Claim OwnershipThe Supreme Court: Oral Arguments
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A public good: every Supreme Court Oral Argument since 2010. Making the Highest Court more accessible for a modern audience. The DC Bar blog's piece about this podcast can be found here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotuspod. If you'd like to support the law student who created this project instead of studying you can do so here: https://www.tinyurl.com/scotusguy. Thanks for listening! Patreon
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Olivier v. City of Brandon | 12/03/25 | Docket #: 24-993
24-993 OLIVIER V. BRANDON, MS
DECISION BELOW: 2023 WL 5500223
CERT. GRANTED 7/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Gabriel Olivier is a Christian who feels called to share the gospel with his fellow
citizens. After being arrested and fined for violating an ordinance targeting "protests"
outside a public amphitheater, Olivier brought a § 1983 suit under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoin its
enforcement against him in the future.
The Fifth Circuit, applying its precedent construing this Court's decision in
Heck
v. Humphrey
, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that Olivier's prior conviction barred his § 1983
suit because even the prospective relief it seeks would necessarily undermine his prior
conviction. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the "friction" between its decision and those
of this Court and other circuits. Over vigorous dissents, the Fifth Circuit denied rehearing
en banc by one vote.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether, as the Fifth Circuit holds in conflict with the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, this Court's decision in
Heck v. Humphrey
bars § 1983 claims seeking purely
prospective relief where the plaintiff has been punished before under the law challenged
as unconstitutional.
2.
Whether, as the Fifth Circuit and at least four others hold in conflict with
five other circuits,
Heck v. Humphrey
bars § 1983 claims by plaintiffs even where they
never had access to federal habeas relief.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-60566
First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin | 12/02/25 | Docket #: 24-781
24-781 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. V. PLATKIN
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 5088105
CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
New Jersey's Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice
Women's Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it
turn over most of its donors' names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42
U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce
it in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General's motion to enforce the
Subpoena but expressly did
not
decide First Choice's federal constitutional challenges.
The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the
district court held that First Choice's constitutional claims were not ripe in federal court.
The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided per curiam decision. Judge Bibas would
have held the action ripe as indistinguishable from
. Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Banta
, 594 U.S. 595, 618-19 (2021). But the majority concluded First
Choice's claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could litigate its constitutional
claims in state court. In doing so, the majority followed the rule of the Fifth Circuit and
split from the Ninth Circuit. It did not address the likely loss of a federal forum once the
state court rules on the federal constitutional issues.
The question presented is:
Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably
objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action
deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-3124
Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, Att'y Gen. | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-777
24-777 URIAS-ORELLANA V. BONDI
DECISION BELOW: 121 F.4th 327
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that noncitizens on American
soil are generally eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)
(A). A refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
Id.
§
1101(a)(42). Noncitizens are presumptively eligible for asylum if they have "suffered
persecution in the past." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1).
If ordered removed by an immigration judge (IJ), noncitizens may appeal the
removal order-and with it, the denial of asylum-to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). From there, "judicial review" is available in "an appropriate court of appeals." 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The INA mandates judicial deference on "findings of fact" and three
other kinds of administrative decisions.
Id.
§ 1252(b)(4). The statute also explicitly
provides for judicial review of the BIA's decisions on "questions of law," but does not
establish a deferential standard of review for such decisions.
Id.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9).
The question presented is:
Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA's judgment that a given
set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute
"persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-1042
Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment | 12/01/25 | Docket #: 24-171
24-171 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT
DECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 222
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright
infringement when it "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster
infringement."
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
,
Ltd
., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling,
developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service
provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users.
Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for
"materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people
were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that
the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote
it?
2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and
subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high
risk that its
own
conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit
upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its
subscribers
'
conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was
illegal.
Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct
infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1168
Rutherford v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-820
24-820 RUTHERFORD V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 360
CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-860
CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's
sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an
"extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy
statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
id
.; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the
defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28
U.S.C. § 994(t).
Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain
drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals
sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act.
The question presented is:
Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may
consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing
law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1904
Fernandez v. United States | 11/12/25 | Docket #: 24-556
24-556 FERNANDEZ V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 104 F.4th 420
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE
FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A COMBINATION OF
“
EXTRAORDINARY AND
COMPELLING REASONS
”
THAT MAY WARRANT A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCE
REDUCTION UNDER 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(1)(A) CAN INCLUDE REASONS THAT
MAY ALSO BE ALLEGED AS GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF A SENTENCE UNDER
28 U. S. C. §2255.
CERT. GRANTED 5/27/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce
the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that
discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the
defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In
reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the
Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered
evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity
in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were
cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth
Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to
matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by
Congress. The question presented is:
Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what
information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary
and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)
(A).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-3122
GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 24-758
24-758 THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. MENOCAL
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4544184
CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately
appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such
"collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and
state sovereign immunity.
The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order
denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately
appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1409
Landor v. LA DOC | 11/10/25 | Docket #: 23-1197
23-1197 LANDOR V. LA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
DECISION BELOW: 82 F.4th 337
CERT. GRANTED 6/23/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb
et seq
., and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
2000cc
et seq
. In
Tanzin v. Tanvir
, 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an
individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for
violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical.
