The High Court Report

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Date Decided: 2/24/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist, a forum fight about when courts keep cases they never should have had. A Texas family sued two companies over their child's heavy metal poisoning from baby food—but after a federal court wrongly kicked out one defendant and ran a two-week trial, an appeals court said the case never belonged in federal court, forcing everyone back to square one.Questions Presented:Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.Holding: Because the federal trial court wrongly dismissed Whole Foods Market, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Hain and Whole Foods): Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Palmquist): Russell S. Post, Houston, Texas

United States v. Hemani reaches far beyond marijuana policy. This case forces the Supreme Court to answer a fundamental question: Can the government strip Second Amendment rights without clearly defining who loses them?Adeel Bashir joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Adeel works as Federal Public and Community Defenders Sentencing Resource Counsel and defended numerous clients charged under this exact statute.Adeel explains the case from each angle then widens the lens. Controlled substances under federal law include Adderall, Xanax, cough medicine, and supplements common in gyms across America. Millions of Americans could fall within the statute's reach without ever knowing it.But the stakes cut both directions. The government argues that courts should defer to congressional judgment about which groups pose risks; a principle that, if accepted, preserves legislative flexibility to address evolving public safety concerns. Adeel walks through Congress' power to classify conduct as dangerous while noting that other prohibited-person categories may face similar challenges.Something must give. The Court's reasoning here will define Second Amendment battles for years. You don't want to miss this episode.Oral arguments take place Monday, March 2nd. To learn more about the case, check out The High Court Report case preview: Here.Connect with Adeel Bashir on LinkedIn: Here.

Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Opinion Date: 2/24/26OverviewToday we break down the February 24, 2026 Supreme Court opinion in United States Postal Service versus Konan. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the postal exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act shields the government even when postal workers deliberately refuse to deliver your mail—not just when they mess up accidentally.Justice Thomas wrote for the majority. Justice Sotomayor fired back with a sharp dissent, accusing the majority of handing the Postal Service blanket immunity that Congress never intended to give.Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a plaintiff can sue the postal service for intentional mail nondelivery where the statute at issue (the Federal Tort Claims Act) permits lawsuits for "loss", "miscarriage", and "negligent transmission".Holding: The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.Result: Vacated.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.

Dr. Adam Feldman called it before the Court released it. His 25-year dataset — 1,700+ cases — flagged the timing before anyone else caught on. The High Court Report sits down with Dr. Feldman to break down exactly what the numbers revealed.In this episode:Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.About Dr. Adam Feldman:Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.Reach Adam Feldman via:LinkedIn: Here;Empirical SCOTUS: Here;Legalytics: Here;Empirilaw: Here.Adam Feldman's Work:The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-searchThe $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search

OverviewThe Pung family lost their $194,400 home over a $2,242 tax bill — a tax bill they never owed. Isabella County auctioned the home for $76,000 and returned only $73,766. The family lost over $118,000 in home equity.Question: Can local governments pay a person their home’s auction price or their home’s fair market value when the government auctions the home at a foreclosure sale?Background: The Pung family lost $194,400 home over $2,242 tax bill they never owed. Isabella County auctioned the home, fetching $76,000. Pung family received only $73,766 back.Pung Argues: Counties must give fair market value as compensation when government takes property, not whatever an auction produces. Losing $118,000 over $2,242 creates grossly disproportionate punishment violating Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.Isabella County Argues: Just compensation means what someone pays at a free and fair auction. No penalty exists, the Pungs lost only difference between auction price and debt.Stakes: If Pung wins: Property owners get market value from forced home sales regardless of what a person pays at an auction. If Isabella County wins: property owners risk losing home equity over small, disputed, but unpaid property taxes.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC.United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:20] Pung Opening Statement[00:02:58] Pung Free for All Questions[00:26:21] Pung Round Robin Questions[00:51:09] United States Opening Statement[00:52:18] United States Free for All Questions[00:59:56] United States Round Robin Questions[01:19:40] Isabella County Opening Statement[01:21:46] Isabella County Free for All Questions[01:39:59] Isabella County Round Robin Questions[01:43:00] Pung Rebuttal

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here |Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.Main Arguments:• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstancesImplications: Enbridge victory expands defendant flexibility for late federal court access when genuine emergencies arise but risks encouraging strategic removal delays. Nessel victory enforces strict congressional deadlines and prevents removal manipulation but could bar federal jurisdiction even when international treaties or diplomatic relations face genuine threats. Middle-ground ruling might distinguish ordinary delays from cases involving actual foreign policy implications, creating specialized removal doctrine for international law contexts.The Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"Primary Cases:• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express onesOral Advocates:For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:00:40] Argument Begins[00:00:51] Enbridge Opening Statement[00:02:46] Enbridge Free for All Questions[00:21:13] Enbridge Round Robin Questions[00:31:21] Nessel Opening Statement[00:33:22] Nessel Free for All Questions[00:55:18] Nessel Round Robin Questions[00:58:18] Enbridge Rebuttal

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.Main Arguments:• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principlesImplications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.The Fine Print:• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"Primary Cases:• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Havana Docks Corp.): Richard Klingler of Ellis George LLP.United States as Amicus Curiae: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondents (Royal Caribbean Cruises): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:12] Havana Docks Opening Statement[00:03:15] Havana Docks Free for All Questions[00:19:05] Havana Docks Round Robin Questions[00:36:46] United States Opening Statement[00:38:14] United States Free for All Questions[00:47:30] United States Round Robin Questions[00:57:21] Royal Caribbean Opening Statement[00:59:35] Royal Caribbean Free for All Questions[01:28:15] Royal Caribbean Round Robin Questions[01:30:23] Havana Docks Rebuttal

Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corpora Cion Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | Oral Argument: 2/23/26 | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to D.C. Circuit decision dismissing lawsuit against Cuban state-owned companies operating stolen American oil facilities raises fundamental questions about congressional authority to override sovereign immunity for targeted foreign policy objectives.Question Presented: Whether Exxon Mobil can sue Cuban companies for seizing Exxon Mobil’s oil refineries and related property.Posture: D.C. District Court denied Cuban companies' motion to dismiss; D.C. Circuit reversed for lack of jurisdictionMain Arguments:• Exxon (Petitioner): (1) Title III's "any person" language including foreign instrumentalities effects clear immunity abrogation; (2) Congressional purpose requires Cuban government accountability without FSIA compliance; (3) Supreme Court precedent eliminates magic-words requirement for immunity waiver• Cimex (Respondent): (1) Kirtz distinction applies because FSIA creates restrictive immunity regime allowing suit progression; (2) Statutory harmonization principles permit Title III and FSIA coexistence without implied repeal; (3) Petitioner's interpretation creates subject-matter jurisdiction gapsImplications: Exxon victory enables $9 billion in Cuban expropriation claims while establishing congressional authority for targeted immunity abrogation. A Cimex victory preserves traditional sovereign immunity protections, requiring Americans to satisfy onerous FSIA exceptions for Cuban trafficking claims.The Fine Print:• Helms-Burton Act § 6082(a)(1): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11): "'Person' means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"Primary Cases:• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Fair Credit Reporting Act abrogated federal sovereign immunity through "any person" language creating government liability; clear congressional intent overcomes immunity presumptions• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (2023): Statutory immunity abrogation requires "unmistakably clear" congressional language; recognizing immunity would negate authorized cause of action entirelyOral Advocates:For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil.United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:55] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:10] Exxon Mobil Opening Statement[00:03:23] Exxon Mobil Free for All Questions[00:18:48] Exxon Mobil Round Robin Questions[00:32:32] United States Opening Statement[00:33:51] United States Free for All Questions[00:42:54] United States Round Robin Questions[00:59:32] Corporacion Cimex Opening Statement[01:01:51] Corporacion Cimex Free for All Questions[01:28:01] Corporacion Cimex Round Robin Questions[01:30:24] Exxon Mobil Rebuttal

OverviewThis episode captures the most electrifying moments from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments in the consolidated Trump Tariff Cases—constitutional blockbusters that pit presidential emergency powers against Congress's exclusive authority to tax. These cases represent the most significant separation of powers challenge since the New Deal, with over $4 trillion in tariffs hanging in the balance.TIMESTAMPS[00:00:00] Episode Intro[00:01:16] Introduction to the Major Question Doctrine[00:01:16] Trump Tariff Cases Highlights[00:01:28] Common-Sense Interpretation and Historical Context[00:02:54] Debating Presidential Powers and Tariffs[00:03:54] Historical Precedents and Legal Interpretations[00:05:59] The Nixon Example and Its Significance[00:09:30] Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation[00:19:26] Nondelegation Principle and Constitutional Concerns[00:24:17] Congressional Delegation and Political Oversight[00:26:52] Historical Context of Presidential Tariff Authority[00:28:10] Legal Interpretations of 'Regulate Importation'[00:29:23] Debating the Scope of Presidential Powers[00:32:07] Judicial Review and Congressional Intent[00:33:15] Revenue-Raising vs. Embargoes[00:35:08] Nondelegation Doctrine and Emergency Powers[00:39:18] Clarifying the Nixon and Algonquin Precedents[00:41:42] Final Arguments and Hypotheticals[00:53:02] Episode Conclusion

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: HereConsolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, OregonQuestion Presented: Whether the President can impose tariffs under IEEPA.Holding: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Reasoning:Majority (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson)The Constitution gives Congress alone the power to tax, and tariffs represent a tax on imports. IEEPA's authority to "regulate importation" lets the President control, restrict, or block foreign transactions—but it never gave him power to reach into Americans' pockets by imposing taxes Congress never authorized.Gorsuch ConcurrenceThe major questions doctrine protects Congress's lawmaking power by requiring clear authorization before the President can claim extraordinary authority, and that principle traces back centuries through English and American law. When Congress wants to hand over its most fundamental power—the power to tax—it must speak clearly, and IEEPA's generic emergency language falls far short.Barrett ConcurrenceCourts interpret statutes using context and common sense, and any reasonable reader would expect Congress to make trillion-dollar tax policy decisions itself rather than hiding them in vague emergency language. The major questions doctrine simply reflects ordinary interpretation informed by constitutional structure—not some special thumb on the scale against executive power.Kagan Concurrence (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson)No special doctrine needed here—"regulate" simply doesn't mean "tax" in any dictionary, any statute, or any universe where words retain their ordinary meaning. When Congress actually delegates tariff power, it uses words like "duty" and "surcharge" and imposes strict limits; IEEPA does none of that.Jackson ConcurrenceThe official congressional reports accompanying IEEPA describe the law as granting "freezing control" authority over foreign property—not power to tax imports. Courts should examine what Congress actually said it intended, not speculate about what makes sense to judges decades later.Kavanaugh Dissent (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito)Text, history, and precedent all confirm that "regulate importation" includes tariffs—President Nixon used identical language for worldwide tariffs in 1971, courts upheld it, and Congress copied that exact phrase into IEEPA six years later. The Court's decision extends the major questions doctrine into foreign affairs for the first time, potentially handcuffing future Presidents when America faces genuine emergencies requiring rapid trade responses.Thomas DissentThe Constitution only prevents Congress from delegating "core legislative power" over life, liberty, and property—but regulating foreign trade involves privileges the government grants, not fundamental rights it must protect. Congress can freely delegate tariff authority to the President, and it did so through IEEPA's broad emergency powers.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, OregonTimestamps:[00:00:00] Episode Intro[00:05:13] Opinion by the Page Count[00:06:26] Tariff Timeline[00:07:55] Tariff Lawsuits[00:08:41] Roberts Majority Opinion[00:19:03] Gorsuch Concurring Opinion[00:20:42] Justice Barrett Concurring Opinion[00:21:57] Justice Kagan Concurring Opinion[00:23:25] Justice Jackson Concurring Opinion[00:24:36] Kavanaugh Dissenting Opinion[00:31:49] Justice Thomas Dissenting Opinion[00:33:17] Implications[00:36:28] Bottom Line

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Chiles v. Salazar | Can States Ban Therapists from Discussing Conversion Therapy?Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: Here Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause. In plain English, this case asks: Can states ban therapists from discussing conversion therapy?Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor GeneralLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:00:50] Argument Begins[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: HereConsolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, OregonLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Overview[00:00:44] Argument Begins[00:00:56] Federal Parties Opening Statement[00:02:53] Federal Parties Free for All Questions[00:36:05] Federal Parties Sequential Questions[01:15:56] Private Parties Opening Statement[01:18:27] Private Parties Free for All Questions[01:36:30] Private Parties Sequential Questions[02:12:28] State Parties Opening Statement[02:13:28] State Parties Free for All Questions[02:33:00] State Parties Sequential Questions[02:35:40] Federal Parties Rebuttal

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Oral Argument: 3/4/2026 | Case No. 24-1238 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts state common-law tort claims against brokers for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers whose vehicles subsequently cause accidents.Overview: Trucking broker liability case determines whether federal deregulation law blocks state tort claims for negligent hiring practices that result in highway accidents with severe injuries.Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed preemption; Ninth Circuit rejected preemption; circuit split.Main Arguments:• Montgomery (Petitioner): (1) Federal safety exception explicitly preserves state tort claims against broker negligent selection; (2) Fair interpretation requires consistent broad reading of both preemption provision and safety exception; (3) Longstanding common law negligent hiring claims predate federal trucking regulation• C.H. Robinson/Caribe (Respondents): (1) Federal law preempts broadly any state regulation of broker services and selection decisions; (2) Safety exception applies narrowly only to direct motor vehicle operation regulation; (3) Comprehensive federal regulatory scheme provides adequate safety oversightImplications: Montgomery victory preserves state tort accountability for broker hiring decisions, incentivizing highway safety through market liability. Respondent victory eliminates broker accountability for negligent selection, potentially reducing safety screening while limiting victim compensation options for trucking accidents.The Fine Print:• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1): "a State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier...or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property"• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A): the preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles"Primary Cases:• Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey (2013): Phrase "with respect to the transportation of property" in FAAAA preemption provision "massively limits" federal preemption scope, requiring direct connection to transportation services• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (9th Cir. 2020): State negligent hiring claims against motor carrier brokers fall within FAAAA safety exception because they represent state authority to regulate safety through common-law tort claims

Hunter v. United States | Oral Argument: 3/3/2026 | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Criminal defendant challenges mandatory medication condition after judge told him he could appeal despite signed appeal waiver, creating fundamental questions about plea agreement enforcement and judicial authorityQuestion Presented: Whether appeal waivers in plea agreements can only include exceptions for ineffective assistance claims and sentences exceeding statutory maximums, and whether judicial statements about appeal rights override written waiversPosture: Fifth Circuit dismissed appeal citing two-exception rule; Supreme Court granted certiorariMain Arguments:• Hunter (Petitioner): (1) Contract law requires broader exceptions protecting reasonable expectations beyond two rigid categories; (2) Other circuits successfully recognize additional exceptions without creating chaos; (3) Judicial statements about appeal rights combined with government silence modify plea agreements• United States (Respondent): (1) Appeal waivers constitute binding contracts requiring enforcement according to written terms; (2) Appeal rights remain statutory rather than constitutional making waivers more enforceable; (3) Post-plea judicial misstatements cannot undermine knowing and voluntary waiversImplications: Hunter victory creates safety valve for extreme sentences but weakens prosecutorial bargaining power and plea agreement finality. Government victory cements nationwide enforcement of broad appeal waivers while potentially allowing constitutional violations without appellate oversight.The Fine Print:• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): Courts may require defendants "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment as specified by the court"Primary Cases:• Garza v. Idaho (2019): "No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims" because plea agreements function essentially as contracts subject to traditional defenses• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Even "most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution" may be waived through knowing and voluntary agreements including plea bargains

United States v. Hemani | Oral Argument: 3/2/2026 | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to federal law criminalizing firearm possession by marijuana users tests Supreme Court's new historical framework for gun regulations after millions potentially face prosecution.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondentPosture: Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance dismissing prosecution; government appeals seeking reversal.Main Arguments:• Government (Petitioner): (1) Founding-era laws restricting "habitual drunkards" provide historical precedent supporting marijuana user disarmament; (2) Circuit courts split on constitutional analysis requiring Supreme Court intervention; (3) Section 925(c) relief process addresses constitutional concerns through administrative remedies• Hemani (Respondent): (1) Government's historical analogues fail Bruen-Rahimi "why" and "how" requirements for constitutional restrictions; (2) No genuine circuit split exists warranting Supreme Court review; (3) Administrative relief cannot cure fundamental constitutional violationsImplications:Government victory enables continued prosecution of millions combining legal state marijuana use with lawful firearm ownership, expanding congressional power over combined legal activities. Hemani victory requires narrow tailoring of federal gun restrictions, potentially invalidating broad categorical prohibitions lacking specific historical justification and forcing legislative reconsideration of drug user firearm restrictions.The Fine Print:• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to...possess...any firearm"• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"Primary Cases:• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Government must demonstrate historical tradition supporting firearm regulations through relevantly similar "why" and "how" justifications from founding era• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Historical analogues need not provide "historical twin" but must address comparable problems through similar regulatory approaches under constitutional analysis

