The Naked Pravda

Last month, as another 30 days of war passed in Ukraine, Russian activists, economists, and politicians in the exiled anti-Kremlin opposition spent much of their time arguing about a banking scandal from the last decade. The debate has been as mystifying to outsiders as it is confusing to those without an education in finance.  With help from Ilya Shumanov, the general director of Transparency International-Russia in exile, The Naked Pravda breaks down the squabbling and criminal stakes at the heart of the scandal involving Probusinessbank, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, and activist Maxim Katz. Timestamps for this episode: (5:27) The complex schemes at play in Probusinessbank (20:35) Where the Russian authorities and the FSB fit in (32:21) Political repression and legal battlesКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

On October 20, Moldovans cast their ballots in both a presidential election and a constitutional referendum — and the results shocked many. In the referendum, which asked whether the country should change its constitution to include the goal of joining the European Union, the “yes” vote won by just over 50 percent. Meanwhile, in the presidential election, pro-E.U. incumbent Maia Sandu came in first but failed to win an outright majority.  The day after the vote, Sandu accused “criminal groups” of attempting to undermine the democratic process by working with foreign forces to try and buy as many as 300,000 votes. Now, she’ll face pro-Russian candidate and former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo in a high-stakes run-off scheduled for November 3.  What does all of this say about Moldova’s political landscape and future foreign policy orientation? To find out, The Naked Pravda spoke to Moldovan journalist and writer Paula Erizanu and Ecaterina Locoman, a senior lecturer in international studies at the University of Pennsylvania’s Lauder Institute.  Timestamps for this episode: (3:05) Judiciary Reforms and Controversies (6:25) The Referendum and Its Implications (9:47) Election Day Atmosphere and Concerns (12:28) Post-Election Developments and Fraud Allegations (17:01) Russia’s Influence and Moldova’s Future (21:26) Impact of the Ukraine War on Moldova (23:14) Kremlin’s Strategy and Moldova’s Challenges (25:03) Public Opinion and the E.U. Referendum (30:37) Moldova’s Path Forward Prefer reading over listening? Subscribe to Meduza’s weekly newsletter The Beet to receive abridged excerpts from this episode. Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Earlier this week, journalists at WIRED and The Washington Post reported that a “Russian-aligned propaganda network notorious for creating deepfake whistleblower videos” appears to be behind a coordinated effort to promote false sexual misconduct allegations against vice presidential candidate Tim Walz. At WIRED, David Gilbert wrote that researchers have linked a group they’re calling “Storm-1516” to the campaign against Walz. “Storm-1516 has a long history of posting fake whistleblower videos, and often deepfake videos, to push Kremlin talking points to the West,” Gilbert explained. A few days earlier, NBC News also reported on Storm-1516, citing its work as demonstrative of Russian propaganda’s growing utilization of artificial intelligence and more sophisticated bot networks. Two days after the WIRED report, Washington Post journalist and Russia expert Catherine Belton reported on another bad actor implicated in spreading the allegations against Walz: John Mark Dougan, a former Florida cop with a long and winding record that includes internal affairs investigations, early discharge from the Marines, and a penchant for posting confidential data about thousands of police officers, federal agents, and judges on his blog, which led to 21 state charges of extortion and wiretapping. To escape that indictment, Dougan fled to Moscow, where he soon put his conspiratorial blogging skills to work, effectively enlisting in the Russian intelligence community’s “Internet war” against America. Records show and disinformation researchers argue that Dougan is responsible for content on dozens of fake news sites with deliberately misleading names like DC Weekly, Chicago Chronicle, and Atlanta Observer. Lately, he’s reportedly started using a GRU-facilitated server and AI generator to create phony videos like the deepfake video showing one of Walz’s former students accusing him of sexual abuse. With a little more than a week until the U.S. presidential election, Meduza spoke to Renée DiResta — the author of Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies Into Reality and an associate research professor at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy — about Russian propaganda, how it’s evolved over the years, and how American social networks are responding (and not responding) ahead of the November 2024 vote. Timestamps for this episode: (5:00) The Role of Social Networks in Identifying Fake Accounts (9:35) Government and Platform Collaboration on Inauthentic Behavior (16:46) A Case Study: Maxim Shugaley and Russian Influence in Libya (21:45) Twitter’s Public Data Dilemma (24:25) Bespoke Realities and Content Moderation (25:57) The Tenet Media Case (27:28) The Role of Influencers in Propaganda (35:26) Marketing and Propaganda: A Historical Perspective (38:27) The Democratization of Propaganda (39:36) Name Your Poison: Tyranny or ChaosКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

