Iran's Gambit

As the Islamic Republic commemorated the fifth anniversary of assassination of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Suleimani, many public figures, who had personal interactions with him delivered lengthy interviews discussing this near-mythical individual. On January 2nd, I discussed former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with Khorasan newspaper, and today, I'll discuss current Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi's interview. He delivered the interview on January 1, and my translation is based on the partial transcription released by Iran's al-Alam network. As you will see, there are significant differences between Dr. Zarif's account and Dr. Araghchi's, but this is understandable: the former no longer serves as foreign minister, and the latter is and must deal with the Quds Force bureaucracy in his everyday work. Nevertheless, as you will hear, you can always detect signs of inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, even in the guarded comments delivered by Dr. Araghchi.

Former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with January 1, 2025 edition of Khorasan newspaper not only provides some insights into his relationship with the late Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem, but also into inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force. An audio recording, allegedly leaked to the media in 2021, provides greater insights into how the Quds Force undermined the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts. 

In the history of most countries, some eras appear more glorious than others. And at times, the past appears more glorious than what we expect of the future. This was my sense monitoring Iran's state-censored media today. Addressing the families of martyrs, including the family of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Soleimani, widows of Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, and other affiliated groups, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of Soleimani's assassination. In his address, Ayatollah Khamenei reflected on the apex of Soleimani's influence, particularly from 2003 to 2020—a period, which coincides with the height of Iranian geopolitical leverage in the Middle East. Regarding future prospects, however, Ayatollah Khamenei's rhetoric conveyed aspirations and hope but lacked a clearly articulated strategic framework. Clearly, glory was in the past and the future looks more uncertain.

There are increasing indications of strategic frustration within the Iranian leadership regarding the trajectory of negotiations with the United States. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has intensified his rhetorical posture against President Donald J. Trump, now openly articulating a policy objective of terminating U.S. presence and influence in the Middle East. Parallel signals are evident in the discourse of Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi, who, for the first time, publicly rebuked U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs, Mr. Steven Witkoff. Mr. Witkoff, whose messaging has lacked consistency, most recently articulated a maximalist position, declaring that Washington would not permit even minimal uranium enrichment within Iranian territory. These developments reflect a sharpening of negotiating positions and an escalation in rhetorical signaling. This polarization is likely a pre-negotiation tactic, as both parties maneuver to consolidate leverage ahead of the forthcoming round of diplomatic engagement.

As Iran prepares for the fifth round of nuclear talks with the United States, the regime in Tehran underscores a strategy combining deterrence and diplomacy. Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi's latest remarks affirm Iran's readiness for transparency in exchange for sanctions relief, while rejecting any compromise on sovereign rights, such as enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil. Dr. Araghchi also appears to be reaching out to U.S. businesses, in an attempt to mobilize support in the U.S. for continued negotiations and a potential agreement.

Much like President Donald J. Trump's dual-track rhetoric toward Iran—alternating between coercive threats and inducements such as the prospect of sanctions relief—the Islamic Republic has likewise adopted a strategy of strategic ambiguity. Tehran is concurrently projecting a willingness to engage in diplomacy over its nuclear program, while simultaneously issuing deterrent threats to disrupt maritime oil shipments in the Persian Gulf in the event of U.S. military escalation.

In response to President Donald J. Trump's conciliatory overtures, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei invokes the historical precedent of Imam Hassan's treaty with Muawiya (subject of one of Khamenei's books), signaling a potential strategic recalibration. Concurrently, media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launch a coordinated campaign against a televised political satire that ridicules the Saudi Foreign Minister. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, while for the first time acknowledging "fundamental divergences at the level of overarching principles" between the United States and Iran, expresses cautious optimism regarding the prospects for diplomatic engagement.

Assessing the initial and subsequent rounds of bilateral negotiations with the United States, Iranian officials have expressed surprise at the rapid pace of diplomatic engagement. This acceleration is primarily ascribed to the limited scope of U.S. demands, the relative inexperience or subject-matter unfamiliarity of American negotiators, a pronounced strategic urgency to secure an agreement, and the personalized and unconventional diplomatic style characteristic of President Donald J. Trump. Nonetheless, the trajectory toward a comprehensive accord remains encumbered by persistent structural and political impediments.

Foreign Minister Dr. Abbas Araghchi has asserted that U.S. interlocutors have refrained from introducing extraneous, non-nuclear issues during the most recent round of negotiations. He confirmed that technical-level discussions would resume in Muscat on Wednesday, April 23, and that he would reconvene with U.S. Special Envoy Mr. Steven Witkoff on Saturday, April 26, to evaluate progress. This indicates Mr. Witkoff's April 15, post on X, stating: "Iran must stop and eliminate its nuclear enrichment" was not expressed as a U.S. demand in the course of the negotiations.