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here |Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.Main Arguments:• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstancesImplications: Enbridge victory expands defendant flexibility for late federal court access when genuine emergencies arise but risks encouraging strategic removal delays. Nessel victory enforces strict congressional deadlines and prevents removal manipulation but could bar federal jurisdiction even when international treaties or diplomatic relations face genuine threats. Middle-ground ruling might distinguish ordinary delays from cases involving actual foreign policy implications, creating specialized removal doctrine for international law contexts.The Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"Primary Cases:• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.Main Arguments:• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principlesImplications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.The Fine Print:• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"Primary Cases:• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"

Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corpora Cion Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | Oral Argument: 2/23/26 | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to D.C. Circuit decision dismissing lawsuit against Cuban state-owned companies operating stolen American oil facilities raises fundamental questions about congressional authority to override sovereign immunity for targeted foreign policy objectives.Question Presented: Whether Exxon Mobil can sue Cuban companies for seizing Exxon Mobil’s oil refineries and related property.Posture: D.C. District Court denied Cuban companies' motion to dismiss; D.C. Circuit reversed for lack of jurisdictionMain Arguments:• Exxon (Petitioner): (1) Title III's "any person" language including foreign instrumentalities effects clear immunity abrogation; (2) Congressional purpose requires Cuban government accountability without FSIA compliance; (3) Supreme Court precedent eliminates magic-words requirement for immunity waiver• Cimex (Respondent): (1) Kirtz distinction applies because FSIA creates restrictive immunity regime allowing suit progression; (2) Statutory harmonization principles permit Title III and FSIA coexistence without implied repeal; (3) Petitioner's interpretation creates subject-matter jurisdiction gapsImplications: Exxon victory enables $9 billion in Cuban expropriation claims while establishing congressional authority for targeted immunity abrogation. A Cimex victory preserves traditional sovereign immunity protections, requiring Americans to satisfy onerous FSIA exceptions for Cuban trafficking claims.The Fine Print:• Helms-Burton Act § 6082(a)(1): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11): "'Person' means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"Primary Cases:• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Fair Credit Reporting Act abrogated federal sovereign immunity through "any person" language creating government liability; clear congressional intent overcomes immunity presumptions• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (2023): Statutory immunity abrogation requires "unmistakably clear" congressional language; recognizing immunity would negate authorized cause of action entirely

Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.Main Arguments:• Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework• Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consentImplications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.The Fine Print:• H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"Primary Cases:• NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach• Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takingsLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:24] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:34] Wolford Opening Statement[00:03:03] Wolford Free for All Questions[00:19:29] Wolford Round Robin Questions[00:33:22] United States Opening Statement[00:34:36] United States Free for All Questions[00:44:23] United States Round Robin Questions[01:07:53] Lopez Opening Statement[01:10:09] Lopez Free for All Questions[01:39:01] Lopez Round Robin Questions[01:51:14] Wolford Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25Overview: Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996 before Congress enacted a new law requiring convicted defendants to pay restitution to victims. Courts later sentenced Ellingburg under this new law and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 - money he never paid. Ellingburg challenged this restitution order as unconstitutional retroactive punishment, arguing the government cannot apply new penalties to old crimes. The case forces the Supreme Court to determine whether victim restitution constitutes criminal punishment protected by the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.Holding: The Supreme Court held that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment subject to Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch.Majority's Rationale: Congress explicitly labeled MVRA restitution as a "penalty" for criminal offenses imposed during sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. The statute appears in the criminal code and requires courts to follow criminal procedure rules when ordering restitution. Defendants who refuse to pay face potential imprisonment for punishment and deterrence purposes, confirming the criminal nature.Concurring Rationale: Justice Thomas argued the Court should abandon its current twelve-factor test for determining criminal punishment. The original 1798 understanding of ex post facto laws protected against any retroactive government penalties for public wrongs. Modern courts should focus on whether laws impose coercive sanctions for offenses against government authority, regardless of civil labels.Link to Opinion: Here.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:58] Argument Begins[00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement[00:19:45] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions[00:33:22] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions[00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement[00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions[01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions[01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal