Oral Arguments from the U.S. Court of Appeals

Case Summary:In the case of Yinnv Liu v. Monthly (Docket No. 25-2074), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation is a complex commercial and intellectual property dispute involving Yinnv Liu (the plaintiff/appellant) and the defendant company Monthly (associated with Monthly.com), along with several other entities including Joybuy.The core factual conflict centers on a breach of contract and copyright infringement claim related to online educational content and digital assets. Monthly operates a platform that hosts creative classes and "learning experiences" taught by high-profile instructors.A primary issue in the record involves the ownership and distribution rights of specific instructional materials. The plaintiff alleges that Monthly and its partner entities, such as Joybuy, exceeded the scope of their licensing agreements by sub-licensing or distributing her proprietary content across international markets without proper authorization or compensation.The factual background includes a dispute over digital rights management (DRM) and the "terms of service" that govern how independent creators interact with the Monthly platform. Monthly contends that the plaintiff voluntarily entered into a broad "Master Services Agreement" that granted the company extensive rights to adapt and monetize the content in exchange for a percentage of subscription revenue.In early 2025, a district court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the plain language of the electronic contracts signed by the plaintiff shielded the companies from the majority of the claims regarding unauthorized international distribution.The current appeal, docketed as 25-2074, challenges that interpretation. The appellant argues that the contracts were unconscionable adhesion contracts—meaning they were presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis with grossly one-sided terms that a reasonable creator would not have knowingly accepted.The appellate record also scrutinizes whether the defendants provided an accurate accounting of the revenues generated from the plaintiff's specific content modules, a factual point that underpins the plaintiff’s claim for damages.During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on the "clickwrap" nature of the agreement and whether the specific clauses allowing for "global sub-licensing" were sufficiently conspicuous to be enforceable under Illinois and federal law.

In the case of Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC (Docket No. 24-3147), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was initiated by Gloria D. Dickerson, a pro se plaintiff and resident of Peter Cooper Village (PCV) in Manhattan, against the property owner, BPP PCV Owners LLC (a joint venture involving Blackstone and Ivanhoé Cambridge).The core of the factual dispute involves allegations of housing discrimination, harassment, and retaliation related to the plaintiff's tenancy. Dickerson, a long-term resident, alleged that the management company engaged in discriminatory practices that affected her right to quiet enjoyment and equal access to housing services.A significant portion of the lower court record focused on procedural hurdles; the defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was "vague and conclusory" regarding specific civil rights violations.In early 2024, the district court granted the motion to dismiss but gave the plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. A factual "comedy of errors" ensued when the pro se plaintiff attempted to file the new complaint at the wrong physical address in Manhattan (80 Worth Street), leading the court to provide additional time and guidance on proper filing procedures.The case was eventually dismissed with prejudice by the District Court for the Southern District of New York after it found that the plaintiff’s subsequent filings still failed to satisfy the federal pleading standards, particularly the "Five Ws" (who, what, where, when, and why) required to establish a plausible claim of discrimination.The current appeal, docketed as 24-3147, challenges that final dismissal. The plaintiff argues that the trial court applied an overly stringent standard to her pro se filings and ignored the substantive evidence of harassment she provided.During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff further opportunities to amend her complaint and whether the existing record contained sufficient factual "nuggets" to warrant a trial on the merits.The defense maintained that BPP PCV Owners LLC acted within its rights as a landlord and that the plaintiff's grievances did not rise to the level of federal civil rights violations or actionable breaches of the lease agreement.

In the case of Immanuel Baptist Church v. City of Chicago (Docket No. 25-1951), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was initiated by Immanuel Baptist Church, a small congregation that had been leasing property at 1443 West Roosevelt Road in Chicago since 2011.The dispute began in 2016 when the church attempted to purchase the leased property, but its lender required confirmation from the City that the building complied with local zoning and parking ordinances.Under the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, religious assemblies were classified under a "Parking Group" requiring one off-street parking space for every eight seats of occupancy, which meant the church needed 19 dedicated spaces it did not possess.The church alleged that the City’s enforcement was discriminatory because other secular assembly uses, such as public libraries and live theater venues of similar size, were exempt from these specific off-street parking requirements.The factual record shows that after the church filed suit, the City passed a new ordinance in 2019 that reduced the church's specific parking requirement to zero, but the church argued the damage had already been done.The church contended that the City’s initial refusal and the resulting two-year delay caused it to lose the opportunity to purchase an adjacent building and forced it to pay higher prices and insurance premiums, constituting a "substantial burden" on its religious exercise.In late 2023, a district court ruled in favor of the church on the substantial burden claim under RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act) but limited the damages to approximately $14,590 for specific out-of-pocket expenses.The current appeal, docketed as 25-1951, involves a challenge to the district court's final judgment, specifically regarding the calculation of damages and the dismissal of the church's "equal terms" claims.During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the City’s application of "subjective" criteria during the zoning review process triggered the individualized assessment protections of federal law.