In the past few days, both the Zelensky administration in Kyiv and South Korea’s national spy agency have said that they believe North Korea has decided to send more than ten thousand troops to support Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. On October 18, following an emergency security meeting called by South Korea’s president, the country’s National Intelligence Service released an assessment claiming that the North is sending four brigades of 12,000 soldiers, including special forces, to Ukraine, which would be an unprecedented move, if true. Diplomats in Russia and North Korea say these reports are false. Meanwhile, American officials have warned repeatedly of the growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, saying that Washington has observed signs of increased material support to Moscow, including both artillery shells and missiles, such as KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles that have been recovered from wreckage in Ukraine. According to British journalists, North Korea supplies Russia with about half of the approximately three million artillery shells that Russian forces use annually in the war against Ukraine. However, Western officials have expressed skepticism about the claims that North Korea is sending large numbers of soldiers, apart from smaller groups of engineers and observers. For example, just the other day, NATO’s general secretary spoke at a press conference right alongside Zelensky and directly contradicted him, saying there is no evidence that North Korean soldiers are involved in the fight. For a crash course in Russian-North Korean relations and a hard look at recent claims from the Ukrainian and South Korean governments of thousands of North Korean soldiers flooding the battlefield in Ukraine, The Naked Pravda welcomed Dr. Fyodor Tertitskiy, a lecturer at Korea University and a leading researcher on North Korean politics. Timestamps for this episode: (3:15) The historical context of North Korea’s military strategy (5:41) South Korean diplomacy (7:45) Potential military aid and consequences (9:38) North Korean diplomatic tactics (12:06) China’s role in the Russian-North Korean alliance (14:46) Russia’s weapon purchases from North Korea (19:12) The historical context of Soviet/Russian-North Korean relations (25:04) Symbolic gestures for Vladimir PutinКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

