Talking Talmud

A long mishnah (or a series that are published together): If a get is written with a name of a place that is not legitimate... Or other goofs in location... If other details are wrong... When is the get not a get? Plus, how a get that is not a get can really mess up a second marriage, and children from the second marriage. Plus, co-wives are treated like the divorcing woman too. Also, a deeper dive into the country that is not legitimate, and other countries as named in divorce. Plus, Rabbi Meir's approach in creating mamzerim.

Wherever you have the word "torah" (meaning, law, not the Torah in total) and the word "chukah" (meaning, statute) - then the capacity to invalidate the offering kicks in . But does that mean either/or or both? It certainly sounds like both - but the Gemara tracks it through and either/or sounds better by the end... Plus, the list of occasions or specific categories of people for which these terms are present in context in the Torah. Also, scriptural repetition about the requirements of the grain-offering establishes those details (where the repetition takes place) as essential. But the offering itself must be a permanent one for this essential status. Until the case where temporary status seems not to be a problem, in light of the number of repetitions...?

If one has intent to leave blood over from an animal sacrifice, does everyone agree that doing so would invalidate the offering? The Tannaim hash it out - with a focus on Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua. With a lot of heartfelt drama in the details of this passage. Also, a new mishnah: If you didn't do a whole slew of the tasks associated with the grain-offering, the tasks on that list won't invalidate the offering. Plus, the Gemara that delves into the specifics of those tasks, and why those details matter to preserve the validity of the offerings. And more on the Temple service for the shelamim - peace-offerings too. Plus, the 15 tasks associated with these grain-offerings all together.

Rabbi Hanina helped Rabbi Hamnuna with understanding something in Torah that he counted as equivalent to all the rest of his Torah learning: namely, on the burning of the handful and pigul, of course. Also, starting chapter 3 with a new mishnah! Taking the fistful of grain, but as something that is not meant to be eaten or that which is not meant to be burned - that would still be valid (except for one who disagrees). With a delving into these details, and then a conundrum regarding the double-language in the source verses.

A long mishnah - on the affect of pigul when it only affects part of the "permitter" - matirin - namely, by burning one part, the rest becomes permitted for consumption. Including a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the sages -- which leads to other areas of dispute between them. And further, a dispute between Rav and Shmuel about the dispute of Rabbi Meir and the sages. Also, the 43 (or 47 or 48) presentations of blood from the animal sacrifices of Yom Kippur. Also, a sesame seed and the smallest amount of potential pigul. Plus, a rejection of Rabbi Meir's views here.

2 mishanyot! 1 - How combinations can make items pigul or not. With the cases of the thanksgiving offering (animal offering plus loaves) and also the "Shtei HaLehem" - lambs and 2 loaves of Shavuot. Also, a long discussion about what question Rabbi Elazar asked of Rav (to determine the question itself), in terms of pigul with varied factors -- the order of events, with regard to offerings, intent, minimal measure, and so on. Plus, a mention of "cannabis" (hemp) in the context of mixtures. 2 - Pigul intent renders the libations pigul once they've been sanctified, but the libations, if brought with pigul intent, would not make the offerings themselves pigul.

Is there such a thing as pigul for half of the offering? It's a machloket! And a further development of Rabbi Yosei's position, which doesn't presume karet and whether some amount of pigul intent contaminates everything - for example, the 2 loaves of lechem ha-panim. What is the smallest unit, so to speak, that can become a problem of pigul? Or can it be in parts at all? Also, what about mitigating factors against the phenomenon of pigul - to make an offering permitted, when it might have become pigul? Also, delving into the position of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi, regarding combining intents and whether pigul results. Plus, the implications of a communal offering (vs. a personal one), with regard to purity/impurity.

Returning to pigul, in a new mishnah, with a focus on Rabbi Yosei's position of when the wrong intent would not result in a punishment of karet. Also, on how removing the fistful of grain was considered parallel to the slaughtering in animal sacrifice. And then the placement of the handful into a vessel is akin to collecting the blood of an animal sacrifice after slaughtering in a vessel. Plus, another new mishnah: the 2 loaves of "lechem ha-panim" (the shewbread) and the 2 bowls of frankincense on the Shulhan/Table - and how they are subject to pigul too.

A long mishnah... specifically on how grain-offerings can be brought with invalidating intent, and how that will make the offerings "pigul." Yet, sometimes, the offering will be invalid, but the punishment for that would not be "karet" (and other times, it would be karet). Plus, the measure of an olive's worth, and the impact of that size portion. Also, the distinction between a sinner's grain-offering, in that the frankincense is not offered, and the burden of violation to the extent of pigul is slightly harder. Plus, again, whether a half-olive measure of eating and a half-olive measure of burning can combine to make a full-olive measure of violation (spoiler: the answer is no).

More on the kohen's fistful from the grain - ensuring no barrier to the grain itself. Plus, the physical description of how to take the grain in one's hand, with the understanding of a basic action - namely, what it means to take a handful. But what about if one used fingertips? Are all fingers supposed to be involved? The Torah has phrasing from which some details may be gleaned. Also, the frankincense! Which itself is (usually) essential to the menahot. Plus, a dispute about what happens for an offering of frankincense on its own, as compared together with the grain-offering (or the lehem hapanim).

