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Exploring Offshore Litigation

Author: Harneys

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Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field.

Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all.

Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.
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Recent decisions of the Jersey and Guernsey courts confirm that generative AI can have a place in litigation, but only where its output is verified and the person relying on it takes personal responsibility for what goes before the court. Both cases involved a litigant in person who had leaned on AI to prepare court documents. Jersey: In Golden Sphinx v Itkin, the Master of the Royal Court found that the defendant had been using AI and that his errors were hallucinations. He cited a non-existent Jersey statute on prescription (limitation), two non-existent Jersey judgments and a genuine trust judgment for a human rights proposition it did not support. His submissions and affidavits ran to over 2,200 pages. Guernsey: In States of Guernsey v Ogier, the Royal Court noted that the respondent had relied on AI to prepare lengthy written submissions, and reminded all parties, represented or not, of their duty to ensure that cases cited are genuine and support the proposition advanced. Similar issues have arisen in other offshore jurisdictions. Our earlier blog, Cayman Court issues warning on AI use in legal filings, discusses a recent Cayman Islands decision on the same theme. There is a particular reason for caution in offshore litigation. As the Jersey Court observed, there is an extremely limited amount of material freely available online about Jersey law, and the same broadly tends to be true in smaller jurisdictions generally. Generic AI tools trained largely on material from larger jurisdictions may fill the gaps with seemingly plausible but wrong answers, or answers based on English or even American law. In an increasingly competitive market, clients reasonably expect their lawyers to use technology to work efficiently and keep costs low. Where used, the following may be helpful: AI should assist, not author. A case should start from real law and evidence. AI can then help to develop and express it, but the legal analysis must be the lawyer's own. Everything is verified. Every authority, quotation and factual statement should be checked against authoritative sources before it is relied on. Supervision is non-negotiable. AI output should be reviewed as carefully as a junior team member's first draft. The correct tools are used. Many leading firms use in-house or bespoke legal AI tools rather than free generic chatbots, which helps to avoid some of their known pitfalls and protect confidentiality. Be candid with the court. Where the rules or the court require AI use to be disclosed, it should be disclosed. Some courts are moving towards requiring it proactively. Shorter is often better. AI makes it easy to produce volume. Courts are alive to being flooded with material, and concise, focused submissions are more persuasive and cost effective. It is simply unrealistic to expect parties not to use AI at all. The real question for clients is not whether their lawyers use AI, but how. Clear boundaries, rigorous verification and candour with the court allow AI to deliver genuine savings without compromising standards. While jurisdiction-specific guidance is key (whether in the form of local Practice Directions, judgments or otherwise), best practice from across the common law world can and should inform the conduct of offshore litigation generally. Harneys does not practise Guernsey law. This article is based on a longer piece by the author submitted to the Jersey and Guernsey Law Review.