The Russian government’s new draft budget for 2025 through 2027 was introduced to the State Duma this week in its first reading. The state’s proposed spending exceeds earlier predictions, with 41.5 trillion rubles (more than $435 billion) allocated for next year alone — and that may not be the final amount. A record share of the budget is classified as “secret” or “top secret” — nearly a third of all proposed expenditures.  To discuss the draft budget, focusing on allocations to the military, The Naked Pravda welcomed back Alexandra Prokopenko, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, a former columnist for the business newspaper Vedomosti, and a former senior advisor at Russia’s Central Bank. Timestamps for this episode: (2:26) Breaking down Russia’s next round of federal spending on the military and national security (4:08) Economic implications and rising taxes (7:18) Russia’s National Wealth Fund and budget deficit (10:14) Patriotism and public-sector funding (11:54) Domestic (in)security (15:12) Lobbying and budget allocations (21:45) Western Sanctions and Russia’s economic resilienceКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Wildberries founder and CEO Tatyana Kim (who recently restored her maiden name) has been having a hell of a time shaking loose her husband, Vladislav Bakalchuk, but their very public divorce is just the tip of the iceberg in what’s become a battle between some of the most powerful political groups in Russia’s North Caucasus. On September 18: Vladislav Bakalchuk tried to storm the company’s office in the Romanov Dvor business center — just a few hundred yards from the Kremlin itself. Bakalchuk has very publicly opposed the Wildberries-RussGroup merger and recently met with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to plead his case, winning the dictator’s support. At the Moscow office, Bakalchuk’s entourage had two former senior executives, but — more importantly — he was accompanied by former and current Chechen police officers and National Guardsmen, as well as trained martial artists from Chechnya, including former world and European taekwondo champion Umar Chichaev. According to Novaya Gazeta Europe, Chichaev fired his service weapon, though his status in the National Guard is a bit fuzzy. On the other side of the conflict, defending the Wildberries office was another team of police and police-adjacent men with ties to Ingushetia. According to the newspaper Novaya Gazeta, Wildberries had recently hired a private security company with ties to Ingush State Duma deputy Bekkhan Barakhoev, who, until three years ago, worked as a vice president of a subsidiary of Russ Outdoor — the smaller company now merging with Wildberries. The most important shadow figure at Russ Outdoor, meanwhile, is Suleiman Kerimov, a billionaire senator from Dagestan. The office shootout left two Ingush men dead and more than two dozen suspects in police custody, though Vladislav Bakalchuk miraculously escaped charges as a mere witness. He claims he merely showed up for a planned business meeting, but Tatyana Kim calls the incident a failed attempt at a hostile takeover. To learn more about this story and its broader political context, The Naked Pravda spoke to Ilya Shumanov, the general director of Transparency International-Russia in exile. Timestamps for this episode: (3:08) The power struggle between Kim and Bakalchuk (4:55) Suleiman Kerimov: Dagestan’s “shadow governor” (7:20) The Wildberries-RussGroup merger and its implications (9:47) Clan battles and regional tensions (21:44) The future of corporate raiding in RussiaКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Last month, the FBI raided the homes of Scott Ritter, a former United Nations weapons inspector and critic of American foreign policy, and Dimitri Simes, a former think tank executive and an adviser to Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. In late August, The New York Times reported that these searches were part of the U.S. Justice Department’s “broad criminal investigation into Americans who have worked with Russia’s state television networks.” In the past two weeks, U.S. officials have taken numerous measures against Russia Today and its affiliates and accelerated police actions against Russia-based individuals and entities accused of covert influence operations, including money laundering, sanctions violations, and unregistered foreign agent work. For example, the Justice Department announced the seizure of 32 Internet domains used in Russian government-directed foreign malign influence campaigns (colloquially referred to as “Doppelganger”), alleging that Russian companies used online domains to impersonate legitimate news entities and unique media brands to spread Russian government propaganda covertly, violating U.S. laws against money laundering and trademarks.  That same day, the Justice Department indicted two Russia-based employees of RT for conspiring to commit money laundering and conspiring to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act in a $10-million scheme to fund and direct a Tennessee-based company to publish and disseminate information “with hidden Russian-government messaging.” A day later, officials charged Dmitri Simes and his wife with participating in a plot to violate U.S. sanctions and launder money obtained from Russian state television. About a week later, the U.S. State Department issued a special “alert to the world,” declaring that new information obtained over the past year reveals that Russia Today has “moved beyond being simply a media outlet” and has become “an entity with cyber capabilities” that’s “also engaged in information operations, covert influence, and military procurement.” Washington claims that the Russian government embedded within RT in Spring 2023 an entity “with cyber operational capabilities and ties to Russian intelligence.” Based on these allegations, Meta — the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp — soon announced that it had banned Russia Today and its affiliates from all its platforms.  A day before that big announcement from the State Department, a jury in Tampa, Florida, convicted four American citizens of conspiracy to act as agents of the Russian government. Case evidence first reported by RFE/RL shows that the activists on trial secretly coordinated their activities and received funding from “Anti-Globalization Movement” head Alexander Ionov, who acted on orders from Russia’s Federal Security Service. To discuss this recent explosion of American police and diplomatic activity targeting RT and Russian covert influence operations in the U.S., The Naked Pravda spoke to RFE/RL journalist Mike Eckel, who coauthored the September 6 report on how Ionov and his FSB handlers “chatted and plotted to sow discord in the United States.” Timestamps for this episode: (5:54) The U.S. government’s coordinated campaign against Russian covert influence operations (7:18) Legal strategies when prosecuting Moscow’s malign activities (8:37) Alexander Ionov and the FSB (15:11) American activists and Russian covert operations (18:52) “Foreign agency” in the U.S. vs. in Russia (32:12) Dmitri Simes and Channel One (36:18) Scott Ritter and Russia TodayКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