Case Summary: Gemini saidIn the case of Damri v. LivePerson, Inc. (Docket No. 25-964), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 20, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:Fact SummaryThe litigation is a federal securities class action brought on behalf of investors who purchased shares of LivePerson, Inc., a conversational AI company, between May 2022 and early 2024.The core factual dispute involves the company’s February 2022 acquisition of WildHealth, a precision medicine startup, for approximately $150 million.Plaintiffs allege that LivePerson and its executives made false and misleading statements regarding the financial health and growth prospects of WildHealth while simultaneously implementing significant capital cuts and layoffs that hindered the subsidiary's ability to generate revenue.A central factual element of the complaint is the disclosure in early 2023 that Medicare reimbursements for a discontinued WildHealth COVID-19 testing program had been suspended, an event plaintiffs claim was known but withheld from investors to artificially inflate the stock price.The factual record highlights a massive decline in LivePerson's market value, with the share price falling over 57% on March 16, 2023, following the company's admission of "material weaknesses" in its internal controls over financial reporting.In March 2025, the district court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to provide specific facts demonstrating "scienter"—the intent to deceive—or that the executives’ upbeat statements about WildHealth lacked a reasonable basis at the time they were made.The appeal, docketed as 25-964, challenges this dismissal, with the appellant arguing that the trial court ignored testimony from confidential witnesses who alleged that the company’s internal metrics directly contradicted its public "business as usual" narrative.During the oral arguments on February 20, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the company had a duty to disclose the Medicare suspension earlier and whether the executives' stock sales during the class period provided a sufficient motive for the alleged fraud.The court also scrutinized whether the "material weakness" in internal controls, once admitted, provided retroactive evidence that the company's previous financial statements were factually unreliable.

Case Summary:In the case of David McDonald v. Trustees of Indiana University (Docket No. 25-2366), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 19, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation is a constitutional challenge brought by several tenured faculty members, including lead plaintiff David McDonald, an associate professor at Indiana University Bloomington, against the Trustees of Indiana University and Purdue University.The core factual dispute centers on the enforcement of Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 202 (SEA 202), a state law effective July 1, 2024, which mandates that public universities implement policies to promote "intellectual diversity" and "free inquiry" among faculty.The statute specifically requires that faculty members be denied tenure or promotion if they are deemed "unlikely to foster a culture of free inquiry" or "unlikely to expose students to scholarly works from a variety of political or ideological frameworks."The factual record includes a new "post-tenure review" process established by the Act, requiring tenured professors to undergo formal re-evaluation every five years to ensure they are meeting these new ideological diversity standards.Plaintiffs allege that the law is unconstitutionally vague and creates a "chilling effect" on academic freedom, as the statute does not define key terms like "intellectual diversity," leaving faculty unable to discern what pedagogical choices might lead to disciplinary action, including termination.In July 2025, the district court dismissed the lawsuit on procedural grounds, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not yet suffered a concrete injury, such as a formal reprimand or denial of promotion, under the new law.The appeal, docketed as 25-2366, challenges that dismissal, with the plaintiffs arguing that the "chilling" of their classroom speech and the immediate requirement to alter their curricula to comply with the law constitute an "injury-in-fact" sufficient for federal court jurisdiction.The factual background is further complicated by the lead plaintiff’s personal history; David McDonald was previously arrested and temporarily banned from campus during 2024 protests, an event he cites as evidence of the university administration's willingness to use punitive measures against faculty for expressive activity.During the oral arguments on February 19, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on whether the plaintiffs' fear of future discipline is "objectively reasonable" and whether the state’s interest in regulating the curriculum of public employees overrides the First Amendment rights of university professors.

