Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. This exchange provides differing perspectives on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. This episode responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3).



Read the review and reply here.



Email usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.







Keywords: victory, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, irregular warfare, Landpower, World War II

Episode Transcript: Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America's Wars”

Stephanie Crider (Host)



You're listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.



I'm here with Alexander, special operations NCO, and Dr. John Nagle, author of “Why America's Army Can't Win America's Wars,” which was published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen.



Dr. John Nagl



It's good to be here, Stephanie.



Alex



Thank you for having me,  Stephanie.



Host



John, please give us a brief recap of your original article.



Nagl



The article argued that the United States has a somewhat acceptable record of conventional war since it became the greatest power on Earth, sometime over the course of the Second World War. Not just the greatest power on Earth but the greatest power the world has ever seen, with a power differential unknown in human history. But it does not have a similar record in irregular wars. In fact, our absolute abject defeat with helicopters off the roof of the embassy in both Vietnam and Afghanistan.



And while Iraq, arguably too soon to tell for sure, does have costs that far exceed any possible gain, I argued in the article that our record in irregular wars since we became the greatest power on Earth is 0 and 3. And I asked why that was and suggested that in the future, enemies of the United States would be very unlikely to confront us conventionally in what the Pentagon is now calling large-scale combat operations, but instead would fight us in ways where they know they have a chance of winning . . . in irregulars, wars, insurgencies, terrorism, the sort of wars that have stymied us for the last 20 years. And therefore, I argue that as the Pentagon focuses on preparing for war with China—to deter and, if necessary, to defeat China—it should spend at least a little time trying to understand why we keep losing irregular wars and more than a little time trying to make sure that we don't lose the next one.



Host



Alex, you took issue with John's piece. Please explain your perspective.



Alex



So, I really appreciated John's analysis, and I absolutely agree that we definitely need to start with why and seek understanding in that. Where I disagreed the most was with his conclusion that if a country is important enough to fight over, it is important enough to stay for generations. I think there are some conditions on that—the most important being that a cultural climate must first be gauged in order to assess how successful or worthw...