Heavily Accented Philosophy of Law

In this episode, we delve into the debate about responsibility for negligence in ethics and law. What is exactly “responsibility”? What does responsibility involve, and it is the same across disciplines? How ancient and medieval moral psychology might (or should) inform contemporary legal theory about these topics? What about specific types of responsibility, such as responsibility for negligence? Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco discusses with us why responsibility is a cornerstone notion in ethics and law, and what is the importance and interest of focusing specifically on responsibility for negligence. We explore first a proposal of reconstruction of this latter notion elaborated by Rodriguez-Blanco, considering the intersection of ancient and contemporary philosophy of action, theories of practical reason, and private law theory. We then analyse the key difference between a “bifurcation model” and an “Aristotelian-inspired model” of deliberation, and how the notion of “akrasia” might illuminate the phenomenon of negligence.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco is the inaugural holder of the Chair of Moral and Political Philosophy (Jurisprudence) in the School of Law, University of Surrey and member of the Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy. She studied law at Oxford University (MJur, Balliol College) and legal philosophy at the University of Cambridge (PhD, Corpus Christi College). Her research is located at the intersection of practical reason, philosophy of action and law. She draws insights from ancient, medieval and contemporary moral psychology and action theory to illuminate the nature of private law, legal authority and normativity. Further details on her current research can be found here. Rodriguez-Blanco’s research has been published in leading journals, and coedited co-editor of Agency, Negligence and Responsibility (CUP, 2021), Dignity in the Legal and Political Philosophy of Ronald Dworkin (OUP, 2018), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (CUP, 2015) . She is the author of two main monographs: Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good (Hart/Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, 2017), where she argues that the understanding of the structure of practical reason sheds light on legal authority and normativity; and, for the main interest of the listeners of this episode, the very recent Responsibility for Negligence in Ethics and Law. Aspiration, Perspective, and Civic Maturity (Oxford University Press, 2025).[This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos]

In this episode, we delve into the debate about experimental jurisprudence (also known as xJur). What is exactly “experimental jurisprudence”? What is in turn “experimental philosophy”? What are the methods of xJur and what are the good practices in order to get replicable results? Can we truly achieve knowledge on law through experiments?Izabela Skoczeń discusses with us the raising in importance of experimental jurisprudence in the last years, how it fits within the underlying assumptions in philosophy and jurisprudence related to law, and the criticisms that have been formulated towards it. We explore first a general introduction to both experimental jurisprudence and experimental philosophy, as well as the array of methods used by the former and an overview of the applicable good practices. We then address some of the criticisms formulated towards xJur, arguing for the ecological validity of xjur, arguing why xjur is helpful, also when focused on non-expert understanding of concepts, and why a short scenario can shed light on complex conceptual issues.  Finally, we close the episode exploring the role of xJur in conceptual analysis and the challenge of conflicting intuitions.Izabela Skoczeń is an assistant professor at the Law Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. Her work focuses on the intersection of legal theory, experimental jurisprudence and philosophy of language.She is a member of the Jagiellonian Centre for Law, Language and Philosophy, a member of the editorial board of the Bloomsbury series ‘Advances in Experimental Philosophy’, and a contributing editor of the jurisprudence section of Jotwell. She is currently working on a project on devising principles for responsible LLM communication with partners from Austria, Romania and Switzerland: https://talkingtobots.net . She is also working on a project on cross-cultural replications of experimental jurisprudence studies, together with K Tobia and J L Nunes.She has published in Synthese (Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction, 2023), Bloomsbury (chapter: From lying to blaming and perjury: deceptive implicatures in the courtroom and the materiality requirement, 2025), Cognition (Outcome effects, moral luck and hindsight bias, 2023, with M Kneer), the Leiden Journal of International Law (Inside the treaty interpreter’s mind: An experimental linguistic approach to international law, 2023, with B Pirker), Ratio Juris (Delimiting Legal Interpretation: The Problem of Moral Bias and Political Distortion—The Case of Criminal Intention, 2022, with F Poggi), the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law (Modelling Perjury: Between Trust and Blame, 2021), Oxford University Press (chapter: Is a Legal Implicature in the Eye of its Beholder?, 2022). She has authored a monograph, Implicatures within Legal Language, in 2019, in the Springer Law and Philosophy Library.Overviews of xJur work mentioned: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on experimental jurisprudence by K Tobia, G Almeida, K Prochownik and I HannikainenThe Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence ed by K TobiaOverview article by K TobiaOverview article by R SommersOverview article by K Prochownik[This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos](00:00:00) Intro HAPL(00:00:18) Introduction to the episode – hosts and guest(00:00:58) Izabela Skoczeń – Academic Genealogy and Research Interests(00:05:04) Experimental Jurisprudence (xJur) – What exactly is it?(00:12:32) xJur and Experimental Philosophy(00:27:49) An Underlying Assumption – does law deal with facts?(00:33:53) Methods of xJur & Replicability(00:45:54) Some Criticisms Formulated Towards xJur(00:54:42) xJur & Conceptual Analysis - The Challenge of conflicting intuitions(01:11:02) Farewell and last words(01:15:34) Outro HAPL

