Dr Fiona Hill, one of the lead reviewers on the UK's 2025 Strategic Defence Review, discusses an expansive approach to defence and security for the modern world. Dr Hill, who served the first Trump administration as a Russia expert, brings deep insights into Russian, American and British defence policy making. Having identified Russia's obsession with recovering the old Tsarist Empire’s borderlands, and anticipated Putin's strategic use of economic power to create dependencies in the 1990s, she sheds light on the thinking of Presidents Putin and Trump, and what is now needed by societies used to a peace dividend. She also explains the challenges faced by the drafters of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review, with limited means available to respond to a transformed international environment, with Russia an enemy, and the USA now an economic rival and a less reliable ally. Dr Hill is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC and Chancellor of Durham University in the UK. She is on Harvard University's Board of Overseers, from where she gained her doctorate in history and was a Frank Knox Fellow. She co-authored Mr Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (2013) and The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold (2003), both with Clifford Gaddy. She has been appointed a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George by the UK and Knight First Class of Finland's Order of the Lion.
Often touted as the gold standard in national security strategy making, 1953's Project Solarium was President Eisenhower's way of developing a strategy to counter Soviet expansionism. With frequent current calls for a new Project Solarium, was the original project a versatile solution or was it particular to Eisenhower's presidency? Professor Walter Hudson explains. By 1947 relations with the Soviet Union were viewed in Washington as an ideological tug-of-war that could only be won by one side. After the initial strategy of Containment had been crafted under President Truman, the US and its NATO allies massively increased defence spending once the Korean War broke out, fearing a series of further acts of Communist aggression. By mid-1953, however, Stalin was dead, the Korean War at its end, while the cost to the US of the Containment strategy adopted in 1950 was becoming unbearable. With Project Solarium President Eisenhower initiated a rethink not only of what American strategy should be, but also how that strategy was made and understood by his Administration. Professor Walter M. Hudson from the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., guides us through the process adopted in 1953. A former US Army officer, he served in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Panama, Korea and Germany, and holds a PhD in military history from Kansas State University. He is the author of Solarium at 70: Project Solarium's Influence on Eisenhower Historiography and National Security Strategy, published in 2023 by the National Defense University.
Beatrice and Paul reflect on the lessons for strategy-making and strategy-delivery from their conversations with and about strategic leaders in earlier episodes. Previous sessions of Talking Strategy have explored the activities of great strategic leaders and commanders from around the world. In this final episode of the current season, Paul and Beatrice reflect on past conversations and try to identify what lessons might be drawn about strategic leadership and how that shapes the way strategy is made and delivered. While the concept of strategic leadership itself is contested, this episode draws out some consistent themes from earlier episodes. Based around the concept of strategic leadership as a fundamentally human endeavour, Beatrice and Paul explore how strategy is developed by understanding and shaping the external environment, by mobilising the resources available within the enterprise the leader controls, and by ensuring the internal culture encourages commitment from all. Strategic leaders play an important role in making sense of the world around them, setting the direction for their organisation and mobilising it in delivering the strategy. But delivery depends on sometimes thousands of others investing their talents in ensuring the strategy’s success. So, while individual strategic leaders, in all their diversity, often appear as heroes, they represent thousands of others too. Join Beatrice and Paul as they try to distil lessons from the greats covered by this podcast series and what we might take away to help liberate the talent of our own organisations to succeed.
Genuine transformation goes beyond structural and process reform. KornFerry's Khoi Tu discusses the crucial role of leadership and culture in strategy making and delivery. In this episode we consider how strategy works in the commercial world. Ranging across a number of commercial sectors, Khoi Tu talks about the similarities and differences in strategy between defence and industry. Some elements, such as an ever-changing and competitive environment are shared, placing a premium on the right leadership and culture. But there are also differences. He describes how all strategy is fundamentally about choices - choices about how one can win, how to instil a sense of purpose, and how to mobilise the team and make them adaptive to the environment. He also highlights how hard it is to find everything an organisation needs from a strategic leader in one individual, but asserts that taking a collective view yields better results - as Dr Christian Keller also argued when looking at the command teams led by Generals Lee and Grant (Season 4, Episode 15). Khoi Tu is a senior partner at KornFerry Consultants, advising leadership boards in world-leading organisations. The author of Superteams: The Secrets of Stellar Performance from Seven Legendary Teams, his research covered the UK Special Forces, charities, and the arts and business sectors.
