Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Trump v. CASA Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 15, 2025. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: CASA, Inc., et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the State and City Respondents) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org)   Question  

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 30, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.Respondent: Gentner Drummond, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioners in No. 24-394) Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner in No. 24-396) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gentner Drummond, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, filed an action against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members seeking to invalidate their contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School. St. Isidore, supported by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, aims to operate as a Catholic virtual charter school. In creating this contract, the Charter School Board recognized religious rights and entitlements for St. Isidore, which deviated from the standard expectation that charter schools remain nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. On June 5 and October 9, 2023, the Charter School Board approvingly voted for St. Isidore's application and contract, both by a 3-2 margin. The contract omitted standard provisions prohibiting religious affiliation while affirming St. Isidore’s religious mission, which the State contends violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Consequently, the State requested a writ of mandamus to rescind the contract, arguing that the use of public funds for a sectarian institution contravenes legal and constitutional prohibitions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted belated relief to the State, holding that the contract violated state and federal law, including constitutional provisions prohibiting government establishment of religion. Question 1. Are a privately owned and operated school’s educational decisions considered state action simply because the school has a contract with the state to provide free education to students?  2. Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibit, or the Establishment Clause require, a state to exclude religious schools from its charter-school program?

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Luke Davis.Respondent: Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Julian Vargas, who is blind, encountered inaccessible check-in kiosks at LabCorp facilities. Vargas attempted to use these kiosks but was unable due to their lack of accessibility for visually impaired individuals. As a result, he had to wait for assistance from a staff member, which delayed his check-in and denied him equal access to services such as maintaining his spot in the queue or updating personal information privately. Vargas claimed that this lack of accessibility infringed on his rights under disability laws, leading to the lawsuit. The district court certified two classes: a California class for Unruh Civil Rights Act claims and a nationwide class for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act. LabCorp appealed the class certification, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question May a federal court certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury?

Martin v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Curtrina Martin.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the Petitioners) Frederick Liu (for the Respondents) Christopher E. Mills (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below on Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, six FBI agents, led by Special Agent Lawrence Guerra, mistakenly executed a no-knock search warrant at the home of Curtrina Martin and her family in Atlanta, Georgia. The intended target was a nearby home suspected to contain violent gang member Joseph Riley. Due to similarities between the two properties and issues with navigating to the correct address, the agents entered Martin’s home instead. The SWAT team, in full tactical gear, entered the house, causing fear and distress to its occupants. They later realized the mistake and promptly left the scene, later apologizing and assuring the family that the FBI would handle any damages. Martin and her family sued the U.S. government and the agents, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Georgia state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and that the Federal Tort Claims Act claims were barred by the Supremacy Clause and the discretionary function exception. Question 1. Does the Supremacy Clause prevent individuals from suing the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act when federal employees’ actions, even if negligent or wrongful, are related to carrying out federal policy and can be interpreted as following federal laws? 2. Is the discretionary-function exception, which usually protects the government from being sued for certain decisions made by its employees, always inapplicable when dealing with claims related to law enforcement officers’ actions that fall under the intentional torts category?

Soto v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: Simon A. Soto.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tacy F. Flint (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran with a combat-related disability, was medically retired in 2006 with less than 20 years of service. Although he became eligible for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in 2009 when he received his disability rating, he did not apply until 2016. The Navy used the Barring Act’s six-year limitation period to calculate his retroactive payments, giving him payments dating back only to 2010 instead of to 2008 when Congress had expanded CRSC eligibility to veterans with less than 20 years of service. Soto filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated veterans who received only six years of back payments, arguing that the CRSC statute’s own procedures should apply instead of the Barring Act’s six-year limit. The district court granted summary judgment to Soto’s class, holding that the CRSC statute was more specific and therefore superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation, resolving any doubt in favor of the veterans. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. Question When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279 Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: A.J.T.Respondent: Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A.J.T., a student with epilepsy, experiences seizures so severe in the morning that she cannot attend school until noon. Her parents repeatedly requested evening instruction from Osseo Area Schools to give her a school day length more comparable to her peers. Despite the District providing some accommodations, including one-on-one instruction, a slightly extended school day, and summer home instruction sessions, they denied the requests for evening instruction. The District’s Director of Student Services, responsible for Section 504 compliance, was unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that District policies allowed at-home schooling as an accommodation. A.J.T., through her parents, sued the District for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?

