Supreme Court Oral Arguments

NVIDIA Corporation v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 13, 2024. Petitioner: NVIDIA Corporation.Respondent: E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioners) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) NVIDIA, a major producer of graphics processing units (GPUs), experienced a surge in demand for its gaming GPUs due to cryptocurrency mining, particularly for Ethereum, during 2017-2018. This mirrored a previous crypto-driven boom and bust cycle experienced by NVIDIA’s rival, AMD. Despite introducing specialized crypto mining GPUs (Crypto SKUs) and reporting their sales separately, NVIDIA continued to see substantial crypto-related purchases of its gaming GPUs. However, the company’s executives, particularly CEO Jensen Huang and CFO Colette Kress, repeatedly downplayed the impact of crypto mining on their gaming segment revenues when questioned by analysts and investors. As cryptocurrency prices began to decline in 2018, NVIDIA’s GPU sales dropped. On August 16, 2018, the company lowered its revenue guidance, which was followed by a more significant miss in November. On November 15, 2018, NVIDIA disclosed that post-crypto channel inventory was taking longer than expected to sell through, with Huang referring to it as a “crypto hangover.” This revelation led to a sharp decline in NVIDIA's stock price, dropping 28.5% in two trading days. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that during the class period (May 10, 2017, to November 14, 2018), NVIDIA's executives knowingly or recklessly misled investors about the company's exposure to crypto volatility by understating the impact of crypto-related purchases on their gaming segment revenues. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that, during the Class Period, Huang made false or misleading statements and did so knowingly or recklessly. Question What is the proper pleading standard to show knowledge or intent for Private Securities Litigation Reform Act claims that rely on internal company documents?

Delligatti v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Salvatore Delligatti.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese Crime Family, was convicted of various charges, including attempted murder in aid of racketeering (under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)). Delligatti had organized a plot to murder Joseph Bonelli, a neighborhood bully who had been stealing from a local gas station owner and was suspected of cooperating against bookies associated with the Genovese Crime Family. Delligatti paid another man to coordinate the murder with gang members, providing them with a gun and a car. The murder attempts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the presence of potential witnesses and the arrest of the would-be murderers by law enforcement. On appeal, Delligatti argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses, including the attempted murder charge, were not “crimes of violence” under the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that attempted murder in aid of racketeering qualifies as a crime of violence, as it necessarily involves the attempted use of physical force, and therefore upheld Delligatti's firearms conviction. Question Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?

Velazquez v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Hugo Abisai Monsalvo Velazquez.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Gerard J. Cedrone (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Mr. Velázquez, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2005. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him and served a deficient Notice to Appear that lacked time and place details. In 2013, Velázquez admitted to unlawful entry and sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In March 2019, an Immigration Judge denied these requests but granted voluntary departure within 60 days. Velázquez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal in October 2021 and reinstated the 60-day voluntary departure period. On December 13, 2021, Velázquez filed a motion to reopen his case to apply for cancellation of removal, arguing he had accrued 10 years of continuous presence due to his deficient Notice to Appear. The BIA denied this motion, finding Velázquez had not asserted “new facts” and that the motion was untimely, filed after the 60-day voluntary departure period. Velázquez then filed a motion to reconsider, challenging only the timeliness determination, which the BIA also denied. Velázquez filed a petition for review in federal court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied review, concluding that Mr. Velázquez failed to voluntarily depart or file an administrative motion within 60 calendar days, the maximum period provided by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2). Question When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)?

Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2024. Petitioner: Facebook, Inc., et al.Respondent: Amalgamated Bank, et al. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondents) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Facebook, the world’s largest social media platform, faced scrutiny in 2018 when news broke that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, had improperly harvested personal data from millions of unwitting Facebook users. The data originated from a personality quiz integrated on Facebook by Aleksandr Kogan, who gained access to users’ data and their Facebook friends’ data without consent. Although only about 270,000 users took the quiz, Kogan harvested data from over 30 million users. Cambridge Analytica used this data to create personality profiles of American voters, which were allegedly used to benefit political campaigns, including Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Facebook learned of Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct in 2015 but failed to inform affected users. The company continued to investigate the data usage and negotiated a confidential settlement with Kogan in 2016. Despite assurances that the data had been deleted, Facebook discovered in 2016 that Cambridge Analytica was still using the data. The scandal became public in March 2018, leading to significant drops in Facebook's stock price. Shortly after, it was revealed that Facebook had been sharing user data with dozens of whitelisted third parties without express user consent, contradicting previous statements about data control and privacy. These revelations, along with subsequent privacy concerns and regulatory actions, led to further stock price declines and reduced revenue growth for Facebook. Shareholders filed a securities fraud action against Facebook and its executives, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act's implementing regulations. The district court dismissed the shareholders’ claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that under the heightened standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the shareholders adequately pleaded falsity as to some of the challenged risk statements. Question Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?

