Brussels Sprouts

More than seven months have passed since the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. The resulting war has disrupted global energy markets, exacerbated regional instability, and increasingly drawn other countries into the conflict. Europe has been forced to navigate both the direct and indirect consequences of the war. Last month, the EU energy commissioner announced that the bloc had spent an additional $100 billion on energy imports since the conflict began, adding to the economic pressures European governments already face. But the war is also creating new security challenges for Europe. U.S. operations in the Middle East are consuming scarce Patriot missile interceptors, raising concerns about the availability of air defenses for Ukraine and NATO. Iran has also explicitly threatened U.S. military bases in Europe, supporting operations against it. A suspected Iranian plot to attack RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom has raised concerns about hybrid threats and Europe’s ability to protect military installations in its territory. Meanwhile, the growing cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is creating new links between the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Europe is already paying a price for the war, but could the conflict spread to European territory? And how prepared is NATO to respond? To discuss these risks, we are delighted to welcome Jonathan Panikoff and Matthew Savill to Brussels Sprouts. Jonathan Panikoff is the senior director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Matthew Savill is the director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute.

A fast-approaching winter looms over Ukraine. Russia has intensified a concerted campaign against the infrastructure that keeps Ukraine’s economy running, striking railways, warehouses, steel plants, and energy facilities. The attacks threaten production and exports and further strain Kyiv’s finances just as temperatures begin to drop. Last week, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development downgraded its 2026 growth forecast for Ukraine from 2.2 percent to 1.5 percent. Europe, meanwhile, is signaling an inability—or an unwillingness—to cover the added cost of Ukraine’s war effort. In early September, Ukrainian officials reported a $27 billion deficit in the defense budget. President Zelensky blamed part of the gap on excess spending by dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Federov, which Fedorov has denied. European leaders have remained noncommittal, with some proposing renewed discussion over using Russia’s frozen assets—an issue that almost derailed the European Union’s existing $105 billion loan to Ukraine. Ukraine’s shortage of air defense interceptors makes these pressures even more acute. As Russia intensifies its attacks, Ukrainians face rolling blackouts, disrupted heating, lost jobs, and mounting economic pressure through the coldest months of the year. The challenge for Kyiv this winter is not simply keeping the lights on but keeping its economy afloat, sustaining its war effort, and maintaining the resilience of its population. So, to discuss all these issues and how Ukraine can manage these challenges, we are excited to welcome Balázs Jarábik and Kateryna Shynkaruk to Brussels Sprouts. Balázs Jarábik is the founder of Minority Report, a political risk consultancy, and a former Slovak diplomat specializing in Eastern Europe. Kateryna Shynkaruk is a senior lecturer at the Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Europe is facing an escalation in high-profile Russian hybrid attacks. Earlier this month, Germany attributed an attempted drone attack at Leipzig Airport to Moscow, Denmark accused a Russian ship of shooting flares at one of its military helicopters, and NATO jets downed a drone carrying explosives over Lithuania. Just yesterday, more Russian drones crashed in Moldova and Romania, while Poland reported sabotage incidents on defense and logistical infrastructure. In response, European leaders are sounding the alarm. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned last week that Russia plans to test NATO’s Article V by striking European countries with drones or missiles. Finnish President Alexander Stubb carried a similar message, and French President Emmanuel Macron briefed his country’s political leaders in an emergency meeting last Friday. Attendees included national rally leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella, who—despite a history of pro-Kremlin sentiment—criticized Russian “intimidation, threats, destabilization, or psychological warfare.” These recent events underscore that we are moving into a more dangerous phase of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia is growing more accepting of risk in its hybrid attacks designed to get Europe to stop supporting Ukraine. Europe, in turn, is also growing more accepting of risk in both its efforts to signal to Russia that there will be costs and its support and facilitation of Ukrainian long-range strikes inside Russia. To help us assess what's happening in Europe and where this escalatory cycle could go, we're very happy to welcome Ben Hodges and Shashank Joshi back to Brussels Sprouts. Ben Hodges is a retired lieutenant general in the United States Army and the former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe. Shashank Joshi is the Washington bureau chief at The Economist. 

Today we are taking a closer look at Germany as it returns to military power. As the United States pulls back from Europe and threats of Russian aggression are heightened, Germany has begun rearming after many decades of restraint. The country has made a constitutional change to allow debt funding for defense spending, published its first military strategy, and increased its defense budget by far higher rates than the average among other European members of NATO, hitting a 36-year high. Many argue that this is necessary to deter Russia and mitigate the risks of a U.S. retreat from European security. But Germany’s domestic politics complicate the picture. On September 6, the far-right Alternative for Germany party took first place in state elections in eastern Germany, winning 44 percent of the vote. Germany is therefore being asked to assume a much larger role in European security while the political consensus that has underpinned its post-war foreign policy is coming under growing strain. So, what kind of military power is Germany becoming, and can Germany make the transition from decades of military restraint to becoming a country capable of leading and defending Europe? To discuss all of this and her book, which answers all these questions, we’re very happy to welcome Liana Fix back to Brussels Sprouts. Liana Fix is a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, where she also leads the Securing Ukraine’s Future Initiative. She is the author of Germany Rearmed: The Return of War and the End of Illusions (Hurst, 2026).

Today we are turning to domestic Russian politics, with Russia’s State Duma elections coming up September 18th through the 20th. The elections are taking place in a more uncertain domestic environment than we have seen since the early days of the war. The Russian economy is struggling, with slowing growth, inflation, and high interest rates squeezing businesses and households, and the Kremlin is facing increasingly difficult trade-offs between sustaining the war and maintaining economic stability at home. There is also more public recognition that Russia’s progress on the battlefield is stalling. And as Ukraine steps up attacks deep inside Russia, the war is becoming harder for ordinary Russians to ignore, with strikes on refineries and energy infrastructure contributing to fuel shortages and long petrol lines in parts of the country, including in Moscow. Although it is unclear whether the Kremlin itself is worried about instability, the regime continues its efforts to eliminate even limited sources of political uncertainty. Most recently, the Kremlin barred Yabloko, the only established party campaigning on an anti-war platform, from participating in the elections, and repression and censorship continue to narrow the space for dissent. None of this means President Vladimir Putin is losing control. The Kremlin has spent years constructing a political system designed to prevent precisely that. But the elections come at a moment when pressures on the system are becoming harder to conceal. So today, to examine what these elections can tell us about the state of Russian politics and just how stable the Putin regime really is, we are excited to welcome Mark Galeotti and Sasha Prokopenko to Brussels Sprouts. Mark Galeotti is the director of the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and a non-resident senior fellow at the Institute for International Relations Prague. Alexandra “Sasha” Prokopenko is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.