States of Play with Sam Olsen

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comShow SummaryRussia is grinding forward in Ukraine, drones now dominate the battlefield, and Western support is faltering. In this episode of States of Play, Sam Olsen speaks with Alexander Lord of Sibylline to unpack where the war stands, how Moscow is leveraging foreign backing from Iran, North Korea and China, and why peace remains elusive despite Trump’s shifting promises.

Show SummaryIn this new episode of States of Play, a repeat of What China Wants, Sam Olsen is joined by Michelin-starred chef and cultural observer Andrew Wong, head chef of London’s acclaimed restaurant A. Wong. Together, they explore how Chinese food is far more than flavour—it is a reflection of history, community, and identity.Andrew shares his journey from growing up in London and Hong Kong to travelling across China, learning from local chefs and traditions that continue to inspire his cooking today. The discussion touches on how Chinese cuisine in the UK and Europe has evolved into its own style, why authenticity is always fluid, and how the act of sharing food is at the heart of Chinese dining culture.From his reimagined Shanghai dumplings to his thoughts on what his last meal on earth would be, Andrew reveals the depth, creativity, and philosophy behind Chinese cuisine.This conversation is about more than food—it’s about culture, memory, and the ties that connect East and West around the dinner table.Andrew's restaurant: https://www.awong.co.uk This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

Show SummaryIn this episode of States of Play (originally recorded for What China Wants), Sam Olsen and Stewart Paterson speak with Stanford economist Scott Rozelle about the stark divide between urban and rural China. Rozelle, author of Invisible China, explains how most working-age adults in rural areas never finished high school, leaving a huge share of the population undereducated and excluded from urban welfare systems—an obstacle with profound consequences for China’s future. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comShow SummaryIn this conversation, Sam Dunning from UK-China Transparency discusses their new report on the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on academic freedom in the UK. He shares insights from a survey conducted among China studies academics, revealing concerns about CCP interference and the financial dependencies of UK universities on Chinese funding. The discussion also touches on issues of deception in academic collaborations, military research, and the need for greater transparency and due diligence in research partnerships. Ultimately, the conversation emphasises the importance of fostering open dialogue and understanding in UK-China academic relations.Here is the report: https://ukctransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Cold-Crisis-Academic-freedom-and-interference-in-China-studies-in-the-UK.pdf

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comShow SummaryIn this episode of States of Play, Sam Olsen interviews political scientist Joseph Torigian about his groundbreaking book on Xi Zhongxun, father of Xi Jinping. Together they explore the history of China under the Chinese Communist Party through the life of Xi Zhongxun, revealing the man as a pragmatic survivor shaped by factional struggles and shifting loyalties. The conversation explores how Xi’s legacy influences China’s current leadership - and what it tells us about power, memory, and authoritarian resilience in modern China.Here is Joseph's book: https://www.sup.org/books/history/partys-interests-come-first

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comShow SummaryIn this episode of States of Play, Sam Olsen is joined by Guy Ward-Jackson of the Tony Blair Institute to explore the critical challenge of scaling tech startups into global champions. As the world enters a new era of techno-nationalism—where national power is increasingly tied to technological prowess—the UK’s ability to grow and retain homegrown firms like DeepMind and Arm becomes central to its geopolitical and economic future. Guy shares insights from the TBI’s report From Startup to Scale Up, identifying systemic weaknesses in capital mobilisation, university spinouts, and policy coordination. Together, they unpack why scaling matters for national prosperity, strategic autonomy, and global influence.Here is the TBI paper: https://institute.global/insights/tech-and-digitalisation/from-startup-to-scaleup-turning-uk-innovation-into-prosperity-and-power

Show SummaryIn this conversation, Sam Olsen and Chinese economy expert Stewart Paterson delve into the complexities of China's economy, its global reach, and the implications for Western nations.They discuss the scale of China's economy, its manufacturing dominance, and how the Belt and Road Initiative serves as a tool for expanding China's political influence. The conversation also touches on the sustainability of China's economic model, the leverage it holds over Western countries, and the future of Western primacy in a changing global landscape.Stewart's profile: https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/profiles/experts-contributors/stewart-paterson/ This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comShow SummaryIn this episode, Sam Olsen discusses the urgent question of whether the US tech is prepared for a war with China, focusing on the rapid advancements in military technology and the implications of artificial intelligence on warfare.Joined by Lieutenant General Mike Groen, they explore the current state of the US military, the role of human capital, the transformative impact of AI, and the ethical considerations surrounding autonomous warfare. The conversation emphasizes the need for agile military innovation and the importance of global cooperation in establishing ethical standards for AI in warfare.Lt Gen Groen's profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-s-groen/

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comShow SummaryIn today's States of Play podcast, Sam Olsen talks to one of the UK's leading Russia experts, Keir Giles, discusses Putin's strategic vision for Russia, which he describes as a desire to return to a world reminiscent of 1914, where Russia was a dominant empire.He explains the dual aims of Russian aggression: to rebuild the empire while simultaneously undermining the Western-led international order. The conversation also touches on the historical misconceptions about Russia's motivations, the role of NATO, and the defence strategies of Eastern European countries.Keir emphasises the need for a cohesive Western response to the Russian threat and discusses the implications of Russia's alliances with countries like China and Iran. The conversation concludes with reflections on Putin's health, succession, and the future of Russia's geopolitical ambitions.Keir’s book, Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent is available here.

This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit samolsen.substack.comSummaryIn this episode of States of Play, Sam Olsen discusses the complexities of the UK-China economic relationship with Charlie Parton, a former British diplomat and one of the UK's leading China experts. They explore the misconceptions surrounding China's importance to the UK economy, the ideological and geopolitical implications of China's rise, and the potential threats posed by China's technological advancements. The conversation emphasises the need for the UK and Europe to reassess their strategies in dealing with China, balancing economic interests with national security concerns.Read more of Charlie's work here https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/author/charles-parton/

SummaryIn this episode of States of Play, Sam Olsen explores the changing dynamics of the global order, particularly focusing on the impact of Donald Trump's presidency and the rise of China. He discusses the historical context of the world order, the principles established by the treaties of Westphalia, and how American values have shaped international relations. The conversation also delves into China's ambitions to create its own world order and the challenges facing the current US-led system.Chapters00:00 Introduction to States of Play00:59 The Trump Effect on the World Order02:49 Understanding World Order05:18 Historical Context of the World Order10:54 The Evolution of American Influence15:58 The Rise of China and Its Ambitions20:15 China's Global Initiatives23:30 Challenges to the Current World Order25:25 Looking Ahead: The Future of the World Order Get full access to States of Play by Sam Olsen at samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

Hello and welcome back to What China Wants. In today’s episode we talk to the author of Realtime Mandarin, Andrew Methven, on how Christmas is celebrated in China. Get full access to States of Play by Sam Olsen at samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

Hello and welcome back to What China Wants.Today Stewart and Sam are talking about Beijing’s international media reach with Josh Kurlantzick from the Council on Foreign Relations. Get full access to States of Play by Sam Olsen at samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

Hello and welcome back to What China Wants.Today we are talking China politics to coincide with the start of Xi Jinping’s third term in office. To do so we are rejoined by Professor Jinghan Zeng of Lancaster University, an expert on the politics of Beijing. Get full access to States of Play by Sam Olsen at samolsen.substack.com/subscribe

Hello and welcome back to What China Wants.Today we return to one of our audience’s favourite topics, the economy of China. Sam interviews Stewart on the latest figures and what this means for the rest of the world.Here are some highlights of our discussion:* Economic figures for the last year show that China’s state sector outperformed the private sector. The problem is that the private sector is much more efficient than the state, and so as the former struggles it will impact negatively on the wider economy.* We will likely see solid growth return soon. A key driver of domestic growth in China post-Covid is likely to be domestic tourism.* But China’s investment to GDP ration has been running very high for many years, leaving China with a capital stock that is much higher than other countries. This is the same situation that Japan found itself in before its 1990s economic bust.* In the long term there is a question as to what role foreign capital plays in China. For instance, by default the parts of the economy that Beijing wants to drive forward are important to the state, and so foreign capital may not be wanted there.* The trouble is, no country can offer what China can when it comes to its manufacturing scale, so not many countries can eat China’s lunch there.* China’s economy is likely to be less commodity intensive moving forward, and so this may be bad news for countries like Australia.* Decoupling between China and the West continues.* Because of the headwinds facing it, there is a good chance that the Chinese economy won’t be that much bigger in ten years than it is now.You can also listen to the podcast on Apple, Amazon, or Spotify.As always please do share, comment, and subscribe. We’ll be back soon with more What China Wants.Many thanks for listening.***Here is the transcript:Sam Olsen: Hello, and welcome back to What China Wants with me, Sam Olsen. Today I am going to be interviewing not a guest, but my co-host, Stewart Paterson, on the state of China's economy. Now, obviously, a lot of people listening to this podcast have a stake in what China's economy is doing around the world and they might have exposure to the Chinese economy directly itself. But one of the things that everyone has in common is that no one really knows what is going on, other than perhaps Stewart.Stewart, we are going to be talking today about its state and about how things have gone right or wrong for it in the last year or so and what you expect moving forward. But could you just sum up in one sentence, is the Chinese economy doing well or doing badly at this present second?Stewart Paterson: Oh, well, I am an economist so I cannot give you a one word answer, Sam. It is doing very badly relative to what people are used to out of China. But clearly, the relaxation of the COVID restrictions are giving China a fillip at the moment. So, let me just put that in a little bit of context for you. In 2022, the year that just finished, according to the official data, China's GDP grew by 3%, which sounds pretty good in comparison to our own growth rates. But for context, with the exception of 2020 - the big Covid down year as it were, in which according to official numbers, China's economy grew by a little over 2%, although, obviously, that is highly questionable - the 3% growth in 2022 would be the worst year of economic growth in China since 1976. So, it does actually represent a very poor performance for China. There are reasons for that, obviously, with the lockdown, but it is an indication I think of where the new normal will be.What is quite interesting, I think, is if you drill into the numbers for last year, because there are a couple of trends that are apparent. The rural economy did better than the urban economy. So, household consumption amongst the rural population was significantly stronger than amongst the urban population, where actually consumption expenditure and urban population in real terms actually shrank a little bit. The other issue is state versus private, and there is quite a stark dichotomy there. For example, if you looked at fixed asset investment, that made by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) grew by 10%, whereas the private sector grew by just 1%. Those are nominal numbers, so private sector fixed asset investment in real terms probably shrank.There is a slight dichotomy there between foreign and domestic as well. So, the foreign shrank by 5%, whereas domestic-funded fixed asset investment grew 5%. What we have been saying for a long time - and I think most people would agree with us - is that the most efficient use of investment expenditure has, broadly-speaking, been the private sector in China. And although the gap has narrowed between foreign and domestic, the foreign investment is also a sort of productivity-enhancing element to that fixed asset investment. Both those areas are in retreat and that is a big cause for concern going forward.SO: Stewart, that is interesting that you say about the private sector shrinking. Well, we have known for the last few years that the private sector has been attacked by the government, whether it is the property sector, or technology. We also know that the private sector has been a massive generator of jobs and productivity for many years now. So, my question to you is, if we continue to see a political attack on parts of the of the domestic private sector, doesn't that mean that we are looking at a brake on growth over the next few years, even with the fillip provided by the freeing up of the economy?SP: I think the short answer is yes, it does. So, the fundamental problem that China faces with its economic model is excess investment, and malinvestment, low-yielding investment. China's investment to GDP ratio has been running at extremely high levels, in excess of 40% of GDP now for many, many years. That, over time, builds up a capital stock that is much larger than other countries in proportion to its GDP. This excess investment has been far greater than we saw in Japan, for example, in the run up to its sort of economic bust in the late 1980s, early 1990s.The incremental capital output ratio - the amount of GDP growth that you get for a unit of investment - has been declining very sharply in China, reflecting the inefficiency of that investment. If what we are seeing in China is actually an increase in the proportion of investment that is inefficient, and a shrinkage in the small amount of investment that has actually been driving growth, then that is very bad news indeed, because the incremental capital output ratio will continue to deteriorate, leading to less efficiency. In our report that we put out for the Evenstar Institute a couple of years ago, it was entitled "China's bloated capital stock and the lost decade", what we were arguing there was that China's economy would struggle to grow at all, if they did not address the inefficiency of investment. What this data seems to suggest is that they are not addressing that inefficiency of investment. In fact, it is getting worse.SO: Okay, so where are the bright spots for the Chinese economy moving forward? If you were sitting there as a foreign investor into China, what sectors would you be most excited about?SP: Well, I think there is a difference to be drawn here between the short-term, by which I mean the next couple of years, and the longer-term outlook. If we start with the obvious sectors that were impacted heavily by the COVID restrictions, domestic tourism fell from about a RMB 7 trillion business and then fell about 80% as a result of Covid. Obviously, when you come off such a low base, you get very spectacular growth numbers coming through. The addition of RMB 3 trillion to RMB 4 trillion to GDP from that sector recovering over the next couple of years will provide a fillip to the Chinese economy that means that it might well be able to beat the 3% growth of last year, this year and the year after potentially. That is the sort of main short-term driver of better growth, although obviously that is contingent upon the parts of the economy that performed last year not deteriorating substantially. We can talk about that but there are question marks over some of it.Longer-term, looking forward, I think the jury is still out as to what role foreign capital actually has to play in China. Remember, China has plenty of excess savings of its own, and at the moment, the politics behind foreign involvement in the economy seem to be decidedly unfavourable. So, looking at it from an investor's point of view, you have to consider the jurisdictional risks that you're going to be taking there. Obviously, the parts of the economy that the Party-State are trying to drive forward, are almost by definition, very sensitive to the Party-State, and therefore foreign participation in them is either limited or tightly scrutinised, and potentially not even welcome. And so that puts foreign investors in a big conundrum; they do not have good visibility as to what kind of operating environment they will be facing over the medium-term in China.SO: Stewart, so in terms of foreign investors into China, that is all very well, but what about foreign investors outside of China reliant on the Chinese economy, for example, commodity producers in Australia? How do you think that they are going to fare in the next few years with the Chinese economy, in terms of what the Chinese economy needs from the rest of the world?SP: Well, I think Sam, in that particular case, there are two very strong headwinds. The first is that China's economy is going to become less commodity intensive, as we move forward, and the mix of commodities that it uses, are going to change very dramatically, as steel production goes into decline, for example, but electric vehicles rise. And so, that is going to lead to a sort of geographical shift, and the shift in who benefits from that commodity importation. The second thing is that under dual circulation strategy, lo