Thucydides set the 'gold standard' for a strategic analysis of war with his history of the Peloponnesian War: Dr Roel Konijnendijk explains how. Thucydides, who lived almost two-and-a-half millennia ago, revolutionised strategic analysis by asserting the place of human agency rather than attributing events as being shaped by Gods or fate. This is something that Machiavelli repeats centuries later in The Prince. Thucydides claimed to have identified patterns of strategic behaviour that he thought would be enacted 'as long as human nature is the same'. A fascinating question, however, is whether strategists have behaved according to these patterns because they have been inspired to do so by reading Thucydides, or did he truly discover patterns of behaviour that endure throughout time and space? Are modern scholars projecting their own strategic world views into Ancient Greece or has our Ancient Greek heritage determined how we see the world? Finally, did Thucydides think that a world in which 'the strong do what they will and the weak have to put up with it' is the only possible one? Dr Roel Konijnendijk is the Derby Fellow of Ancient History at Lincoln College, Oxford. After his PhD from University College London, he held several prestigious research fellowships and taught ancient history at UCL, Birkbeck, Warwick, Oxford, and Edinburgh. He is the author of Classical Greek Tactics: A Cultural History (2018) and Between Miltiades and Moltke: Early German Studies in Greek Military History (2022) as well as co-editor of Brill's Companion to Greek Land Warfare Beyond the Phalanx (2021).
General Marshall planned brilliantly for the US Army’s rapid wartime growth and a 'Just Peace' for post-war Europe. Professor Bill Johnsen explains how. General George C Marshall's (1880-1959) career as a strategist and strategic leader was impressive. As the Chief of Staff for the US Army, he oversaw a forty-fold increase in the size of the Army. Quick to spot talent and advance it out of turn, his appointments included Generals Omar Bradley, Lesley J McNair, George S Patton, and perhaps most crucially, Dwight D Eisenhower. Winston Churchill described Marshall as 'the organiser of victory' After the War, he was appointed as Secretary of State, where he lobbied for the reconstruction of Europe that would build the capacity of nations exhausted by the War, and act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. The European Reconstruction Plan, which would eventually become simply the 'Marshall Plan', earned him the unique distinction of being the only Army General to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Professor William (Bill) Johnsen is the former Director of Academics at the US Army War College, and a former Infantry Officer. He served in NATO working on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the 1991 NATO Strategy. He is the author of numerous works, including Origins of the Grand Alliance: Anglo-American Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor (University Press of Kentucky, 2016), and his latest manuscript, tentatively entitled War Councilors: The Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Winning of World War II, is under publication review.
Professor Lucy Riall explains Garibaldi's mastery of revolutionary war by harnessing military, political and populist levers of power to become a father of modern Italy. Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) was one of the world's greatest revolutionaries, leading resistance movements with irregular armies such as the Ragamuffins and the Red Shirts in Latin America and Europe. A crucial figure of 19th century liberalism and nationalism, he inspired millions. Che Guevara claimed that he was the only hero the world needs. As one of the fathers of modern Italy, Garibaldi was the Risorgimento's Sword, to Count Cavour's Brain and Giuseppe Mazzini's Soul. Untrained as a soldier and often over-matched by his opponents, he nevertheless achieved victories against the French and Austrian Armies, the Papal States and in Sicily. Perhaps as impressively, he maintained the effectiveness of irregular forces in numerous retreats that might, under a lesser commander, have lost the morale of his citizen fighters against professional armies. Historian AJP Taylor described Garibaldi thus: 'He evoked from the people, and even from the politicians, a personal devotion almost without parallel in modern history; . . . and he showed himself the greatest general that Italy has ever produced.' Professor Lucy Riall is a leading expert on modern Italy. She has written extensively on Italy's formation, as well as on Giuseppe Garibaldi. She is currently at the European University institute in Florence and a Visiting Professor at the National Museum of Ethnology in Japan.
