Cunningham v. Cornell University Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Casey Cunningham.Respondent: Cornell University. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioners) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cornell University administered two retirement plans for its employees: the Retirement Plan and the TDA Plan. As of 2016, these defined-contribution plans had over 30,000 participants and nearly $3.4 billion in combined net assets. Cornell delegated administrative responsibilities to its Vice President for Human Resources and established the Retirement Plan Oversight Committee (RPOC) to oversee the plans. The plans offered approximately 300 investment options and incurred investment management and recordkeeping fees, with TIAA-CREF and Fidelity Investments serving as both investment providers and recordkeepers. Plaintiffs, representing a class of plan beneficiaries, sued Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries in federal district court, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including failure to adequately monitor the plans, resulting in the retention of underperforming investment options and excessive fees, as well as engaging in prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. § 1106. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims, and the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claim before the court entered final judgment. The plaintiffs challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment on two counts, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court. Question Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?
Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?
McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2025. Petitioner: McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc.Respondent: McKesson Corporation. Advocates: Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the Petitioner) Joseph R. Palmore (for the Respondents) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) True Health Chiropractic, Inc. and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. filed a class action lawsuit against McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited advertisements via fax. They claimed they neither invited nor gave permission to receive these faxes, and even if there was permission or an established business relationship, the faxes lacked the required opt-out notice. The district court initially granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on McKesson's consent defenses. The court also decertified the proposed class and denied treble damages to the plaintiffs. McKesson appealed the summary judgment decision on their consent defenses. The plaintiffs cross-appealed the class decertification and denial of treble damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo, the decertification order for abuse of discretion, and the denial of treble damages for abuse of discretion, ultimately affirming all of the district court’s decisions. Question Does the Hobbs Act require a federal district court to accept the Federal Communication Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?
Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2025. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration.Respondent: R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Ryan J. Watson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) These cases arise from the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) denial of R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.’s applications to market various e-cigarettes, including menthol- and berry-flavored “Alto” e-cigarettes. R.J. Reynolds, along with retail entities like Avail Vapor Texas and the Mississippi Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Stores Association, challenged this denial in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The FDA filed a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer, arguing that the petitioners do not meet the venue requirements set forth in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act for filing their petition in the Fifth Circuit. The case was consolidated with previous related cases, and the court had previously ruled that venue was proper in the Fifth Circuit in a related matter. In the present matter, the Fifth Circuit stood by its prior decision that venue was proper. Question May a manufacturer file a petition for review in a circuit where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located within that circuit?
Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2025. Petitioner: Free Speech Coalition, Inc.Respondent: Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Texas enacted H.B. 1181, a law regulating commercial entities that publish or distribute material on internet websites, including social media platforms, where more than one-third of the content is sexual material harmful to minors. The law requires these entities to implement age verification methods to limit access to adults and display specific health warnings on their landing pages and advertisements. It defines sexual material harmful to minors using a modified version of the Miller test for obscenity. Shortly after the law was enacted but before it took effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming H.B. 1181 violates their First Amendment rights and, for some plaintiffs, conflicts with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The district court issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and suffer irreparable harm. The court ruled that the age-verification requirement and health warnings fail strict scrutiny—that is, that it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means to achieve that interest—and that Section 230 preempts H.B. 1181 for certain plaintiffs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that rational basis review—i.e., rationally related to a legitimate government interest—was the proper standard of review and thus vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement but affirmed as to the health warnings. Question Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?
Thompson v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Patrick D. Thompson.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Chris C. Gair (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Patrick Thompson took out three loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings between 2011 and 2014, totaling $219,000. In late 2017, Washington Federal failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became its receiver, hiring Planet Home Lending to service the loans. Thompson received an invoice showing a loan balance of $269,120.58, which included interest. In subsequent phone calls with Planet Home and FDIC contractors in February and March 2018, Thompson disputed the higher balance. He acknowledged borrowing money but claimed he had only borrowed $110,000, omitting mention of the two additional loans. When the contractors found out about Thompson’s 2013 and 2014 loans shortly thereafter, they called Thompson back on March 5, 2018, he again expressed doubt over the accuracy of the higher loan balance. Eventually, Thompson and the FDIC agreed to settle his debt for $219,000—the amount Thompson owed without interest in December 2018. In April 2021, a grand jury charged Thompson with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014—a statute that criminalizes making a “false statement . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of the FDIC or a mortgage lending business. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Thompson of both counts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Does the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?
Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Gary Waetzig.Respondent: Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Advocates: Vincent Levy (for the Petitioner) Matthew D. McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2020, Gary Waetzig sued his former employer Halliburton for age discrimination but voluntarily dismissed his suit without prejudice due to a contractual obligation to arbitrate. After an arbitrator granted summary judgment to Halliburton, Waetzig returned to federal court. Instead of filing a new complaint under the Federal Arbitration Act, he moved to reopen his original case and vacate the arbitration award. The district court agreed to reopen the case using Rule 60(b), citing Mr. Waetzig’s mistaken dismissal and an intervening Supreme Court case that affected his ability to refile. The court then vacated the arbitrator’s order, finding the arbitrator had exceeded her powers, and remanded for further proceedings before a new arbitrator. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Waetzig’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not a “final proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b). Question Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?
Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Karyn D. Stanley.Respondent: City of Sanford, Florida. Advocates: Deepak Gupta (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jessica C. Conner (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Karyn Stanley, a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, retired due to Parkinson's disease in 2018 after serving for about 19 years. When she joined in 1999, the City's policy provided free health insurance until age 65 for employees retiring due to disability. However, in 2003, the City changed its plan, limiting the health insurance subsidy for disability retirees to 24 months post-retirement. Unaware of this change, Stanley filed suit in April 2020, shortly before her subsidy was set to expire, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Florida Civil Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and Florida Statutes section 112.0801. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the City, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on (and reaffirming) binding precedent within that circuit that “a Title I plaintiff must ‘hold[ ] or desire[ ]’ an employment position with the defendant at the time of the defendant's allegedly wrongful act.” Question Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?
Hewitt v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Tony R. Hewitt.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioners) Michael H. McGinley (in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2009, Corey Deyon Duffey, Jarvis Dupree Ross, and Tony R. Hewitt were convicted of multiple counts of conspiracy, attempted bank robbery, bank robbery, and using firearms in furtherance of these crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After appeals and resentencing, they received mandatory minimum sentences of 5 years for their first § 924(c) conviction and 25 years for each subsequent conviction, as per the law at that time which allowed “stacking” of these charges. In 2020, following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, the appellants successfully filed for habeas relief. The district court vacated their § 924(c) conspiracy convictions and ordered resentencing. Before their resentencing in 2022, the appellants argued that § 403 of the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated sentence stacking for § 924(c) convictions, should apply to their cases. The government initially opposed this view but later changed its position to support the application of § 403. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected their challenges and affirmed the convictions. Question Does the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provision apply to a defendant whose original sentence was imposed before the Act’s enactment, but was later vacated and resentenced after the Act took effect?
TikTok, Inc. v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2025. Petitioner: TikTok, Inc.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners TikTok, Inc., et al.) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioners Brian Firebaugh, et al.) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) TikTok is a social media platform with approximately 170 million monthly U.S. users that allows users to create and watch short video clips. The platform’s content is determined by a recommendation engine originally developed by ByteDance, a China-based company that is TikTok’s ultimate parent. While TikTok created a U.S. subsidiary (TTUSDS) and partnered with Oracle to handle U.S. operations and data security, ByteDance retains significant control over the platform's global operations and source code development. In response to national security concerns about Chinese influence over TikTok, both the Trump and Biden administrations attempted various measures to address these risks, including attempted forced divestiture and transaction bans. After lengthy negotiations over TikTok’s proposed National Security Agreement proved unsuccessful, Congress passed a law in 2024 requiring “foreign adversary controlled applications” (specifically including TikTok) to divest from foreign ownership or face effective shutdown through prohibitions on U.S. companies providing hosting and distribution services. The law takes effect on January 19, 2025, though companies can avoid the prohibitions by completing a qualified divestiture that eliminates foreign adversary control and operational relationships. Three sets of petitioners (ByteDance/TikTok, Based Politics, and eight individual TikTok creators) filed constitutional challenges to the Act in May 2024, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Act survived constitutional scrutiny. Question Does the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violate the First Amendment?
Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 11, 2024. Petitioner: Dewberry Group, Inc.Respondent: Dewberry Engineers Inc. Advocates: Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioner) Nicholas S. Crown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Elbert Lin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dewberry Engineers and Dewberry Group are two businesses in the real estate development industry that both use the “Dewberry” name. In 2006, they confronted each other over their competing brands, leading to a lawsuit that was settled in 2007 with a confidential settlement agreement (CSA). The CSA allowed Dewberry Engineers to use its registered marks freely while strictly limiting Dewberry Group’s use of “Dewberry.” It prohibited Dewberry Group from challenging Dewberry Engineers’ federal trademark registrations and required Dewberry Group to abandon pending applications for the “Dewberry Capital” mark. In 2017, Dewberry Group decided to rebrand, changing its name from “Dewberry Capital” to "Dewberry Group” and adopting several subbrands. Despite the CSA, Dewberry Group applied to register new “Dewberry” marks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for real estate-related services. The USPTO rejected these applications due to likelihood of confusion with Dewberry Engineers’ marks. Dewberry Engineers sent cease-and-desist letters to Dewberry Group, claiming trademark infringement and breach of the CSA. Dewberry Group refused to abandon its applications, arguing that the CSA allowed its use of “Dewberry” marks other than “Dewberry Capital” for non-architectural services. The district court ruled in favor of Dewberry Engineers and ordered Dewberry Group to pay almost $43 million in disgorged profits for infringing on Dewberry Engineers’ trademark. The district court also enjoined Dewberry Group from further violating its agreement with Dewberry Engineers and required Dewberry Group to pay Dewberry Engineers’ attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does an award of the “defendant's profits” under the Lanham Act allow a court to require the defendant to disgorge profits earned by legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates?
Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2024. Petitioner: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition.Respondent: Eagle County, Colorado. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Federal Respondents) William M. Jay (for Respondents Eagle County, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Surface Transportation Board (STB) granted a petition from the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition to construct and operate an 80-mile railway in Utah’s Uinta Basin. The railway’s primary purpose would be to transport waxy crude oil from the basin to the national rail network. The STB conducted an environmental review process, including the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Board issued a final decision in December 2021, authorizing the construction and operation of the railway subject to environmental mitigation conditions. In its environmental analysis, the STB considered various impacts of the railway’s construction and operation within the project area, including effects on water resources, air quality, special status species, land use, and local economies. However, the Board declined to analyze certain “downline impacts”—effects from increased train traffic on existing rail lines beyond the new railway. The STB also omitted analysis of other potential environmental effects, such as increased crude oil refining impacts on Gulf Coast communities, upline impacts of increased drilling in the Uinta Basin, and downline effects of potential oil spills along the Colorado River. Finally, the Board did not disclose the potential effects of the project on historic sites or structures along the Union Pacific line in Eagle County. The Board justified these omissions by arguing that minimal increases in train traffic on existing lines were unlikely to cause significant impacts, and that some effects were beyond the scope of its regulatory authority. Eagle County asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to review the Board’s orders, and the granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, and vacated the underlying order. Question Does the National Environmental Policy Act require an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority?
Feliciano v. Department of Transportation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2024. Petitioner: Nick Feliciano.Respondent: Department of Transportation. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve officer, performed active duty from July to September 2012 under 10 U.S.C. § 12302, receiving differential pay. His service was extended to July 2013 without differential pay. From July 2013 to September 2014, he served again under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to support various operations, followed by medical treatment until February 2017 under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(h). In 2018, he filed an appeal alleging a hostile work environment and later amended it to include claims about denied differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538. The Board denied his request for differential pay, citing Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, 3 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021), which required service in a statutory contingency operation for eligibility. Mr. Feliciano appealed this decision. Question Is a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.
