Talking Talmud

Now, the peace-offerings that are brought on occasions of thanksgiving - what if one were slaughtered in the name of a different person's thanksgiving? Is the fact that it's still a thanksgiving offering sufficient for it to be fit as an offering, or must another be offered? Also, other offerings that have to be made in the name of the specific sacrifice (like the Korban Pesach, which has to be a Shelamim/peace-offering).

More questions on sacrifices that were brought with incorrect intent. Do these incorrect sacrifices that are kosher as sacrifices function to atone for those who bring them? The in-depth discussion begins on amud alef and continues through amud bet. Note that a korban olah atones for a lack of fulfillment of a positive commandment -- what happens if a person needs to atone for two such violations? Including a parallel to the laying on of hands (semiha) for the offering, though in the end, it is set aside.

A sacrifice brought for a different reason than the original intent is a kosher/valid sacrifice, but it doesn't remove the obligation for whatever sacrifice from the individual who needs to bring it. Plus, Resh Lakish and his penchant for lying on his stomach in the beit midrash (study hall), presumably as an example of his very simple living. He is named here because of his queries on the above principle regarding a sacrifice brought for the wrong intention. Meaning, if the offering is valid, why wouldn't it provide atonement for the person offering it? Rabbi Eliezer has an answer, based on a parallel to an offering that was designated by a given individual, but not brought before that person died. With a parallel to the woman who bears a child (with the open question regarding her potential dealth in the interim, given the maternal death rate at the time). Also, other sages weigh in on the same divided opinions - with precedent of a comparable situation, and making suppositions about how Resh Lakish would have responded to a query. Plus, more on the apparently comparable case of a mother's children and whehther they can effect the atonement ...

[Apologies for this late release. Unfortunately, we are beholden to the app we use for publication of each episode, and we were delayed, apparently, by the app updating, or not updating, as the case was. We hope it will be in good form now for a long time to come.]What is the biblical source that the 4 different "blood" acts of worship - slaughter, receiving the blood in a consecrated vessel, bringing the blood to the altar, and throwing the blood on the altar - need to be done specifically for the sake of the specific offering being brought and also for the correct owner of that offering? Also, once those sources are established, a review of how the laws were actually derived from them - with principles of generalizations and specifics being applied.

If an offering is brought in the name of a different purpose from its originally intended purpose, it may or may not be fit as an offering. With comparisons to other arenas of Halakhah, specifically with regard to containers and the laws of purity and impurity. Also, an in-depth consideration of "change" - what happens when the owner of the offering is the change, and not the purpose of the offering itself? Why can't the offering be transferred to another?

An introduction to Seder Kodashim... with its focus on Temple ritual and the distance of those practices from how we practice Judaism today (and, for that matter, from how the sages did too). Including overviews for the kinds of korbanot (sacrifies), where they're offered, and the wide range of occasions when sacrifices are made. Also, a new mishnah! Namely, how korbanot can be offered not for the reason they were being brought - and they are still "kosher," fit as offerings, but with some exceptions. Plus, a comparison to bills of divorce written "in the name of" the woman being divorced. Where Rava raises a theory, a contradiction, and a resolution.

Where not attributing a sage's opinions to him by name is a punishment - specifically, here, in the case of Rabbi Meir, in follow-up to the previous daf's story of a kind of mutiny. Also, a debate over which kind of scholar is preferable - one who is incisive and sharply analytic or one who knows large swathes of information? Plus, the honor that Rav Yosef and Rabbah showed to each other. Also, another round of the sages, next generation - the honor given to Abaye for teaching material that none refuted.

Still and again, new mishnayot! 1 - An order of hierarchy when one has limited resources, where sometimes the man takes precedence and sometimes the woman does. Including a much too close for comfort recognition of this need, potentially, in the case of captives. Likewise, a man chooses to save himself, his teacher, his father - to save them in that order, though his mother would take precedence over all -- again, a bit disturbing, but in terms of irreplaceablity, perhaps reasonable. Plus, more stages, given various statuses. Also, there are 10 things that are harmful to one learning Torah, some of whcih sound distracting or destructive under other circumstances as well. Also, when the nasi (or king), the av beit din, or a Torah scholar enters the study hall, directives to the students when to stand and when it mattered less. Which leads to drama about who is worthy of being stood up for, especially when not everyone has the same degree of Torah scholarship as everyone else. Note the rudeness and kindness for Rabbi Shimon about Tractate Uktzin.

