SCOTUS Aloud

22-888 RUDISILL v. McDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRSQUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Barrett, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined.QP - 00:21Opinion of the Court - 1:03Concurrence by Kavanaugh, J. - 32:55Dissent by Thomas, J. - 39:58For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-913 DEVILLIER V. TEXASQUESTION PRESENTED: In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized. The question presented is: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.QP - 00:21Opinion of the Court - 1:15For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-1074 SHEETZ V. COUNTY OF EL DORADO, CAQUESTION PRESENTED: George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz-bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 37 4, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan. A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents. The question presented is whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined.QP - 00:23Opinion of the Court - 1:59Concurrence by Sotomayor, J. - 17:20Concurrence by Gorsuch, J. - 18:33Concurrence by Kavanaugh, J. - 22:05For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-1165 MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE, V. MOAB PARTNERS, L.P.QUESTION PRESENTED: Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly.Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading. Against this backdrop, this case presents the following question: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits- that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement.Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.QP - 00:23Opinion of the Court - 01:35For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

23-51 BISSONNETTE V. LePAGE BAKERIES PARK ST.QUESTION PRESENTED: The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry." The question presented is: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.QP - 00:21Opinion of the Court - 01:04

22-1178 FBI V. FIKREQUESTION PRESENTED: Individuals are sometimes removed from the No Fly List during ongoing litigation about their placement on that list. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that an individual's removal from the No Fly List moots a case when the government represents that the individual will not be placed back on the list based on currently available information. In conflict with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that respondent's claims were not moot even though he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he "will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information." The question presented is whether respondent's claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kavanaugh, J., joined.QP - 00:22Opinion of the Court - 1:10Concurrence by Alito, J. - 15:50For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-666 WILKINSON V. GARLANDQUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero-Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020). The question presented is whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined.QP - 00:17Opinion of the Court - 1:42Concurrence by Jackson, J. - 26:10Dissent by Roberts, C.J. - 28:45Dissent by Alito, J. - 29:10For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-324 O'CONNOR-RATCLIFF V. GARNIERQUESTION PRESENTED: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or dutyIt is a per curiam opinion.QP - 00:24Opinion of the Court - 00:44For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-611 LINDKE v. FREEDQUESTION PRESENTED: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." App. 5a. The question presented is: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.Barrett, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.QP - 00:22Opinion of the Court - 1:02For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-340 PULSIFER v. UNITED STATESQUESTION PRESENTED: The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., joined.QP - 00:24Opinion of the Court - 00:57Dissent by Gorsuch, J. - 14:47For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

23-719 TRUMP V. ANDERSONQUESTION PRESENTED: The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review. The question presented is: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?There is a per curiam opinion for a unanimous Court. Barrett, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ. concurred in the judgment.QP - 00:22Per Curiam Opinion - 01:15Concurrence by Barrett, J. - 22:20Concurrence by Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ. - 23:21For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-721 MCELRATH V. GEORGIAQUESTION PRESENTED: The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges. Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?Jackson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., fled a concurring opinion.QP - 00:24Opinion of the Court - 00:57Concurrence by Alito, J. - 14:47For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-500 GREAT LAKES INSURANCE SE V. RAIDERS RETREAT REALTY CO., LLCQUESTION PRESENTED: The questions presented are: 1. Under federal admiralty law, what is the standard for judging the enforcement of a choice of law clause in a maritime contract? 2. Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced?Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion.QP - 00:27Opinion of the Court - 00:50Concurrence by Thomas, J. - 18:58For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-846 DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE V. KIRTZQUESTION PRESENTED: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.QP - 00:23Opinion of the Court - 0:42For comments or suggestions, please email scotusloud@gmail.com.

22-660 MURRAY V. UBS SECURITIES, LLCQUESTION PRESENTED: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). The Question Presented is: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Barrett, J., joined.QP - 00:23Opinion of the Court - 01:49Concurrence by Alito, J. - 23:17

22-429 ACHESON HOTELS, LLC V. LAUFER QUESTION PRESENTED: Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., and Jackson, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.QP - 00:21Opinion of the Court - 00:56Concurrence by Thomas, J. - 05:20Concurrence by Jackson, J. - 19:52

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