Case Summary:In the case of Kenithia Alston v. District of Columbia (Docket No. 25-7056), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on February 19, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was brought by Kenithia Alston, acting as the special administrator of the estate of her 22-year-old son, Marqueese Alston, who was fatally shot by D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers on June 12, 2018.The incident began when MPD officers approached a group of individuals in the Ward 8 neighborhood of Southeast D.C., allegedly utilizing a controversial "jump-out" tactic intended to surprise and search suspects for illegal firearms.A central factual dispute involves the pursuit into an alleyway, where officers claim they saw the outline of a gun through the decedent's pants and that he subsequently fired a weapon at them during the chase.In contrast, the plaintiff cites witness accounts and video evidence suggesting that Marqueese Alston was unarmed, was carrying only a cell phone, and was shot between 12 and 18 times, including multiple wounds to his back.The factual record highlights a controversy regarding the body-worn camera (BWC) footage, which the plaintiff alleges was withheld for years and, when finally shown privately, appeared to be heavily edited and inconsistent with the official police narrative.Following the shooting, a firearm was recovered from a bush yards away from the decedent's body; however, the plaintiff contends the weapon was placed there by officers to justify the use of deadly force.In March 2025, a district court judge denied the officers' motion to dismiss several claims, ruling that qualified immunity could not be granted at the pleading stage because the facts, as alleged, suggested a violation of the Fourth Amendment.The current appeal, docketed as 25-7056, focuses on whether the District of Columbia and the individual officers can be held liable for excessive force and municipal liability based on the "jump-out" practices and the subsequent handling of the investigation.During the oral arguments on February 19, 2026, the D.C. Circuit panel examined whether the district court erred in allowing the case to proceed to discovery despite the officers' claims of immunity and the government's defense of its tactical operations.

Case Summary:In the case of Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of St. Bernard, OH (Docket No. 25-3265), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation centers on a First Amendment challenge by Norton Outdoor Advertising, which has operated billboards in the Village of St. Bernard for decades.The dispute was triggered when the Village revoked a permit for two billboards located at 130 West Ross Avenue after Norton converted them from static displays to variable-message LED signs.The Village justified the revocation by citing a specific section of its municipal code that prohibits "multiple-message or variable-message" displays for off-premises advertising signs.Norton filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the Village's sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it treated "on-premises" signs more favorably than "off-premises" signs and contained content-based exemptions.In a prior phase of the case, the Sixth Circuit determined that while on/off-premises distinctions are generally content-neutral, the Village’s ordinance included a "public service" exemption that required officials to examine the content of a sign to determine its legality.The appellate court previously ruled that this specific exemption rendered the ordinance content-based, thus triggering strict scrutiny, the highest level of judicial review for speech restrictions.The current appeal, docketed as 25-3265, follows a remand to the district court to determine whether the unconstitutional "public service" exemption can be severed from the rest of the sign code.The factual record involves a debate over legislative intent: the Village argues the code should remain enforceable without the exemption, while Norton contends the entire regulatory scheme is so intertwined with content-based distinctions that it must be struck down in its entirety.During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Sixth Circuit panel examined whether severing the exemption would fundamentally alter the Village's original goal of balancing traffic safety and aesthetics with free speech rights.The court also scrutinized whether the remaining ban on digital billboards can stand independently if the underlying definitions used to categorize those signs are found to be constitutionally flawed.

Case Summary:In the case of Abadi v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Docket No. 25-38), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was initiated by Aaron Abadi, a pro se plaintiff with a sensory processing disorder, against Greyhound Lines, Inc., following his inability to travel on the company’s buses during the federal COVID-19 mask mandate.The core factual dispute involves the plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation to travel without a face mask, for which he provided a medical note documenting his condition.Greyhound’s response to the request required the plaintiff to adhere to a specific exemption procedure, which included providing current medical documentation and a recent negative COVID-19 test result.The plaintiff alleges that he was unable to complete these requirements and was subsequently denied boarding, which he contends constituted a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.A primary legal and factual issue in the record is whether the plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief, given that the federal mask mandate expired before the case reached a final adjudication in the lower court.In December 2024, the district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety, finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a "continuing or imminent harm" necessary to maintain a claim for future relief.The appeal, docketed as 25-38, challenges this dismissal, with the plaintiff arguing that Greyhound’s internal policies remain discriminatory and that his past exclusion created a cognizable injury that the court must address.During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the case had become moot following the expiration of the government mandate or if the plaintiff's claims under state and city human rights laws provided an independent basis for the suit to continue.The court also scrutinized the "intracorporate bar" doctrine in relation to the plaintiff’s allegations that Greyhound conspired with government and industry entities to enforce the mask protocols against disabled individuals.

Case Summary:In the case of Reginald Chapman v. Eileen O'Neill Burke (Docket No. 25-1311), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 18, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation is a civil rights action brought by Reginald Chapman against Eileen O'Neill Burke in her official capacity as the Cook County State’s Attorney (having succeeded Kim Foxx).The case centers on the fallout from the plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction and subsequent exoneration, with Chapman alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during the original prosecution and subsequent post-conviction proceedings.A primary factual issue involves the "wrongful conviction" framework, specifically whether the State’s Attorney's Office maintained a policy or custom of withholding exculpatory evidence or failing to investigate credible leads that would have proven the plaintiff’s innocence years earlier.The defendant, Eileen O'Neill Burke, moved to dismiss the claims based on prosecutorial immunity, arguing that the actions taken by her office—even if allegedly improper—were performed as part of the judicial process and are therefore shielded from civil liability.The factual record explores the distinction between "administrative" actions and "prosecutorial" functions; the plaintiff contends that the withholding of evidence occurred during the investigative phase, where immunity is more limited.In early 2025, a district court judge granted a motion to dismiss several of the plaintiff’s claims but allowed the central cause of action regarding the office's "disclosure policies" to proceed to the appellate level for clarification.The appeal, docketed as 25-1311, focuses on whether the State’s Attorney’s Office can be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for systemic failures in its Brady disclosure protocols that allegedly led to Chapman's prolonged and wrongful incarceration.During the oral arguments on February 18, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the newly elected State’s Attorney can be substituted as a defendant in a way that maintains the plaintiff’s claims against the office as a whole.The court also scrutinized whether the plaintiff’s allegations met the "plausibility" standard required to survive a motion to dismiss, specifically regarding the existence of a widespread pattern of misconduct within the Cook County State's Attorney's Office.

Case Summary:In the case of Jewel Sanitary Napkins, LLC v. Busy Beaver Publications, LLC (Docket No. 25-1905), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 17, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation centers on a defamation and trade libel claim brought by Jewel Sanitary Napkins, LLC, a company that manufactures "Reign" brand sanitary pads containing a layer of graphene marketed for wellness and anti-bacterial benefits.The dispute arose after the defendant, Busy Beaver Publications, which serves a substantial Amish and Mennonite readership, published a reader-submitted advertisement known as the "Concerned Sister" ad.The advertisement in question raised public health concerns about Jewel’s products, allegedly suggesting that the graphene layer was being used to covertly and illegally administer vaccines to women without their consent.Jewel contends that the publication of these "anonymous and disparaging" claims directly caused a collapse in sales among the Amish community, resulting in lost profits exceeding $100,000 per month.The factual record explores whether Busy Beaver acted with "actual malice," with the plaintiff arguing that the publisher was "willfully blind" to the obvious falsity of the health claims regarding graphene and vaccines.Busy Beaver maintains that as a small publication, it does not have a legal duty to independently verify the scientific accuracy of every reader-submitted letter or health-related advertisement it prints.In early 2025, a district court granted summary judgment for the publisher, finding that Jewel failed to prove the defendant entertained "serious doubts" as to the truth of the ad, a necessary threshold for a defamation claim involving a public issue.The appeal, docketed as 25-1905, challenges the trial court's application of the "limited-purpose public figure" status to Jewel and questions whether the anonymous nature of the ad should have triggered a higher duty of investigation by the publisher.During the oral arguments on February 17, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the publication’s reliance on routine advertising policies provided a sufficient defense against claims of reckless disregard for the truth.