More on Rabbi Yossi HaGelili's opinion and the king's exemptions from having to bring atonement offerings. Note the privilege and, alternatively, the limitations of having wealth, as a king must. Also, a new mishnah! When various people violate mitzvot unwittingly that would get a "karet" sentence if done with intent, then they each bring specific animals as offerings. And here too, an unusual opinion, this time, Rabbi Shimon.

More on the anointed kohen, in comparison with the court - specifically, the bringing of a sin-offering for a violation that would receive "karet" if done intentionally and entails a sin-offering when done unwittingly. Plus, the significance of these details being biblical in origin, and therefore prompt a hunt for the source text, as compared to a halakhic dispute. Also, a new mishnah: When the court would not be required to bring the offering. Note that the "aseh" and "lo ta'aseh" come together - which likely would have benefited from more specific articulation in the episode. The cases of ritual impurity or contamination in the Temple come front and center - and are contrasted with the same kind of erroneous judgement having a different outcome with regard to the offering if it were about a menstruant woman, as compared to the consecretated foods in the Temple. Thus, limitations on the requirement to bring an offering in the event of an erroneous ruling. Also, another new mishnah! With additional limitations, specifically on the kinds of cases for which the court might have issued an erroneous ruling and then not necessarily been obligated to bring an offering in atonement. For example: false testimony. Plus, what is the liability of a king in these kinds of capacities? (Hint: It's a machloket)

When people returned to the land of Israel from Babylonia after that exile, they brought an offering on behalf of the people from the era of Tzedkiyahu. But all of that generation and long died! Normally, a designated sin-offering that isn't offered before the person offering it dies is left alone to get a blemish. But for a public offering, that doesn't work. But an inference can be made from the he-goat of Rosh Chodesh, in terms of it being a communal offering. But maybe the cases aren't comparable, say, if nobody died before the offering was made? Maybe eglah arufah is a good comparison? Some of the returning members of the community were actually still alive at this time - survivors from the time of the First Temple, which was certainly a sad time for them, but they were able to offer the sin-offering. Were they the minority or the majority? Also, the case where one of the public dies - when all the people must bring the offering. Now what? And so a search for parallet categories begins.

A new mishnah! (beginning on 4b) - Who actually brings the offering to atone for the erroneous ruling? What about when the sin is per tribe? Or if the majority of people in less than a majority of tribes?

An indictment of the Sadducees in the context of a court that issues an erroneous ruling that agrees with their understanding of the Torah. With a further investigation into what it would mean to make this kind of "uprooting halakhah" kind of error - how did that come about? And - two new mishnayot: 1 - Ways in which the erroneous judgement came to be issued when it so clearly should not have been. Plus, capital punishment. 2 - What if everyone sins because of the erroneous judgement? That's when the sacrifice or offering becomes essential, for each person.

Given that if the majority of Jewish people sin in following an erroneous ruling and they need to bring an offering to atone - who counts as that majority? It excludes the Jews who live in the Diaspora - with a source for that in the book of Kings. Also, how does this kind of majority obviate the views of the minority? And - a new mishnah! When the court issues an erroneous ruling and they realized they were in error and they correct themselves, but there are those who follow the initial ruling - do those people need to bring an offering or not? It will depend on their circumstances and whether they were in the position to hear about the revision to the ruling. Plus, what if the court wants to cancel an entire section of the Torah's law from practice?

A new tractate! On rulings that the court issues in error, and people then follow those ruling - are they held accountable, and if so, how? Sources are in Leviticus and Numbers. Plus, Eduyot and Avot. Also, a new mishnah: A decision to violate a mitzvah is in error - who would bring an offering to atone? Also, the communal offering for when the court explicitly allows something that is not permitted. Spotlighting Ben Azzai and Ben Zoma.