The Pentagon says it’s confirmed that Iran has given “a number of close-range ballistic missiles to Russia.” While Washington isn’t sure exactly how many rockets are being handed over to Moscow, the U.S. Defense Department assesses that Russia could begin putting them to use within a few weeks, “leading to the deaths of even more Ukrainian civilians.” “One has to assume that if Iran is providing Russia with these types of missiles, that it’s very likely it would not be a one-time good deal, that this would be a source of capability that Russia would seek to tap in the future,” Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Major General Pat Ryder told reporters on September 10. That same day, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in London that the new supply of Iranian missiles will allow Russia to use more of its own longer-range ballistic missiles for targets that are farther from the frontline. To find out where the Russian-Iranian partnership is headed and what, if anything, changes in the Ukraine War with Tehran sending ballistic missiles to Moscow, The Naked Pravda spoke to Dr. Nicole Grajewski, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an associate researcher with the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Grajewski also has a forthcoming book, titled Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine. Timestamps for this episode: (1:54) Technical details about these ballistic missiles (5:05) The role of sanctions and the Iran nuclear deal (8:51) Iranian drones and ballistic missiles in Ukraine (10:16) Russian-Iranian military cooperation (16:07) Factional politics in Iran and RussiaКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Russia’s federal censor has been throttling YouTube playback speeds for the last month or so, just like it slowed Twitter data transfer speeds back in 2021. Throughout August, Russian Internet users have reported sudden and widespread outages in access to popular apps and services like Telegram, WhatsApp, Skype, Wikipedia, Steam, Discord, and more. While the RuNet crackdown has become a familiar feature of the Putin regime, its technical side is hard to understand. For help with the science of Russian Internet censorship and surveillance, Meduza spoke to Sarkis Darbinyan, a senior legal counsel to the digital rights group RKS Global (which recently published a report titled “State of Surveillance: A Study on How the Russian State, Through Laws and Technology, Carries Out Digital Surveillance”) and Philipp Dietrich, a project officer for the “Risks of the Sovereign Internet for Russia and Beyond” project at the German Council on Foreign Relations’s Center for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. Timestamps for this episode: (3:58) The technical underbelly of Internet throttling (6:24) Telegram’s public role and past political controversies in Russia (10:05) Police surveillance tools and data leaks (19:15) Meet SORM, the FSB’s surveillance system (30:54) VPNs, Google Global Cache, and the Internet’s CDN infrastructureКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

It’s been almost two weeks since the Ukrainian Armed Forces smashed through Russia’s border defenses in the Kursk region and began a surprise offensive that has advanced about 17 miles at its deepest point, according to Meduza’s estimates. Regional officials in Kursk have evacuated towns along the Ukrainian border, and more than 120,000 people have been forced to leave their homes. Vladimir Putin has met several times with top national security officials, but Russia’s president hasn’t yet bothered to make a national address, even though part of the country — a real part of the country, not just Ukrainian lands that Moscow claims — is now under foreign occupation. At the same time, Russian troops are still attacking Ukrainian defenses in the Donbas, where Kyiv remains vulnerable after months of slow Russian advances. The world is watching to see if the Kursk incursion can force the Kremlin to pull soldiers from eastern Ukraine. One of the most sensitive issues inside Russia related to Ukraine’s Kursk offensive is the use of conscript soldiers. To discuss the course of the Kursk incursion and to understand why sending conscripts into Russia’s new conflict zone is so tricky, The Naked Pravda spoke to RFE/RL journalists Mark Krutov and Sergey Dobrynin, who have tracked the war closely and recently wrote an article addressing how the Russian military plans to use conscripts amid Kyiv’s offensive in Kursk. Timestamps for this episode: (3:04) How Ukraine penetrated Russia’s border so easily (9:10) Comparisons to previous incursions and Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive (16:10) The role and impact of conscripts (29:00) Political sensitivity and Russian public reactionsКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the West has imposed over 16,000 sanctions on Russia, intending to cripple the economy driving the Kremlin’s war machine. But the much-anticipated collapse of Russia’s economy never came to pass. In fact, Russia’s wartime economy has proven to be surprisingly resilient, with the IMF estimating that Russia’s GDP grew by 3.5% in 2023 and will continue to grow by 3.2% in 2024. The Kremlin has managed to keep Russia’s economy afloat, in large part, by increased military spending and forging new partnerships with countries like China and India who don’t mind flying in the face of Western sanctions. And although the Kremlin touts all of this as evidence that the West and its sanctions have failed in their endeavors to defeat Russia, a closer look under the hood reveals a more desperate disposition. A recent Financial Times article paints a more bleak picture of Russia’s relative power in the world's geopolitical hierarchy and the economic consequences it brings. Financial Times’ Russia correspondent, Anastasiia Stognei, joined The Naked Pravda to reconcile these two vastly different images being painted of Russia’s economy and to discuss the potential long-term consequences of the war in Russia. Timestamps for this episode: (3:17) Sanctions and the Russian economy (6:22) Russia’s wartime economic strategies (15:23) Long-term effects on Russian society (24:55) Future trade relations and economic outlookКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