A trustee who falls short in its deliberations will not necessarily see its decision unwound. That is the message from the Privy Council on appeal from the Bahamas. In Dawson-Damer v Grampian Trust Company, the Board found that the trustee had breached its duty of proper consideration – but still refused to set aside appointments worth over US$400 million. The decision is to be welcomed. It does not represent a radical break from tradition. Rather, it affirms orthodoxy on trustee decision-making, while offering clear, practical guidance in two areas: (a) how the wishes of a corporate settlor are identified; and (b) the two-stage approach the court must take when a decision is challenged for "inadequate deliberation". The dispute concerned the Glenfinnan Settlement, a Bahamian discretionary family trust. Its assets could be traced back to George Skelton Yuill, a Scotsman who made his fortune in beef and butter in Australia and the Far East. Following a restructuring in 1992, the settlor of Glenfinnan was a Bahamian company, Spey. Grampian was the sole trustee. Ashley Dawson-Damer was a discretionary beneficiary. She was the widow of John Dawson-Damer, one of Mr Yuill's great-grandsons. After John's death in 2000, relations between Ashley and the family advisers soured – and, ultimately – became acrimonious. In 2006 and 2009, Grampian appointed around 98 per cent of the Glenfinnan assets into new trusts for the descendants of John's brother, George. Ashley was not a beneficiary of the new trusts, and was not consulted. Around 2 per cent was held back in Glenfinnan as a "safety net" for her. By the time of the appeal, that sum had grown to around US$14 million. Ashley sought to set the appointments aside. Her claim failed before Justice Winder at first instance, and again before the Court of Appeal. Two issues were before the Board: 1. whether the lower courts had applied the wrong test in attributing to Spey the wish that the Glenfinnan assets be used for future generations; and 2. whether there had been a breach of duty by inadequate deliberation – and, if so, what followed from it. Lord Burrows and Lady Rose gave the judgment of the Board. It was common ground that a settlor's wishes are a relevant factor which a trustee must take into account. As the UK Supreme Court made clear in Pitt v Holt, those wishes are always a material consideration – but they should not displace all of the trustee's independent judgement. Nor do they need to be set out in a formal letter of wishes. The twist here was that the settlor was a company. Both sides accepted that Spey's wishes had to be identified using the ordinary corporate attribution rules; the directing mind of Spey for this purpose was a majority of the three directors. Ashley argued that the judge never found that a majority of Spey's board had formed the relevant wish. She said there was no such evidence. The documents and witness evidence relied on came from others, such as the family advisers and the family's solicitor, and not from Spey's board. The Board disagreed. It held that the judge had applied the correct test, and that he was entitled to infer the board's wish from the evidence before him. A board decision does not have to be formally adopted and minuted in order to be attributed to a company. The typed minutes of Spey's board meeting did not record the "next generation" purpose – but handwritten notes described the Glenfinnan share as a "long term fund". All three Spey directors had died by the time of trial, so there was an obvious gap in the evidence. The first instance judge was entitled to fill that gap by drawing inferences from the oral evidence and the documents, both contemporaneous and later. On the second issue, the Board restated the law laid down in Pitt v Holt. The court may only intervene on the basis of inadequate deliberation where there has been a breach of fiduciary duty. The inadequate deliberation must be sufficiently serious – it is not enough th...
Time-barred in the PRC, but not in the BVI: Lead Express v Mihot Investments The BVI Commercial Court has decided, for the first time, that a foreign limitation rule which bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right is procedural, so the BVI court applies its own six-year limitation period instead. In Lead Express Ltd v Mihot Investments Ltd, Mithani J appointed liquidators over a BVI company owing HK$60 million under PRC-law loans, even though the three-year PRC limitation period had expired before demand was made. The decision is significant for creditors of the many BVI companies used by PRC individuals and businesses to hold assets. It confirms that an expired PRC limitation period will not, by itself, stop a creditor from pursuing a BVI liquidation, provided the debt is still within time under BVI law. Mihot Investments Limited is a BVI company. Its main asset is an Airbus A318 Elite private jet, which was arrested in Hong Kong in early February 2026. Under three loan agreements made in 2020 and 2021, Madam Chu Lam Yiu lent Mihot a total of HK$60 million (about US$7.69 million), each loan for one year at 4% interest. The loans fell due between October 2021 and October 2022. None of the money was repaid. On 10 February 2026, Madam Chu assigned the loans to Lead Express Limited, a company set up the previous month for the sole purpose of bringing the application. Lead Express served notice of the assignment and a demand for payment that same day. The next day, Mihot, acting through Mr Li Jie, its sole shareholder and then sole director, acknowledged the assignment and said it could not pay. The application to appoint liquidators was issued on 13 February 2026. The opposition came from an unexpected direction. Chengdu Huan Hua Yi Technology Company Limited, a PRC company, holds a PRC judgment against Mr Li personally for more than US$20 million. Chengdu is not a creditor of Mihot. On its application, the court appointed receivers over Mr Li's share in Mihot. The receivers appointed additional directors, who then removed Mr Li from the board and took up the fight against the liquidation application. Mihot said the debt was disputed in good faith on substantial grounds, and put forward four arguments: 1. Identity of the debtor: a Hong Kong company with the same name, also owned by Mr Li, might have been the real borrower. 