Cyrus’ exemplary leadership forged a patchwork of ethnicities into an empire that founded Persian rule in the Middle East, Professor Lynette Mitchell explains. Cyrus the Great (or the Elder) is known to many through the Cyrus Cylinder exhibit preserved in the British Museum, which tells us that he was chosen by God for his special virtues to become ‘king of the four corners of the world’.[1] Indeed, he created a Persian empire that extended from the Greek communities of Asia Minor to the marches of India. Ever since, virtues of a great strategic leader have been attributed to him, including by Xenophon who, as a Greek, might have been expected to be hostile to Cyrus’ expansion. Instead, Xenophon took him as a model for the ideal leader in war and peace. Even today, the stories of his leadership are revered in management literature. But does the reality justify the acclaim? Professor Lynette Mitchell of the University of Exeter has discovered her interest in the life and achievements of Cyrus from her earlier research on Greek culture and customs, on which she has published widely. Her book, Cyrus the Great: A Biography of Kingship, was published by Routledge in 2023. [1] Irving Finkel (ed.): The Cyrus Cylinder: The King of Persia's Proclamation from Ancient Babylon. (London: I-.B- Tauris, 2013)
Baroness Catherine Ashton, formerly the European Union’s lead for foreign and security strategy, discusses challenges, opportunities and tips for collaborative strategy-making. As the EU’s first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton was at the heart of international strategy making between 2009 and 2014 working on some of the world’s most intractable problems. She was appointed by the UN Security Council to lead the P5+1 negotiations for a nuclear deal with Iran and was in post when Russia first invaded Ukraine, seizing Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014. She also led peace negotiations in the Western Balkans between Serbia and Kosovo, for which she was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. In this episode, she reflects on strategy-making in an international and supranational context, the challenges facing Europe today and how ‘false binaries’ – such as those that posit the EU and NATO as being in opposition – stifle effective strategy elaboration. She argues that strategy makers need preparedness of thought and action, the ability to ground their ambition both in reality but also in individual and organisational values, as well as the will to ask, and respond to, the key question of any adaptive strategy, ‘And then what?’. In an illustrious career, The Rt Hon The Baroness Catherine Ashton of Upholland LG GCMG PC was a minister, Leader of the House of Lords, the UK’s first female Commissioner in the European Union and the High Representative and First Vice President for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in the Barroso Commission establishing the European External Action Service as a major actor in international affairs.
General Nasution's journey from insurgent to Army commander and strategist fighting against communist insurgents in Indonesia is described by Colonel Dr Almuchalif Suryo. Trained by the Dutch as part of the Netherlands East Indies Army, General Abdel Haris Nasution (1918-2000) fought with them against the Japanese during the Second World War and then against them for Indonesian independence. Having become an expert guerilla commander, he was then charged with creating Indonesia's state army, a force that had to unite elements trained by the Dutch and the Japanese, as well as citizen soldiers. One of the first tasks of this new army was to counter a communist insurgency in which Nasution himself was a target. Narrowly surviving an assassination attempt that killed his 8-year old daughter, he fell afoul of Indonesia's politics and was removed from post by President Sukarno. Nasution was rehabilitated under President Suharto before the two fell out. Towards the end of Nasution's life, they reconciled, and Nasution became one of only three five-star generals in Indonesia's history. Colonel Dr Almuchalif Suryo was an infantry officer in the Indonesian Army, where he was the school commander of the Combatant Training Centre and Head of Total War Study at the Republic of Indonesia Defence University. Now retired, he still lectures there. He speaks to us in a personal capacity. FURTHER READING Abdul Haris Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Abdul Haris Nasution, Towards a People's Army, Djakarta cv Delegasi, 1964. C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: a political biography, University of Queensland Press, 1985. Almuchaif Suryo, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Concept of Citizen Soldiery, Norwich University, 1999.