When the Torah uses the term "finger" or the term "kohen," it is understood to always mean the right hand. The bias against the left-hand is already understood, but note that the Torah specifies the right-hand on occasion. But there are other occasions when the left-hand was explicitly called for (also as per the Torah) - to the extent that Rabbi Shimon allowed left-handed acceptance of the blood. Going back to the verses, "finger" AND "kohen" is necessary in his estimation. And the mishnah seems not to have included this machloket.

If oil and grain for the grain-offering were mixed outside the wall, would that be kosher as an offering or not? It's a machloket! With verses as prooftexts for each view. Also, left-handed grain-taking, which is, again, problematic in terms of the grain-offering. Plus, the explicit mention of the left-hand in the verses about the person recovering from tzara'at, and the way the rules of interpretation handle it (no pun intended).

On the "griddle-cakes" of the kohen gadol, Rabbi Yohanan addresses how partial cakes can be sanctified. But a beraita makes it clear that they needed to be brought as full cakes, not partial ones, so the kohen gadol could bring the amount of a smaller cake for the morning and afternoon, which might be lesser in some aspect, but no less sanctified. How does all of this connect to the ordinary minhah offering - why not learn one from the other? Plus, when do you bring a "havitin" without oil? Frankincense? With 4 "gufa" inquiries on this daf, referring back to the case on the previous one.

On the offering that is brought by a person who would make it invalidated, which means that there's no rectification for the grain-offering, by returning the fistful to the original vessel. Also, that vessel only functions to sanctify something when it's not on the ground. [Who's Who: Rav Avimi] Rav Avimi seems to have forgotten his Torah, especially that of Tractate Menahot - and there's discussion of his experience of studying with Rav Hisda. Also, more on the question of the vessel on the ground - where Rav Sheshet says: Go look and see what people do (but how did that work, generations after the Temple?). With recourse to the example of switching/refreshing the Lehem HaPanim (the shewbread). But isn't the Table (the Shulhan) resting on the ground?!

More on learning the details of the treyfa from "min ha-bakar" - to disqualify the treyfa. How several verses work together to learn the teaching that the Gemara wants to prove. Plus, a new mishnah! With a list of ways the offering would be rendered invalid. Also, a statement from Rav that seems to contradict the statement that a non-kohen taking the fistful of the grain would render it invalid. Can this error simply be redone? That may depend on the details of the case.

What happens in the case of a person who needs purification from tzara'at - a whole process - where the order of the tasks may make a difference in terms of validity - in the goal of using the case of tzara'at to answer the question the grain-offering, and ultimately rejecting it. Also, another parallel to animal sacrifices... in terms of paving the way for the sanctification of sacrifices, including, for example, melikah (of the bird). Plus, a kal va-chomer vs. verses understanding, where neither is quite rejected.

The meal-offerings that are exceptions to the general acceptance of them when offered in error: a sin-offering, and a minhat kena'ot, the "jealousy" offering of the sotah-woman. With verses to establish why the sin-offering is necessarily different, while the sotah-offering is a little more complicated, and dependent also on some logic. But wait - there's another offering that cannot be offered with any error of intent: the Omer! Which permits new grain for use, so if it was not brought correctly, it wouldn't permit the new grain. With a parallel to the nazir. And what about a guilt-offering?

Where are the most sacred offerings brought? And the less sacred offerings? That is, the northern and southern parts of the Temple courtyard, respectively. And what happens if the offering were brought in the wrong part of the courtyard? Also, what happens if one's intent is not for a grain-offering, but an animal sacrifice, for example? Or not for the right grain-offering? Intent is evident in the different kind of grain-offerings produced (fried, fluffy dough, etc.). And yet, the evident wrong-intent rarely invalidates the grain-offering. Why?

Shifting away from the animal sacrifices of Tractate Zevahim to grain-offerings and the particulars of offering from grain. The first key aspect of a grain-offering is removing a fistful of grain from it, and the parallel is drawn between the handling of it and that of the blood that was collected from animal sacrifice for the altar. Opening with a new mishnah, of course: If that fistful were taken, but not in the name of the offering being brought - the offering is still valid except for a sin-offering and a "minhah kenaot" - a "jealousy" offering that is brought by the Sotah woman. Also, the various kinds preparation of grain-offerings (all of which would be fit) - a flat griddle fried cake, a more spongy dough, etc. So if the kohen offered one in place of the other, with wrong intent, it's still clear what was done, and it leaves the grain-offering fit because it's identifiable. Note the difference between a grain-offering that is brought because the given offering is supposed to be from grain, as compared to when one is offered for the sake of an animal sacrifice, but when there was some reason that the animal wouldn't be brought.

More on private altars - beginning with whether a nighttime slaughter on a private altar was permitted. Plus, other details of the nature of the particulars of the acts on the altars. Also, issues of intent (back to pigul!) on the public altar in an era when there were private altars too. Plus, the effort to derive the laws about the private altars from the known laws about bird offerings and their potential for disqualification (specifically about timing and non-kohanim).