Professor Gendler begins with brief introductory remarks about the course’s methodology, explaining the approach that was taken to reading and presenting various articles. She continues with a discussion of Cass Sunstein’s work on social norms, looking particularly at his account of the willingness to pay/willingness to accept distinction. The lecture continues with a consideration of how this distinction-–and the heuristic reasoning that gives rise to it–-might be used to explain our responses to the trolley problem. In the final segment of the lecture, Professor Gendler offers a way of thinking systematically about relations among the political philosophical views of Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls and Robert Nozick.
After introducing Plato's Republic, Professor Gendler turns to the discussion of Glaucon's challenge in Book II. Glaucon challenges Socrates to defend his claim that acting justly (morally) is valuable in itself, not merely as a means to some other end (in this case, the reputation one gets from seeming just). To bolster the opposing position--that acting justly is only valuable as a means to attaining a good reputation--Glaucon sketches the thought experiment of the Ring of Gyges. In the second half of the lecture, Professor Gendler discusses the experimental results of Daniel Batson, which suggest that, at least in certain controlled laboratory settings, people appear to care more about seeming moral than about actually acting fairly. These experimental results appear to support Glaucon's hypothesis in the Ring of Gyges thought experiment.
Professor Gendler explains the interdisciplinary nature of the course: work from philosophy, psychology, behavioral economics, and literature will be brought to bear on the topic of human nature. The three main topics of the course are introduced--happiness and flourishing, morality, and political philosophy--and examples of some of the course’s future topics are discussed. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Professor Gendler explores some aspects of the question of what sorts of non-rational persuasion are legitimate for a government to engage in. She begins with two modern examples that illustrate Plato’s view on state censorship. She next turns to the text itself and outlines in detail Plato’s argument that since we are vulnerable to non-rational persuasion, and since a powerful source of such persuasion is imitative poetry, such poetry must be censored by the state. Drawing on a number of earlier themes from the course, she then discusses several implications of the fact our limited ability to rationally regulate our non-rational responses to representations makes fiction both potentially powerful, and potentially dangerous. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
In this concluding lecture, Professor Gendler charts four paths through the course. The first path traces how the course’s three main goals were realized: the goals of introducing students to the discipline of Philosophy though a number of central texts; of considering certain central questions raised by those philosophical texts in light of alternative approaches from related disciplines; and of considering more generally the how various disciplines might provide complementary perspectives on important questions. The second path traces how students’ understanding of the main course topics-–happiness and flourishing; morality; and political legitimacy and social structures--might have changed over the course of the semester. The third path traces the course’s main topics in light of three themes that unify the material-–the multi-part soul; luck and control; and the relation between the individual and society. And the fourth path looks at the course in light of three three central quotations, from Plato, Aristotle and Epictetus. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Professor Gendler begins by recapping the topic of state legitimacy and then offers a way of understanding the disagreement between Rawls and Nozick as one over what states ought to do given the phenomena of moral luck. She then turns to a discussion of how social and cultural structures influence both our characters and our perception of the world. She begins by discussing ways in which this theme plays a role in the work of Aristotle and John Stuart Mill. She then discusses recent empirical work on this question, including a body of anthropological and psychological literature that suggests that individuals raised in societies that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic have highly atypical responses in a wide range of cases. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is presented as a counterpoint to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. In contrast to Rawls, who puts justice at the center of his theory, Nozick maintains that the primary notion should be rights or liberties. With that assumption in place, Nozick argues that a minimal state is the only just state, and that any state more extensive violates fundamental liberties. Professor Gendler proceeds to introduce and discuss the central elements of the seventh chapter of Anarchy, State, and Utopia: the notions of justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and the Lockean Proviso. The lecture concludes with an examination of Nozick’s well-known Wilt Chamberlain argument, by which he attempts to justify his claim that state-sponsored economic redistribution is unjust. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
The discussion of Kant from last lecture continues with a statement and explication of his first formulation of the categorical imperative: act only in such a way that you can will your maxim to be a universal law. Professor Gendler shows how Kant uses the categorical imperative to argue for particular moral duties, such as the obligation to keep promises. In the second part of the lecture, Philippa Foot’s Trolley Problem is introduced, which poses the problem of reconciling two powerful conflicting moral intuitions. A critique of Foot’s solution to the problem is explored, and the lecture ends with Judith Jarvis Thomson’s proposed alternative. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
The discussion of the legitimacy of government is continued with an introduction to a major 20th century work of political philosophy, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Professor Gendler explores John Rawls’ central claims: that “justice is the first virtue of social institutions,” and that the just society is that which rational and self-interested individuals would choose for themselves from behind a “veil of ignorance” (that is, not knowing what role in society they would occupy). The lecture concludes with an exploration of two substantive principles of justice which Rawls derives from his framework: the equal liberty principle, and the difference principle. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Two game theoretical problems--the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Problem of the Commons--are explored in detail. Both collective decision-making scenarios are structured such that all parties making rational choices ensures a less desired outcome for each than if each had chosen individually-less-preferred options. To conclude, Professor Gendler discusses various strategies that can be used to address both problems. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