2. Limitation: the debt was time-barred under PRC law. 3. The assignment: Madam Chu may not have had the mental capacity to sign it. 4. Abuse of process: the application was a device to help Mr Li escape enforcement by Chengdu. None of them succeeded, either individually or taken together. On the identity point, Mihot never actually said that the Hong Kong company was the borrower. Its position was only that it could not accept that the bank account was its own. The judge regarded that as a non-admission rather than a dispute, and made the point that suspicion is not a prima facie case. All of the evidence pointed to the BVI company. The loan agreements named it as borrower, the remittance records showed the money going into its account, and the bank confirmed by email that the account holder was registered in the BVI under Mihot's own company number. Mihot also owned the jet that the loans had been used to buy. Mihot criticised the font and signature block of the bank's email, but the judge said those criticisms came nowhere near showing that the email was not genuine. In his words, a company that says a document from its own bank, identifying its own account by its own registration number, is not genuine "must do more than comment on its typography". The challenge to Madam Chu's capacity was not successful. Mihot had dropped an earlier allegation of forgery, and the capacity point rested entirely on second-hand hearsay from an unnamed intermediary, passed on by Chengdu. On the other side, Madam Chu had travelled to Japan and made an affirmation before a Tokyo notary confirming that she signed the d...
In a recent decision of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, a US$87 million claim for "specific performance" of share redemption rights was found to be what it really was: a claim for money, caught by a Hong Kong arbitration clause. The action was stayed. Investors and companies in Asia involved in redemption disputes should take note. Calling a payment claim something else will not take it outside an arbitration agreement, and wording that lets parties go to court for certain relief may be far narrower than it looks. In TB MGMT LLC v Taibang Biological Ltd, the Plaintiffs were holding vehicles through which Joseph Chow held shares in Taibang, a Cayman Islands company. Mr Chow was removed as chairman in December 2024. The Plaintiffs said this was without "Cause", which entitled them to have Taibang redeem their shares at fair market value. Taibang said he was removed for Cause, so no redemption right arose. The shareholders' agreement provided for HKIAC arbitration in Hong Kong. It also allowed either party to seek "an injunction, temporary restraining order or other equitable relief" in court. The Plaintiffs relied on that wording and sued in the Grand Court for specific performance of the redemption provisions, asking to be paid over US$87 million. Three days later, Taibang began the arbitration. It then applied to stay the Cayman Islands action. Justice Doyle granted a mandatory stay under section 4 of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Enforcement Act. The real dispute was whether Mr Chow had been removed without Cause. The specific performance claim was held to be "entirely artificial and a mere device" to get around the arbitration clause. Even if it had been genuine, the court-relief wording only covered interim relief "enjoining" a breach, not a full claim to be paid. An argument that Taibang had waived arbitration also failed, and the judge said he would have granted a discretionary stay in any event. The Plaintiffs, whose attorneys had come off the record, did not attend the hearing and were ordered to pay Taibang's costs. Redemption and put rights in Cayman Islands companies backed by PRC and Hong Kong investors are often paired with an arbitration clause in the shareholders' agreement. For anyone holding or facing those rights, five points stand out. 1. Substance wins over form: The Court will look past the label to the real dispute. If what you are really after is the redemption price, assume the claim will be treated as a claim for money, however you plead it. 2. Read the court-relief wording closely: Here, a right to seek "an injunction, temporary restraining order or other equitable relief" in court was confined to genuine interim relief. It did not open the door to a full payment claim. Nor did the clause heading, "Specific Performance", help, because the agreement said headings were not to be used in interpreting it. If you want redemption claims heard in court, say so clearly. 3. The articles may not offer a way out: The redemption rights and the definition of Cause appeared in both the shareholders' agreement and the articles, but only the shareholders' agreement had an arbitration clause. The Plaintiffs argued that their claims under the articles did not need to be arbitrated. That did not help them, because the substance of the dispute still fell within the arbitration agreement. The simplest fix at the drafting stage is to make the dispute resolution provisions match. 4. Do not go quiet: A company can only appear in the Grand Court through an attorney. If its attorneys come off the record and it does nothing, the Court can carry on without it and order it to pay costs. The judge described the approach taken by the Plaintiffs as an "unhelpful and potentially abusive strategy of non-engagement" and remarked that burying your head in the sand "is rarely, if ever, a good litigation tactic". 5. Move quickly: Taibang started its arbitration three days after the writ was issued and applied for a stay before fili...
