Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Case v. Montana Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2025. Petitioner: William Trevor Case.Respondent: State of Montana. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2021, Trevor Case’s ex-girlfriend J.H. called police to report that Case had threatened suicide during their phone conversation. J.H. believed Case was intoxicated due to his erratic behavior, and she became alarmed when he mentioned getting “a note or something like that” before committing suicide. During the call, J.H. heard clicking sounds resembling a cocking pistol, prompting her to tell Case she would call police. Case responded by threatening to harm any officers who came to his home. The call ended when J.H. heard a “pop” that she believed was a gunshot, followed by dead air, though the line remained connected. Unable to get Case to respond, J.H. contacted police and drove to his residence. Law enforcement officers arrived at Case’s home and attempted to make contact by knocking on doors and calling through an open window, but received no response. Through the windows, officers observed empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad they believed contained a suicide note. The officers knew of Case’s history of alcohol abuse, mental health issues, and previous suicide threats, including an incident where he brought a weapon to the school where he taught. After approximately forty minutes on scene, officers made the decision to enter the home without a warrant to conduct a welfare check. They entered with weapons drawn due to J.H.’s report of Case's threats against officers. While clearing the home, Sergeant Pasha encountered Case in an upstairs bedroom closet. When Case suddenly opened the closet curtain, Pasha observed what he believed was a dark object at Case’s waist and shot him in the abdomen. A handgun was subsequently found in a laundry hamper next to where Case fell. Case was charged with Assault on a Peace Officer and filed pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Following a jury trial in December 2022, Case was convicted of the felony charge. Case appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, which affirmed. Question May law enforcement enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring?

Louisiana v. Callais (Reargument) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2025. Appellant: Louisiana.Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections.   Question Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?  

Ellingburg v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2025. Petitioner: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) John F. Bash (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In December 1995, Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robbed a bank and was indicted in April 1996. He was convicted in August 1996 and sentenced to prison, along with an order to pay over $7,500 in restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). Following his release from prison in June 2022, having paid only about one-quarter of the original restitution amount, Mr. Ellingburg filed a motion arguing that enforcement of his restitution order was unlawful. He claimed that the applicable 20-year payment period under the VWPA had expired and that applying a longer restitution term and mandatory interest provision under the later-enacted Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court rejected Mr. Ellingburg’s arguments and upheld the restitution order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question Is criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Bowe v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2025. Petitioner: Michael Bowe.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Kasdin M. Mitchell (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below as to Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2008, Michael Bowe was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and received a 288-month sentence, which included a mandatory consecutive 120-month term for the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Starting in 2016, Bowe made multiple attempts to challenge his § 924(c) conviction through a series of motions and applications, arguing that changes in Supreme Court precedent (particularly Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis) meant that his underlying crimes no longer qualified as “crimes of violence” that could support the firearm conviction. The district court initially denied Bowe’s first § 2255 motion in 2016, finding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery still qualified as a crime of violence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then denied several subsequent applications from Bowe to file additional challenges, ultimately concluding in that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his latest application because he was attempting to raise the same claim he had already presented in previous applications.     Question 1. Does a rule requiring dismissal of repeat claims in state prisoner habeas petitions also apply to repeat claims in federal prisoner motions to vacate their sentences? 2. Does the Court have jurisdiction to review lower court decisions allowing or denying federal prisoners permission to file repeat challenges to their sentences?    

United States Postal Service v. Konan Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: United States Postal Service.Respondent: Lebene Konan. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lebene Konan, a Black property owner, leased two rental residences in Euless, Texas, and retrieved business and tenant mail from a central mailbox daily. In May 2020, United States Postal Service (USPS) employee Jason Rojas changed the lock on the mailbox at one of Konan's properties without her approval, halted mail delivery, and demanded ownership verification. Even after USPS’s Inspector General confirmed Konan’s ownership, Rojas and another USPS employee, Raymond Drake, allegedly continued marking mail addressed to Konan and her tenants as undeliverable. Konan claims this refusal of service extended to her second property and was racially motivated, causing loss of rental income and disruption of essential communications. Konan sued USPS, Rojas, Drake, and the United States, raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and alleging violations of the equal protection guarantees of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985. The district court dismissed her FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the postal-matter exception, and her equal protection claims for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claims but reversed on the FTCA claim, holding that sovereign immunity did not bar claims based on intentional acts of mail non-delivery. Question Does a claim that Postal Service employees intentionally refused to deliver mail to a designated address arise out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of postal matter under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal-matter exception?

