After being brought back from the Pacific Theater, this George went to a children’s playground in San Diego, California. The museum received it in 1959 and in 2000 the museum began an extensive, eight-year restoration. They found serial numbers from four different aircraft during the disassembly. This beautiful restoration either came from several different aircraft brought back to the U.S. for exploitation after the war, or from the Japanese putting several aircraft together during the war. The serial number 5312 was most common and is now the number cited. This concludes Part 1 of the of the Intelligence Guide to the National Museum of the United States Air Force.
The B-29’s photo-reconnaissance capabilities yielded what Major General Haywood Hansell called, “probably the greatest…single contribution…in the air war with Japan.” The Superfortress’ photo-reconnaissance configuration was the F-13A. On 1 November 1944, one of the two F-13A aircraft that arrived from the U.S. just two days before flew from Saipan to Tokyo. Captain John Steakley’s aircraft flew over Tokyo at 32,000 feet for 35 minutes taking 7,000 images. A Japanese fighter approached the F-13, but did not attack it. That was the first land-based American plane to fly over Tokyo since the Doolittle Raid in 1942. Those photos provided the XXI Bomber Command locations of Japanese aircraft manufacturing plants, helping the mission planners to choose targets for the coming B-29 onslaught. Steakley’s F-13A became “Tokyo Rose” after that mission.
The Catalina performed some of the most critical surveillance missions of World War II. An RAF Catalina located the German battleship Bismarck, enabling the Royal Navy to destroy it in May 1941. A Canadian Catalina warned the Royal Navy’s Indian Ocean fleet of the approach of a Japanese carrier group in April 1942 before being shot down by a Zero. A Catalina also spotted the Japanese carrier force as it approached Midway Island in June 1942 and provided one of the most important radio messages of the war. This aircraft is a Consolidated OA-10 Catalina.
The world’s first operational jet fighter was the Me 262A-1. On 16 May 1945, technical intelligence personnel found this aircraft at Munich-Riem airfield where fighter ace Adolph Galland’s Jagdverband (JV) 44 left it behind as the unit fled to Austria. Personnel of the 54th Air Disarmament Squadron named it Beverly Anne and it became one of 10 Watson’s Whizzers aircraft returned to the US at the end of the war. While being ferried from Lechfeld, Germany, to Cherbourg, France it stopped at Melun, France. It was there that Beverly Anne became Screamin’ Meemie. Lieutenant Bob Strobell named it that because of the sound it made. On 27 June 1945, this jet served as the lead ship in an aerial exhibition for General Carl Spaatz. After arrival in the U.S. it went to the U.S. Navy, along with four other Me 262s, serving at Patuxent Naval Air Station.
The FW 190D-9 on display surrendered to the Royal Air Force at Flensburg, Germany, up near the Danish border. It served with JG3 during the war. The American technical intelligence troops acquired it from the British and loaded it on board the H.M.S. Reaper for the trip back to the United States. As FE-120, the aircraft participated in six hours of flight testing here at Wright Field, before being stored at Freeman Field and later in Maryland. The D-9 was 20 inches longer than a standard Focke-Wulf, due to the large Jumo 213 bomber engine placed in it for greater performance. It could fly 426 miles per hour, putting on par with the P-51 and it featured a wooden propeller.
American forces captured this Bf 109G-10 at an airfield near Munich at the end of the war. It originally belonged to Jagdgeschwader (JG) 52, the same unit the highest scoring aces of all time belonged to. American technical intelligence personnel trucked the aircraft to Cherbourg, France, where it went on board the H.M.S. Reaper, along with the museum’s FW 190D- 9 and Me 262. After arriving in Newark, New Jersey, in July 1945, the aircraft, then known as FE-124, went to Freeman Field, Indiana, for exploitation and display purposes. Germany built more than 30,000 Bf 109s, and combined with those produced in Czechoslovakia and Spain after the war, it became the most produced fighter aircraft in history.
Sometimes technical intelligence personnel went to great lengths to recover enemy equipment and bring it back for exploitation. The museum’s Ju 88D-1 defected from the Romanian Air Force to the Royal Air Force on the island of Cyprus in July 1943. The British flew it to Egypt and turned it over to American volunteer pilots at Cairo in October 1943. Those pilots flew it from Cairo to Dayton across the southern route of Sierra Leone, Ascension Island, Brazil, Guiana, Puerto Rico, Florida and Memphis. It received the nickname “Baksheesh” and the tail number of FE (foreign equipment)-1598. As a part of its testing, the Ju 88 underwent 36 hours of trial flights at Wright Field and was one of two Ju 88 bombers that operated here during the war.
When intelligence indicated that the Germans planned to deploy a ballistic missile against England, one of Churchill’s scientific advisors claimed it to be impossible since, in his expert opinion, it required solid propellant. According to Lord Cherwell, that made the missile too huge to hide, thus it was false intelligence. When the V-2s began falling in September 1944, an angry Churchill stated, “We have been caught napping!”27 In that situation, one individual with a wrong idea created doubt in many of the analysts that held true information. That made them hesitant to share accurate data until absolute proof of its significance existed. Because of the accurate intelligence, the British did have a good idea about the characteristics of the missile before the first attack. The examination of a V-2 that crashed in Sweden, reconnaissance photos, a dummy missile and documents taken in Normandy and Enigma messages all led to a basic understanding of what they faced. The V-2 took about an hour to erect, fuel and launch. It flew about 200 miles in under four minutes. After reaching an altitude of 60 miles, it came in at nearly Mach 3, dug 30 feet into the ground and detonated its one ton warhead. There were two explosions in a V-2 strike: the first was impact, the second was the sonic boom. The mobile Meillerwagen transporter-erector made the system very difficult to find and destroy before launch.
When the V-1s began to fall in London in June 1944, Dr. R.V. Jones devised an ingenious plan to save lives. Knowing that German double-agents needed to provide at least some truth and that the V-1 flying bombs typically fell several miles short of Trafalgar Square, Jones determined that the spies needed to report the V-1 impacts to the north and west of London, along with the times of the ones that fell in the south and east. He did this in spite of the fact his home was south of London, right in the area the bombs would fall. Although Germany equipped a number of the V-1s with radio transmitters which confirmed that they had fallen short, the Germans chose to disregard it in favor of the more reliable human intelligence. The aircraft on display is actually an American reverse-engineered Republic/ Ford JB-2 Loon.
OPERATION FORTITUDE was the Allied effort to deceive the Germans about the timing and location of the upcoming Allied invasion of Normandy. The plan called for intelligence to make the Germans believe that Norway was the primary target for the initial invasion. They also wanted to hide the buildup of forces in Southern England and to convince them that Pas de Calais not Normandy was the real landing site. In addition, once the invasion began at Normandy, they wanted the Germans to believe it was a deception before the real landings began at Pas de Calais. The Allies had to make the Germans believe an entire 250,000-man army was in Scotland. They used false radio transmissions, allowed German reconnaissance planes to photograph decoy ships and depended upon double agents to provide evidence that the fictitious Fourth Army existed (although it was only forty people). It tied up 27 German divisions that could have made Normandy worse. In Southeast England, deception efforts attempted to create a million-man army with Maj. Gen. George Patton in command. Huge tent cities with smoking camp stoves, roads to nowhere, fake landing craft, scripted radio transmissions and true, unimportant messages from double agents kept the Germans near Pas de Calais. It was the best case of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) in history.
The Spitfire’s PR, or photo reconnaissance, variant proved to be extremely successful in the imagery collection role. The camera-equipped fighter aircraft accomplished several key reconnaissance missions. For the high-altitude, highspeed area coverage missions, the pilot of a high-flying fighter kept constant watch on the rear-view mirror to make sure that a contrail did not reveal his presence. Once over the target, the pilot maintained a precise course and altitude setting to collect a wide-area view of the situation on the ground. If photo-interpreters identified an important target, such as a V-1 launch site, another mission flew in low. Those missions presented more danger than the high-altitude missions. At high-speed and low-altitude, the pilot lined up a black cross on the side of the canopy with a small black stripe painted on the wing. He had to focus in the face of anti-aircraft fire, fighters and the ground. Sometimes other sources of intelligence validated the photo-interpreter’s analysis. After they assessed that there was a Focke-Wulf 190 plant working at Marienburg, Germany, technical intelligence verified it through the interpretation of data plates from crashed FW-190s and the Eighth Air Force destroyed the factory.
The P-38 played a critical role in applying the decisions of national policy makers after intelligence provided critical information. On 14 April 1943, the U.S. naval intelligence effort, code-named “Magic,” intercepted and decrypted a message containing specific details regarding an upcoming inspection tour by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander of Japan’s Combined Fleet. The SIGINT collection provided arrival and departure times and locations, as well as the number and types of planes that would transport and accompany him on the journey. The message gave Yamamoto’s 18 April flight information from Rabaul to Ballale Airfield on an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. When presented with the intelligence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to “Get Yamamoto.” Knox instructed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz of Roosevelt’s wishes. Admiral Nimitz then authorized a mission on 18 April to intercept Yamamoto’s flight and shoot it down. Lockheed P-38 Lightnings from the 339th Fighter Squadron found Yamamoto and killed him as a result of the intelligence data that enabled policy makers to direct the attack.
The Italian aircraft on display is a Macchi MC.200 and it represented the British technical intelligence cooperation the US received in World War II. The aircraft transferred from a squadron in Italy to the 165th Squadron in North Africa during November 1942. The Italians abandoned it at Benghazi airfield following the battle of El Alamein and General Montgomery’s forces captured it there. After the British completed their examination of it, the U.S. shipped the MC.200 here to Wright Field. From here, it went on a war bond tour around the country.