Admiral John (Jacky) Fisher radically transformed the Royal Navy in terms of its people, doctrine, equipment and structures. Dr Richard Dunley explains how. Few service chiefs have had such a profound effect on their service as Admiral of the Fleet, Baron Fisher of Kilverstone, Chief of the British Royal Navy in 1904-1910, and again in 1914-1915, before resigning in frustration over Churchill's Gallipoli campaign. Joining a wooden-hulled, sail-powered Royal Navy at the age of 13, by the time he retired aged 74, his Service was operating steel-hulled, oil-powered and technologically advanced battleships, with submarine and aviation arms. He was at the forefront of many of these reforms, but his impact went beyond the technology, overseeing profound changes in naval strategy (working alongside Julian Corbett - Season 1, Episode 1), doctrine, force disposition, personnel and training. Like other great strategic leaders, he was adept at shaping the political environment, securing for the Royal Navy the lion's share of the defence budget. Yet his legacy is mixed - his Royal Navy was undoubtedly a stronger, more capable fighting force but, according to our guest, was institutionally damaged and divided, and took some time to recover. Dr Richard Dunley is a senior lecturer in history and maritime strategy at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, where he teaches at the Australian Defence Force Academy. His research focuses on the relationship between navies and technology, with a particular emphasis on the Royal Navy in the early 20th century.
Professor Charles Forsdick tells the story of Toussaint Louverture, who led Haiti’s successful and highly adaptive slave revolt against the 18th century’s great powers. Toussaint Loverture was a force of nature. A former slave, he led the revolt in Saint Domingue between 1791– 1802 that resulted in Haitian independence. As a self-taught military commander, he was ever present in the fight, adapting his tactics, employing psychological warfare techniques and harnessing the island’s tropical diseases to degrade the French occupying forces. A man of contradictions, he was variously a Spanish monarchist and a French republican who played the great powers of Britain, France, Spain and the United States to secure the space and resources for his revolution to succeed. Despite leading one of the only successful slave revolts in history, he was less successful as a ruler, where the traits that made him such a great military leader, isolated him from his people. Internal divisions within the revolutionary army led to his capture by Napoleon’s forces and death in captivity in France a few months before Haiti achieved full independence in 1803. For this reason, the Haitian’s know him as ‘the Precursor’ and reserve the title, ‘Liberator’, for one of his lieutenants, Dessalines. Professor Charles Forsdick is the Drapers Chair of French at the University of Cambridge. He writes extensively about post-colonial memory in Francophone countries, and is the co-author of Toussaint Louverture, A Black Jacobin in the Age of Revolution, with Christian Høgsbjerg published by Pluto Press in 2017.
Jean-Marc Lieberherr examines Jean Monnet’s vital role in securing US arms for Britain and France during the Second World War and in driving international cooperation. A committed internationalist, long before becoming one of the founding fathers of the EU, Jean Monnet played a crucial role in enabling cooperation between countries in two world wars. As a member of the Executive Committee of the Allied Maritime Transport Council during the First World War, he helped coordinate shipping between the Allied powers of France, Great Britain, Italy and, from 1918, the US, before becoming the Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations in 1919. During the subsequent world conflagration, , Monnet, trusted by Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle, coordinated arms procurement from the US through the Anglo-French Co-Ordinating Committee, the British Purchasing Committee and the Combined Production and Resources Board. According to economist John Maynard Keynes, Monnet’s work shortened that war by one year. After 1945, Monnet continued seeking internationalist solutions, connecting the French and German markets under the European Coal and Steel Community. Seeing how the principles of cooperation could be applied more broadly, he advocated for a European Defence Community during the Korean War. While this attempt at European defence integration failed, his work inspired the founding treaties of the EU. He became the first ‘Honorary Citizen of Europe’ in 1976. Jean-Marc Lieberherr is the founding chairman of the Jean Monnet Institute (JMI), which is devoted to promoting Monnet’s historical heritage. Before creating the JMI in 2021, he had a career with large international groups such as LVMH, Unilever and Rio Tinto. Further Reading Jean Monnet, Memoirs (London: Harper Collins, 1978). François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York, NY: W W Norton, 1994). Robert R Nathan, ‘An Unsung Hero of World War II’, in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds), Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 1991). W W Rostow, ‘Jean Monnet: The Innovator As Diplomat’ in Gordon A Craig and Francis L Loewenheim (eds), The Diplomats, 1939-1979 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 257–88. Sherrill Brown Wells, Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 2011). Institut Jean Monnet Website, available at: https://institutjeanmonnet.eu/en/.