E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: E.M.D. Sales, Inc.Respondent: Faustino Sanchez Carrera. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lauren E. Bateman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) E.M.D. Sales Inc. (EMD) is a distributor of Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian food products to grocery stores in the Washington, D.C. area. Three of EMD’s sales representatives—Faustino Sanchez Carrera, Magdaleno Gervacio, and Jesus David Muro—sued EMD and its CEO, Elda Devarie, in 2017 for allegedly violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by denying them overtime wages. The plaintiffs claimed they worked about 60 hours per week, paid on commission without overtime compensation. The sales representatives were assigned routes of stores, spending most of their time servicing chain stores and some independent groceries. Their duties included restocking shelves, managing inventory, and submitting orders for EMD products. While they could make some sales to independent stores, their ability to make sales at chain stores was limited, as high-level negotiations between EMD management and corporate buyers typically determined product placement. EMD argued that the sales representatives were exempt from overtime pay under the FLSA’s “outside sales” exemption. The case went to a bench trial, where the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs’ primary duty was making sales, qualifying them for the exemption, or if their work was primarily incidental to sales made by others. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that EMD failed to prove the outside sales exemption applied, awarded both unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages, but limited the damages to a two-year period after concluding that EMD's violation was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence?

Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: Advocate Christ Medical Center, et al.Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (for the Petitioners) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves the calculation of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals under the “disproportionate share hospital” (DSH) adjustment, which provides additional compensation to hospitals serving a high percentage of low-income patients. The adjustment is based on two formulas: the Medicare fraction and the Medicaid fraction. The Medicare fraction, which is at the center of this dispute, represents the percentage of a hospital's Medicare patients who are also entitled to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Over 200 hospitals are challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) interpretation of who counts as “entitled to supplementary security income benefits” for the Medicare fraction calculation. HHS considers only patients who qualify for the monthly SSI cash payment during their hospital stay, while the hospitals argue that all patients enrolled in the SSI program should be included, even if they don't receive a payment that month. The hospitals also dispute HHS’s matching process and seek access to detailed SSI payment codes for their patients. After being denied relief by HHS’s internal review board and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the hospitals sought judicial review, but the district court granted summary judgment to HHS. The U.S. Circuit Court for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?

Wisconsin Bell, Inc. cv. United States, ex rel. Heath Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2024. Petitioner: Wisconsin Bell, Inc.Respondent: United States, ex rel. Todd Heath. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Tejinder Singh (for the Respondent) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1996, Congress created the E-rate program to help schools and libraries afford telecommunications services. The program provides federal subsidies on a sliding scale, and service providers must follow the “lowest-corresponding-price” rule, offering schools and libraries the lowest price charged to similarly situated non-residential customers. Wisconsin Bell, aware of this rule since its inception, provided services to hundreds of eligible schools and libraries under the E-rate program. Despite knowing about the rule, Wisconsin Bell did not train its sales representatives or implement compliance mechanisms until 2009. The company admitted to treating pricing contracts for schools and libraries the same as other customers, often instructing sales representatives to offer the highest prices possible. In 2009, following a settlement by its parent company with the Department of Justice and FCC, Wisconsin Bell developed a compliance plan. In 2008, Todd Heath filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Wisconsin Bell submitted false claims and certifications related to the E-rate program. After initial dismissal and subsequent appeal, the case proceeded to discovery, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Bell. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. Question Do reimbursement requests submitted to the Federal Communications Commission's E-rate program qualify as “claims” under the False Claims Act?

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: City and County of San Francisco, California.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Tara M. Steeley (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. During heavy rains, the system can exceed its capacity, resulting in combined sewer overflows (CSOs) that discharge pollutants into the Pacific Ocean. The Clean Water Act requires cities like San Francisco to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for such discharges. San Francisco has been implementing a CSO control plan since the late 1960s and completed construction of its current CSO control facilities in 1997. In 2019, the EPA and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a new NPDES permit for San Francisco's Oceanside treatment facility. San Francisco is challenging two provisions in this permit: (1) narrative prohibitions against violating water quality standards, and (2) a requirement that San Francisco update its long-term CSO control plan. San Francisco argues that these provisions are inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. The EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board denied San Francisco's administrative appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition for review, holding that the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to include in the Oceanside NPDES permit the challenged provisions, and that EPA's decision to do so was rationally connected to evidence in the administrative record. Question Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?