In the opening part of the lecture, Professor Gendler concludes her discussion of punishment by exploring how Alan Kazdin’s research on effective parenting provides insights about techniques for rehabilitating individuals who violate societal norms. She then moves to the third large unit of the course: the question of the legitimacy and structure of the state. One answer to the question of state legitimacy--that of Thomas Hobbes--is presented. Hobbes argues that life without a government, in a “state of nature,” would be “nasty, poor, solitary, brutish, and short” as a result of violent competition for resources. To avoid this situation, Hobbes contends that rational individuals should lay down some of their rights in order to receive the benefits of a centralized state, to the extent that others are also willing to do so. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
The lecture begins with a consideration of the traditional consequentialist account of punishment–-that punishment is justified by its deterrent effect on future crimes. Traditional criticisms of the view are presented, and John Rawls’ two-level justification for punishment is offered as one possible way to avoid such criticisms by bringing together consequentialist and deontological justifications of punishment in a single theory. Next, Professor Gendler reviews some empirical research on punishment intuitions, including data on moral outrage and the “Knobe effect”. The lecture concludes with a brief discussion of how moral luck interacts with intuitions about punishment. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Professor Gendler begins with a discussion of differing responses to hypothetical and actual examples, and offers an actual example of a Trolley Problem. Then, the central topic of the lecture, punishment, is presented. After offering a characterization of what civil punishment involves, Professor Gendler discusses various justifications that have been offered of the practice. She distinguishes between justifications that are forward-looking and those that are backward-looking, and between justifications that are primarily victim-directed and those that are primarily offender-directed. These outlooks are then connected to the moral views that have been presented in earlier lectures: Utilitarianism and deontology. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
In the first part of the lecture, Professor Gendler finishes up the discussion of non-standard responses to the Trolley Problem by presenting Cass Sunstein’s proposed resolution. This is followed by a general discussion of heuristics and biases in the context of risk regulation. In the remainder of the lecture, she introduces two additional puzzles: the puzzle of ducking vs. shielding (which is due to Christopher Boorse and Roy Sorensen) and the puzzle of moral luck. Whereas the ducking/shielding puzzle seems amenable to a heuristic-style solution, the puzzle of moral luck appears to be more profound. The fact that an action can seem more or less morally blameworthy depending on consequences which were entirely outside of the agent’s control seems to resist a solution in terms of heuristics, and instead leads to deeper problems of free will and moral responsibility. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
The Trolley Problem, as discussed in the last lecture, is the problem of reconciling an apparent inconsistency in our moral intuitions: that while it is permissible to turn the runaway trolley to a track thus killing one to save five, it is impermissible to push a fat man onto the trolley track, killing him to save the five. In this lecture, Professor Gendler reviews several “non-classic” responses to this problem, each of which aims to bring the two cases, and hence our apparently conflicting judgments about them, together. The three responses considered differ not only in their conclusions, but also in their methodologies, illustrating how different techniques might be brought to bear on philosophical puzzles. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Professor Gendler opens with a final criticism of Utilitarianism from Bernard Williams: in some cases, a good person should feel reluctant to do an act which brings about the greatest happiness, even if it is the right thing to do. The second half of the lecture introduces Kant’s deontological moral theory. In contrast to consequentialism, deontology holds that it’s not the outcome of actions that matter for their moral valence, but rather the will of the agent performing such actions. The outlines of Kant’s deontological theory are presented, to be continued in the next lecture. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Professor Gendler begins with a general introduction to moral theories–what are they and what questions do they answer? Three different moral theories are briefly sketched: virtue theories, deontological theories, and consequentialist theories. Professor Gendler introduces at greater length a particular form of consequentialism—utilitarianism—put forward by John Stuart Mill. A dilemma is posed which appears to challenge Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle: is it morally right for many to live happily at the cost of one person’s suffering? This dilemma is illustrated via a short story by Ursula Le Guin, and parallels are drawn between the story and various contemporary scenarios. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
We become virtuous by acting as if we are virtuous. This central insight of Aristotle is explored in this lecture. Professor Gendler begins by explaining how Aristotle’s method can allow us to turn normative laws - which describe how we should act – into descriptive laws – which describe how we do act. But what practical strategies are available to help us turn our reflective behavior (acting as if virtuous) into automatic behavior (being virtuous)? To address this question, Professor Gendler explores a number of surprising parallels between Pavlovian conditioning of animals, successful parenting strategies, and techniques for acquiring virtue by habit. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Professor Gendler begins with a review of the situationist critique of virtue ethics,which claims that character plays only a minimal role in determining behavior. She then presents some countervailing evidence suggesting that certain personality traits appear to be quite stable over time, including work by Walter Mischel showing a strong correlation between an early capacity to delay gratification and subsequent academic and social success. Delayed gratification remains the topic of discussion as Professor Gendler shifts to Aristotle’s account of weakness of will and contemporary behavioral economics work on hyperbolic discounting. In the final segment of the lecture, drawing on work by Aristotle, Walter Mischel, George Ainslie and Robert Nozick, she presents several strategies for self-regulation: preventing yourself from acting on the temptation, manipulating incentive structures, and acting on principles. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.
Although we become virtuous by acting as the virtuous person does, a close reading of Aristotle’s text shows that, on his account, it is not enough to be virtuous that we act in certain ways. What’s needed, according to Aristotle, is that you knowingly act virtuously for its own sake from a stable character, and do so with pleasure. Professor Gendler turns to Julia Annas’s suggestion that Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s idea of flow may be helpful in characterizing the condition that you take pleasure in the virtuous act. Finally, a critique of virtue ethics from John Doris and situationist psychology is raised which offers experimental evidence that casts doubt on the existence of stable character traits. Complete course materials are available at the Open Yale Courses website: http://oyc.yale.edu This course was recorded in Spring 2011.