In this episode, we delve into the debate about legal validity and concept-construction methodology. What is exactly legal validity? What would be the most adequate way to construct a concept of legal validity? How is the idea of cluster concepts important for this debate? Do theoretical or conceptual distinctions have any practical relevance? Mathieu Carpentier discussed with us why legal validity is a key concept for legal theory and why it is better understood as a cluster concept, broken down into more elementary units of meaning. We explore first how – and why – acluster concept-construction methodology is more useful than other methodologies and then explore in-depth the elementary units Carpentier identify related to the concept of legal validity, as well as the internal relations among theseunits. Finally, touch upon the impact of all of these on the definition of the rule of recognition, and the relevance of this discussion and distinctions to legal positivism (including the inclusive and exclusive legal positivism debate).Mathieu Carpentier is a Professor of Public Lawat the University of Toulouse Capitole and a Fellow of the Institut universitaire de France. He works on various issues in legal philosophy as well as constitutional law and theory and comparative constitutional law. His PhD thesis was devoted to legal defeasibility (it was published in French in 2014).He recently edited a book called “Meta-Theory of Law” (ISTE/Wiley, 2022). He has written around 50 papers in French and English.  Listeners wanting to dive deeper in his work on legalvalidity, concept-construction and the methodology of jurisprudence can check some of his papers on SSRN: Sources and Validity (2018), Validity and Applicability: A Small Dose of Scepticism(2018), Kelsen on Derogation and Normative Conflicts (2020), Sources of Law (with Torben Spaak, 2024), Against “Legal Facts” (forthcoming 2025). French readers may also consult his Problèmes relatifs à l'identification temporelle des systèmesjuridiques (2023) and Controverses sur la “nature” du droit (2018).  [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos] (00:00:00) Intro HAPL(00:00:16) Introduction to the episode – hosts and guest(00:01:30) Mathieu Carpentier – Academic Genealogy and Research Interests(00:06:24) Legal Theory and Philosophy in France(00:19:05) Legal Validity – Concept, Classical View, Importance for Legal Theory and Philosophy(00:27:49) Legal Validity & Adequate Methodology of Concept-Construction(00:32:50) Legal Validity as a Cluster Concept(00:40:21) Legal Validity and its Units of Meaning (an Introduction)(00:55:50) Legal Validity and the Concept of Legal System(01:00:58) Legal Validity and its Units of Meaning – On Efficacy and Relation between Units(01:09:24) Legal Validity and the Rule of Recognition(01:21:31) Adequate Methodology of Conceptual Analysis and Concept-Construction(01:30:22) Farewell and last words(01:32:49) Outro HAPL

In this episode, we delve into the debate on rules and principles, the topic of law and categorisation, and the connection between equality (and analogy). Why the obsession in philosophy of law with the rules/principles debate? Is the distinction purely definitional or also substantial? How is the element of genericity – not generality - important for the debate? Does equality have something to do here? And analogy? Pedro Moniz Lopes discusses with us why the distinction between rules and principles is better understood as a strong distinction, different of the kind proposed by Robert Alexy. This strong distinction is based on the key criterion of genericity – that is, based on the specificity of the action that is being governed by the norm. We explore how categorisation might not be purely didactical or pedagogical and its role in allowing us to anticipate the way entities behave in reality, the possible parallels between principles in law and causal forces in the natural world in regards to explanation, how equality factors in the discussion regarding genericity and principles, and how analogy enters the picture.   Pedro Moniz Lopes is an Assistant Professor of Legal Philosophy and Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Lisbon. He co-heads “Lisbon Legal Theory” and is a Senior Fellow of the Lisbon Public Law Research Centre in which he coordinates research activities in the field legal theory and legal philosophy.  Pedro has also been the Executive Director of e-Publica – Public Law Journal for the past 10 years.  His current research interests are constitutional equality and analogical reasoning, linguistic and logical accounts of generic norm sentences and marginal utility of fundamental rights.  Pedro’s work is mostly available at his academia page: https://pedromonizlopes.academia.edu/ [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos]   (00:00:00) Intro HAPL (00:00:18) Introduction to the episode (00:01:09) Pedro Moniz Lopes – Academic Genealogy and Research Interests (00:07:07) Research Groups – Lisbon Legal Theory and History (00:13:54) Rules & principles: Arrival to the Distinction and Criteria for Distinguishing (00:26:12) Rules & principles: what entities are they? How does this connect with the issue of categorisation? (00:32:28) Genericity as the distinction criterion between rules & principles (00:48:04) The role of equality in the discussion on categorisation & rules and principles (01:00:24) Equality and analogy: similarities and differences (01:08:55) How to Frame the Discussions regarding Rules & Principles: from the Legal System to Legal Practitioners (01:16:58) Farewell and last words (01:21:00) Outro HAPL