In the recent decision of BTA Bank v Mamesh, the BVI Court of Appeal rejected BTA Bank's attempt to use restored BVI shell companies as anchor defendants for an alleged US$230 million fraud claim against foreign defendants, and upheld the order setting aside permission to serve out. The decision, which turns largely on appellate deference to the judge's evaluative assessment, illustrates that a claimant relying on the necessary or proper party gateway must show that there is genuine utility in the BVI Court trying the claim against the anchor defendant(s). It is also a stark reminder of the consequences of failing to give full and frank disclosure on an ex parte service out application. BTA Bank, a Kazakhstani financial institution, alleges that it was the victim of a fraudulent scheme orchestrated by its former chairman and employees between around 2005 and 2009, involving around 100 letters of credit to fund purported commodity sales, with the money diverted through offshore special purpose vehicles and on to foreign entities. Some of those vehicles were BVI companies. In September 2021, the bank issued proceedings against 54 defendants in the BVI after restoring eight BVI companies that had been struck off and dissolved years earlier. In May 2022, it obtained permission ex parte to serve the foreign defendants out of the jurisdiction, relying principally on the necessary or proper party gateway, with the BVI companies as the anchor defendants. The BVI companies never engaged with the claim and were struck off again in 2022 and 2023. Several foreign defendants applied to set aside the permission to serve out and Justice Wallbank granted the application. He found that (i) even assuming there was a real issue between the bank and the BVI companies, it was not reasonable for the court to try it; (ii) the company gateway was not engaged; (iii) the BVI was not clearly or distinctly the appropriate forum; and (iv) the bank had breached its duty of full and frank disclosure in ways that were not innocent. The bank appealed and argued that the judge was wrong in (i) finding that there was no real issue that was reasonable for the court to try; (ii) deciding that the BVI was not clearly and distinctly the most appropriate forum; and (iii) concluding that there was a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure. The Court of Appeal dismissed the bank's appeal on all grounds. As a starting point, the Court confirmed that, as an appellate court, it ought to be slow to interfere with the judge's decision where the appeal involves an evaluation of the facts and law and exercise of discretion. Applying the principles set out in its decision in Dufour v Helenair and the English Court of Appeal's decision in Re Sprintroom, the Court reaffirmed that it would only interfere if the judge's decision could be shown to be wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in his treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency or a failure to consider a material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion. In recognising the appellate court's deference to the evaluative assessment undertaken in the court below, the Court also gave weight to the fact that the same judge had heard both the ex parte application and the set-aside applications. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the bank's argument that the judge had misapplied the gateway. Relying on the Privy Council's decisions in Nilon Ltd v Royal Westminster Investments SA and Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobile Tel Ltd, the Court restated the principles, including the following, applicable to the necessary or proper party gateway: Caution must always be exercised in bringing foreign defendants within the jurisdiction under that gateway, and it should never become the practice to bring them in as a matter of course on the ground that the only alternative requires more than one suit in more than one jurisdiction. The fact that an anchor d...
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