Supreme Court Oral Arguments

First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2025. Petitioner: First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc.Respondent: Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey. Advocates: Erin M. Hawley (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Sundeep Iyer (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. is a nonprofit organization in New Jersey that operates a network of centers offering pregnancy-related services. In 2023, the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs began investigating First Choice over concerns that its client-facing websites downplayed its pro-life mission and may have misled donors and clients about its services, staff qualifications, and medical practices. State investigators identified possible discrepancies between what First Choice told donors—emphasizing a pro-life mission—and what was publicly communicated to potential clients on other websites. The investigation also scrutinized potentially misleading medical statements and questioned whether unlicensed staff were performing services that require medical credentials. As part of its investigation, the State issued a non-self-executing subpoena to First Choice seeking internal documents, advertising material, substantiation for medical claims, and information on donors and licensed personnel. First Choice objected to the subpoena—particularly the requests for donor identities—arguing that complying would violate its constitutional rights, including freedom of association and donor privacy. While First Choice continued to raise these objections, the state filed a motion in New Jersey Superior Court to compel enforcement. The state court denied First Choice’s motion to quash the subpoena in full but did not order immediate production of documents. Instead, it instructed the parties to negotiate the subpoena’s scope, specifically reserved constitutional arguments for future resolution, and clarified that donor identities would be sought only for those who contributed through two specific websites. As a result, First Choice remained under no court order to turn over the disputed materials while negotiations continued. While contesting the subpoena in state court, First Choice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking federal relief to block enforcement on constitutional grounds. The district court twice dismissed the federal suit as unripe, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the ongoing state court proceedings and the lack of any order compelling compliance rendered First Choice’s claims not ready for federal adjudication. Question When the recipient of a state investigatory subpoena demonstrates an objectively reasonable chill of its First Amendment rights, does a federal court lack jurisdiction to hear the case because those constitutional claims must first be resolved in state court?

Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2025. Petitioner: Cox Communications, Inc.Respondent: Sony Music Entertainment. Advocates: E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cox Communications, Inc. is a major internet service provider selling internet, telephone, and cable television to millions across the United States. Between 2013 and 2014, some of Cox’s internet subscribers used peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, such as BitTorrent, to download and distribute copyrighted songs owned by numerous record companies and music publishers, including Sony Music Entertainment (the “Plaintiffs”). These record companies, through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), hired a company called MarkMonitor to monitor illegal file sharing and notify internet service providers when infringement was detected. MarkMonitor sent Cox over 163,000 notices of infringement during the relevant period. In response, Cox operated a “thirteen-strike” policy, under which it warned or temporarily suspended subscribers after repeated notices, but in practice it rarely terminated service for copyright infringement, while regularly terminating service for nonpayment. Plaintiffs became frustrated with Cox’s limited enforcement against repeat infringers and sued Cox instead of its subscribers, alleging that Cox was secondarily liable for copyright infringement occurring on its network. Specifically, plaintiffs contended Cox either intentionally contributed to or benefited from its subscribers’ infringements by failing to take adequate steps to stop it, thereby inducing or materially contributing to the unlawful acts. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Cox statutory safe harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and allowed the case to proceed to trial on theories of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The jury found Cox liable on both counts and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement, reversed the vicarious liability verdict, and vacated the damages award, remanding the case for a new trial on damages. Question Can an internet service provider be held liable, and found to have acted willfully, for copyright infringement just because it knew users were infringing and did not terminate their access?

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2025. Petitioner: Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana.Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General. Advocates: Nicholas Rosellini (for the Petitioners) Joshua Dos Santos (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, a Salvadoran citizen, fled to the United States with his wife and minor child after facing threats from Wilfredo, a local hitman. The violence began in 2016 when Wilfredo shot and seriously injured Urias-Orellana’s two half-brothers in separate incidents. Wilfredo then vowed to kill their entire family. Over the next several years, Urias-Orellana was repeatedly threatened at gunpoint by masked men demanding money and warning they would harm him like his brothers. In December 2020, he was physically assaulted in his hometown, with the attackers striking him three times in the chest. To escape these threats, Urias-Orellana and his family relocated multiple times within El Salvador. They lived peacefully in some locations for extended periods but encountered problems when returning to areas near his hometown. After noticing his attackers searching for him in early 2021, the family entered the United States without authorization in June 2021. The Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioners with removability for illegal entry. They applied for asylum based on persecution of their family group, with Urias-Orellana also seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge denied their applications, finding the harm did not constitute persecution and that they could safely relocate within El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, leading to this petition for review before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision on all claims. Question Must a federal court of appeals defer to the BIA’s judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute “persecution” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)?