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: Michael J. Bost.Respondent: Illinois State Board of Elections. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Michael Talent (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Jane E. Notz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Bost, a multi-term U.S. Representative from Illinois’s 12th District, along with Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney, political activists who served as presidential electors in 2020, challenged Illinois’s mail-in ballot receipt procedure. Under Illinois law, election officials can receive and count mail-in ballots for up to fourteen days after Election Day if the ballots are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs argued this procedure violates federal election statutes by impermissibly extending Election Day beyond the federally mandated date. They claimed the counting of these “untimely” ballots dilutes their votes and forces them to expend additional campaign resources to monitor ballot counting for two weeks after Election Day. Plaintiffs filed suit in May 2022 against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its Executive Director. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court also rejected their claims on the merits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Question Do federal candidates have Article III standing to challenge state laws that allow mail-in ballots to be received and counted for two weeks after Election Day based on claims that such laws dilute their votes and force them to incur additional campaign expenses for extended ballot monitoring?

Chiles v. Salazar Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Kaley Chiles.Respondent: Patty Salazar. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioner) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Shannon W. Stevenson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor practicing in Colorado Springs. She holds a master's degree in clinical mental health and provides talk therapy, specializing in clients dealing with addiction, trauma, sexuality, gender dysphoria, and other mental health concerns. Chiles identifies as a Christian and serves clients who often seek religiously informed care that aligns with traditional biblical understandings of sexuality and gender. Prior to the enactment of a 2019 Colorado law banning conversion therapy for minors, Chiles counseled clients, including minors, in accordance with their self-identified goals, which sometimes included diminishing same-sex attractions or aligning gender identity with biological sex. Since the law’s passage, Chiles has refrained from engaging in discussions with minors that she believes could be interpreted as conversion therapy and alleges that this has hampered her ability to provide full counseling services in line with her and her clients’ religious convictions. In September 2022, Chiles brought a pre-enforcement lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colorado officials responsible for enforcing the statute. She alleged that the ban on conversion therapy for minors violates her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Seeking a preliminary injunction, she asked the district court to block enforcement of the law against her. The court denied the motion but found she had standing to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that Colorado’s law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and survived rational basis review. Question Does a Colorado law banning “conversion therapy”—i.e., attempts to “convert” someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity—violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Barrett v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Dwayne Barrett.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Matthew B. Larsen (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent, in support of the Petitioner) Charles L. McCloud (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between August 2011 and January 2012, Dwayne Barrett and several co-conspirators carried out a string of armed robberies in New York, often using guns, knives, and threats of violence. On December 12, 2011, Barrett and two associates followed a minivan carrying the proceeds from a sale of untaxed cigarettes. While Barrett waited in the car, his accomplices held two men at gunpoint and stole the vehicle, which also contained $10,000 and a third victim, Gamar Dafalla. As he tried to discard some of the money during the getaway, Dafalla was fatally shot by one of the robbers. Later that day, Barrett took part in another robbery, threatening a victim’s life. He also helped dispose of the murder weapon and clean their vehicle with latex gloves and cleaning fluid to eliminate evidence. Barrett was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery (one involving Dafalla’s murder), and separate firearms offenses, including a murder charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He was convicted in 2014 and originally sentenced to 90 years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated one firearms conviction under the Supreme Court’s then-new decision in United States v. Davis. Barrett was resentenced to 50 years in 2021. After further appellate proceedings, the Second Circuit affirmed most of his convictions and sentence but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Lora v. United States, which held that § 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing under § 924(c). Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment permit two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)?

Berk v. Choy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: Harold R. Berk.Respondent: Wilson C. Choy. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Frederick R. Yarger (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Harold R. Berk injured his ankle and allegedly received negligent medical care from three healthcare providers: Dr. Wilson C. Choy, Beebe Medical Center, Inc., and Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Middletown, LLC. Believing he suffered harm due to their malpractice, Berk filed a lawsuit against them under Delaware law. Like many states, Delaware requires plaintiffs in medical negligence cases to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM)—a statement from a qualified expert certifying that the lawsuit has a reasonable basis—either with the complaint or within a short time after filing. Berk failed to submit an AOM with his complaint and did not request an extension before the deadline passed. Because the Delaware statute treats the AOM requirement as mandatory, the district court dismissed his case. Berk appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the Delaware AOM statute is substantive and therefore must be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity. Question Must a Delaware law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity?

Villarreal v. Texas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: David Asa Villarreal.Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Stuart Banner (for the Petitioner) Andrew N. Warthen (for the Respondent) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Asa Villarreal was charged with murder in Bexar County, Texas. During his trial, Villarreal took the stand in his own defense shortly before a planned midday recess. Because Villarreal was still in the middle of his direct examination when the court adjourned for an overnight recess, the trial judge instructed his attorneys not to confer with him regarding his ongoing testimony but permitted them to discuss other trial-related matters. Villarreal’s lead counsel objected to this limitation under the Sixth Amendment but otherwise indicated understanding of the court's directive. The next day, Villarreal resumed his testimony, and no further objections about the limitation were raised. Villarreal was ultimately convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison. Following his conviction, Villarreal appealed, arguing that the trial court’s restriction violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A divided appeals court affirmed his conviction, and Villarreal petitioned for discretionary review, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge’s limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Question Does a trial court violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing the defendant and his lawyer from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight break in the trial?

Trump v. CASA Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 15, 2025. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: CASA, Inc., et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the State and City Respondents) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org)   Question  

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 30, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.Respondent: Gentner Drummond, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioners in No. 24-394) Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner in No. 24-396) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gentner Drummond, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, filed an action against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members seeking to invalidate their contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School. St. Isidore, supported by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, aims to operate as a Catholic virtual charter school. In creating this contract, the Charter School Board recognized religious rights and entitlements for St. Isidore, which deviated from the standard expectation that charter schools remain nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. On June 5 and October 9, 2023, the Charter School Board approvingly voted for St. Isidore's application and contract, both by a 3-2 margin. The contract omitted standard provisions prohibiting religious affiliation while affirming St. Isidore’s religious mission, which the State contends violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Consequently, the State requested a writ of mandamus to rescind the contract, arguing that the use of public funds for a sectarian institution contravenes legal and constitutional prohibitions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted belated relief to the State, holding that the contract violated state and federal law, including constitutional provisions prohibiting government establishment of religion. Question 1. Are a privately owned and operated school’s educational decisions considered state action simply because the school has a contract with the state to provide free education to students?  2. Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibit, or the Establishment Clause require, a state to exclude religious schools from its charter-school program?

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Luke Davis.Respondent: Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Julian Vargas, who is blind, encountered inaccessible check-in kiosks at LabCorp facilities. Vargas attempted to use these kiosks but was unable due to their lack of accessibility for visually impaired individuals. As a result, he had to wait for assistance from a staff member, which delayed his check-in and denied him equal access to services such as maintaining his spot in the queue or updating personal information privately. Vargas claimed that this lack of accessibility infringed on his rights under disability laws, leading to the lawsuit. The district court certified two classes: a California class for Unruh Civil Rights Act claims and a nationwide class for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act. LabCorp appealed the class certification, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question May a federal court certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury?

Martin v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Curtrina Martin.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the Petitioners) Frederick Liu (for the Respondents) Christopher E. Mills (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below on Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, six FBI agents, led by Special Agent Lawrence Guerra, mistakenly executed a no-knock search warrant at the home of Curtrina Martin and her family in Atlanta, Georgia. The intended target was a nearby home suspected to contain violent gang member Joseph Riley. Due to similarities between the two properties and issues with navigating to the correct address, the agents entered Martin’s home instead. The SWAT team, in full tactical gear, entered the house, causing fear and distress to its occupants. They later realized the mistake and promptly left the scene, later apologizing and assuring the family that the FBI would handle any damages. Martin and her family sued the U.S. government and the agents, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Georgia state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and that the Federal Tort Claims Act claims were barred by the Supremacy Clause and the discretionary function exception. Question 1. Does the Supremacy Clause prevent individuals from suing the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act when federal employees’ actions, even if negligent or wrongful, are related to carrying out federal policy and can be interpreted as following federal laws? 2. Is the discretionary-function exception, which usually protects the government from being sued for certain decisions made by its employees, always inapplicable when dealing with claims related to law enforcement officers’ actions that fall under the intentional torts category?

Soto v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: Simon A. Soto.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tacy F. Flint (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran with a combat-related disability, was medically retired in 2006 with less than 20 years of service. Although he became eligible for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in 2009 when he received his disability rating, he did not apply until 2016. The Navy used the Barring Act’s six-year limitation period to calculate his retroactive payments, giving him payments dating back only to 2010 instead of to 2008 when Congress had expanded CRSC eligibility to veterans with less than 20 years of service. Soto filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated veterans who received only six years of back payments, arguing that the CRSC statute’s own procedures should apply instead of the Barring Act’s six-year limit. The district court granted summary judgment to Soto’s class, holding that the CRSC statute was more specific and therefore superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation, resolving any doubt in favor of the veterans. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. Question When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279 Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: A.J.T.Respondent: Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A.J.T., a student with epilepsy, experiences seizures so severe in the morning that she cannot attend school until noon. Her parents repeatedly requested evening instruction from Osseo Area Schools to give her a school day length more comparable to her peers. Despite the District providing some accommodations, including one-on-one instruction, a slightly extended school day, and summer home instruction sessions, they denied the requests for evening instruction. The District’s Director of Student Services, responsible for Section 504 compliance, was unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that District policies allowed at-home schooling as an accommodation. A.J.T., through her parents, sued the District for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?

Diamond Alternative Energy LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2025. Petitioner: Diamond Alternative Energy LLC.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Federal Respondents) Joshua A. Klein (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, California applied for a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement its Advanced Clean Car Program, which included two key components: a Low Emission Vehicle Program to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 34% for new cars in Model Years 2017-2025, and a Zero Emission Vehicle Program requiring about 15% of manufacturers’ fleets to be electric cars by 2025. The EPA granted this waiver in 2013, and automobile manufacturers began investing to meet these requirements. However, in 2019, under a different administration, the EPA withdrew the 2013 waiver, arguing that state greenhouse gas regulations were preempted by federal fuel economy standards, that California’s standards weren’t necessary to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” and that California could not show a direct connection between greenhouse gas emissions and its air pollution problems. After this withdrawal, several automakers like Honda, Ford, and BMW voluntarily agreed to continue meeting California’s standards due to their existing investments and growing consumer demand for electric vehicles. In 2022, under yet another administration, the EPA reversed course again and reinstated the 2013 waiver, prompting challenges from various states and fuel industry groups who argued that California should not receive special treatment and that climate change is not a “compelling and extraordinary condition” justifying state-specific standards. California, environmental organizations, and automobile manufacturers intervened to defend the EPA’s decision. The D.C. Circuit dismissed most of the claims for lack of standing, finding that challengers had not shown that their injuries were redressable by a favorable decision. Question May a party establish the redressability component of Article III standing by pointing to the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties?

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2025. Petitioner: Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Respondent: Jennifer Zuch. Advocates: Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010 and 2011, while still married, Jennifer Zuch and Patrick Gennardo made two estimated tax payments totaling $50,000 for their 2010 taxes, without specifying how to allocate the payments between them. In September 2012, after filing separate tax returns, Gennardo reported owing $385,393 while Zuch reported an overpayment. The IRS applied the entire $50,000 in estimated payments to Gennardo’s liability. When Zuch later filed an amended return reporting additional income and claiming her share of the $50,000, the IRS assessed the additional tax but did not credit her for any portion of the estimated payments, even after Gennardo filed his own amended return indicating the payments should be allocated to Zuch. In August 2013, the IRS notified Zuch of its intent to levy her property to collect approximately $36,000 in unpaid 2010 taxes. During the ensuing Collection Due Process hearing, Zuch challenged her underlying tax liability, arguing she was entitled to credit for the estimated payments. Meanwhile, over several years while Zuch was disputing her 2010 liability, the IRS repeatedly took her tax refunds from other years and applied them to what it calculated as her 2010 liability, eventually reducing the balance to zero by April 2019. The case went through the Tax Court, which initially denied summary judgment and remanded to the IRS Office of Appeals. When the balance was reduced to zero through the IRS’s seizure of Zuch's later tax refunds, the Tax Court dismissed the case as moot. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the IRS cannot eliminate Tax Court jurisdiction over a disputed tax liability simply by seizing a taxpayer’s refunds to cover the contested debt. Question Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes become moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding?

Mahmoud v. Taylor Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2025. Petitioner: Tamer Mahmoud.Respondent: Thomas W. Taylor. Advocates: Eric S. Baxter (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Alan E. Schoenfeld (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2022, Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland approved LGBTQ-inclusive books for its English Language Arts curriculum. These “Storybooks” featured characters and themes related to sexual orientation and gender identity, including books like “Pride Puppy!” for pre-K students and “Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope” for K-5 students. Initially, the school board allowed parents to receive notice and opt their children out of lessons involving these books, in line with the district’s guidelines for religious accommodations. However, in March 2023, the Board abruptly reversed this policy, eliminating all notice and opt-out options without explanation, though they later cited concerns about high student absenteeism, classroom disruption, administrative burden, and potential stigmatization of individuals represented in the books. Several parents of different religious backgrounds (Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Ukrainian Orthodox) sued the Board, arguing that the denial of notice and opt-out options violated their religious freedom and parental rights. The parents did not seek to ban the books or challenge their adoption into the curriculum; rather, they sought to maintain control over how and when their children would be exposed to content they believed conflicted with their religious duties to train their children according to their faiths on matters of gender, marriage, and sexuality. The district court denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the parents failed to demonstrate a cognizable burden to their religious freedom, and the parents filed an interlocutory appeal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. Question Do public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?

Parrish v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2025. Petitioner: Donte Parrish.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Amanda Rice (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) While serving a 15-year federal prison sentence in 2017, Donte Parrish sued the United States for $5 million, claiming prison officials unlawfully held him in administrative segregation for three years. After the district court dismissed his case in March 2020, Parrish did not receive notice of the dismissal until June 2020 due to his transfer to state custody. He promptly filed a notice of appeal, which the appeals court treated as a request to reopen his appeal time. The district court granted this request in January 2021, giving him 14 days to file a new appeal, but Parrish missed this deadline and instead sent a supplemental brief to the appeals court a few days late. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Question Must a party who files a notice of appeal during the period between when their original appeal deadline expired and when the court reopens their time to appeal file a second notice after the reopening is granted?