The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in
his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-30686
Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S. | 11/05/25 | Docket #: 24-1287
24-1287 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. V. TRUMP
DECISION BELOW:
THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED. CONSOLIDATED
WITH 25-250 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. EXPEDITED BRIEFING. THE CASES WILL BE SET
FOR ARGUMENT IN THE FIRST WEEK OF THE NOVEMBER 2025 ARGUMENT SESSION.
CERT. GRANTED 9/9/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701
et seq.
("IEEPA")
permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition, holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or
exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest[.]"
Id.
§ l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has
ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to
the executive orders challenged here.
The question presented is:
Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 25-5202
Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-724
24-724 HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP V. PALMQUIST
DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 294
CERT. GRANTED 4/28/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court
against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York,
and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction,
arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court
agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal-
court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter
of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered
the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post-
removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of
appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely
diverse parties before it.
The questions presented are:
1.
Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties
must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a
non-diverse party at the time of removal.
2.
Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by
amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a
nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-40197
Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | 11/04/25 | Docket #: 24-808
24-808 CONEY ISLAND AUTO PARTS, INC. V. BURTON
DECISION BELOW: 109 F.4th 438
CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of
personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal
courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must
be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that
there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule
60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence
of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment
entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this
case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4).
The question presented is:
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set
aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-5881
Hencely v. Fluor Corp. | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-924
24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.
DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412
CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured
by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked
on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary
contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation
of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for
negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken
"federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking
Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp.
, 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the
government
for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against
the
contractor
. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth,
Ninth and D.C. Circuits over
Boyle
's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by
invoking §2680(j).
The question presented is:
Should
Boyle
be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's
combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government
contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994
Rico v. United States | 11/03/25 | Docket #: 24-1056
24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900
CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662
Case v. Montana | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-624
24-624 CASE V. MONTANA
DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985
CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on
less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid
exception requires probable cause.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136
Louisiana v. Callais | 10/15/25 | Docket #: 24-109
Background: Louisiana was ordered by federal courts to create a second majority-Black congressional district to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The Louisiana Legislature responded by passing S.B. 8, which created the required second majority-Black district. However, a different federal court then ruled that S.B. 8 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and blocked its implementation.
The Core Issue: Can a state be required to create a majority-minority district under the Voting Rights Act, but then have that same district struck down as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering? Louisiana argues this creates an impossible legal bind.
Questions Before the Court: Whether the lower court erred in finding that race predominated in drawing S.B. 8, whether the map fails strict scrutiny review, whether certain legal tests were properly applied, and whether courts should even be deciding these redistricting disputes.
Current Status: The case has been restored for reargument. The Court has ordered supplemental briefing on whether intentionally creating majority-minority districts violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.
Significance: This case could reshape how states balance Voting Rights Act compliance with constitutional requirements, potentially affecting redistricting nationwide.
Ellingburg v. United States | 10/14/25 | Docket #: 24-482
24-482 ELLINGBURG V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 113 F.4th 839
JOHN F. BASH, ESQUIRE, OF AUSTIN, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND
ARGUE THIS CASE, AS
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT
BELOW.
CERT. GRANTED 4/7/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is
penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-3129
Bowe v. United States | 10/14/25 | Docket #: 24-5438
24-5438 BOWE V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: CA 11 ORDER 6/27/2024
KASDIN M. MITCHELL, ESQUIRE, OF DALLAS, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE
THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO
QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1),
“[
a] claim presented in a second or successive
habeas
corpus application under section 2254
that was presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed.
”
(emphasis added).
The first question presented is:
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive
motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
*
*
*
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E),
“[
t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of
appeals to file a second or successive
application
shall not be appealable and shall not be the
subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari.
”
(emphasis added).
The second question presented is:
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the
grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to
vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-11704
USPS v. Konan | 10/08/25 | Docket #: 24-351
24-351 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE V. KONAN
DECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 799
CERT. GRANTED 4/21/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671
et
seq
.), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for
injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts
from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b). The question presented is as
follows:
Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal
Service employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the
loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10179
Bost v. IL Bd. of Elections | 10/08/25 | Docket #: 24-568
24-568 BOST V. ILLINOIS BOARD OF ELECTIONS
DECISION BELOW: 114 F.4th 634
CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the
federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including
Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after
Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections
and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be
received up to fourteen days after Election Day.
The sole question presented here is whether Petitioners, as federal candidates,
have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state
time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-2644
Barrett v. United States | 10/07/25 | Docket #: 24-5774
24-5774 BARRETT V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 102 F.4th 60
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION
1
PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.
CHARLES L. McCLOUD, ESQUIRE, OF WASHINGTON, D. C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND
ARGUE THIS CASE, AS
AMICUS CURIAE
, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW.
CERT. GRANTED 3/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED:
I.
Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act
that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits
but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.
II.
Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)
(3)(A), a question left open after"
United States v. Taylor
, 596 U.S. 845 (2022).
United States v. Stoney
, 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1379
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