Kousisis v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2024. Petitioner: Stamatios Kousisis.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioners) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The U.S. Department of Transportation provides funds to state agencies for transportation projects, requiring recipients to set participation goals for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). Kousisis, Frangos, and their companies, Alpha and Liberty Maintenance, were awarded contracts for two Philadelphia projects with DBE requirements. They committed to working with Markias, Inc., a certified DBE, claiming they would obtain millions in paint supplies from the company. However, the defendants submitted false documentation about Markias’s role in the projects. Instead of Markias supplying products or performing a commercially useful function as required, it served merely as a pass-through. The defendants arranged for actual suppliers to send invoices to Markias, which then issued its own invoices with a 2.25% fee added. This scheme allowed the defendants to appear compliant with DBE requirements, a condition for receiving payments and avoiding penalties. The jury convicted Kousisis and Alpha of false statements, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and wire fraud. The district court calculated the loss based on the defendants’ “ill-gotten profits,” determining that this was an appropriate measure of loss when the actual loss to the government was not measurable at the time of sentencing. This calculation led to a 20-point sentencing enhancement corresponding to a loss between $9.5 million and $25 million. Kousisis and Alpha appealed their convictions and the calculation of the loss for sentencing purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the loss calculation. Question Can deception to induce a commercial exchange constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme?
United States v. Skrmetti Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2024. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter for Tennessee. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Chase B. Strangio (for the Respondents L.W., et al., supporting the Petitioner) J. Matthew Rice (for the Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2023, Tennessee and Kentucky passed laws restricting certain medical treatments for transgender minors. These laws prohibited healthcare providers from administering puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and sex-transition surgeries to minors for the purpose of altering their appearance or validating their gender identity when inconsistent with their biological sex. Both laws included exceptions for certain medical conditions and provided mechanisms for enforcement, including professional discipline for healthcare providers and extended statutes of limitations for lawsuits. In response, groups of transgender minors, their parents, and healthcare providers challenged these laws in federal court. The plaintiffs argued that the laws violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. They sought preliminary injunctions to prevent the laws from taking effect. In both cases, district courts initially granted injunctions, finding that the laws likely infringed on parents’ fundamental rights to direct their children's medical care and discriminated based on sex. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stayed these injunctions, allowing the laws to go into effect pending further legal proceedings. Question Does a Tennessee law restricting certain medical treatments for transgender minors violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment?
Republic of Hungary v. Simon Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2024. Petitioner: Republic of Hungary.Respondent: Rosalie Simon. Advocates: Joshua S. Glasgow (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from the Hungarian government’s confiscation of Jewish-owned property during the Holocaust. In 1944, Hungary rapidly exterminated over half a million Jews and seized their property. Fourteen Holocaust survivors sued Hungary and its agency, Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., seeking compensation for this seized property. To overcome Hungary’s sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception, asserting they were either stateless or Czechoslovakian nationals at the time of the takings, not Hungarian nationals. This claim was made in response to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Fed. Republic of Germany v. Philipp that a country’s taking of property from its own nationals is generally excluded from the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The case has a complex litigation history, with multiple appeals focusing on the plaintiffs’ nationality status and FSIA jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to shift the burden of proof to Hungary to disprove, contrasting with the Second Circuit’s decision that plaintiffs must demonstrate a link between the expropriated property’s funds and U.S. commercial activity. Question 1. Does historical commingling of assets suffice to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act? 2. Must a plaintiff make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference? 3. Does a sovereign defendant bear the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA?