It’s a tense moment for Ukraine. The optimism that followed Ukraine’s early successes on the battlefield in 2022 started to fade last summer as its counteroffensive failed to achieve a breakthrough. By late 2023, Ukraine’s then-commander-in-chief said the war had reached a “stalemate” — and by the start of the spring, things were looking even worse, with high-ranking Ukrainian officers warning a collapse of the front lines could be imminent without more weapons from Washington. In mid-April, U.S. lawmakers finally passed a $60-billion aid package, buying Ukraine some time and some hope. But Ukraine’s defense still faces major headwinds, and Russian forces have continued gradually advancing along various sections of the front line in recent weeks. Amid this enormous uncertainty, a new report from the International Crisis Group titled “Ukraine: How to Hold the Line” aims to distill the lessons of the past year for Ukraine and its backers. According to Simon Schlegel, the group’s senior Ukraine analyst, if Ukraine and its partners take these lessons into account, Russia’s aggression is “likely to fail” — but applying them will be anything but easy. Schlegel joined The Naked Pravda to discuss Crisis Group’s recommendations for Kyiv and its supporters and the stakes for the wider region if Ukraine fails to hold the line against Russia. Timestamps for this episode: (1:33) Stakes for Ukraine and Europe (6:41) Western military aid: Incrementalism and its impact (9:47) European allies: Preparedness and challenges (12:25) Advanced weapons systems: Training and deployment issues (16:59) Planning for contingencies: Ukraine’s efforts and limitations (20:34) Negotiation prospects (24:54) Putin’s mixed signals: Peace talks and nuclear threatsКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

For the past two months, millions of Kazakhstanis have been glued to their screens, witnessing a landmark moment in the nation’s history: a murder trial live-streamed on YouTube. This was the trial of Kuandyk Bishimbayev, Kazakhstan’s former economic minister, who was convicted of torturing and killing his wife, Saltanat Nukenova, on November 9, 2023. The brutal CCTV footage of the incident went viral, not just within Kazakhstan but internationally as well. This trial not only highlighted Saltanat Nukenova’s tragic case but also shined a glaring spotlight on Kazakhstan’s chronic issues with domestic violence. To learn more about the case and its wider significance, Meduza intern Ekaterina Rahr-Bohr and Meduza senior news editor Sam Breazeale spoke to Century College political scientist Dr. Colleen Wood, human rights activist and NeMolchiKZ founder Dinara Smailova, and The Village Kazakhstan editor-in-chief Aleksandra Akanaeva. Timestamps for this episode: (6:33) The role of social media and public sentiment (9:51) The impact of “Saltanat’s law” (16:41) Broader issues of domestic violence in Kazakhstan (26:00) The role of NGOs and activists (28:55) Dinara Smailova’s personal stories (36:34) The need for systemic changesКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Historically, Ukraine has been home to people of a variety of faiths and religious denominations, and it’s been exceptionally “open to receiving a wide spectrum of religious communities” in the years since the collapse of the U.S.S.R, according to expert Catherine Wanner. This laissez-faire approach to religion stands in stark contrast to Russian state policy, which claims to embrace religious pluralism while systematically repressing religious liberty. In Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, experts have documented at least 76 incidents of religious persecution since the full-scale war began in February 2022, including forced conversion, abduction, and murder. This persecution, which some experts say may constitute a “systematic” campaign, has affected Ukrainians of a number of faiths, including Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Muslims. But members of one group have been especially likely to face repressions: Protestants, despite making up between two and four percent of Ukraine’s population, were the victims of 34 percent of cases of religious persecution, as writer Peter Pomerantsev noted in his article “Russia’s War Against Evangelicals,” published in Time last month. This includes evangelical Baptists, who were the most likely denomination to face persecution after Ukrainian Orthodox believers. Russia’s disproportionate targeting of evangelical Christians in Ukraine is no coincidence. One Ukrainian pastor quoted in Pomerantsev’s article summed up the occupation authorities’ mindset like this: “You are the American faith, the Americans are our enemies, [and] the enemies must be destroyed.” To learn more about Russia’s violent campaign against Ukrainian evangelicals and one organization’s efforts to raise awareness about it in the United States, Meduza senior news editor Sam Breazeale spoke to Steven Moore and Anna Shvetsova from the humanitarian aid organization the Ukraine Freedom Project, and Catherine Wanner, a professor of history and religious studies at Penn State University who studies religious life in Ukraine. Timestamps for this episode: (2:30) Exploring Ukraine’s religious landscape since 1991 (9:31) The persecution of Protestants in occupied Ukraine (26:14) The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the conflict (27:24) Navigating political disinformation and support for Ukraine in the U.S.Как поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

