respondent: B. P. J., By Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson. Advocates: Michael R. Williams (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Joshua A. Block (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) B.P.J. is a transgender girl who has identified as female since the third grade. At the onset of puberty, B.P.J. began taking puberty blockers and estrogen for medical treatment of gender dysphoria, effectively halting male pubertal development and aligning her physical characteristics with those of cisgender girls. Since her social transition, B.P.J. has consistently lived as a girl at school and participated on girls’ athletic teams. In 2021, West Virginia enacted the “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which requires public school and collegiate sports teams to be designated based on “biological sex” and excludes individuals identified as male at birth from participating on female teams. This law, by its design and effect, prevented B.P.J. from continuing to compete on her school’s girls’ cross-country and track teams. Shortly after the Act took effect, B.P.J., through her mother, sued the West Virginia State Board of Education and other state and county education officials, as well as the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. She alleged that excluding her from girls’ sports violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The State of West Virginia intervened to defend the law. Initially, the district court granted B.P.J. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to participate on girls’ teams pending litigation. However, at summary judgment, the district court reversed course and upheld the law, concluding that the classification on the basis of “biological sex” was substantially related to the important government interest in ensuring fairness and opportunity in girls’ athletics. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied B.P.J.’s cross-motion, holding that the exclusion of B.P.J. from girls’ sports did not violate the Constitution or Title IX. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It held that application of the law to B.P.J. violated Title IX and that factual disputes precluded summary judgment against her equal protection claim. Question Does Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause prohibit a state from assigning students to girls’ and boys’ sports teams based on their biological sex as determined at birth?

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2026. Petitioner: Chevron USA Incorporated.Respondent: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Aaron Z. Roper (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands. The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations. After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Can an oil company being sued in state court for its World War II-era oil production move its case to federal court simply because the oil was produced to meet federal government contracts for wartime fuel—even if the contract did not specifically direct how to produce the oil?

Hamm v. Smith Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: John Q. Hamm, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.Respondent: Joseph Clifton Smith. Advocates: Robert M. Overing (for the Petitioner) Harry Graver (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joseph Clifton Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama. Years later, Smith filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to overturn his death sentence on grounds that he is intellectually disabled and therefore cannot be executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The central issue in Smith’s case involved determining whether he met the three-prong test for intellectual disability: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation of these qualities before age 18. Smith's IQ testing revealed multiple scores—72, 74, 75, 74, and 78—that fell within or near the range associated with intellectual disability when accounting for standard error of measurement. His experts testified that four of his five scores were consistent with mild intellectual disability, while the state’s expert, Dr. King, argued that Smith’s multiple scores placed him in the borderline range just above intellectual disability. After extensive evidentiary hearings featuring competing expert testimony about both Smith’s IQ scores and his adaptive functioning deficits, the district court found Smith intellectually disabled. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted Smith’s habeas petition and vacated his death sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case, asking the Eleventh Circuit to clarify whether its ruling relied solely on the lower end of Smith's IQ score range or on a holistic analysis of all evidence. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit explained that its reasoning was based on a holistic analysis. Question When a capital defendant has taken multiple IQ tests with varying results, how should courts evaluate the cumulative effect of those scores to determine whether the defendant has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning under Atkins v. Virginia?

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: FS Credit Opportunities Corp.Respondent: Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners and BlackRock Respondents supporting the Petitioners) Max E. Schulman (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Saba Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Investment funds organized as closed-end mutual funds under Maryland law adopted “control share provisions” that stripped voting rights from shareholders who owned 10% or more of a fund’s shares. These provisions were adopted in response to activist investor Saba Capital, which had been acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds with the goal of unlocking shareholder value through various strategies, including electing new directors and advocating for share buybacks. Saba Capital sued sixteen closed-end funds in June 2023, seeking rescission of these control share provisions. Saba argued that the provisions violated Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which requires that “every share of stock shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding stock.” Saba brought its lawsuit under Section 47(b) of the ICA, relying on Second Circuit precedent that recognized an implied private right of action for parties seeking to rescind contracts that violate the ICA. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Saba against eleven of the funds (five were dismissed due to forum selection clauses requiring suit in Maryland). The district court held that the control share provisions violated the ICA’s equal voting rights mandate and ordered their rescission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision in a summary order. Question Does Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), create an implied private right of action?