Diamond Alternative Energy LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2025. Petitioner: Diamond Alternative Energy LLC.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Federal Respondents) Joshua A. Klein (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, California applied for a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement its Advanced Clean Car Program, which included two key components: a Low Emission Vehicle Program to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 34% for new cars in Model Years 2017-2025, and a Zero Emission Vehicle Program requiring about 15% of manufacturers’ fleets to be electric cars by 2025. The EPA granted this waiver in 2013, and automobile manufacturers began investing to meet these requirements. However, in 2019, under a different administration, the EPA withdrew the 2013 waiver, arguing that state greenhouse gas regulations were preempted by federal fuel economy standards, that California’s standards weren’t necessary to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” and that California could not show a direct connection between greenhouse gas emissions and its air pollution problems. After this withdrawal, several automakers like Honda, Ford, and BMW voluntarily agreed to continue meeting California’s standards due to their existing investments and growing consumer demand for electric vehicles. In 2022, under yet another administration, the EPA reversed course again and reinstated the 2013 waiver, prompting challenges from various states and fuel industry groups who argued that California should not receive special treatment and that climate change is not a “compelling and extraordinary condition” justifying state-specific standards. California, environmental organizations, and automobile manufacturers intervened to defend the EPA’s decision. The D.C. Circuit dismissed most of the claims for lack of standing, finding that challengers had not shown that their injuries were redressable by a favorable decision. Question May a party establish the redressability component of Article III standing by pointing to the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties?

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2025. Petitioner: Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Respondent: Jennifer Zuch. Advocates: Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010 and 2011, while still married, Jennifer Zuch and Patrick Gennardo made two estimated tax payments totaling $50,000 for their 2010 taxes, without specifying how to allocate the payments between them. In September 2012, after filing separate tax returns, Gennardo reported owing $385,393 while Zuch reported an overpayment. The IRS applied the entire $50,000 in estimated payments to Gennardo’s liability. When Zuch later filed an amended return reporting additional income and claiming her share of the $50,000, the IRS assessed the additional tax but did not credit her for any portion of the estimated payments, even after Gennardo filed his own amended return indicating the payments should be allocated to Zuch. In August 2013, the IRS notified Zuch of its intent to levy her property to collect approximately $36,000 in unpaid 2010 taxes. During the ensuing Collection Due Process hearing, Zuch challenged her underlying tax liability, arguing she was entitled to credit for the estimated payments. Meanwhile, over several years while Zuch was disputing her 2010 liability, the IRS repeatedly took her tax refunds from other years and applied them to what it calculated as her 2010 liability, eventually reducing the balance to zero by April 2019. The case went through the Tax Court, which initially denied summary judgment and remanded to the IRS Office of Appeals. When the balance was reduced to zero through the IRS’s seizure of Zuch's later tax refunds, the Tax Court dismissed the case as moot. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the IRS cannot eliminate Tax Court jurisdiction over a disputed tax liability simply by seizing a taxpayer’s refunds to cover the contested debt. Question Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes become moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding?

Mahmoud v. Taylor Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2025. Petitioner: Tamer Mahmoud.Respondent: Thomas W. Taylor. Advocates: Eric S. Baxter (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Alan E. Schoenfeld (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2022, Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland approved LGBTQ-inclusive books for its English Language Arts curriculum. These “Storybooks” featured characters and themes related to sexual orientation and gender identity, including books like “Pride Puppy!” for pre-K students and “Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope” for K-5 students. Initially, the school board allowed parents to receive notice and opt their children out of lessons involving these books, in line with the district’s guidelines for religious accommodations. However, in March 2023, the Board abruptly reversed this policy, eliminating all notice and opt-out options without explanation, though they later cited concerns about high student absenteeism, classroom disruption, administrative burden, and potential stigmatization of individuals represented in the books. Several parents of different religious backgrounds (Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Ukrainian Orthodox) sued the Board, arguing that the denial of notice and opt-out options violated their religious freedom and parental rights. The parents did not seek to ban the books or challenge their adoption into the curriculum; rather, they sought to maintain control over how and when their children would be exposed to content they believed conflicted with their religious duties to train their children according to their faiths on matters of gender, marriage, and sexuality. The district court denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the parents failed to demonstrate a cognizable burden to their religious freedom, and the parents filed an interlocutory appeal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. Question Do public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?