Bufkin v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joshua E. Bufkin.Respondent: Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton were each denied benefits despite evidence that appeared to be in “approximate balance.” The benefit-of-the-doubt rule, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” However, in reviewing the Veterans Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 7261(b)(1), which requires the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule “does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond” performing the usual review of the underlying factual findings for clear error—a basic procedural requirement that was already in place before enactment of the Veterans Benefits Act. Question Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1)?

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Amina Bouarfa.Respondent: Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security. Advocates: Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, submitted Form I-130 to petition for her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, to be classified as her immediate relative under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Secretary approved the petition in 2015 but later notified Bouarfa of an intent to revoke the approval, stating that Hamayel had entered into a previous marriage solely to evade immigration laws. Despite Bouarfa’s response, the Secretary revoked the approval, and Bouarfa’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was unsuccessful. Bouarfa sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the officials’ actions as arbitrary and capricious. The Secretary and Director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the revocation decision was unreviewable because it was a discretionary action. The district court granted the motion, concluding that while the action was based on nondiscretionary criteria, the action itself was discretionary and thus that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a visa petitioner obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria?

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Medical Marijuana, Inc.Respondent: Douglas J. Horn. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims. On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury. Question Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Glossip v. Oklahoma Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 9, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Eugene Glossip.Respondent: Oklahoma. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richard Glossip was sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese, the owner of the Oklahoma City motel where Glossip worked as a manager. Critical to Glossip’s conviction was testimony from Justin Sneed, a handyman at the hotel, who told jurors that Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Van Treese. After Glossip’s conviction, he received information that Sneed had testified falsely about his mental health and whether he had seen a psychiatrist. Glossip asked the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside his conviction, but the court rejected that request, and the state’s Pardon and Parole Board turned down Glossip’s request for clemency. All told, Glossip has spent 26 years behind bars, faced nine execution dates, and had multiple independent investigations that raised serious doubts about his conviction. Ahead of his execution date of May 18, 2023, Glossip asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution and consider whether Oklahoma violated Glossip’s constitutional rights when prosecutors suppressed evidence that their key witness was under a psychiatrist’s care; the Court granted his motion to stay and granted his petition, as well. Question May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?

Lackey v. Stinnie Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Gerald F. Lackey.Respondent: Damian Stinnie. Advocates: Erika L. Maley (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Brian D. Schmalzbach (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under the so-called “American Rule,” each litigant pays their own attorney’s fees, regardless of whether they win or lose. However, certain statutes permit the payment of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in litigation; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is one such statute, permitting the payment of attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in civil rights litigation. Several indigent Virginia residents challenged in federal court a state statute that required automatic suspension of the driver’s licenses of those who failed to pay certain court fines and fees. Finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the state to remove the plaintiffs’ suspensions. The state did not appeal the injunction, so the plaintiffs were able to drive again. Before the case could go to trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the statute. The plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under Section 1988, but the district court rejected that request, citing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit holding that a grant of a preliminary injunction does not render a plaintiff a “prevailing party.” The plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but, on rehearing, the en banc 4th Circuit reversed.   Question Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988?

Garland v. VanDerStok Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland.Respondent: Jennifer VanDerStok. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Peter A. Patterson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) ATF, created in 1972, is responsible for regulating firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). The GCA requires federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to conduct background checks, record firearm transfers, and serialize firearms when selling or transferring them. The GCA’s regulation of firearms is based on the definition of “firearm,” which includes the “frame or receiver.” However, ATF’s 1978 definition of “frame or receiver” became outdated due to changes in modern firearm design, such as the AR-15 and Glock pistols. Furthermore, the rise of privately made firearms (PMFs) or “ghost guns” posed challenges to law enforcement because they were not regulated under the GCA and did not require serialization. In response, ATF issued a Final Rule in 2022, updating the definitions of “frame,” “receiver,” and “firearm” to better capture modern firearm designs and regulate PMFs. The Final Rule took effect on August 24, 2022. The respondents in this case challenged the Final Rule’s redefinition of “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” arguing that it exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated the Final Rule in its entirety. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the two provisions exceeded ATF’s statutory authority. Question Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?

Williams v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Nancy Williams, et al.Respondent: Fitzgerald Washington, Alabama Secretary of Labor. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioners) Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dissatisfied with the Alabama Department of Labor’s handling of their unemployment benefits applications, 26 plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for injunctive relief against Secretary Fitzgerald Washington and the Department. The plaintiffs, each having filed applications for benefits, alleged various grievances against the Department’s processing methods. Subsequently, Secretary Washington and the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, which resulted in the omission of several initial claims and the exclusion of the Department as a defendant. The remaining allegations in the suit were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Secretary Washington of implementing policies and procedures that violated both the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including multiple permanent and preliminary injunctions to expedite the handling of unemployment compensation applications and improve communication clarity, as well as attorney fees. Secretary Washington again moved to dismiss the case, citing reasons such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, absence of a private cause of action, and the substantive meritlessness of the claims. The court granted the dismissal without stating the basis for it. The plaintiffs moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, but the court denied their motion. They then appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. Question Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?

Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc.Respondent: Anastasia Wullschleger. Advocates: Katherine B. Wellington (for the Petitioners) Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Anastasia Wullschleger filed a class-action complaint in Missouri state court against Royal Canin and Nestle Purina, alleging that their requirement for a prescription for specialized dog food was misleading and led to higher prices. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court, and then they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which determined that the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims raised substantial federal issues and belonged in federal court. Upon returning to the district court, Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove references to federal law, dropped the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims, and added a civil-conspiracy claim. Despite these changes, the district court exercised federal-question jurisdiction and ultimately granted the manufacturers’ motion to dismiss, leading to a second appeal. Reviewing the case de novo, the Eighth Circuit concluded that amending a complaint to eliminate the only federal questions destroys subject-matter jurisdiction and thus returned the case to state court. Question Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law?

Trump v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Former President Donald Trump was indicted in August 2023 on four counts arising from Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. Trump claimed that he cannot be prosecuted for his official acts as president and that a former president cannot be prosecuted unless he has first been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate. U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan initially set Trump’s trial for March 4, 2024, but later vacated this date pending resolution of Trump’s immunity claims. Judge Chutkan denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, and Smith asked the Supreme Court directly to expedite review and bypass a decision by the D.C. Circuit. The Court declined, deferring instead to the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. On February 6, the D.C. Circuit upheld Chutkan’s decision, and Trump requested a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to expedite the case. Question Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?

Moyle v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2024. Petitioner: Mike Moyle, et al.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Joshua N. Turner (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2022, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the Biden administration brought a legal challenge to a restrictive Idaho abortion law. The Biden administration argued that the state law, which criminalizes providing an abortion except in a few narrow circumstances, including to save the life of the mother, is preempted by a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires hospitals receiving Medicare funding to offer “necessary stabilizing treatment” to pregnant women in emergencies. The district court ruled in favor of the Biden administration and barred Idaho from enforcing its law to the extent that it conflicted with EMTALA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to stay the district court's ruling while the state appealed. Question Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?

Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Starbucks Corporation.Respondent: M. Kathleen McKinney. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In early January 2022, Nikki Taylor, a supervisor at a Memphis Starbucks, initiated union-organizing efforts, contacting Buffalo, New York, Starbucks employees and the Union for guidance. Conversations with colleagues about unionizing led to managerial scrutiny and disciplinary actions against Taylor for alleged insubordination and a dress code violation. Despite this, Taylor and coworkers held a meeting with Union representatives and drafted a letter to Starbucks's CEO announcing their intent to unionize. On January 18, following the public release of the unionization letter, the Memphis store was closed early by management under the pretext of understaffing, coinciding with a media event covering the unionization efforts. Subsequent investigations by Starbucks led to the February 8 firing of seven employees, including key organizing committee members, for policy violations during the media event. These terminations led to a reduced display of union support among the remaining staff and increased anxiety about unionizing in other Starbucks locations. However, the Memphis store voted to join the Union in June. The Union filed charges against Starbucks for unfair labor practices. Following an investigation, a district court ordered a temporary injunction, demanding the reinstatement of the terminated employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the NLRB satisfied its burden of showing “‘reasonable cause’ to believe that employers engaged in unfair labor practices and that an injunction protects the Board’s remedial power.” Question What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?

Department of State v. Munoz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Department of State, et al.Respondent: Sandra Munoz, et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Eric T. Lee (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, an El Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. They have a U.S. citizen child. Asencio-Cordero, who arrived in the U.S. in 2005 and has multiple tattoos, applied for an immigrant visa after Muñoz filed an approved immigrant-relative petition and waiver for his inadmissibility. In 2015, he returned to El Salvador for his visa interview, denying any gang affiliations. However, in December 2015, the U.S. Consulate denied his visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), suggesting his potential involvement in unlawful activities. Muñoz sought intervention from Congresswoman Judy Chu, but the State Department upheld the decision. A declaration from a gang expert, Humberto Guizar, stated that Asencio-Cordero’s tattoos were not gang-related. Despite this and further appeals, including to the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the decision remained unchanged, with authorities confirming the inadmissibility and indicating no grounds for appeal. Following the government’s denial of Asencio-Cordero’s immigrant visa application, the plaintiffs sought judicial review, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, invoking the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to prevent judicial scrutiny of the visa decision. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the government failed to provide the constitutionally required notice within a reasonable time after the visa application was denied. As a result, the appellate court determined that the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and vacated the district court's decision. Question Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?