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2025. Petitioner: National Republican Senatorial Committee.Respondent: Federal Election Commission. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondents, supporting the Petitioners) Roman Martinez (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Marc E. Elias (for the Intervenors) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2022, two Republican party committees—the National Republican Senatorial Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee—along with then-Senator J.D. Vance and then-Representative Steve Chabot, sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The Republican committees asserted that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) unconstitutionally restricts their ability to coordinate campaign advertising with their own candidates. This coordination allows the party and its candidates to unify their political message and spend money more efficiently. For example, in the 2021-2022 election cycle, the senatorial committee spent about $15.5 million and the congressional committee spent about $8.3 million on such coordinated expenditures, which primarily fund political advertising. The plaintiffs argue that developments since a 2001 Supreme Court decision, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which upheld these same limits, have rendered that decision obsolete. Specifically, they point to changes in campaign finance law, the rise of “Super PACs,” and shifts in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as reasons the restrictions no longer pass constitutional muster. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. As required by FECA for constitutional challenges, the district court certified the legal question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the FECA’s limits on coordinated campaign expenditures do not violate the First Amendment and denied both the facial and as-applied challenges brought by the plaintiffs. Question Do FECA limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with “party coordinated communications”?

Trump v. Slaughter Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2025. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Amit Agarwal (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Rebecca Kelly Slaughter was serving as a Commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an agency led by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to seven-year terms. The Federal Trade Commission Act limits the President’s ability to remove an FTC Commissioner to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” President Donald J. Trump fired Commissioner Slaughter, explaining her continued service was “inconsistent with [the] Administration’s priorities,” which did not meet the statutory standard of “cause.” Slaughter sued President Trump and the three remaining FTC Commissioners, arguing her removal was unlawful because the President failed to offer a statutory cause. The district court ruled in favor of Commissioner Slaughter, declaring her removal unlawful, ordering her reinstatement, and issuing a permanent injunction against the remaining Commissioners and their subordinates, barring them from interfering with her duties. The government appealed the decision and requested a stay of the district court's order pending the appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal and dissolved an administrative stay that had been previously entered. The Supreme Court granted the stay on September 22, 2025, and also granted certiorari. Question Do the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers?

Olivier v. City of Brandon, Mississippi Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2025. Petitioner: Gabriel Olivier.Respondent: City of Brandon, Mississippi, et al. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) G. Todd Butler (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gabriel Olivier was an evangelical Christian who regularly preached in public using signs and loudspeakers to convey religious messages. Between 2018 and 2019, he evangelized several times outside the Brandon Amphitheater, a city-owned venue in Brandon, Mississippi. In 2019, the city enacted an ordinance requiring protestors during live events to remain in a designated protest area, restricting use of loudspeakers and prohibiting non-handheld signs. In May 2021, Olivier returned to the Amphitheater during a concert to preach and was ordered by the police chief to move to the protest area. After briefly complying, Olivier returned to a more populated area, resulting in a citation for violating the ordinance. He pleaded no contest in municipal court, paid a fine, and did not appeal the conviction. Olivier then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance, arguing it violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court held that his claims were barred by the doctrine established in Heck v. Humphrey because success on them would necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-standing conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, modifying the dismissal to be with prejudice only until the conditions set by Heck were met. Question Does Heck v. Humphrey bar Section 1983 claims for purely prospective relief when the plaintiff has already been punished under the challenged law, and does that bar apply even if the plaintiff lacked access to federal habeas relief?

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2025. Petitioner: First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc.Respondent: Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey. Advocates: Erin M. Hawley (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Sundeep Iyer (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. is a nonprofit organization in New Jersey that operates a network of centers offering pregnancy-related services. In 2023, the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs began investigating First Choice over concerns that its client-facing websites downplayed its pro-life mission and may have misled donors and clients about its services, staff qualifications, and medical practices. State investigators identified possible discrepancies between what First Choice told donors—emphasizing a pro-life mission—and what was publicly communicated to potential clients on other websites. The investigation also scrutinized potentially misleading medical statements and questioned whether unlicensed staff were performing services that require medical credentials. As part of its investigation, the State issued a non-self-executing subpoena to First Choice seeking internal documents, advertising material, substantiation for medical claims, and information on donors and licensed personnel. First Choice objected to the subpoena—particularly the requests for donor identities—arguing that complying would violate its constitutional rights, including freedom of association and donor privacy. While First Choice continued to raise these objections, the state filed a motion in New Jersey Superior Court to compel enforcement. The state court denied First Choice’s motion to quash the subpoena in full but did not order immediate production of documents. Instead, it instructed the parties to negotiate the subpoena’s scope, specifically reserved constitutional arguments for future resolution, and clarified that donor identities would be sought only for those who contributed through two specific websites. As a result, First Choice remained under no court order to turn over the disputed materials while negotiations continued. While contesting the subpoena in state court, First Choice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking federal relief to block enforcement on constitutional grounds. The district court twice dismissed the federal suit as unripe, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the ongoing state court proceedings and the lack of any order compelling compliance rendered First Choice’s claims not ready for federal adjudication. Question When the recipient of a state investigatory subpoena demonstrates an objectively reasonable chill of its First Amendment rights, does a federal court lack jurisdiction to hear the case because those constitutional claims must first be resolved in state court?

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2025. Petitioner: Cox Communications, Inc.Respondent: Sony Music Entertainment. Advocates: E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cox Communications, Inc. is a major internet service provider selling internet, telephone, and cable television to millions across the United States. Between 2013 and 2014, some of Cox’s internet subscribers used peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such as BitTorrent, to download and distribute copyrighted songs owned by numerous record companies and music publishers, including Sony Music Entertainment (the “Plaintiffs”). These record companies, through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), hired a company called MarkMonitor to monitor illegal file sharing and notify internet service providers when infringement was detected. MarkMonitor sent Cox over 163,000 notices of infringement during the relevant period. In response, Cox operated a “thirteen-strike” policy, under which it warned or temporarily suspended subscribers after repeated notices, but in practice it rarely terminated service for copyright infringement, while regularly terminating service for nonpayment. Plaintiffs became frustrated with Cox’s limited enforcement against repeat infringers and sued Cox instead of its subscribers, alleging that Cox was secondarily liable for copyright infringement occurring on its network. Specifically, plaintiffs contended Cox either intentionally contributed to or benefited from its subscribers’ infringements by failing to take adequate steps to stop it, thereby inducing or materially contributing to the unlawful acts. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Cox statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and allowed the case to proceed to trial on theories of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The jury found Cox liable on both counts and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement, reversed the vicarious liability verdict, and vacated the damages award, remanding the case for a new trial on damages. Question Can an internet service provider be held liable, and found to have acted willfully, for copyright infringement just because it knew users were infringing and did not terminate their access?

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2025. Petitioner: Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana.Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General. Advocates: Nicholas Rosellini (for the Petitioners) Joshua Dos Santos (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a Salvadoran citizen, fled to the United States with his wife and minor child after facing threats from Wilfredo, a local hitman. The violence began in 2016 when Wilfredo shot and seriously injured Urias-Orellana’s two half-brothers in separate incidents. Wilfredo then vowed to kill their entire family. Over the next several years, Urias-Orellana was repeatedly threatened at gunpoint by masked men demanding money and warning they would harm him like his brothers. In December 2020, he was physically assaulted in his hometown, with the attackers striking him three times in the chest. To escape these threats, Urias-Orellana and his family relocated multiple times within El Salvador. They lived peacefully in some locations for extended periods but encountered problems when returning to areas near his hometown. After noticing his attackers searching for him in early 2021, the family entered the United States without authorization in June 2021. The Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioners with removability for illegal entry. They applied for asylum based on persecution of their family group, with Urias-Orellana also seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge denied their applications, finding the harm did not constitute persecution and that they could safely relocate within El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, leading to this petition for review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision on all claims. Question Must a federal court of appeals defer to the BIA’s judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)?

Rutherford v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2025. Petitioner: Daniel Rutherford.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner in No. 24-820) David A. O'Neil (for the Petitioner in No. 24-860) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2003, twenty-two-year-old Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies at a Pennsylvania chiropractic office within a five-day period. During the first robbery, he brandished a gun at the chiropractor and stole $390 and a watch. Four days later, he returned to the same office with an accomplice, again pulled a gun, and stole $900 in cash and jewelry. A jury convicted Rutherford of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 125 months for the robbery-related charges plus mandatory consecutive sentences of 7 years for the first § 924(c) offense and 25 years for the second, totaling nearly 42.5 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction in 2007, and he did not appeal his sentence. In 2021, Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in federal sentencing law would result in a significantly shorter sentence if he were sentenced today. The district court denied his motion in 2023, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial. Question May a district court, when evaluating a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), consider as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” the fact that a defendant is serving a sentence substantially longer than what would be imposed today due to the First Step Act’s prospective changes to mandatory minimum penalties, particularly where the disparity amounts to decades of additional imprisonment?