Professor Mark Wilson explains how governments, industry and the military collaborated to forge the US’s ‘arsenal of democracy’ during the Second World War. The prevailing myth is that the miracle of US industrial production was achieved by individual business leaders who were freed from the dead hand of government. The truth is more nuanced. The impressive efforts of business leaders relied on their workforce, government and the military. It was also a truly international effort. French and British orders started before the European war and long before Pearl Harbor, thereby expanding US industrial capacity and providing a springboard for success once the US was mobilised. This episode’s guest, Professor Mark Wilson, is an historian from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He specialises in in military-industrial relations and war mobilisations in US history, having written important books on US Civil War mobilisation and the business and politics of US industrial mobilisation for the Second World War.
Fighting for her rightful inheritance of the English crown, Empress Matilda (1110–1125) proved to be a grandmaster in the Anarchy’s bloody chess game. The war of dynastic succession in 12th century England and Normandy is known as the Anarchy. (1135-1154). Barons and nobles of all ranks joined in the family quarrel over the succession to Henry I. Matilda, Henry’s only surviving legitimate child and widow of Holy Roman Emperor Henry V, challenged her cousin and rival Stephen of Blois, who managed to seize the crown. This was a game of chess or chequers, in which seizing castles and fortified towns was what mattered, as well as bringing nobles with their retainers over to one’s side. Matilda played astutely but only won when she ceased to pursue the crown for herself and demanded it for her son. She continued as the power behind Henry II’s throne from Normandy. This episode’s guest, Dr Catherine Hanley, is the author of the latest scholarly biography of Empress Matilda, Matilda: Empress, Queen, Warrior (Yale University Press, 2019). Holding a PhD in Medieval Studies from the University of Sheffield, she is the author of several history books.
Modern Turkey was forged by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. In this episode, Dr Mesut Uyar joins us to discuss Atatürk’s legacy of strategic leadership. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was the most important Turkish political leader since the Ottoman Empire’s expansion was checked at Vienna in 1683. A career officer educated from the age of 12 in military academies – where he excelled, earning the nickname Kemal (‘the Perfect’) – he saw service in Tripolitania (modern Libya) and the Balkans. He entered the world stage during the First World War, especially for his command of the Ottoman 19th Division defending the Gallipoli peninsula against the Allied forces’ landings in 1915–16. His ascent was secured through his command in the war with Greece over the frontiers of the Turkish rump-state in 1919–1922, which ended in a population exchange. His military successes paved the way for his political leadership, which was inspired by French Republican views. He transformed Turkey through a profound programme of modernisation, which earned him a new title, Ata-Türk – father of Turkey. Despite his small stature, he cast a long shadow over Turkey that endures today. Dr Mesut Uyar, our guest for this episode, graduated from the Turkish Military Academy and from Istanbul University (Political Sciences). As a Turkish career military officer twice wounded in action, he served as an instructor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and did several tours for the UN in Georgia and as a staff officer in Afghanistan. He has lectured on Ottoman military history at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, and at Antalya Bilim University. He is currently a visiting professor at the University of New South Wales, Canberra.
H.R. McMaster shares his extensive experience of strategy-making and strategic leadership as a military officer, academic and former United States’ national security advisor. ‘The Iconoclast General’, H.R. McMaster has a distinguished record serving his country. Commissioned from West Point into the armoured cavalry, he retired as a Lieutenant General after thirty-four years’ service, including operational service in Iraq and Afghanistan. His success in fighting counter-insurgency campaigns saw him involved in the development of the United States’ Army and Marine Corps’ counter-insurgency field manual (FM3-24). One of Time Magazine’s 100 most influential people in April 2014, he was described by Lieutenant General (retired) David Barno as ‘the 21st century Army's pre-eminent warrior-thinker’. Appointed by President Trump, H.R. McMaster served as the 25th National Security Advisor between February 2017 to March 2018. His account of his time in the White House is described with typical balance and candour in At War With Ourselves. Consultation, bringing top leaders together and getting them to thrash out what the problem is and what one should do about it, and then to issue directives to a (sometimes) reluctant bureaucracy, that was his recipe. In this episode, he describes how the National Security Strategy of 2017 was negotiated during his time in office, the methodology, some of its main tenets, and how it was translated into policy making. And how an historical perspective offers lessons and consolation today. A historian by training, he has a PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on the flaws and inadequacies of U.S. strategy in the Vietnam War, and now lectures at Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business. He hosts the podcast series Battlegrounds: Vital Perspectives on Today’s Challenges and is a regular on GoodFellows, both of which are produced by the Hoover Institution. He is a Distinguished University Fellow at Arizona State University.