Receiving the Saudi Defense Minister in Tehran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei chose a condescending attitude in dealing with the younger brother of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, but the fact that he received him undermines policy recommendation of Iranian strategist Dr. Mehdi Kharatian, who argues Iran can improve its negotiation position vis a vis the United States by attacking Saudi interest. In the meantime, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi downplays the significance of the change in U.S. Middle East Envoy Steven Witkoff's ever-changing positions as expressed on television and social media.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei states he is "neither excessively optimistic, nor excessively pessimistic" regarding Iran's bilateral diplomatic engagement with the United States—an appropriate stance, given the latest recalibration in U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff's position on Iran's uranium enrichment capacity. While Iranian media appear condemn the change in Witkoff's position, Deputy Foreign Minister and member of the negotiation team Kazem Gharibabadi delivered a more careful assessment indicating Iran is more interested in what positions U.S. negotiators present at the negotiation table than what they post on social media.

As a prelude to potential diplomatic engagement with the United States, the Islamic Republic is strategically signaling both deterrence and openness to negotiation. The activation of Yemeni Houthi proxies and the controlled disclosure of the Revolutionary Guard's subterranean missile infrastructure serve as calibrated demonstrations of Iran's strategic depth and military resilience, aimed at reinforcing its bargaining position vis-à-vis President Donald J. Trump. Simultaneously, the removal of the U.S. flag from the facility's floor, alongside Tehran's formal diplomatic response, indicates a conditional willingness to engage in dialogue. However, Iran appears to be setting its own parameters for negotiations. Two sources have dismissed the United Arab Emirates as a potential intermediary, implicitly suggesting that Abu Dhabi is an unlikely venue for talks. Furthermore, while Tehran has signaled readiness to deliberate on its nuclear program within the established framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it has categorically ruled out any discussion of its defense posture and ballistic missile capabilities, framing these as non-negotiable aspects of its national security doctrine.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's March 20 New Year address was far from jubilant, conveying a tone of somber resilience rather than triumphalism. He acknowledged that Iranians had endured significant economic hardship over the past year, with further adversities likely in the year ahead. Regarding recent communications from President Donald J. Trump and other U.S. officials, Khamenei adopted a posture of defiance, though his rhetoric was not categorically intransigent:  Iran has no proxies in the Middle East region, he asserted, which may indicate Khamenei willingness to accommodate Trump's demands with regard to Iran's regional activities. Separately, amid escalating geopolitical tensions between Washington and Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) aired video footage purportedly recorded within an underground Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile complex. The broadcast was likely intended as a demonstrative display of Iran's strategic deterrence posture, but also sent a subtle message to Washington: The facility's access tunnel floor was emblazoned with an Israeli flag, but as opposed to previous footage of similar installations, the American flag as not positioned adjacent to the Israeli flag. Both illustrated old problems Iran will be wrestling with in the new year: attempting to reach a negotiatied solution to the crisis over Iran's nuclear program, negotiating from a position of strength, potentially sacrificing proxies for the sake of retaining the strategic core of the nuclear program.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran prepares for negotiations with the administration of President Donald J. Trump, the Islamic Republic finds itself in urgent need of expendable bargaining assets to safeguard the strategic core of its nuclear program. Yemen's Houthis, a key force aligned with Iran's regional ambitions, present an ideal sacrificial piece: First, Tehran escalates Houthi aggression against U.S. interests, using the Yemeni proxy as a tool to apply pressure and shape the regional security landscape. Then, at the negotiating table, Tehran offers de-escalation—promising to rein in the Houthis or even sever ties— in exchange for preserving the core of its nuclear program. Washington, on the other hand, targets Houthi positions to bereave the regime of its bargaining chip, coercing Tehran into offering strategic concessions during negotiations.

Iran faces escalating environmental and infrastructural crises, exposing governance deficiencies. Tehran's seismic vulnerability is critical, with accumulated tectonic stress indicating a high-probability magnitude 7+ earthquake. Rapid urbanization and inadequate disaster preparedness put millions at risk. Simultaneously, Iran's energy crisis worsens as demand outpaces supply. Dr. Hashem Oraee highlights policy mismanagement, with heavy subsidies fueling excessive consumption. Prioritizing residential energy over industrial needs has led to economic stagnation, inflation, and public sector shutdowns. Iran's water crisis compounds these challenges. Over-extraction, reduced precipitation, and groundwater depletion have pushed the country into hydrological emergency, leading to land subsidence. With 90% of water allocated to agriculture, shortages threaten national stability.

On the same day that former Emirati Foreign Minister Anwar Mohammed Gargash visited Tehran, purportedly to deliver an official communique from President Donald J. Trump to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei categorically dismissed the prospect of diplomatic negotiations with the United States.

On March 7, during an interview with Fox Business, President Donald J. Trump asserted that he had dispatched a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stating: "I hope you're going to negotiate because it's going to be a lot better for Iran... If we have to go in militarily, it's going to be a terrible thing for them... The other alternative is we have to do something, because you can't let them have a nuclear weapon." Later that day, while addressing the press from the Oval Office, the president reaffirmed: "We're down to final strokes with Iran,... We can't let them have a nuclear weapon." The president's latest declarations have elicited divergent reactions from the Islamic Republic, reflecting both internal factionalism within the ruling elite regarding strategic engagement with the United States and a lack of bureaucratic cohesion.