Fernandez v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2025. Petitioner: Joe Fernandez.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Benjamin Gruenstein (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joe Fernandez participated as a backup shooter in a 2000 murder-for-hire scheme in the Bronx. On February 22, 2000, Patrick Darge hired him to help kill Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Vivero Flores, two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect approximately $6.5 million owed by drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya for 274 kilograms of cocaine. When Darge's gun jammed after shooting Cuellar in the head, Fernandez fired fourteen shots in the apartment building lobby, nine hitting the victims. He received $40,000 for his participation. After eleven years on the run, Fernandez surrendered to police in October 2011. Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, Fernandez proceeded to trial in 2013. The government's key witness was Patrick Darge, who admitted during cross-examination to lying to authorities in previous cases. Despite this admission, the jury convicted Fernandez of participating in a murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence. In October 2014, he received a mandatory life sentence, while his cooperating co-defendants received significantly lighter sentences: Darge (30 years), Reyes (25 years), Minaya (15 years), and Rivera (2 years). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York originally sentenced Fernandez, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 2016. In 2021, the district court vacated one of his convictions but left the mandatory life sentence intact. When Fernandez filed a compassionate release motion citing his possible innocence and sentencing disparity, the district court granted it in 2022, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision. Question Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate release law to get their sentence reduced based on claims that they might be innocent or that their sentence is unfair, even though these same claims would normally have to be raised through habeas corpus?

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2025. Petitioner: Damon Landor.Respondent: Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety. Advocates: Zachary D. Tripp (for the Petitioner) Libby A. Baird (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, vowed as part of his faith never to cut his hair—a religious commitment known as the Nazarite Vow. Incarcerated in 2020, Landor was first held at the St. Tammany Parish Detention Center and later at LaSalle Correctional Center, both of which allowed him to maintain his hairstyle in accordance with his religious beliefs. After approximately five months and with three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. Upon arrival, Landor proactively explained his religious practices and presented documentation of previous accommodations, including a copy of a federal court decision supporting similar claims. An intake guard disregarded his documentation, summoned the warden, and upon Landor’s inability to produce immediate additional proof of his beliefs, guards forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head. Following his release, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers, asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed Landor’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages, holding such relief unavailable under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, and rejecting Landor’s arguments that subsequent Supreme Court authority or other legal developments altered that result. Question May an individual sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)?

The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2025. Petitioner: The GEO Group, Inc.Respondent: Alejandro Menocal. Advocates: Dominic E. Draye (for the Petitioner) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondents) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Alejandro Menocal and other immigration detainees brought a class action lawsuit against The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), a private company that operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (AIPC) in Colorado under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GEO maintained a mandatory Sanitation Policy requiring all detainees to clean common areas including walls, floors, bathrooms, and recreation yards. Detainees who refused these cleaning assignments faced escalating disciplinary actions, beginning with suspension of television and phone privileges and potentially resulting in solitary confinement for up to seventy-two hours. Menocal, detained from June to September 2014, witnessed fellow detainees placed in isolation for refusing to clean, and multiple detainees testified to being threatened with or actually placed in solitary confinement for noncompliance. Additionally, AIPC operated a Voluntary Work Program where detainees could work up to eight hours daily in various jobs such as food preparation, barbering, and laundry services for compensation of $1.00 per day. Menocal filed suit in October 2014, alleging forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for the mandatory cleaning program and unjust enrichment under Colorado common law for the $1.00 daily wage in the Voluntary Work Program. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified two classes in 2017, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2018. Following discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. The district court denied GEO's motion in October 2022, finding that ICE neither directed nor required GEO to compel detainee labor or limit compensation to $1.00 per day. GEO appealed this denial to the Tenth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Question Is an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine?

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2025. Petitioner: Learning Resources, Inc., et al.Respondent: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the federal parties) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the private parties) Benjamin Gutman (for the state parties) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc. are family-owned businesses that design and distribute educational products for children. Although their product development and some assembly occur domestically, most of their manufacturing is outsourced to international partners, including China. Beginning in early 2025, a series of executive orders from President Donald J. Trump, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed unprecedented tariffs on imports, including goods from China. These included a 20% “trafficking” tariff and additional “reciprocal” tariffs that pushed rates on Chinese goods to over 145%. Petitioners’ imports were directly affected, and complying with the new tariffs would increase their import-related costs from $2.3 million in 2024 to over $100 million in 2025, putting their businesses at existential risk. The petitioners filed suit on April 22, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on May 29, 2025, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs and finding that the tariffs posed an existential threat to the petitioners. However, that ruling was stayed just days later, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit docketed the case. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled similarly in related cases but its decision was also stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.   Question Does the International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“IEEPA”), authorize the president to impose tariffs?