The world’s first independent air force owes its survival and shape to its ‘father’, Hugh Trenchard. We explore how with the RAF Museum’s Dr Harry Raffal. Described as ‘the architect and patron saint of modern air power’, Marshal of the RAF Viscount Hugh Trenchard (1873–1956) was the first Chief of the Air Staff (January–April 1918 and 1919–1930). An army officer badly wounded in the Boer War, he was among the first British military pilots and the frontline commander of the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War. The RAF was formed on 1 April 1918, and Trenchard set firm foundations for its survival and development, often against bitter hostility from the other Services. His administrative skills, realism, tenacity and willingness to be unpopular created an organisation that saved the nation during the Battle of Britain. His friend TE Lawrence (Season 3, Episode 7) argued that ‘The RAF is the finest individual effort in history. No other man has been given a blank sheet and told to make a Service from the ground up. It is your single work…’ Following retirement from the RAF, Trenchard was appointed as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, where he set about a substantial reform agenda with the same single-mindedness. Dr Harry Raffal is Head of Collections and Research at the RAF Museum. His doctorate, from the University of Hull, explores RAF and Luftwaffe operations during the evacuation of Dunkirk. He is a Committee member of the RAF Historical Society and the British Commission for Military History, and Vice-Chair of the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Aeronautical Heritage Group.
The 3rd Marquess of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732), soldier, diplomat and scholar, pioneered humanist ways to prevent or suppress insurgencies in his Military Reflections. In his time, Marcenado was the most widely read Spanish author on war. He drew on his own rich experiences of the Spanish War of Succession to complement his erudition based on existing publications from antiquity to the Age of Enlightenment. In a work comprising 11 volumes, he examined subjects ranging from the ethical question of whether it is right to go to war, to the leadership qualities required in a general, to the merits and dangers of battle or the recruitment of soldiers. Intended as guidance for practitioners, his work set standards in both erudition and the human approach to war. This applies particularly to his thoughts on how to prevent, contain or pacify insurgencies. Marcenado was also a diplomat charged with negotiating on behalf of his kingdom to end the Anglo-Spanish War of 1727. His writing on war thus transcends the merely military, and the greater political dimension behind it can already be discerned. Dr Pelayo Fernández García of the University of Oviedo – our guest for this episode – is the greatest living expert on this Spanish thinker and practitioner, whose ideas are strikingly modern even for our times.
Voted Britain’s ‘greatest general’ by the National Army Museum in 2011, ‘Uncle Bill’ Slim led the XIVth Army from defeat to victory. Dr Robert Lyman tells us about Slim’s strategic leadership. Field Marshal William Slim (1891–1970) is famous for transforming troops who had retreated almost 1,000 miles through Burma pursued by the Japanese Army into a force that emerged from the Second World War victorious. Whether in defeat – where his leadership ensured his forces maintained their order and discipline – or in the campaign that led to their victory, his men loved him, giving him the affectionate title ‘Uncle Bill’. To have achieved this is all the more remarkable given the diversity of forces under his command. A master of combined and joint warfare, his forces included African, American, British, Chinese, Gurkha and Indian troops, and his ability to integrate air into his campaign predates – but acts as an exemplar for – the relationships needed for the air-land battle. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten stated about our subject that: “Whenever leadership is spoken of or written about, tribute is regularly paid to his supreme qualities as the finest leader of fighting men in the Second World War”. Our guest, Dr Robert Lyman MBE, agrees with this; he is a former officer in the British Army and a renowned author. His books include a biography of William Slim – Slim, Master of War (Constable & Robinson, 2004); a record of the Battle of Kohima (Kohima, 1944, published by Osprey Press, 2010); and, with General Lord Richard Dannatt, Victory to Defeat (Osprey, 2023). Dr Lyman is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.