It’s strange days recently at Russia’s Defense Ministry. Amid the replacement of the agency’s head, police have brought large-scale bribery charges against at least two senior officials in the Defense Ministry, raising questions about the state of corruption in Russia’s military and the Kremlin’s approach to the phenomenon in wartime.  Also earlier this month, the American Political Science Review published relevant new research by political scientist David Szakonyi, an assistant professor at George Washington University and a co-founder of the Anti-Corruption Data Collective. In the article, titled “Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia,” Dr. Szakonyi explores if corrupt State Duma deputies “govern differently” and tries to establish what the governing costs of such corruption might be. The methodology he uses will be familiar to The Naked Pravda’s listeners who know the techniques of anti-corruption activists like the researchers at Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Dr. Szakonyi joins this week’s podcast to discuss his findings in the context of a major “anti-corruption moment” for Russia’s Armed Forces. Timestamps for this episode: (3:26) Is this a story about corrupt politicians writ large or specifically in authoritarian states? (4:55) Explaining the paper’s methodology (13:09) The demographics of State Duma corruption (14:21) How the Kremlin co-opts corrupt officials and even welcomes them into politics (17:35) The State Duma as a “rubber stamp” legislature (19:53) “High politics” and “low politics” (21:32) The role of Russia’s security services (23:34) Exhaustion with anti-corruption revelationsКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

The leadup to voting this November will renew fears in the United States about Russian malign influence. That means more paranoia from politicians, more alarming op-eds and white papers from the institutes created and funded to draw attention to foreign disinformation, and more mutual suspicions among ordinary people on social media, where journalists and pundits often draw their anecdotal conclusions about popular opinion. This week, for a skeptical view of the foreign disinformation threat in America, The Naked Pravda welcomes Gavin Wilde, an adjunct faculty member at the Alperovitch Institute, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a former director for Russia, Baltic, and Caucasus Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council. Together with Olga Belogolova, Lee Foster, and Thomas Rid, Wilde recently coauthored “Don’t Hype the Disinformation Threat: Downplaying the Risk Helps Foreign Propagandists — but So Does Exaggerating It” in Foreign Affairs. About a month earlier, he also wrote an article in the Texas National Security Review, titled “From Panic to Policy: The Limits of Foreign Propaganda and the Foundations of an Effective Response.” In this week’s episode, Wilde talked about both of these essays. Timestamps for this episode: (3:51) Talking to those who believe that foreign disinformation threatens to undo U.S. democracy (7:32) The profit incentives behind counter-disinformation work (10:43) Shifting geopolitical adversaries in counter-disinformation work (13:26) Cognitive information threats (16:56) Deconversion from the ‘Period of Panic’ (20:12) Hard-science methodologies and ontologies (22:49) When does downplaying foreign disinformation become dangerous? (25:23) The challenges of U.S. partisan subjectivityКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Over the past few weeks, many in the think-tank community have argued about the negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv in the first two months of the full-scale invasion, following an article published on April 16 in Foreign Affairs, titled “The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine: A Hidden History of Diplomacy That Came Up Short — but Holds Lessons for Future Negotiations,” by Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, and Sergey Radchenko, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Europe. In their article, Charap and Radchenko acknowledge that today’s prospects for negotiations “appear dim and relations between the parties are nearly nonexistent,” but they argue that the “mutual willingness” of both Putin and Zelensky in March and April 2022 “to consider far-reaching concessions to end the war” suggest that these two leaders “might well surprise everyone again in the future.” Charap and Radchenko joined The Naked Pravda to talk about this largely forgotten diplomacy, as well as the reactions to their research and what it might reveal in the years ahead. Timestamps for this episode: (2:27) Summary of the Foreign Affairs article (4:46) Entertaining the idea that Russia negotiated in good faith (7:41) If Putin was open to concessions during early setbacks, could the West hope for leverage again? (12:51) Criticism from Poland’s think-tank community (15:13) Lessons and recommendations for tomorrow’s parallel-track diplomacy? (20:40) The biggest surprises in this research (26:46) The shape of a possible peace to comeКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

According to a new investigation from Novaya Gazeta Europe, Chechnya Governor Ramzan Kadyrov was diagnosed with pancreatic necrosis in 2019 and isn’t long for this world. Since then, he’s supposedly undergone “regular procedures,” including surgeries, at an elite hospital in Moscow. A bout of COVID-19 in 2020 reportedly further degraded his health, kicking off another round of sudden weight loss. His kidneys reportedly started to fail and fluid built up in his lungs, making it difficult for him to speak and walk. After Novaya released the first part of this investigation, Kadyrov’s Telegram channel shared its first video in five days, posting footage of Kadyrov meeting with his cabinet to discuss the war in Ukraine. Kadyrov’s speech is slurred and he barely moves. He doesn’t look good. He looks like the title character in Weekend at Bernie’s.  Novaya Gazeta has released two more installments in this story since that first report, and a fourth article is due out soon. On this week’s episode of The Naked Pravda, Meduza spoke to journalist Kirill Martynov, the editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Europe, to dig into these revelations and learn more about the predicament of Russia’s second-worst autocrat. Timestamps for this episode: (5:02) Why is Ramzan Kadyrov so hard to replace as head of Chechnya? (10:31) What’s so special about Major General Apti Alaudinov, the commander of the “Akhmat” Chechen Volunteer Special Forces Association? (15:18) Protecting Kadyrov’s sons by putting them in the limelight (20:01) Novaya Gazeta Europe’s sources for this investigationКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

It’s no secret that the economies of Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan rely heavily on labor migration to stay afloat. In 2022, according to the International Organization for Migration, remittances from Russia accounted for just over half of Tajikistan’s GDP, and made up more than 20 percent of the GDPs of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Many of the workers sending these remittances are their families’ sole breadwinner — and given the lack of employment opportunities at home, working in Russia is often their best option, even if means dealing with a maze of bureaucracy and relentless discrimination.  The aftermath of last month’s terrorist attack in Moscow has brought the xenophobia that Central Asian migrants face in Russia back into the spotlight, with media outlets reporting on a surge in blatant discrimination and, in some cases, targeted violence. Meanwhile, the Russian authorities have launched a renewed crackdown on migrant workers. This is despite the fact that Russia, with its shrinking population and labor shortage made worse by the war, needs migrants to keep its economy functioning. To learn about Russia’s migration policy under Vladimir Putin and how the xenophobic backlash to last month’s attack has affected ethnic and religious minorities, The Naked Pravda spoke to Moscow Times special correspondent Leyla Latypova; Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center fellow Temur Umarov; and political scientist Caress Schenk, an associate professor at Nazarbayev University. And be sure to check out Temur Umarov’s previous appearance on The Naked Pravda: How Russia pressures Central Asian migrants into military service. Timestamps for this episode: (2:35) Xenophobia in the wake of the Crocus City Hall attack (16:55) Russia’s dependence on migrant labor (27:35) How Russia uses migration policy for political aims (31:25) The migration-extremism fallacy (39:13) The long-term effects of Russia’s current migration crackdownКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно

Look at almost any recent major news story from Russia, and you’ll find the Federal Security Service, better known as the FSB. Having failed to prevent the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow last month, the agency has played a major role in arresting and apparently torturing the suspected perpetrators. It was FSB agents who arrested Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich on espionage charges just over a year ago. And the FSB has been heavily involved in enforcing Russia’s crackdowns on dissent and LGBTQ+ rights. At the same time, the FSB is inextricably linked to Moscow’s war against Ukraine. After years of carrying out subversive activities there, it provided Putin with key (though apparently misleading) intel that led him to launch his full-scale invasion in 2022. Since then, its agents have facilitated the deportation of Ukrainian children, tortured an untold number of Ukrainian civilians in so-called “torture chambers,” and tried to plant former ISIS members in Ukrainian battalions. And let’s not forget that Putin himself was shaped by his career in the FSB’s predecessor agency, the Soviet-era KGB. Putin’s rise to power was defined by his image as a strong man who could ensure security and stability. Since assuming the presidency, he’s given himself direct authority over the FSB and steadily expanded its ability to surveil and repress Russian citizens. To learn about the Russian FSB’s evolution over the last three decades, its operations in Russia and beyond, and its possible future after Putin, Meduza in English senior news editor Sam Breazeale spoke to Dr. Kevin Riehle, an expert in foreign intelligence services and the author of The Russian FSB: A Concise History of the Federal Security Service. Timestamps for this episode: (3:13) Decoding the FSB: Structure, mission, and operations (5:58) The evolution of Russian national security: From KGB to FSB (14:36) Corruption and ideology: The FSB’s internal struggle (23:31) The FSB’s foreign reach and domestic repression (38:49) The agency’s post-Putin futureКак поддержать нашу редакцию — даже если вы в России и вам очень страшно