Parrish v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2025. Petitioner: Donte Parrish.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Amanda Rice (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) While serving a 15-year federal prison sentence in 2017, Donte Parrish sued the United States for $5 million, claiming prison officials unlawfully held him in administrative segregation for three years. After the district court dismissed his case in March 2020, Parrish did not receive notice of the dismissal until June 2020 due to his transfer to state custody. He promptly filed a notice of appeal, which the appeals court treated as a request to reopen his appeal time. The district court granted this request in January 2021, giving him 14 days to file a new appeal, but Parrish missed this deadline and instead sent a supplemental brief to the appeals court a few days late. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Question Must a party who files a notice of appeal during the period between when their original appeal deadline expired and when the court reopens their time to appeal file a second notice after the reopening is granted?

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2025. Petitioner: Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Secretary of Health and Human Services.Respondent: Braidwood Management, Inc. Advocates: Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires private insurers to cover certain preventive-care services without cost sharing. Rather than defining these services directly, the ACA empowers three agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services to determine required services: the United States Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). The Task Force consists of sixteen volunteer experts serving four-year terms, ACIP has fifteen members selected by the HHS Secretary, and HRSA operates through offices and bureaus reporting to the HHS Secretary. Over the years, these agencies issued various preventive care recommendations, including ACIP’s 2007 recommendation for HPV vaccines, HRSA’s 2011 guidelines for contraceptive coverage, and the Task Force’s 2019 recommendation for HIV prevention drugs (PrEP). Four individuals and two Christian-based businesses in Texas challenged these requirements, arguing that mandatory coverage of these services violated their religious beliefs by making them “complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.” The plaintiffs filed suit in 2020 against the federal government and various department secretaries, primarily arguing that the structure of these agencies violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled in their favor regarding the Task Force but rejected their challenges to ACIP and HRSA, and both parties appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Task Force’s structure violated the Appointments Clause and upheld the injunction against enforcing its recommendations, but reversed the district court’s universal remedies and remanded for further consideration of whether HHS properly ratified ACIP and HRSA’s recommendations. Question Does the structure of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force violate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, and if so, is the provision that insulates the task force from the Health & Human Services secretary’s supervision severable from the rest of the statute?

Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 2, 2025. Petitioner: Eunice Medina, Interim Director, South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services.Respondent: Planned Parenthood South Atlantic. Advocates: John J. Bursch (for the Petitioner) Kyle D. Hawkins (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Medicaid, established in 1965, is a cooperative federal-state program that provides medical assistance to needy individuals. The program offers federal funding to states that agree to comply with certain conditions, including the “free-choice-of-provider” provision added in 1967, which ensures Medicaid beneficiaries can obtain medical assistance from any qualified provider. States must submit their medical assistance plans to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval, and the Secretary can withhold funds if states fail to comply with federal requirements. In South Carolina, Planned Parenthood South Atlantic operates two health centers providing various medical services, including contraception, cancer screenings, and STI treatment. Julie Edwards, a Medicaid beneficiary, received care at Planned Parenthood and planned to continue her gynecological care there. However, in July 2018, South Carolina’s Governor issued an executive order directing the Department of Health and Human Services to terminate abortion clinics from the Medicaid program. As a result, DHHS informed Planned Parenthood that it was no longer qualified to provide services to Medicaid beneficiaries and terminated its enrollment agreements immediately. Planned Parenthood and Edwards then sued the Director of DHHS in federal court, seeking to block enforcement of the executive order. The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction blocking South Carolina from terminating Planned Parenthood’s Medicaid enrollment, and after multiple appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and one previous remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit again held that Medicaid beneficiaries can sue to enforce their right to choose their provider. Question Does the Medicaid Act’s “any qualified provider” provision unambiguously confer a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider?