Case Summary:Gemini saidIn the case of Kimberly Ballard v. Ameren Illinois Company (Docket No. 25-1562), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 17, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The plaintiff, Kimberly Ballard, was hired by Ameren Illinois in August 2013 to serve as an energy efficiency advisor.In February 2015, while attending a work-related conference, the plaintiff suffered a fall that resulted in a serious wrist injury requiring multiple surgeries.The plaintiff alleges that following her injury, she was subjected to ongoing disability discrimination and harassment by management, which persisted despite her internal reports of the conduct.The dispute culminated in the plaintiff’s termination from Ameren on February 26, 2018, an action she contends was retaliatory for her complaints regarding her treatment and disability status.Following her discharge, the plaintiff submitted a Complainant Information Sheet (CIS) to the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) in August 2018, requesting an investigation and a cross-filing of her claims with the EEOC.A critical factual and procedural issue in the litigation is whether the filing of this information sheet constituted a formal "charge" of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).In January 2025, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling that the plaintiff had failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies because her formal EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after her termination.The current appeal, docketed as 25-1562, challenges the trial court's reliance on Seventh Circuit precedent (Carlson v. Christian Bros. Servs.) to determine that the initial information sheet did not satisfy the filing requirements.During the oral arguments on February 17, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined whether the plaintiff’s intent to initiate an investigation through the IDHR information sheet was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for her federal claims.

Case Summary:In the case of Oldnar Corp v. Sanyo North America Corp (Docket No. 25-1336), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on February 17, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation involves a long-standing intellectual property and contract dispute between Oldnar Corp (formerly known as Nartron Corporation) and Sanyo North America Corporation (along with its successor, Panasonic) concerning capacitive touchscreen technology developed for vehicle dashboards.The factual background dates back to 2008 when Sanyo approached Nartron to assist in developing a "Smart Touch" prototype to win a major supplier contract with General Motors (GM) for the Cadillac User Experience (CUE) system.The parties operated under a Development Services Agreement (DSA) which stipulated that if Sanyo used Nartron’s "Existing Property Rights" or "know-how" in a final product, it was required to execute a separate license agreement and pay royalties.A central factual finding by the district court was that Nartron provided the "core idea" and technical know-how—specifically relating to charge-transfer sensing—that allowed Sanyo to successfully pass the "proof-of-concept" and feasibility phases with GM.Despite using this technical assistance to secure the GM project, Sanyo never executed a final "Product Agreement" or paid royalties to Nartron, leading to a breach of contract claim based on the unauthorized use of intellectual property under Section 9.3 of the DSA.The case has seen over a decade of litigation, including a prior 2019 appellate ruling that remanded the case for a specific determination of what "know-how" was used and how damages should be calculated.In the most recent phase of the litigation, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Sanyo did indeed use Nartron's unauthorized know-how through November 2009, but it faced complex factual questions regarding the measure of damages for that specific window of time.The appeal argued on February 17, 2026, challenges the district court’s final assessment of damages, with Oldnar Corp contending that the court undervalued its intellectual property contributions and improperly dismissed its claims for unjust enrichment for the period following the contract's expiration.During the oral arguments, the Sixth Circuit panel scrutinized whether the district court's "reasonable royalty" calculation properly accounted for the market value of the technical "head start" Nartron provided to Sanyo in the competitive GM bidding process.

Case Summary:In the case of Schwetz v. The Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) of Nassau County (Docket No. 24-2957), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The plaintiff, Patricia Schwetz, was a long-time employee of Nassau BOCES who was promoted to the position of Executive Director of Special Education in September 2018.The litigation centers on allegations of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New York State Human Rights Law.A primary factual dispute involves a 2019 directive from the BOCES District Superintendent, Dr. Robert Dillon, for Schwetz to rescind an employment offer made to a job candidate whom the Superintendent deemed unqualified.Schwetz alleges that after she expressed concerns that rescinding the offer was discriminatory, the Superintendent began challenging her own professional qualifications and performance for the first time in her tenure.The factual record also includes an incident involving an error in data submission to the New York State Education Department, for which Schwetz claims she was unfairly disciplined after opposing a proposal to submit incorrect data.In September 2024, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BOCES, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the adverse employment actions were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent rather than legitimate business reasons.The current appeal, docketed as 24-2957, challenges the dismissal of the suit, with the plaintiff arguing that the trial court ignored material evidence of a "pretextual" campaign to undermine her authority following her protected complaints.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the temporal proximity between Schwetz’s internal complaints and the subsequent scrutiny of her performance was sufficient to warrant a jury trial.

Case Summary:Gemini saidIn the case of United States v. Shaquiel Mendez (Docket No. 25-2127), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The defendant, Shaquiel Anthony Mendez, was convicted in December 2024 following a four-day jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota.The jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy to tamper with a federal witness, an offense linked to an underlying investigation into a 2020 drug-related murder in Fargo.According to the factual record, while detained in the Cass County Jail, the defendant conspired with other inmates to assault a witness to prevent them from providing information to law enforcement or testifying in a homicide proceeding.The prosecution presented evidence that the defendant coordinated an attack in which the witness was stabbed with a pencil by two other inmates acting under his direction.In April 2025, the district court sentenced the defendant to a significant term of federal imprisonment based on the violent nature of the obstruction and his role as a leader in the conspiracy.The current appeal, docketed as 25-2127, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish the defendant’s participation in the conspiracy and the legality of the sentencing enhancements applied by the trial judge.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Eighth Circuit panel examined whether the testimony of the co-conspiring inmates was sufficiently corroborated to support a criminal conviction for witness tampering.The court also scrutinized whether the district court properly calculated the sentencing guidelines regarding the "threat of physical force" used to obstruct justice.

Case Summary:In the case of Cornett v. Banks (Docket No. 25-830), which was argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation was initiated by the parents of J.B., a student with multiple severe disabilities including traumatic brain injury and cerebral palsy, against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and its Chancellor.The plaintiffs allege that the DOE failed to provide J.B. with a Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) for the 2022–2023 school year as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).A central factual dispute in the record is the appropriateness of the Individualized Education Program (IEP) developed by the DOE, which recommended placing the student in a specialized public school (P.S. Q256).The parents rejected the public placement and unilaterally enrolled J.B. in iBRAIN, a private school specializing in brain injuries, and subsequently sought tuition reimbursement from the city.In the initial administrative hearing, an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) found that the DOE failed to provide a FAPE because the proposed public school could not actually implement the specific medical and educational supports required by J.B.’s IEP.However, a State Review Officer (SRO) later reversed that decision, concluding that the IHO’s findings regarding the public school's inability to implement the IEP were "impermissibly speculative."In early 2025, a federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOE, upholding the SRO's determination that a FAPE had been offered and denying the parents' claim for tuition reimbursement.The current appeal, docketed as 25-830, challenges that ruling, with the plaintiffs arguing that the district court failed to give due weight to the factual evidence regarding the public school's lack of necessary medical facilities and trained staff.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Second Circuit panel examined whether the DOE is required to prove a school's capacity to implement an IEP before a student actually attends, or if such challenges remain premature until a failure to implement occurs.

Case Summary:In the case of Laura Revolinsky v. Bayer Corporation (Docket No. 25-2401), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation is a class action lawsuit involving allegations that Seresto flea and tick collars, developed by Bayer and sold by Elanco Animal Health, were defectively designed and caused significant harm or death to thousands of pets.The plaintiff, Laura Revolinsky, is one of the lead representatives for a certified class of consumers who purchased the collars based on representations that the product was safe for dogs and cats.A central factual element of the case is the combination of two pesticides, imidacloprid and flumethrin, which the plaintiffs allege create a toxic effect that was not adequately disclosed to consumers or regulators.The factual record includes more than 75,000 incident reports submitted to the EPA since 2012, including approximately 1,700 reported pet deaths and nearly 1,000 reports of human harm, such as skin rashes and neurological symptoms.The defendants maintain that the collars are safe when used as directed and that the reported incidents do not establish a scientific causal link between the product and the alleged injuries.The case follows a $15 million class action settlement that was preliminarily approved in 2024; however, the current appeal focuses on a July 25, 2025, district court order regarding the scope of the class or the fairness of the final distribution.The appellate record examines whether the district court erred in its certification of the class or in its handling of objections from class members who claimed the settlement amount was insufficient given the scale of the alleged veterinary expenses.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel scrutinized whether the district court properly applied the standards for "adequacy of representation" for the diverse group of pet owners included in the settlement.

Case Summary:In the case of Gary Betts v. Boone County, Illinois (Docket No. 25-1685), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 13, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation stems from the 1977 murder of Louise Betts, whose remains were believed by her family to have been handled and buried intact by the then-Boone County Coroner, Wesley Hyland.In November 2022, forty-four years after the burial, the Boone County Coroner’s Office revealed that the late Coroner Hyland had secretly and illegally retained Louise Betts' skull, along with the remains of other individuals, in his private possession.Upon learning of this discovery, the plaintiffs, Gary and Earl Betts, were forced to disinter their sister's remains to reunite them with the recovered skull and provide her with a complete and proper burial.The plaintiffs filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Boone County and the current Coroner, alleging that the unauthorized retention of the remains constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.A primary factual and legal issue at the trial level was whether Illinois law recognizes a "property interest" in a dead body sufficient to trigger federal constitutional protections.The district court initially found that while Illinois law treats a dead body as "quasi-property" for the purpose of burial rights, the plaintiffs had standing to sue because the injury—the interference with their right to possess the remains—accrued only upon the discovery of the coroner's secret misconduct.In March 2025, however, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish Monell liability because the late coroner’s secret, illegal actions did not constitute an "official policy or widespread custom" of Boone County.The court reasoned that because Hyland’s actions were hidden and would have resulted in his immediate removal if known, his conduct was a "departure from policy" rather than an implementation of one.The current appeal, docketed as 25-1685, challenges this dismissal, with the plaintiffs arguing that as the elected Coroner, Hyland was the final policymaker for the county regarding the disposition of human remains, making his actions attributable to the municipality.During the oral arguments on February 13, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel focused on whether a single official's "discretionary decision" to break the law can ever establish municipal liability if that official is the highest-ranking authority in their specific department.

Case Summary:In the case of C.B. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois (Docket No. 25-1323), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 12, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation is a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of transgender individuals who were denied coverage for gender-affirming medical care under health insurance plans administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois (BCBSIL).The lead plaintiff, C.B. (represented by their parents), is a transgender minor whose employer-sponsored health plan contained a categorical exclusion for all "services or supplies for, or leading to, gender reassignment surgery" and related treatments.A central factual element of the case is BCBSIL’s role as a Third-Party Administrator (TPA), meaning it processes claims and manages benefits for self-funded insurance plans designed and owned by private employers.The plaintiffs allege that BCBSIL violated Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, which prohibits sex-based discrimination in any "health program or activity" that receives federal financial assistance.The factual record shows that while BCBSIL's fully insured plans typically cover gender-affirming care, the company provided "standard language" and administrative tools that allowed roughly 400 self-funded employers to opt for categorical exclusions of those same services.The defense maintains that as a TPA, it is legally and contractually obligated under ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act) to follow the specific plan terms dictated by the employer, regardless of whether those terms would be discriminatory if applied by the insurer itself.In a prior district court ruling, the judge found that BCBSIL is a covered entity under the ACA and cannot "shield itself" from non-discrimination laws by claiming it was merely following a client's instructions.During the oral arguments on February 12, 2026, the Seventh Circuit panel examined the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Skrmetti (2025), specifically whether a plan-wide exclusion for gender-dysphoria treatment constitutes "facial" sex discrimination or is a permissible medical-based classification.The court also scrutinized whether BCBSIL's receipt of federal funds for its own insurance products triggers a "cross-program" duty to ensure that the third-party plans it administers for others also comply with federal civil rights standards.

Case Summary:Gemini saidIn the case of Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. FERC (Docket No. 25-1007), argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 12, 2026, the relevant facts are as follows:The litigation centers on a dispute between Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. (MDU) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the management of power grid congestion at the "Charlie Creek to Watford City" flowgate (Flowgate 5717) located in North Dakota.The factual conflict began in April 2023 when the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) initiated "Market-to-Market" (M2M) coordination with the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) to manage congestion on this specific transmission line.MDU, which operates generation facilities in the region, filed a formal complaint alleging that this coordination was unauthorized because the congestion was a "wholly local" constraint that did not meet the necessary regional impact criteria defined in the Joint Operating Agreement between MISO and SPP.The utility company contended that the M2M coordination resulted in "duplicative" and "unwarranted" payments that were ultimately passed down to its customers without providing a corresponding regional benefit.FERC issued a series of orders in 2024 and 2025 (188 FERC ¶ 61,168 and 190 FERC ¶ 61,162) denying MDU's complaint and subsequent requests for rehearing, finding that the coordination was consistent with established technical protocols and "shift factor" sensitivity studies.MDU's appeal, docketed as 25-1007, challenges the agency’s reliance on these technical studies, arguing that the Commission failed to address MDU’s evidence that no MISO-side generation was actually available to relieve the local constraint.The central factual question before the court is whether the administrative record supports FERC's conclusion that the congestion on Flowgate 5717 possessed a "significant" enough impact on the adjacent market to justify the inter-regional coordination charges.During the oral arguments on February 12, 2026, the Eighth Circuit panel examined whether FERC's refusal to order refunds for the contested payments was based on a "reasonable explanation" or if the agency ignored material evidence regarding the local nature of the grid constraint.