Rutherford v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2025. Petitioner: Daniel Rutherford.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner in No. 24-820) David A. O'Neil (for the Petitioner in No. 24-860) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2003, twenty-two-year-old Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies at a Pennsylvania chiropractic office within a five-day period. During the first robbery, he brandished a gun at the chiropractor and stole $390 and a watch. Four days later, he returned to the same office with an accomplice, again pulled a gun, and stole $900 in cash and jewelry. A jury convicted Rutherford of one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Rutherford to 125 months for the robbery-related charges plus mandatory consecutive sentences of 7 years for the first § 924(c) offense and 25 years for the second, totaling nearly 42.5 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction in 2007, and he did not appeal his sentence. In 2021, Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in federal sentencing law would result in a significantly shorter sentence if he were sentenced today. The district court denied his motion in 2023, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial. Question May a district court, when evaluating a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), consider as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” the fact that a defendant is serving a sentence substantially longer than what would be imposed today due to the First Step Act’s prospective changes to mandatory minimum penalties, particularly where the disparity amounts to decades of additional imprisonment?

Fernandez v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2025. Petitioner: Joe Fernandez.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Benjamin Gruenstein (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joe Fernandez participated as a backup shooter in a 2000 murder-for-hire scheme in the Bronx. On February 22, 2000, Patrick Darge hired him to help kill Arturo Cuellar and Idelfonso Vivero Flores, two Mexican drug cartel members who had come to New York City to collect approximately $6.5 million owed by drug trafficker Jeffrey Minaya for 274 kilograms of cocaine. When Darge's gun jammed after shooting Cuellar in the head, Fernandez fired fourteen shots in the apartment building lobby, nine hitting the victims. He received $40,000 for his participation. After eleven years on the run, Fernandez surrendered to police in October 2011. Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, Fernandez proceeded to trial in 2013. The government's key witness was Patrick Darge, who admitted during cross-examination to lying to authorities in previous cases. Despite this admission, the jury convicted Fernandez of participating in a murder-for-hire conspiracy resulting in two deaths and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm to commit murder during a crime of violence. In October 2014, he received a mandatory life sentence, while his cooperating co-defendants received significantly lighter sentences: Darge (30 years), Reyes (25 years), Minaya (15 years), and Rivera (2 years). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York originally sentenced Fernandez, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in 2016. In 2021, the district court vacated one of his convictions but left the mandatory life sentence intact. When Fernandez filed a compassionate release motion citing his possible innocence and sentencing disparity, the district court granted it in 2022, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision. Question Can a federal prisoner use the compassionate release law to get their sentence reduced based on claims that they might be innocent or that their sentence is unfair, even though these same claims would normally have to be raised through habeas corpus?

Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2025. Petitioner: Damon Landor.Respondent: Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety. Advocates: Zachary D. Tripp (for the Petitioner) Libby A. Baird (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Damon Landor, a devout Rastafarian, vowed as part of his faith never to cut his hair—a religious commitment known as the Nazarite Vow. Incarcerated in 2020, Landor was first held at the St. Tammany Parish Detention Center and later at LaSalle Correctional Center, both of which allowed him to maintain his hairstyle in accordance with his religious beliefs. After approximately five months and with three weeks left in his sentence, Landor was transferred to Raymond Laborde Correctional Center. Upon arrival, Landor proactively explained his religious practices and presented documentation of previous accommodations, including a copy of a federal court decision supporting similar claims. An intake guard disregarded his documentation, summoned the warden, and upon Landor’s inability to produce immediate additional proof of his beliefs, guards forcibly handcuffed Landor and shaved his head. Following his release, Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, its Secretary James LeBlanc, the correctional center, and Warden Marcus Myers, asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his federal constitutional rights, as well as state law claims. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissed Landor’s individual-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages, holding such relief unavailable under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, and rejecting Landor’s arguments that subsequent Supreme Court authority or other legal developments altered that result. Question May an individual sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)?

The GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2025. Petitioner: The GEO Group, Inc.Respondent: Alejandro Menocal. Advocates: Dominic E. Draye (for the Petitioner) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondents) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Alejandro Menocal and other immigration detainees brought a class action lawsuit against The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), a private company that operates the Aurora Immigration Processing Center (AIPC) in Colorado under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). GEO maintained a mandatory Sanitation Policy requiring all detainees to clean common areas including walls, floors, bathrooms, and recreation yards. Detainees who refused these cleaning assignments faced escalating disciplinary actions, beginning with suspension of television and phone privileges and potentially resulting in solitary confinement for up to seventy-two hours. Menocal, detained from June to September 2014, witnessed fellow detainees placed in isolation for refusing to clean, and multiple detainees testified to being threatened with or actually placed in solitary confinement for noncompliance. Additionally, AIPC operated a Voluntary Work Program where detainees could work up to eight hours daily in various jobs such as food preparation, barbering, and laundry services for compensation of $1.00 per day. Menocal filed suit in October 2014, alleging forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act for the mandatory cleaning program and unjust enrichment under Colorado common law for the $1.00 daily wage in the Voluntary Work Program. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado certified two classes in 2017, which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 2018. Following discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment claiming derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co. The district court denied GEO's motion in October 2022, finding that ICE neither directed nor required GEO to compel detainee labor or limit compensation to $1.00 per day. GEO appealed this denial to the Tenth Circuit, which dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Question Is an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine?

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2025. Petitioner: Learning Resources, Inc., et al.Respondent: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the federal parties) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the private parties) Benjamin Gutman (for the state parties) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Learning Resources, Inc. and hand2mind, Inc. are family-owned businesses that design and distribute educational products for children. Although their product development and some assembly occur domestically, most of their manufacturing is outsourced to international partners, including China. Beginning in early 2025, a series of executive orders from President Donald J. Trump, invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), imposed unprecedented tariffs on imports, including goods from China. These included a 20% “trafficking” tariff and additional “reciprocal” tariffs that pushed rates on Chinese goods to over 145%. Petitioners’ imports were directly affected, and complying with the new tariffs would increase their import-related costs from $2.3 million in 2024 to over $100 million in 2025, putting their businesses at existential risk. The petitioners filed suit on April 22, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the legality of the IEEPA tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on May 29, 2025, holding that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs and finding that the tariffs posed an existential threat to the petitioners. However, that ruling was stayed just days later, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit docketed the case. Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of International Trade ruled similarly in related cases but its decision was also stayed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.   Question Does the International Emergency Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (“IEEPA”), authorize the president to impose tariffs?  

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2025. Petitioner: Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc.Respondent: Jeanne Ann Burton. Advocates: Daniel Ginzburg (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In November 2014, Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, a Nashville-based auto-parts corporation, entered bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. In 2015, Vista-Pro—later represented by its Chapter 7 trustee—filed an adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., a New York corporation, to recover about $50,000 in unpaid invoices. Vista-Pro mailed the summons and complaint to Coney Island’s Brooklyn address addressed only to the corporate entity, not to any officer, agent, or individual as required for proper service under the rules governing service on corporations. Coney Island did not respond to the complaint, leading the bankruptcy court in May 2015 to enter a default judgment against it. Following reconversion of the case to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee repeatedly attempted to collect the judgment. Coney Island received notice of the judgment at least as early as April 2016 when its CEO was sent a demand letter. Years later, after the trustee sought to enforce the judgment by freezing Coney Island’s bank assets in New York, Coney Island sought to vacate the default judgment, arguing that it was void due to improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court and later the district court denied Coney Island’s motion to vacate the judgment as untimely. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that under its precedents interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), motions to vacate void judgments must be filed within a reasonable time. Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) impose any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction?