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 1, 2025. Petitioner: Miriam Fuld.Respondent: Palestine Liberation Organization. Advocates: Kent A. Yalowitz (for the Petitioners in No. 24-20) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioner in No. 24-151) Mitchell R. Berger (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A group of United States citizens who were injured in terror attacks in Israel, along with the estates and survivors of U.S. citizens killed in such attacks, filed a lawsuit in 2004 against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PLO, founded in 1964, conducts Palestine’s foreign affairs and serves as a Permanent Observer to the United Nations, while the PA was established under the 1993 Oslo Accords to serve as the interim governing body for parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act for the defendants’ alleged involvement in these attacks. At trial, a jury found the defendants liable for six terror attacks and awarded $218.5 million in damages (automatically trebled to $655.5 million under the Anti-Terrorism Act), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this judgment in 2016, finding that U.S. courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the PLO and PA. In 2019, Congress enacted the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. This law deemed the PLO and PA to have consented to personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts if they engaged in certain conduct after the law’s enactment: either making payments to families of deceased terrorists or designees of imprisoned terrorists who harmed U.S. nationals, or conducting various activities within the United States (with some exceptions for UN-related activities). After the district court found that the defendants had made qualifying payments following the Act’s enactment, the Second Circuit ultimately concluded that this consent provision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Question Does the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2025. Petitioner: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc.Respondent: Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission. Advocates: Eric C. Rassbach (for the Petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Colin T. Roth (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Catholic Charities Bureau (CCB) is the social ministry arm of the Diocese of Superior in Wisconsin, operating since 1917 to provide services to the poor and disadvantaged as an expression of the Catholic Church's social ministry. The organization is controlled by the bishop of the Diocese, who serves as CCB’s president and appoints its membership. CCB’s mission is to provide service to people in need and advocate for justice, with a philosophy rooted in being “an effective sign of the charity of Christ.” The organization makes no distinctions based on race, sex, or religion in its services, employment, or board appointments. Under CCB’s umbrella are four sub-entities involved in this case: Barron County Developmental Services, Black River Industries, Diversified Services, and Headwaters. These entities provide various social services, including job placement and coaching for people with disabilities, community-based training, daily living services, and support programs. While CCB oversees these sub-entities and provides management services, the sub-entities themselves are primarily funded through government contracts and do not receive direct funding from the Diocese. Neither employees nor service recipients are required to be of any particular religious faith, and the programs do not provide religious training or attempt to promote the Catholic faith. CCB and its sub-entities sought an exemption from state unemployment insurance contributions in 2016, but the Department of Workforce Development denied the exemption. An administrative law judge reversed that decision, but then the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) reversed again, finding the organizations were not operated primarily for religious purposes. Then, the circuit court sided with CCB, and then the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated LIRC’s decision. Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the organizations did not qualify for the religious purposes exemption under state law. Question Does a state violate the First Amendment’s religion clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state’s criteria for religious behavior?

Rivers v. Guerrero Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2025. Petitioner: Danny Richard Rivers.Respondent: Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division. Advocates: Peter A. Bruland (for the Petitioner) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, Danny Rivers was convicted in Texas state court of multiple charges related to sexual abuse of a child and possession of child pornography. He filed his first federal habeas petition in August 2017 challenging these convictions, which was denied by the district court in September 2018. While his appeal of that denial was pending, Rivers filed a second habeas petition in February 2021 raising new claims after obtaining his attorney-client file through a state bar grievance in October 2019. The district court deemed this second petition “successive” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and transferred it to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for authorization, but Rivers failed to file the required motion for authorization. After the Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial of his first petition in May 2022, Rivers appealed the transfer order of his second petition, arguing that it should have been treated as a motion to amend his first petition rather than as a successive petition since his first petition was still pending when he filed the second one. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rivers’s second-in-time petition for lack of jurisdiction. Question Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) apply to all second habeas petitions, or only specific types of second petitions?

Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2025. Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.Respondent: Consumers' Research, et al. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioners in No. 24-354) Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners in No. 24-422) R. Trent McCotter (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established in 1934 to regulate interstate communications and ensure widespread access to telecommunications services. To further this mission, Congress in 1996 instructed the FCC to establish and maintain a universal service fund, requiring telecommunications carriers to contribute quarterly based on their revenues. The FCC partners with the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), a private entity, to manage this process—USAC calculates projected demand and contribution factors using FCC formulas, submits these proposals to the FCC for approval, and then uses the approved figures to determine individual contribution amounts. Consumers’ Research challenged the constitutionality of the 1996 Telecommunications Act’s universal service requirements and the FCC’s implementation of those requirements. Their primary arguments were twofold: first, that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the FCC through the universal service provisions, and second, that the FCC improperly delegated its authority to a private entity (USAC) to manage the universal service fund. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied the petition, finding no constitutional violations in either delegation. The Court determined that Congress provided sufficient guidance (an “intelligible principle”) to the FCC in the statute, and that the FCC maintained adequate control and oversight over USAC’s activities in managing the universal service fund, preventing any improper delegation of government authority to a private entity. Question Did Congress violate the Constitution in the way it delegated power to the FCC to collect Universal Service Fund money, and did the FCC violate the Constitution by letting a private, industry-controlled company make those collection decisions?

Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma, et al.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Advocates: Mithun Mansinghani (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1067) Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1068) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) strengthened its national air quality standards for ozone, requiring states to submit implementation plans that would prevent their emissions from significantly impacting other states’ air quality. In February 2023, the EPA issued a final rule disapproving the plans submitted by 21 states, including Oklahoma and Utah, after evaluating them using a four-step framework designed to address interstate pollution. Oklahoma and Utah, along with various industry groups, challenged the EPA’s disapproval of their plans in their respective regional circuit courts. The EPA responded by moving to transfer these cases to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing that because the disapprovals were published together in a single Federal Register notice and used a consistent analytical approach, they must be reviewed by the D.C. Circuit rather than regional courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the EPA that the challenged rule is nationally applicable, so it granted the EPA’s motions to transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit. Question Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have exclusive jurisdiction to review an Environmental Protection Agency action that affects only one state or region, simply because the EPA published that action alongside actions affecting other states in a single Federal Register notice?

Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2025. Petitioner: Environmental Protection Agency.Respondent: Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for Respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (for Respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress amended the Clean Air Act to establish the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which requires refiners and importers of transportation fuel to blend increasing amounts of renewable fuels into their products each year. To comply, these companies must either blend renewable fuels themselves or purchase credits called Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) from other companies that do the blending. Recognizing that this might create hardship for small refineries (those processing less than 75,000 barrels of crude oil daily), Congress created three exemptions: an initial blanket exemption through 2011, extensions based on a Department of Energy study, and case-by-case exemptions that small refineries could petition for based on “disproportionate economic hardship.” In 2022, the EPA issued two decisions denying multiple small refinery exemption petitions. The April 2022 decision denied 36 petitions for the 2018 compliance year (including some that had previously been granted in 2019), and the June 2022 decision denied 69 petitions covering the years 2016 through 2021. These denials were based on EPA’s new interpretation that required hardship to be caused solely by RFS compliance costs and its “RIN passthrough” economic theory. The affected refineries challenged these denials as impermissibly retroactive, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the EPA’s adjudications, denied a change of venue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and remanded, based on its conclusion that the denial was (1) impermissibly retroactive; (2) contrary to law; and (3) counter to the record evidence. Question Should challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program be heard exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?

Louisiana v. Callais Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2025. Appellant: Louisiana.Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al. Advocates: J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Appellant in No. 24-109) Stuart C. Naifeh (for the Appellants in No. 24-110) Edward D. Greim (for the Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections. Question Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

Riley v. Bondi Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2025. Petitioner: Pierre Yassue Nashun Riley.Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General. Advocates: Keith Bradley (for the Petitioner) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Stephen J. Hammer (court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Riley entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1995. In 2006, he was indicted and later convicted of marijuana distribution and firearm charges, receiving a 25-year sentence. After being granted compassionate release in January 2021, immigration authorities took him into custody and ordered his removal due to his aggravated felony conviction. Though Riley expressed fear of returning to Jamaica, leading to various proceedings regarding potential persecution and torture claims, he ultimately was only eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While an immigration judge initially granted this relief, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the decision in May 2022 and ordered Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Riley petitioned for review, and his case was temporarily held pending the resolution of Martinez v. Garland. In Martinez, the U.S. Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an order denying CAT relief is not a final order of removal for purposes of § 1252(a)(1). Relying on Martinez, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Question 1. Is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited?  2. Can a person obtain review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision?