DiscoverRoot Causes: A PKI and Security Podcast
Root Causes: A PKI and Security Podcast
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Root Causes: A PKI and Security Podcast

Author: Tim Callan and Jason Soroko

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Digital certificate industry veterans Tim Callan and Jason Soroko explore the issues surrounding digital identity, PKI, and cryptographic connections in today's dynamic and evolving computing world. Best practices in digital certificates are continually under pressure from technology trends, new laws and regulations, cryptographic advances, and the evolution of our computing architectures to be more virtual, agile, ubiquitous, and cloud-based. Jason and Tim (and the occasional guest subject matter expert) will help you stay current on developments in this essential technology platform and to understand the whys and wherefores of popular Public Key Infrastructures.
688 Episodes
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In this episode about the key compromise at the public certificate authority eMudhra and its exit from the WebPKI, Jason and Tim discuss how a researcher found intermediate CA keys with only one byte of entropy and what eMudhra's incident report says went wrong. They walk through the move of keys between hardware security modules (HSMs), the scripting error that replaced the original keys outside the HSMs' safeguards, and the tighter key generation rules Tim expects from the CA/Browser Forum, and why, unlike with Heartbleed, no subscriber can know whether an attack already took place. Clarification: eMudhra's incident report lists 16 affected intermediate CAs. Eight of them, the elliptic curve (ECDSA P-384) keys, had only one byte of entropy, not all 16 as said in the episode. Jason Soroko on LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-soroko-19b41920/
In this episode about Tim's move from Sectigo to Microsoft, Jason and Tim discuss why Microsoft runs a public certificate authority strictly for its own use, and what Tim's new compliance role there involves. They cover the scale of Microsoft's footprint (roughly 5% of the world's public servers, by Tim's estimate), compare Amazon, Google and GoDaddy running their own CAs, explain why the job is narrower than at a commercial CA yet faces the same Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs), post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and shorter certificate lifespans, and confirm that Root Causes continues. Jason Soroko on LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/in/jason-soroko-19b41920/
In this episode about Merkle trees and cryptographic mirrors, Jason and Tim discuss Jason's hands-on experiment building an RFC-compliant Merkle tree to log autonomous AI actions and keep AI systems tamper-evident. They explain how binary hash pairing works from leaf events up to the root hash, uncover how an attacker or misaligned agent could silently prune unpaired trailing branches without invalidating the root math, and show why independent mirrors run by CAs, browsers, and infrastructure providers are essential to Merkle Tree Certificates (MTCs).
In this episode about the security risks of treating a phone number as an identity, Jason and Tim discuss why a telephone number is merely a routing label for potential reachability rather than a proof of who is on the other end. They examine how silent SIM-swapping attacks, three-line mobile SMS redirection malware, low-entropy knowledge-based verification questions, and AI voice cloning render telephone-based authentication and SMS OTPs below an acceptable security threshold.
In this episode about certificate agility, Jason and Tim discuss what it takes to replace any or all digital certificates across an organization rapidly and reliably. They explain why browser root programs are driving shortened certificate lifespans (down to 47 days) and deprecating public clientAuth certificates as a forcing function for automation, why public WebPKI rules exist to protect everyday internet users, and how visibility and Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) prepare enterprises for revocations, key compromises, and post-quantum transitions.
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