During the first months of the war in the Pacific, the Navy OP-20-G group broke the very complex Japanese Imperial Navy JN-25 code. In decrypted transmissions, they saw the code “AF” mentioned several times and thought it might mean an attack was coming on that location. To affirm it was Midway Island, they used a communications cable that ran on the bottom of the ocean and had the Navy send a “in the clear” radio message that said, “water distillation plant damaged…send fresh water.” The JN-25 code then produced a message saying, ”AF needs fresh water.” They knew where and when the attack would happen as well as enemy strength because of SIGINT. It helped win the Battle of Midway and became one of the greatest intelligence coups in naval history.
One of the greatest Foreign Materiel Exploitation stories of World War II was the testing of a crashed Japanese Navy A6M2 Zeke, known as Koga’s Zero. After the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor, Alaska, in June 1942, a Zero piloted by an Ensign Koga, crash-landed on an island in the Aleutians. A PBY Catalina spotted the Zero. Navy personnel recovered it, buried the pilot and took the aircraft to San Diego. After making it flyable, the Navy conducted performance and vulnerability testing against all American fighter aircraft. They learned that the Sakae engine was carbureted and cut out in a negative G maneuver. The aircraft rolled faster to the left than to the right and that in a high speed dive the Zero’s controls stiffened due to compressibility issues. By November 1942, all the intelligence went to the fleet and the tide turned against the Zero. It was an intelligence treasure and one of the great FME projects of the war.
The cipher machine known as Enigma encrypted and decrypted secret message traffic for the Germans in World War II. Although invented in the early 1920s, Germany used it before and during the war. The Polish Cipher Bureau earned the distinction of first breaking Enigma ciphers in December 1932. Beginning in 1938, the Germans increased the complexity of the Enigma system, which required the Poles to develop a calculating computer known as a Bomba. Realizing the German plans to invade their country, the Poles turned the Enigma secret over to French and British military intelligence in July 1939. With that information, British codebreakers decrypted almost 84,000 messages a month from 1943 until the end of the war. The Allies codenamed the intelligence collected by this SIGINT source, “Ultra.” It provided critical intelligence that saved countless Allied lives and speeded the ultimate victory.
Moving into the World War II years, the circular radio directional finder antenna on top of the museum’s O-47B recalls an interesting intelligence episode early in the war: The Battle of the Beams. Knickebein (Crooked Leg) was a German program that used two radio beams to accurately navigate and bomb at night. British intelligence at the Air Ministry, led by Reginald V. Jones, were aware of the system initially because a downed German bomber’s Lorenz navigation system was analyzed and seen to be far too sensitive to be a mere landing aid. A search by the British found two German signals met over the Rolls-Royce engine plant at Derby, England. The British also secretly recorded transcripts from German POW pilots indicating the existence of bombing beams. In addition, Churchill received Ultra intelligence mentioning “bombing beams.” The German signal used a Morse code dot for the area left of the correct heading and dashes for right and they blended into the beam when on course. The British used deception by placing false dots into the German signals to confuse the bomber crews and make them miss.
Strategic bombing became a reality in World War I with both Zeppelin and fixed-wing crews attacking infrastructure targets and even civilian populations. Fiorello La Guardia, congressman from New York and future mayor of New York City, led about 100 Americans that flew Italian-built Caproni bombers for the Italian Air Force. While he used his political influence in ways few U.S. Army captains have ever experienced, he also trained and equipped bomber crews that flew 65 bombing missions for Italy. The bomber advocates became dedicated aerial reconnaissance advocates as well, because when the crews took their own strike photos, it validated their mission and existence. Intelligence people had to learn to interpret those strategic strike photos from bombers and zeppelins — that was the beginning of strategic Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA).
The U.S. developed an aircraft-mounted radiotelephone near the end of the war known as the SCR-68 (Set, Complete, Radio). This DH-4 has one, indicated by the generator on the wheel strut. That generator is a good example of linking a modification to a new capability: voice communication instead of telegraphy. The U.S. Army Signal Corps discovered many problems with it, primarily its inability to communicate beyond three miles. To communicate with the ground-mounted SCR- 67, the observer extended a 300-foot, long wire antenna out the rear of the aircraft. The SCR-68 was one of the first steps towards developing more effective messaging system between pilots and commanders and opened a whole new challenge for signals intelligence (SIGINT).
The German fighters of World War I inflicted tremendous losses on the opposing photo-reconnaissance sorties. To counter those losses, France began configuring single seat fighters, such as this SPAD XIII for high-speed reconnaissance. The mission did not call for extreme fighter-like maneuvering, but very fast, level flight, at high-altitude. The 94th Aero Squadron had one aircraft configured for the high speed reconnaissance mission.