United States v. Miller Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2024. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: David L. Miller. Advocates: Yaira Dubin (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, All Resorts Group, Inc. paid $145,138.78 to the Internal Revenue Service to cover personal tax debts of two of its principals. The company filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2017. Subsequently, the United States Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the United States to avoid these transfers, relying on Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The United States did not contest the substantive elements required to establish a voidable transfer but argued that sovereign immunity would bar an actual creditor from avoiding the tax payments outside of bankruptcy. This prevented the Trustee from satisfying the "actual creditor requirement" of Section 544(b)(1). The Trustee countered that the sovereign immunity waiver in Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code applied not only to the adversary proceeding but also to the underlying state law cause of action. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Trustee, and both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor’s tax payment to the United States under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?
FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration.Respondent: Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Eric N. Heyer (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, requiring FDA approval for new tobacco products, including e-cigarettes. FDA issued guidance on the application process, stating that long-term studies were not necessary and emphasizing the importance of marketing plans to prevent youth access. Manufacturers were encouraged to use existing data and observational studies. In January 2020, FDA announced it would prioritize enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based e-cigarette products due to their popularity among youth. Wages and White Lion Investments (Triton Distribution) and Vapetasia, manufacturers of flavored nicotine liquids for refillable e-cigarette systems, submitted applications in September 2020. Their applications included existing studies on e-cigarettes generally and detailed marketing plans to restrict youth access. However, in August 2021, FDA unexpectedly announced a new requirement for randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies specific to flavored products. Shortly after, FDA denied the applications of Triton and Vapetasia, citing a lack of evidence that their flavored products would benefit adult users enough to outweigh risks to youth. The manufacturers challenged this decision, arguing that FDA had changed its requirements without notice and refused to consider their marketing plans. Question Was the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?
NVIDIA Corporation v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 13, 2024. Petitioner: NVIDIA Corporation.Respondent: E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioners) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) NVIDIA, a major producer of graphics processing units (GPUs), experienced a surge in demand for its gaming GPUs due to cryptocurrency mining, particularly for Ethereum, during 2017-2018. This mirrored a previous crypto-driven boom and bust cycle experienced by NVIDIA’s rival, AMD. Despite introducing specialized crypto mining GPUs (Crypto SKUs) and reporting their sales separately, NVIDIA continued to see substantial crypto-related purchases of its gaming GPUs. However, the company’s executives, particularly CEO Jensen Huang and CFO Colette Kress, repeatedly downplayed the impact of crypto mining on their gaming segment revenues when questioned by analysts and investors. As cryptocurrency prices began to decline in 2018, NVIDIA’s GPU sales dropped. On August 16, 2018, the company lowered its revenue guidance, which was followed by a more significant miss in November. On November 15, 2018, NVIDIA disclosed that post-crypto channel inventory was taking longer than expected to sell through, with Huang referring to it as a “crypto hangover.” This revelation led to a sharp decline in NVIDIA's stock price, dropping 28.5% in two trading days. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that during the class period (May 10, 2017, to November 14, 2018), NVIDIA's executives knowingly or recklessly misled investors about the company's exposure to crypto volatility by understating the impact of crypto-related purchases on their gaming segment revenues. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that, during the Class Period, Huang made false or misleading statements and did so knowingly or recklessly. Question What is the proper pleading standard to show knowledge or intent for Private Securities Litigation Reform Act claims that rely on internal company documents?
Delligatti v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Salvatore Delligatti.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese Crime Family, was convicted of various charges, including attempted murder in aid of racketeering (under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)). Delligatti had organized a plot to murder Joseph Bonelli, a neighborhood bully who had been stealing from a local gas station owner and was suspected of cooperating against bookies associated with the Genovese Crime Family. Delligatti paid another man to coordinate the murder with gang members, providing them with a gun and a car. The murder attempts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the presence of potential witnesses and the arrest of the would-be murderers by law enforcement. On appeal, Delligatti argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses, including the attempted murder charge, were not “crimes of violence” under the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that attempted murder in aid of racketeering qualifies as a crime of violence, as it necessarily involves the attempted use of physical force, and therefore upheld Delligatti's firearms conviction. Question Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?