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2025. Petitioner: The Hain Celestial Group, Inc., et al.Respondent: Sarah Palmquist, Individually and as Next Friend of E.P., a Minor. Advocates: Sarah E. Harrington (for the Petitioners) Russell S. Post (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Grant and Sarah Palmquist’s son Ethan developed normally until about 30 months of age, when he experienced sudden and severe developmental regression, including cognitive, behavioral, and physical impairments. He was later diagnosed with a range of conditions—some physical, like seizures and hypotonia, and others mental, like autism and neurocognitive disorders. Tests also revealed high levels of toxic heavy metals in Ethan’s system, which some physicians attributed to heavy-metal poisoning. The Palmquists linked his symptoms to his nearly exclusive consumption of Earth’s Best Organic baby food—manufactured by Hain Celestial Group, Inc. and sold by Whole Foods Market, Inc.—from infancy through toddlerhood. In 2021, a U.S. House Oversight Committee report revealed that Hain’s baby foods contained high levels of arsenic, lead, cadmium, and mercury and that Hain had not tested final products for such contaminants until 2019. In 2021, the Palmquists sued Hain and Whole Foods in Texas state court, raising various state-law claims. Hain removed the case to federal court, alleging that Whole Foods had been improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The district court agreed, dismissed Whole Foods, and denied the Palmquists’ motion to remand. It later granted judgment as a matter of law for Hain during trial. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Palmquists had adequately stated claims against Whole Foods, defeating diversity jurisdiction. It vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to return it to state court. Question Must a federal court’s final judgment be set aside if the case did not have complete diversity when it was removed from state court, and can a plaintiff block diversity jurisdiction by updating the complaint after removal to include a valid claim against a nondiverse defendant?

Hencely v. Fluor Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2025. Petitioner: Winston Tyler Hencely.Respondent: Fluor Corporation. Advocates: Frank H. Chang (for the Petitioner) Mark W. Mosier (for the Respondents) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2016, U.S. Army Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely was stationed at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Fluor Corporation held a Department of Defense contract to provide base life support services at Bagram, including vehicle maintenance and hazardous materials management. Under the military’s “Afghan First” counterinsurgency program, which aimed to develop the Afghan economy by employing local nationals, Fluor’s subcontractor hired Ahmad Nayeb, an Afghan national. The Army sponsored Nayeb’s employment despite knowing he was a former Taliban member, viewing his hiring as a reintegration effort. Nayeb worked the night shift at the hazardous materials section of the non-tactical vehicle yard with limited supervision. During his employment, Nayeb likely smuggled explosives onto the base and constructed an explosive vest while working alone, using base tools including a multimeter he had checked out despite not needing it for his assigned duties. On the morning of November 12, 2016, at the end of his shift, Nayeb was supposed to board a bus to be escorted off base. Instead, he lied about needing to attend a hazardous materials class and walked undetected for 53 minutes to an area near the starting line of a Veterans Day 5K race. When Hencely and others confronted him, Nayeb detonated his vest, killing himself and five others while severely wounding seventeen more, including Hencely. The Taliban claimed credit for the attack. Hencely sued Fluor in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging negligent supervision, entrustment, and retention under South Carolina law, as well as breach of the government contract. The district court granted judgment to Fluor on all claims, holding that federal law preempted the state tort claims and that Hencely was not a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the government contract. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, which immunized government contractors from liability under certain circumstances, extend to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

Rico v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2025. Petitioner: Isabel Rico.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Joshua K. Handell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In May 2018, Isabel Rico absconded from supervised release after serving only five months of her 42-month term. Rico had originally been convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and was serving supervised release as part of her sentence. She remained a fugitive until January 2023, when authorities located her. In February 2023, the probation office filed violations based on her absconding and other conduct during her supervised release term. The district court revoked Rico’s supervised release and sentenced her to 16 months in prison followed by a new two-year term of supervised release. Rico appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court lacked authority to revoke her supervised release because her original 42-month term would have expired during the time she was a fugitive, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision. Question Does the fugitive-tolling doctrine apply in the context of supervised release?