In this episode, we delve into the topics of non-human agents, the construction of legal reality, and the encompassing role of legal education. What does it mean to be an agent? In which sense can we talk about non-human agents? Can we say that legal reality is “constructed”? How do we fit non-human agents within this legal reality? How does legal education participate in it? Antonia Waltermann discusses with us why researching on agency is important for the study of law, and why it is also important to extend the research also to what can be called “non-human agents”. We also explore what does it mean for legal reality to be a social construction and how and to what extent non-human agents might be considered as participating in such construction, as well as how legal education fits the picture through its presence, content, and influence on human agents. Antonia M. Waltermann is assistant professor of legal theory and philosophy at the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University. She has been a visiting scholar at Stockholm, Bologna and Ljubljana University. She has worked on sovereignty (e.g. Reconstructing Sovereignty, Springer Law and Philosophy Library, 2019), law and the cognitive sciences (e.g. in Law and Mind, Cambridge University Press, 2021) and non-human agency (e.g. in Law, Science and Rationality, Eleven International Publishing, 2019). Her current research focuses on social ontology, particularly on the agency and responsibility of non-human entities (including but not limited to AI) both within the law and when it comes to the (social) construction of law. As regards education, she has extensive experience with legal education in various roles, including but not limited to course design, coordination, and evaluation. Most recently, she is involved in educational design and policy at a programme level as well. [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos]

In this episode, we delve into the encompassing topic of international law, exploring it through the eyes of philosophy of law. Can our conceptions of law encompass international law? Is there something akin of a nature of international law? What would be the main elements to determine such a nature? Miodrag Jovanović discusses why there has been a historical lack of philosophical interest in international law, and then delves into the analysis of the possibility to identify a nature of international law and its elements. We also explore how the choice of methodological perspective changes the approach to the existence and content of such nature, the properties of coercion and justice appness of international law, and inquire about the emergence of global law as a phenomenom and a field of study. Miodrag A. Jovanović is a Full Professor in Jurisprudence, at the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade. He also teaches at the Legal Methods module of the European Master in Legal Theory, at the Goethe University, Frankfurt. He is a fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the 2016 Brandon Fellow of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law (Cambridge). His internationally published books include Constitutionalizing Secession in Federalized States: A Procedural Approach (Eleven International Publishing, 2007), Collective Rights – A Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Unpacking Normativity – Conceptual, Normative and Descriptive Issues (co-edited with Kenneth Einar Himma and Bojan Spaić) (Hart Publishing, 2018) In you want to dive deeper into the topic of the nature of international law and philosophy of international law, you can check Miodrag’s book “⁠The Nature of International Law⁠” (Cambridge University Press, 2019). [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos] (00:00:00) Intro HAPL (00:00:05) Introduction to the episode (00:01:25) Miodrag Jovanovic – Academic Genealogy and the Interest for International Law (00:09:12) Academy and a Generalised lack of philosophical interest regarding International Law – Why are the reasons? (00:14:32) Are our concepts and conceptions of law enough or adequate to give an account of International Law? (00:32:18) In search of the “nature” of International Law: conceptual analysis and methodology (00:52:08) The nature of international law: what are its typical features? How does coercion fit here? And global law? (01:03:30) The nature of international law and fragmentation of international law (01:11:40) The nature of international law: internal and external perspectives (01:16:41) Farewell (01:18:35) Outro

The guest for this fourth episode of the HAPL podcast is Giovanni Tuzet, currently Full Professor of Philosophy of Law at Bocconi University (Milan, Italy). In the first part of this interview with Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić, Tuzet talks about his academic path to the present and introduces the topic of evidential reasoning, starting from the most general question about legal reasoning and moving towards evidential reasoning and evidence law. He analyses the similarities and differences between evidential reasoning and other domains of factual reasoning, and explains different criteria for admissible evidence in law and those other domains. In the second part of the interview, Tuzet discusses his approach to the relation of truth and evidence (developed in his recent book “La prova ragionata”) and its differences with other approaches. The debate goes on to touch admissibility of evidence, evaluation criteria, and standards of proof, evidence and inference, probabilism and control of the inferences, artificial intelligence and evidential reasoning, and much more. (00:00:00) HAPL Intro (00:00:18) Introduction – Welcome to Giovanni Tuzet & Academic Genealogy (00:05:52) A general account of legal reasoning (00:10:47) Reasoning & Argumentation: public and private aspects of reasoning (00:13:00) Legal Reasoning & Inferentialism (00:19:06) Evidential Reasoning in Law and in Other Domains (00:27:25) ER: Admissibility of Evidence in Law – general concept (00:33:32) ER: Truth and Evidence in “La prova ragionata” (Giuffre, 2023) (00:39:54) ER: Admissibility of Evidence in Law – criteria of admissibility and exclusion (00:46:37) ER: Evidence & Inference (ft. Sherlock Holmes) (01:01:53) ER: Probabilism & Control of the results of ER (01:13:58) ER & Artificial Intelligence – limits and possibilities (01:20:44) ER: Standards of Proof (01:30:23) ER & Artificial Intelligence – would an AI have convicted OJ Simpson? (01:35:06) Interview end – Farewell to Giovanni Tuzet (01:36:58) HAPL Outro [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos]