Case v. Montana Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2025. Petitioner: William Trevor Case.Respondent: State of Montana. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2021, Trevor Case’s ex-girlfriend J.H. called police to report that Case had threatened suicide during their phone conversation. J.H. believed Case was intoxicated due to his erratic behavior, and she became alarmed when he mentioned getting “a note or something like that” before committing suicide. During the call, J.H. heard clicking sounds resembling a cocking pistol, prompting her to tell Case she would call police. Case responded by threatening to harm any officers who came to his home. The call ended when J.H. heard a “pop” that she believed was a gunshot, followed by dead air, though the line remained connected. Unable to get Case to respond, J.H. contacted police and drove to his residence. Law enforcement officers arrived at Case’s home and attempted to make contact by knocking on doors and calling through an open window, but received no response. Through the windows, officers observed empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad they believed contained a suicide note. The officers knew of Case’s history of alcohol abuse, mental health issues, and previous suicide threats, including an incident where he brought a weapon to the school where he taught. After approximately forty minutes on scene, officers made the decision to enter the home without a warrant to conduct a welfare check. They entered with weapons drawn due to J.H.’s report of Case's threats against officers. While clearing the home, Sergeant Pasha encountered Case in an upstairs bedroom closet. When Case suddenly opened the closet curtain, Pasha observed what he believed was a dark object at Case’s waist and shot him in the abdomen. A handgun was subsequently found in a laundry hamper next to where Case fell. Case was charged with Assault on a Peace Officer and filed pretrial motions to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Following a jury trial in December 2022, Case was convicted of the felony charge. Case appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, which affirmed. Question May law enforcement enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring?

Louisiana v. Callais (Reargument) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2025. Appellant: Louisiana.Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections.   Question Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?  

Ellingburg v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2025. Petitioner: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) John F. Bash (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In December 1995, Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robbed a bank and was indicted in April 1996. He was convicted in August 1996 and sentenced to prison, along with an order to pay over $7,500 in restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). Following his release from prison in June 2022, having paid only about one-quarter of the original restitution amount, Mr. Ellingburg filed a motion arguing that enforcement of his restitution order was unlawful. He claimed that the applicable 20-year payment period under the VWPA had expired and that applying a longer restitution term and mandatory interest provision under the later-enacted Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court rejected Mr. Ellingburg’s arguments and upheld the restitution order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question Is criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Bowe v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2025. Petitioner: Michael Bowe.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Kasdin M. Mitchell (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below as to Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2008, Michael Bowe was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and received a 288-month sentence, which included a mandatory consecutive 120-month term for the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Starting in 2016, Bowe made multiple attempts to challenge his § 924(c) conviction through a series of motions and applications, arguing that changes in Supreme Court precedent (particularly Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis) meant that his underlying crimes no longer qualified as “crimes of violence” that could support the firearm conviction. The district court initially denied Bowe’s first § 2255 motion in 2016, finding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery still qualified as a crime of violence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then denied several subsequent applications from Bowe to file additional challenges, ultimately concluding in that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his latest application because he was attempting to raise the same claim he had already presented in previous applications.       Question 1. Does a rule requiring dismissal of repeat claims in state prisoner habeas petitions also apply to repeat claims in federal prisoner motions to vacate their sentences? 2. Does the Court have jurisdiction to review lower court decisions allowing or denying federal prisoners permission to file repeat challenges to their sentences?      

United States Postal Service v. Konan Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: United States Postal Service.Respondent: Lebene Konan. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lebene Konan, a Black property owner, leased two rental residences in Euless, Texas, and retrieved business and tenant mail from a central mailbox daily. In May 2020, United States Postal Service (USPS) employee Jason Rojas changed the lock on the mailbox at one of Konan's properties without her approval, halted mail delivery, and demanded ownership verification. Even after USPS’s Inspector General confirmed Konan’s ownership, Rojas and another USPS employee, Raymond Drake, allegedly continued marking mail addressed to Konan and her tenants as undeliverable. Konan claims this refusal of service extended to her second property and was racially motivated, causing loss of rental income and disruption of essential communications. Konan sued USPS, Rojas, Drake, and the United States, raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and alleging violations of the equal protection guarantees of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985. The district court dismissed her FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the postal-matter exception, and her equal protection claims for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claims but reversed on the FTCA claim, holding that sovereign immunity did not bar claims based on intentional acts of mail non-delivery. Question Does a claim that Postal Service employees intentionally refused to deliver mail to a designated address arise out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of postal matter under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal-matter exception?

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: Michael J. Bost.Respondent: Illinois State Board of Elections. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Michael Talent (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Jane E. Notz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Bost, a multi-term U.S. Representative from Illinois’s 12th District, along with Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney, political activists who served as presidential electors in 2020, challenged Illinois’s mail-in ballot receipt procedure. Under Illinois law, election officials can receive and count mail-in ballots for up to fourteen days after Election Day if the ballots are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs argued this procedure violates federal election statutes by impermissibly extending Election Day beyond the federally mandated date. They claimed the counting of these “untimely” ballots dilutes their votes and forces them to expend additional campaign resources to monitor ballot counting for two weeks after Election Day. Plaintiffs filed suit in May 2022 against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its Executive Director. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court also rejected their claims on the merits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Question Do federal candidates have Article III standing to challenge state laws that allow mail-in ballots to be received and counted for two weeks after Election Day based on claims that such laws dilute their votes and force them to incur additional campaign expenses for extended ballot monitoring?

Chiles v. Salazar Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Kaley Chiles.Respondent: Patty Salazar. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioner) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Shannon W. Stevenson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor practicing in Colorado Springs. She holds a master's degree in clinical mental health and provides talk therapy, specializing in clients dealing with addiction, trauma, sexuality, gender dysphoria, and other mental health concerns. Chiles identifies as a Christian and serves clients who often seek religiously informed care that aligns with traditional biblical understandings of sexuality and gender. Prior to the enactment of a 2019 Colorado law banning conversion therapy for minors, Chiles counseled clients, including minors, in accordance with their self-identified goals, which sometimes included diminishing same-sex attractions or aligning gender identity with biological sex. Since the law’s passage, Chiles has refrained from engaging in discussions with minors that she believes could be interpreted as conversion therapy and alleges that this has hampered her ability to provide full counseling services in line with her and her clients’ religious convictions. In September 2022, Chiles brought a pre-enforcement lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colorado officials responsible for enforcing the statute. She alleged that the ban on conversion therapy for minors violates her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Seeking a preliminary injunction, she asked the district court to block enforcement of the law against her. The court denied the motion but found she had standing to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that Colorado’s law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and survived rational basis review. Question Does a Colorado law banning “conversion therapy”—i.e., attempts to “convert” someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity—violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Barrett v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Dwayne Barrett.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Matthew B. Larsen (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent, in support of the Petitioner) Charles L. McCloud (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between August 2011 and January 2012, Dwayne Barrett and several co-conspirators carried out a string of armed robberies in New York, often using guns, knives, and threats of violence. On December 12, 2011, Barrett and two associates followed a minivan carrying the proceeds from a sale of untaxed cigarettes. While Barrett waited in the car, his accomplices held two men at gunpoint and stole the vehicle, which also contained $10,000 and a third victim, Gamar Dafalla. As he tried to discard some of the money during the getaway, Dafalla was fatally shot by one of the robbers. Later that day, Barrett took part in another robbery, threatening a victim’s life. He also helped dispose of the murder weapon and clean their vehicle with latex gloves and cleaning fluid to eliminate evidence. Barrett was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery (one involving Dafalla’s murder), and separate firearms offenses, including a murder charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He was convicted in 2014 and originally sentenced to 90 years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated one firearms conviction under the Supreme Court’s then-new decision in United States v. Davis. Barrett was resentenced to 50 years in 2021. After further appellate proceedings, the Second Circuit affirmed most of his convictions and sentence but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Lora v. United States, which held that § 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing under § 924(c). Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment permit two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)?