The guest for this third episode of the HAPL podcast is Domingos Soares Farinho, currently professor auxiliar at the Faculdade de Direito of the Universidade de Lisboa, member of the Centro de Investigação em Direito Público (CIDP) do Instituto de Ciências Jurídico-Políticas da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa, and member of Lisbon’s ALF team. In the first part of this highly interactive interview with Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić, Farinho introduces his academic genealogy and discusses with the hosts about the relation between legal theory and legal practice, focusing on Portugal’s experience on the matter and his personal experience as a practitioner. In the second part of the interview, Farinho discusses with the hosts about the relation and influence between technology development, law, and philosophy of law. The debate goes on to touch upon regulation of digital content, artificial intelligence, science fiction, production of texts by artificial intelligence, autonomy and liability, criteria for legal personhood, and much more. (00:00:00) HAPL Introduction (00:00:15) Interview Introduction – Welcome to Domingos Farinho (& General Rumbling) (00:04:25) Academic Genealogy and Non-Academic Experience (00:12:57) Relationship between Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Portugal’s experience (00:29:20) Relationship between Legal Theory and Legal Practice: Farinho’s experience (00:37:38) Artificial Intelligence, Algorithms and Autonomy (00:53:49) When does AI Matter to Law? Embodied Artificial Intelligence and the Possibility of Lawyer’s Replacement (01:09:27) Artificial Intelligence, Legal Personhood, and Science Fiction (01:23:41) Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, and Liability (01:52:29) Interview end – Farewell to Domingos Farinho (01:53:16) HAPL Outro [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos]

The guest for this second episode of the HAPL podcast is Marco Segatti, currently senior researcher at the Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy – University of Genoa and member of UNIGE’s ALF team. In the first part of this highly interactive interview with Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić, Segatti first introduces his academic genealogy and discusses with the hosts about the high importance of research groups for academy and the potential societal impact of philosophy and its branches. Then, he discusses about research methodology and his preferred topics of research. In the second part of the interview, Segatti discusses with the hosts about Habits and the Law, and his research towards a new definition of habits. The debate goes on to touch upon the relation between habits, behaviours, and the explanation of (social) rules, to finally conclude on the interactions between habits and rules. (00:00:00) HAPL Introduction (00:00:24) Interview Introduction – Welcome to Marco Segatti (& General Rumbling) (00:04:18) Academic Genealogy, Importance of Research Groups & Societal Impact of Philosophy (00:24:50) Research Methodology and Preferred Topics of Research (00:43:16) Habits and the Law: towards a new definition of habits (01:10:59) Habits, Behaviours, and the Explanation of (Social) Rules (01:27:37) Interaction between Habits and Rules (01:50:58) Interview end – Farewell to Marco Segatti (01:51:46) HAPL Outro Follow the ALF Project on social media: - Facebook | ⁠https://www.facebook.com/ALF.AdvancingCooperationOnTheFoundationsOfLaw⁠ - Instagram | ⁠https://www.instagram.com/alfhorizon/⁠ - X (ex-Twitter) | https://twitter.com/ALFHorizon⁠ - Youtube | ⁠https://www.youtube.com/@alfhorizon9951⁠ [This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and Bojan Spaić; edited by Bojan Spaić; uploaded and formatted by Julieta Rabanos]

The guest for this first episode of the HAPL podcast is Gerald J. Postema, Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In conversation with Julieta Rabanos, he discusses his last book “Law’s Rule: The Nature, Value, and Viability of the Rule of Law” (OUP, 2022), paying particular attention to his conception of the Rule of Law and how to address both the threats and the challenges he identifies regarding the Rule of Law. In the final part of the conversation, Postema discusses one of the questions posited in the last chapters of the book: “AI in the Law or AI in the Place of Law?” This episode was hosted by Julieta Rabanos and edited by Bojan Spaić. Follow the ALF Project on social media: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ALF.AdvancingCooperationOnTheFoundationsOfLaw Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/alfhorizon/ X (ex-Twitter): https://twitter.com/ALFHorizon Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@alfhorizon9951 (PS: Sorry for the audio - we will make it better next time!)