Wavell Room Audio Reads

This brief presents a strategic imperative. The development of the IMF is consistently bound by a very complex set of messaging - not just within the MoD but also across its supplier base - whereby interlinking technology, organisational and institutional change is hindering scalability across 'The Stack'. Increasingly, the three components of technology, people, and change need to be brought together using simple themes of design, build, secure and deliver to create the required capability positioning both within the MoD and its acquisition processes. This will demand a unifying plan/approach by the MoD to manage and exploit fully the IMF approach - consolidating a range of individual components such as cloud, security, et, under a cohesive plan/framework to support operational outcomes.[/note] to embed an Identification/Mission First (IMF) framework at the core of UK Defence. In the face of rising digital threats and rapid technological evolution, the UK must shift from legacy force structures to an agile, information-led defence model where identification, not just firepower, drives operational advantage. IMF is defined as the ability to collect, process, and exploit information faster and more effectively than adversaries, seamlessly connecting Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Logistics (including Medical), Command and Control (C2), and FIRES. This is both a technological and behavioural shift, aligning with modern warfare doctrines such as UK Fusion Doctrine, NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) loop.1 In an increasingly congested, contested, and connected battlespace, information superiority - not platform superiority - is the decisive edge, with speed of identification and mission alignment emerging as critical differentiators. As such, data must be treated as a strategic asset, akin to oil in the 20th century, requiring ethical prioritisation, protection, and operationalisation. Furthermore, civilian digital infrastructure, including social media and undersea cables, forms a crucial part of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ecosystem, and must be lawfully integrated into defence strategies.2 To operationalise these imperatives, several core recommendations are identified and proposed. Under Leadership and Governance, Defence should appoint a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) for Identification/Mission First (IMF) and establish a Digital Identification Task Force under Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) to oversee strategy, ethics, and innovation. In terms of Workforce and Skills, it is essential to build a pipeline of data-literate, ethics-conscious strategists, and to incentivise digital fluency across all services through tailored career pathways. Regarding Investment and Architecture, Defence must prioritise sovereign, interoperable digital systems with low latency and secure data exchange, while embedding real-time, multi-domain identification layers into command, control (C2), and ISR platforms. For Operational Integration, IMF capabilities should be embedded into Joint Action doctrine and field exercises, and open-source intelligence should be harnessed through structured, policy-governed approaches. Finally, under Strategic Communication and Ethics, a Defence-wide Digital Ethics and Law Compliance Framework must be established, alongside clearly defined red lines for the use of private and civilian digital systems in targeting and surveillance. These measures collectively aim to ensure that Defence maintains its competitive edge through agile, ethical, and integrated information dominance Introduction Digital connectivity and rapid technological change have redefined modern warfare, where information superiority increasingly determines success. While kinetic force retains importance, digital tempo - the speed and effectiveness of information-action cycles - has become decisive.3 The MoD remains constrained by legacy structures ...

"I like the word lethal. It is reminiscent [. . .] of pretty women and muscular men in classy hotels. Of secret negotiations and ice cubes in 25-year-old scotch glasses. [. . .]." Commentator in a study by Ofra Ben Ishai In this brief article, I will propose that the concept of lethality, aside from being poorly defined, has become a bleak commodity for Western military leaders. To be used as a tool for political consumption, devoid of real worth beyond permitting those who wish so to sweep aside any falsely perceived 'ethical' barriers to the conduct of war. Notably military forces that have not paid much heed to such ethics, for example, the Russians, conduct themselves on the battlefield and in occupation, already at the ultimate end-state of this dark consumerism. Lethality is becoming a military fiction as far removed from reality as any James Bond movie. That numerous Western militaries are now placing this at the centre of their national defence is, to me, both an act of desperation and a neglect of senior leaders' duties. It is a myth that shields itself from scrutiny. I will outline three points that you may wish to consider to gain a better understanding of my perspective. The first will be a rather heavy, but mercifully brief, interpretation of lethality as consumerism, using the work of post-modern sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. Second, outline the simple fact that lethality is so poorly defined as to be conceptually meaningless, and finally, to dissect through first principles some of the recent leadership statements about lethality and how they raise more questions than provide answers. Post-Modern Sociologists Like many post-modern sociologists, Zygmunt Bauman saw the termination of the 'rational' modern society in the concentration camps of the Holocaust. Rational man, bringing industrial-scale slaughter to humanity. In its place now stands a world devoid of rational values; the only cause for existence is to consume. How much you possess being the only mark of merit. Whilst this appears to be a potentially dark future, Bauman does see this as an opportunity, where the individual is now unconstrained by the guardrails of modernism. It is also important to note that societies don't just step over the border from modernism to postmodernism; these are theories, and of course, reality is far more complex. But Bauman's ideas are powerful ones. But it is in the darker aspects of Bauman's postmodernism that I see the relationship between the military and lethality. To suggest that the political process surrounding military strategy is not immersed in post-modernism is a form of profound cognitive dissonance. Politics at present is a prime case study in Bauman's thesis; military strategy like it or not is inseparable from that. To use the words of General Miley, 'militaries don't fight war, nations do,' post-modern nations. Lethality is becoming a commodity, an end in itself; sacks of shiny lethality become the worth of a military organisation. Detached from the necessity of military prudence. An anchorless idea that the Vietnam War and the outcomes of Western militaries in recent attempts at 'nation building' with massively overmatched firepower show is void. The problem with any form of consumerism is that it is always form over substance; the unique and well-advertised commodity is immediately desirable and not subject to critique of its worth. The recent strike on Iran's nuclear facilities being a prime example, any questioning of the strategy (or lack thereof) and effectiveness was immediately viewed as unpatriotic. Additionally, noting that the engines of this lethality consumerism, the defence industry, will do nothing to check this voraciousness. The entrance of numerous venture capital companies into the sector is a telling indicator. Things are entirely subjective My second point is that, like commodities themselves, what is desirable is entirely subjective. Additionally, as Stephen Wren had demonstrated with...

Modern military debate often gets lost in technology, jargon, and expensive promises about the "next war." In Euclid's Army: Preparing Land Forces for Warfare Today, William F. Owen cuts through the fog with a sharp and uncompromising thesis: armies must be simpler, cheaper, and better at the basics. This is not a comfortable read for those invested in the current way of doing things, but it is a necessary one. At a time of constrained budgets and increasing threats, Owen forces us to reconsider how we train, equip, and organise land forces. Owen's central argument is that land forces have drifted into over-complexity. He contends that armies are seduced by shiny technology, vast acquisition programmes, and speculative concepts of future war. Instead, they should prioritise what can be proven to work: robust doctrine, adaptable organisation, and relentless training in fundamentals. In clear language, he argues that preparing for the "unknowable future" requires paring back excess and focusing on what soldiers can do with the tools available, rather than chasing the next big procurement dream. Throughout the book Euclid's Army examines cost, weight, complexity, and effectiveness. Owen insists that simpler equipment is cheaper and more resilient in war. The current war in Ukraine seems to demonstrate this. Logistics, mobility, and the ability to sustain fighting power matter more than whether a system boasts the latest sensors or software. This view will resonate with readers who have watched acquisition programmes spiral out of control or units trained more for parades and PowerPoint than for combat. Owen writes like he speaks: direct. He does not mince his words. Euclid's Army, aim is to provide a framework1 that enables armies to think clearly about force design in uncertain times. The book's greatest strength lies in its provocation. It demands that military professionals and defence planners ask hard questions. Are our training systems preparing troops for combat, or for box-ticking exercises? By stripping away complexity, Owen forces us to confront uncomfortable realities: much of what is currently fashionable in defence policy may have little utility when bullets start flying. That said, Euclid's Army is not without weaknesses. Critics will argue that emerging domains - cyber, space, and multi-domain integration - cannot simply be ignored, yet Owen gives them little attention. Given the entrenched interests of industry and bureaucracy, some of his proposals may also feel politically unrealistic. At times, his solutions are presented as self-evident truths rather than contested ideas. Readers looking for detailed pathways to implementation may find the book light in that respect. Euclid's Army is not meant to be the final word on force design. Rather, it is a call to debate. In that sense, it succeeds brilliantly. By challenging orthodoxy, Owen reopens questions that many assume are settled. Do we need ever-heavier infantry vehicles? Are complex systems a liability in expeditionary warfare? How much training time is wasted on activities with no combat value? These are questions that every military professional and defence thinker should grapple with. For a British audience, and indeed for allied readers, the relevance is obvious. As defence budgets tighten and the character of conflict remains uncertain, armies cannot afford to get force design wrong. Owen's plea for simplicity is timely. His message that training, doctrine, and organisation matter more than technology should resonate with anyone who has served on exercise or deployment. Even if one disagrees with his conclusions, the act of engaging with them is worthwhile. Euclid's Army is a provocative and valuable addition to contemporary military debate. Its strength lies in its clarity and its insistence on fundamentals. Its weakness lies in its lack of nuance and occasional overconfidence. Yet that is also what makes it powerful: it forces readers to think, argue...

Introduction This year marked the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, the non-use of nuclear weapons has remained the single most significant phenomenon of the nuclear age. Central to any discussion of global nuclear politics is the term nuclear taboo, which refers to a de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo is not the act of non-use itself, but the deeply rooted belief that such use is illegitimate. This belief has endured for nearly 80 years, but the foundations are beginning to crack. While the nuclear taboo has historically played a significant role in limiting the use of nuclear weapons, contemporary geopolitical shifts, rhetorical normalisation of nuclear use, and the weakening of nuclear diplomacy indicate a gradual erosion of this norm. What the world is now witnessing is an exponential increase in stockpiles, an escalation in nuclear rhetoric, and the erosion of arms control regimes. In the meantime, there is also an acceleration in the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons, with the rising geopolitical tensions. Escalating Nuclear Rhetoric Rhetoric holds a constitutive role when it comes to international politics. We can see how the power of language can shape issues such as national identity or give birth to social movements. One of the reasons why the tradition of nuclear non-use is a taboo, but not only a norm, is the subjective and intersubjective sense of taboo-ness. It manifests itself in how nuclear weapons have been discussed and interpreted over the years. How state actors speak about nuclear use is critical in altering the normative structures governing their use. For instance, in January 2024, Israeli Heritage Minister Amihai Eliyahu made headlines by commenting that a "nuclear attack" was an option in case of Gaza. His remark was eventually met with international outrage, which led to his suspension from cabinet meetings. More worryingly, it signalled a normalisation of extreme language when referring to conflict and war. From the East…and the West Only a matter of months after Eliyahu's statement on Gaza, a similar shift in rhetoric was adopted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. He expanded Moscow's nuclear doctrine to allow any conventional attack by non-nuclear states that were allied to a nuclear power to be met with a nuclear strike, as if they themselves were armed with nuclear weapons. In April 2025, the senior Iranian official Ali Larijani declared that Iran would be obliged to reevaluate its nuclear stance, should the Western powers act irresponsibly. This sharply contrasted with Iran's former assertions that aimed to maintain its intentions were peaceful about its nuclear program. The erosion of conventional deterrence after direct strikes by Israel and the United States eventually developed into nuclear signalling. Rhetoric from the West, particularly following the return of Donald Trump to power, has become more confrontational. This hardening stance has likely led to the changing perception of a threat to Iran, paving the way for miscalculation. Moreover, the growing normalisation of aggressive nuclear signalling across conflict zones increases the risk of escalation and misjudgment. In a recent statement, President Donald Trump defended the American strikes against Iran. He compared them to the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which, according to him, brought an end to the Second World War. This type of language promotes the rhetorical normalisation of escalation by reframing the conversation around nuclear use, which eats away at the taboo over time. A world that is rearming at an alarming rate What makes this rhetorical shift more alarming is the material reality that accompanies it. As nuclear discourse grows more casual, nuclear states overtly invest in hard (military) power, as evidenced by the record levels of global military expenditure. In 2024, global defence sp...

You may have thought that another book on Arnhem was not necessary or that it could not possibly tell you anything you did not already know about this iconic battle from World War Two. However, Gary Buck's new book, A Risk Too Far, takes a new and novel approach to the subject that has you reappraising the commonly held views and your own long-held conceptions. Whilst past commentators have been quick to apportion blame for the planning and execution of Operation Market Garden, Buck seeks to ask why and how errors might have been made. A Risk Too Far blends historical research with psychological models and theories to examine the different cognitive influences and biases that individuals face when making decisions under stressful conditions. It focuses on three of the prominent commanders of Operation Market Garden: Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, the commander of 21st Army Group who first conceived of the operation; Lieutenant-General 'Boy' Browning, the deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army and overall tactical commander for the operation; and Major-General Roy Urquhart, commander of the British 1st Airborne Division. It draws on both primary and secondary sources including memoirs, personal letters and reflections of both the subjects and their superiors and subordinates. Whilst referencing important psychological theories and models, the book is structured around the OODA (Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act) loop which will be familiar to military readers. In so doing, Buck deftly brings out the human element of conflict, putting one in the shoes of those commanders, seeking to understand the decisions taken against the context and pressure they were under. Studying Montgomery and the strategic level, Buck asks why he choose to embark on such a high-risk operation when he was usually so deliberate, meticulous, and careful? He examines the problems of supply and an acute manpower shortage faced by 21st Army Group that were becoming critical in the face of stiffening German resistance. Monty's options are considered in light of the political impetus to prevent further V2 launches against London and his growing frustration with Eisenhower's insistence on a broad front strategy. Analysing his character, Buck finds that Montgomery was facing acute pressures and had succumbed to what is known as a grip reaction in which he abandoned his normal analytical logical approach. Operation Market Garden was a gamble, but he had decided that it was worth it. For that to be true it needed some likelihood of success. For that, Buck turns to the operational level and Lieutenant General 'Boy' Browning. Examining 'Boy' Browning we find that he was pushing for use of the First Allied Airborne Army, accepted risks in planning, and inexplicably opted to deploy his own Corps HQ in the first lift. A colourful character driven by pride and ambition, he was concerned with the diminishing possibilities for field command and to prove the continued utility of airborne forces. Faced with similar pressures to Montgomery, he was too optimistic and failed to raise concerns about a plan that could only really be successful under the best circumstances and with a significant amount of luck. At the tactical level, Buck asks why Urquhart's plan was so rigid and lacking in focus to the extent that only one battalion ever made it to the bridge in Arnhem? He examines how his lack of airborne experience led him to fall back on inadequate experience, to make illogical decisions under time pressure and to not question clear failings in the plan over a fear that his division might be broken up to solve Monty's manpower shortage. A Risk Too Far presents a thorough investigation of the span of strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the operation. It provides considerable food for thought with regards to how other fateful operations may have been planned and executed under similar circumstances. Usefully, Buck also articulates the ways in which c...

The recent Defence Committee report, Defence in the Grey Zone, brings renewed focus to the challenge of hostile activity below the threshold of conventional war. The term 'Grey Zone' suggests a novel ambiguity, a modern strategic dilemma born of new technologies; this ambiguous environment challenges not only our strategic doctrines but also our classical ethical frameworks for conflict. However, while the character of this struggle is undeniably new, its foundational principles are not. The Grey Zone is the modern evolution of ancient principles of statecraft, supercharged by technology and the unique vulnerabilities of a hyperconnected world. To navigate this strategic evolution requires both re-understanding the classical strategists, from Sun Tzu and Kautilya to Clausewitz and Liddell Hart, while simultaneously grappling with profound ethical questions they could never have envisioned. The Timeless Why The strategic intent underpinning Grey Zone activity, to "coerce governments or simply erode their ability to function", is as old as statecraft itself. It is the practical application of "the acme of skill" according to Sun Tzu's Art of War: "to subdue the enemy without fighting". This ideal, which finds echoes in the "silent war" of Kautilya's Arthashastra, offers an intellectual foundation for modern Grey Zone Operations. From a Consequentialist perspective - where morality is based on outcomes alone - this is a grim yet vital calculus aimed at avoiding the greater evil of devastating state-on-state conflict. The report is replete with modern manifestations of ancient approaches. The use of propaganda and disinformation, "driving a wedge between social groups", is a direct heir to the classical strategy of attacking an adversary's societal cohesion. Sun Tzu notes that "all warfare is based on deception", while Kautilya takes this further, highlighting Bheda (sowing dissent) as one of the four primary tools of statecraft. The employment of "proxies, including sub-state actors such as rebel groups, mercenaries, criminal gangs, or cyber 'hacktivists'", offers the same plausible deniability sought by ancient spymasters. Sun Tzu dedicates an entire chapter to the use of spies for gaining intelligence and manipulating the enemy, while Kautilya describes vast and intricate spy networks as the primary tool for both internal control and external influence. The report's observation that "attribution of grey zone activity is often challenging" is equally neither a new nor unforeseen problem but the intended outcome of a strategy designed to achieve political effect while adhering to the Jus Ad Bellum ('justice to war', the principles governing righteous initiation of war) principle of Right Intention (from the aggressor's perspective at least) by avoiding an overt act of war. The goal, now as then, is to weaken the adversary from within, making them politically, economically, and socially unable to resist. The Transformative What While the strategic why is timeless, the what - the nature of modern warfare and in particular that of the Grey Zone challenge - has fundamentally transformed. Technology has not merely supplied new tools for the strategist's arsenal, but created entirely new domains of conflict and systemic vulnerabilities that are without historical precedent. The report correctly states that "technology has magnified the impact and global reach of grey zone attacks, and identified new areas for prosecuting operations that did not exist a generation ago, particularly regarding cyberattacks". This has created a geographically boundless cyber domain where adversaries may conduct countless operations on a scale, and at a rate, previously unimaginable - such as the "over 90,000 sub-threshold attacks" launched against the MoD's networks over just two years. This digital dependency has birthed a new critical national vulnerability: the physical infrastructure of the internet. The report highlights the "approximately 60 under...

Aligned to His Majesty's Government (HMG) priorities of curtailing irregular migration and associated connections to human trafficking from Albania, efforts to address the drivers of migration and organised crime at source are underway. The British Army's ongoing specialist survey work in Albania's Kukës Subterranean Complex (KSC) may lead to livelihood creation, mitigating some of the risk factors of human trafficking. This demonstrates the military instrument's contribution to Human Security. UK Strategy on Irregular Migration from Albania Enabled in large part by online messaging applications such as TikTok Albanians made up a quarter of all arrivals to the UK by small boats at a reported peak in 2022. The UK's Home Affairs Committee June 2023 report details the legal, social and political context of migration to the UK from Albania. Three key drivers identified are: 1. Economic migration because of Albania's comparative poverty 2. Refugees (particularly women) who have been trafficked or made modern slaves; and 3. Organised crime In 2023 and 2024, the UK returned more Albanians (2624) by nationality than any other, but irregular detections from Albania continued throughout 2024 (825). Time should be taken to understand migration terms and figures (see here), but the key takeaway is that the UK's intent is to reduce migration and where possible, minimise push factors at source To achieve this effect, cross-government strategy in partnership with international state and non-state partners has been pursued, complimented by a plethora of UK-Albania bilaterals, culminating in a Bilateral Cooperation Plan signed in December 2022 which centred around 'security and home affairs' with a focus on 'organised crime and illegal immigration'. Development of Kukës city - a vulnerable area prone to criminality and trafficking 'from which a substantial proportion of Albanian emigration to the UK occurs' - has been recognised as means to combat emigration. The UK has already worked with local NGOs, UNICEF and conducted fact finding missions in Kukës on perceptions and drivers of emigration. Defence Integrating into UK Strategy On 17 July 2023, the then Secretary for Defence Ben Wallace received Albanian Defence Minister Niko Peleshi in London, with former Minister of State Baroness Goldie later signing a Statement of Intent (SoI) between the two MoDs with Peleshi. The SoI is wide ranging, and leaves plenty of scope for 'any new potential areas of cooperation'. Likely by design, the SoI does not detail expected outcomes, but does list some specific outputs, one of which includes 'infrastructural development'. While the military instrument is not positioned as the lead actor in counter-trafficking efforts, those drafting the SoI seem aware that military activity could contribute meaningfully to the conditions which reduce trafficking risk. The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) form completed for bilateral activity reinforces this interpretation. The military engagement is framed in terms of defence engagement, recognising 'representatives of other [Albanian] government and academic institutions also attend activity delivered by the UK Defence Section in support of UK Partners Across Government'. The effect is subtle but significant: rather than overstate Defence's role, the SoI and OSJA position military activity as a potential discreet net contributor to broader foreign policy and Human Security outcomes - reduction of emigration and associated trafficking through targeted development programmes at source. In this context, the absence of outcome language should be read not as an oversight, but as policy discipline. It reflects a conscious decision to align with HMG objectives without mischaracterising the military's role or inadvertently committing Defence to outcomes it alone cannot deliver. The Plan 'Exploring the potentials of the tunnels' was agreed as an output in the Defence and Security Bilateral Cooperation planned o...

In the not-so-distant future, a U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific could be forced to fight two major wars at once - one against a Chinese assault on Taiwan, the other against a North Korean attack on the Korean Peninsula. This dual-front crisis scenario, long considered unlikely, is now routinely modeled in wargames and quietly debated in high-level policy circles. Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution. Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them. But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war. Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins. Learning from NATO's Blueprint At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force. A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow. NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies. If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork. The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized. The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework. Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...

The rapid advancement of military technology continues to transform the operational landscape of modern warfare. Cavalry operations (CavOps), traditionally focused on reconnaissance and rapid manoeuvre, now increasingly rely on sophisticated sensor systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to maintain battlefield superiority. This article explores the integration of the Observation Targeting and Surveillance Systems (OTAS) and drone swarms controlled from the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), coupled with the Digital Aided Fire Solution (DAFS). Focusing on the Norwegian Army's implementation efforts, it evaluates how this technological fusion enhances targeting capabilities and situational awareness whilst critically examining the cost-effectiveness and tactical trade-offs associated with tethered drone systems. Cavalry Formations and Their Operational Concepts: The Case of Porsanger Battalion A cavalry formation primarily conducts its missions as part of enabling operations (US ARMY, 2016, p. 12) . Enabling operations are operations that facilitate a transition to either offensive or defensive operations (NATO Standardization Agency, 2009, p. 185) . Within this spectrum, a cavalry formation must be capable of conducting reconnaissance and security operations. Therefore, it is important to combine firepower, manoeuvre, and protection with the ability to identify targets. Porsanger Battalion, within the framework of the Finnmark Brigade, is Norway's only pure cavalry formation dimensioned for this role. Norway has chosen to use the CV90 platform for the concept development of such a cavalry formation. Similar to several Nordic countries, more are now recognising the platform's utility in terms of adaptability and flexibility, acquiring the CV90 platform for their own armed forces (Ministry of Defence, 2025) The CV90 Platform and OTAS Capabilities The CV90 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), developed by BAE Systems Hägglunds and fielded by several NATO countries, is a modular, highly adaptable platform tailored for reconnaissance and combat operations in demanding environments. Its open digital architecture enables integration of advanced mission systems, transforming the vehicle into a networked sensor and command node. A key capability enhancer is the Observation Targeting and Surveillance Systems (OTAS), which significantly improves the CV90's effectiveness in surveillance, target acquisition, and precision engagement. In the Norwegian CV90 reconnaissance configuration, OTAS incorporates the Chess Dynamics Hawkeye Modular Mission Pod (MMP); a mast-mounted, multi-sensor suite combining electro-optical and infrared sensors, a high-power daylight camera, a long-range laser rangefinder (>30 km), a laser pointer, and a compact radar system for target detection and tracking. This radar capability provides persistent surveillance and allows for wide-area situational awareness, even in degraded visual environments. The system meets Category 1 Target Location Error (TLE) standards, the highest level of geolocation accuracy in NATO, enabling precise engagement at ranges beyond 20 km. Integrated into either a local Combat Management System (CMS) or a broader Battlefield Information System (BIS), and enhanced by AI-powered classification and tracking tools, OTAS delivers near-real-time threat detection and dissemination across the network. This dramatically increases the unit's operational autonomy and survivability in fast-paced, sensor-dense battlespaces (Chess Dynamics, 2023) . Drone Swarms and Digital Fire Solutions Integration Integrating drone swarms directly into the CV90's command ecosystem represents a fundamental shift in how reconnaissance and targeting operations are conducted. Unlike conventional UAV operations that depend on external ground control stations, deploying and controlling drone swarms from within the vehicle reduces communication latency and enhances tactical responsiveness (Edvardsen & Hansen, 2024)...

Introduction Like many of us, I love listening to our veterans' tales, exploits and adventures. They regale stories from their long careers, dits about the changes in warfare and the disruptions following the digital transformation of our armed forces. Suddenly, I feel my age as they talk about some of the equipment I worked on, but in the past tense. As I reflect on this, I think that maybe the military got digital transformation all wrong. Instead of focusing on the transformation of warfare by digitalisation, we have been preoccupied with the digitalisation of the equipment, not on the transformation of our Armed Forces and how we should prosecute a digital war using it. Instead of welcoming AI and digital transformation as a new paradigm for our Armed Services, did we merely apply it as a trendy veneer on legacy ways-of-war models, processes and practices? In the first major digital war, Ukraine quickly learnt that their legacy Soviet and even adopted legacy NATO doctrine, models, processes and practices, built for the last war, were defunct in this new digital battlespace. As new conflicts arise, this challenges our fundamental assumptions about how we think, work, and measure success in the new AI-enabled profession of arms. The rise of AI is giving us all a moment of pause. Do we choose to also apply a veneer of AI to the same old legacy processes and practices, making them incrementally a little faster and more efficient … or do we work to focus on the important things in the next war - applying AI to increase our efficiency, effectiveness and lethality? At the same time, we must also chart new skills pathways for all our people and harness everyone's creativity so we can deliver a truly transformed AI-enabled military. Augmenting and fusing the human mind with advanced AI technologies could provide a pivotal moment for us if we are bold enough to seize it. Digitalisation isn't transformation It has only been a decade since General Barrons presented his vision on Warfare in the Information Age. It promised to revolutionise us for a new way of war. But for many, the outcome was far from revolutionary; instead of truly investing in digital transformation, we faffed and frittered away the opportunity, making only superficial changes and tweaks rather than complete transformation. This approach reinforced and cemented traditional tactics, techniques and procedures from the Cold War era, without dismantling the barriers that separated individuals, tasks and data within our formations. Each team, function and arm got its own ICS, which was meant to enhance efficiency but ended up complicating future efforts to aggregate data and interoperate as one. While much of our equipment changed, how we operated on the battlefield did not fundamentally change the nature of our work or transform it. We introduced new, better equipment, interfaces, and architectures, improving the speed, security and quantity of the same things we always did. It allowed us to maintain the same old Cold War practices, with the data being passed and workflows remaining disparate, still siloed within different domains. Instead of transforming how we fight, we extended, prolonged, and gave a lifeline to the old ways of warfare with which we were comfortable. We didn't challenge the politics or conventions, retire outdated thinking or butcher any sacred cows. How often have we heard "Why do we keep doing it this way?" We failed to change our perspective on how we think. We failed to question whether our traditions were right in this modern battlespace. We failed to understand how we should fight in this digital world. As with digital transformation, there is no one-size-fits-all for AI enablement either, but iteration or refinement of past legacy practices is not the answer. A reimagined military A few organisations fundamentally understood the real power of digital; they reimagined their purpose and developed a whole new way of delivering their product/s...

The British Army faces a pivotal moment as it navigates the evolving demands of modern warfare within the framework of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) expected in spring 2025. The SDR places NATO at the core of the UK's defence posture, requiring the Army to maintain credible, deployable forces capable of deterring peer adversaries, particularly in high-threat regions like the High North and the Baltics, while supporting operations in the Middle East and Africa. This essay proposes a restructured British Army organised around two divisions, one tracked and one wheeled, each comprising three brigades, with each brigade containing three all-arms battle groups. These battle groups would serve as the primary deployable fighting units, with brigades and divisions acting as resource providers. The tracked division would sustain two armoured battle groups, one in the High North on a three-year accompanied posting and one in the Baltics on six-month rotations, while the wheeled division would provide support and manoeuvre for the tracked division and enable operations in the Middle East and Africa. This essay examines the equipment forecast, the deployment of divisional and brigade-level assets, and the cultural and structural challenges of this transformation, concluding with a proposed timeline for implementation. This essay specifically leaves out 16AABCT and associated light infantry (including UKSF and Royal Marines). Proposed Structure: A Two-Division Model The proposed structure realigns the British Army into two deployable divisions: a tracked Heavy Division and a wheeled Expeditionary Division. Each division would consist of three brigades, with each brigade comprising three all-arms battle groups, totalling 18 battle groups across the Army. This structure departs from the current model, where the 3rd (UK) Division is the primary warfighting formation, and the 1st (UK) Division focuses on lighter roles. The new model ensures both divisions are optimised for combined arms manoeuvre, with battle groups as the primary tactical units, supported by brigade and divisional enablers. The Heavy Division (Tracked) The Heavy Division, based on the 3rd (UK) Division, would be optimised for high-intensity conflict against peer adversaries, particularly in NATO's northern and eastern flanks. It would consist of three Armoured Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), each with three battle groups. Each battle group would include: 1 Armoured Squadron: Equipped with 14 Challenger 3 main battle tanks, providing heavy firepower and shock action. 1 Armoured Infantry Company: Equipped with Ajax infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), offering mobility and protection. 1 Mechanised Infantry Company: Equipped with tracked Ares vehicles for dismounted support and anti-tank capabilities. Support Elements: Including a platoon of 120mm mortars, a reconnaissance troop with Jackal 2 vehicles, and a fire support team with Javelin anti-tank guided missiles. The Heavy Division would sustain two forward-deployed battle groups: one in the High North (e.g., Norway) on a three-year accompanied posting, allowing families to be collocated for stability, and one in the Baltics (e.g., Estonia) on six-month rotations as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). The three-year posting in the High North would leverage existing infrastructure, such as NATO bases in Norway, to support long-term deterrence, while the Baltic deployment would align with rapid-response requirements. Each ABCT would rotate its battle groups to maintain one in the Baltics, one in training, and one in maintenance, ensuring sustainable readiness. The Expeditionary Division (Wheeled) The Expeditionary Division, restructured from the 1st (UK) Division, would focus on rapid deployment and manoeuvre, supporting the Heavy Division and conducting operations in the Middle East and Africa. It would comprise three Mechanised Brigade Combat Teams (MBCTs), each with three battle groups. Each battle group would...

The four-day India-Pakistan military crisis showcased a real-world glimpse of how near-peer militaries will face each other on the future battlefield. This high-tech military showdown was of immense significance for the People Liberation Army (PLA), which has been monitoring the global conflicts, Russia-Ukraine war, Nagorno-Karabakh and Syrian civil war, to draw operational lessons, adaptation tactics and a foresight gaze to prepare for the hypothetical conflicts in its backyard. Featured between the two nuclear-armed rivals, the conflict was the first of its kind where a military (Pakistan) possessed advanced Chinese weapons in its inventory, mainly the HQ-9 air defence system, PL-15 beyond-visual-range-air-to-air-missile (BVRAAM), J-10C Vigorous Dragon and JF-17 Thunder fighter planes. During the intense aerial exchange, Pakistan's downing of five Indian fighter jets, including top-of-the-line Rafales, provided a trial run of cutting-edge Chinese weaponry under fire. The crisis came as an optimal moment for China, which has not been in active combat since 1979. The successful demonstration of Chinese high-end weaponry against the relatively superior Western weaponry underscores China's preparation and anticipation of future conflict with strong adversaries like the US. In 2019, China's State Council published a white paper, China's National Defence in the New Era, which noted that the international military landscape is witnessing rapid transformation. The document emphasised multi-domain and trans-theatre operations to facilitate jointness among all service branches. To achieve synergy among its service branches, the Chinese military has integrated cyber, space and information domains under the multi-domain warfare (MDW) concept. It has also developed a robust data link architecture to enable the seamless integration between fighter jets, airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft and other supporting units. These data links augment combat efficiency by supporting coordination among various assets, allowing rapid target data sharing and providing missile guidance. Theoretically, they also help the Chinese military to overcome the bottleneck of information processing during live combat. The more interoperable these data links are, the faster the execution of the OODA loop in real-time combat. In the 100-hour India-Pakistan live air combat, both sides were engaged in what the Chinese called 'system-to-system' confrontation. Pakistan's indigenously developed Link-17 enabled it to execute a sequenced kill chain in a multi-domain environment. During peacetime, Pakistan has enhanced its situational awareness by integrating its ground radars, fighter jets, and AWACS aircraft. Relatedly, it has been engaged in a series of joint exercises with China, such as Warrior, Shaheen and Sea Guardian, respectively. This peacetime readiness allowed Pakistan to simultaneously lock, target and destroy the enemy's airborne assets in a high-speed environment. According to the South China Morning Post, Pakistan Air Force deployed 'A' launched by 'B' and guided by 'C' method to stage an 'air ambush' for the Indian fighter jets. Visualising hypothetically, Michael Dahm, a prominent aerospace expert at the Mitchell Institute, stated that Pakistan's kill chain may have started with the locking of the Indian airborne targets by a ground-based radar. Then, a J-10C Vigorous Dragon launched its PL-15 BVRAAM from a standoff distance, and finally, an AWACS guided the missile to the target by using a midcourse data link. This kill chain is comparable to what the US is trying to create among its services through the Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) concept. On the contrary, India's Rafales and S-400s are indubitably superior, but fragmentation in India's network-centric system hinders the interoperability among these assets. Unlike Pakistan, India lacks a unified data link to facilitate integration between a hodgepodge of Rus...

I first discussed Lawrence of Arabia by Ranulph Fiennes over an evening mezze in Jordan with a senior civil servant. With myself stationed in Jordan - Lawrence's old backyard - and him working on Middle Eastern defence policy from the UK, we find ourselves, somewhat sheepishly, admitting a shared disappointment. We both expected more. What we encountered was a curious blend of personal memoir, travelogue, and partial biography that struggled to bring T.E. Lawrence meaningfully to life. Ranulph Fiennes, famed adventurer and former soldier, sets out to retrace Lawrence's footsteps across the Middle East. It's a promising concept: a man of notable action revisiting the deserts that shaped a legend. Yet the execution falters. Fiennes repeatedly draws comparisons between himself and Lawrence, highlighting his own limited Arabic, failed training attempts, and military frustrations. These reflections seem less like acts of humility and more like a veiled attempt to position himself within the Lawrence mythos. In doing so, Fiennes's personal shortcomings become a distraction and end up pulling the reader away from, rather than toward, a deeper understanding of Lawrence's legacy. More troubling, the book does little to situate Lawrence within the broader strategic tapestry of the First World War. It gestures at the geopolitical stakes but rarely lingers long enough to add analytical weight. Lawrence - the man, the myth, the contradiction - remains frustratingly distant. There is little exploration of what made Lawrence so tactically and politically distinctive - his use of mobility and surprise in guerrilla warfare, his attempts to unify disparate Arab tribes under a single campaign, or his complex relationship with British imperial objectives. On the rare occasions when the narrative gains momentum and begins to offer something substantial, Fiennes abruptly shifts focus back to his own anecdotes, jolting the narrative like a kick to the shins. This contrast is thrown into sharper relief when compared to authors who have succeeded where Fiennes has not. Michael Asher's Lawrence: The Uncrowned King of Arabia offers a far more grounded, critical engagement with both Lawrence's strategic brilliance and inner turmoil. Even Scott Anderson's Lawrence in Arabia manages to tell a multi-threaded geopolitical story while still rendering Lawrence vivid and contradictory. In contrast, Fiennes remains oddly disinterested in the world Lawrence helped shape. Instead of offering readers insight into a region still grappling with the legacy of imperial meddling, he offers sunburn, sore feet, and a sense of being out of place - both geographically and literarily. To the military reader, this book might offer a surface-level introduction to Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. It could serve as a light primer for those unfamiliar with the geography or tone of the campaign. Where the book does show brief promise is in its occasional glimpses of the emotional toll the campaign took on Lawrence, hinting at the inner strain behind the myth. These fleeting moments offer a rare glimpse of the man behind the legend. But for anyone seeking serious insight into Lawrence's irregular warfare, adaptation to Arab cultural dynamics, or the early complexities of building 'partner' capacity in fluid and unfamiliar terrain, this book will fall short. In the end, Lawrence of Arabia reads less like a serious study of a singular historical figure and more like a tribute to Fiennes's own uneven Middle Eastern journey. A mirage of a book - promising from afar, but ultimately offering little substance once approached.

The U.S. Navy faced multiple threats in an emerging technology environment. The past two years have offered many lessons about the efficacy of anti-ship ballistic missiles and unmanned platforms and we must identify and learn them. The lessons from Ukraine and Yemen are shaping fleet design for the next generation. Understanding the context of the lessons from the conflicts is crucial. What can the Battle of Lissa tell us? In 1866, the navies of Austria and Italy fought near the island of Vis. Cutting the story short, the Austrians attacked in formations designed to aggressively ram the Italian ships, winning the battle despite an inferior status. The lessons of Lissa would impact naval design for the next 50 years. Before the Battle navies believed in the big gun. After Lissa navies were copying the Austrians and adding rams to new ships and developing ram-based tactics. But the lesson was wrong and the torpedo was the future. As modern navies prepare for future conflict, it is important to understand the context of lessons, or risk drawing faulty conclusions. Past as Prologue For nearly 150 years, from De Ruyter until Nelson, naval tactics were static. Wooden ships fought each other with broadsides. Technical innovations squeezed more efficiency at the margins. Copper sheathing improved ships' maneuverability with additional speed. The carronade increased the lethality of a ship's broadside while decreasing cannon weight. These technological advances did not change the general tactic of pummeling ships with cannon broadsides. The 19th century was an age of technological revolution and emerging technology. In 1807, Robert Fulton tested his first steamboat in New York. This technology would continue to develop throughout the century. The steam engine revolutionized naval warfare because ocean-going warships were no longer beholden to the wind for maneuver. Developments in artillery meant that cannons were capable of firing explosive shells on flat trajectories to destroy wooden-hulled warships. By the 1840s, France and Britain sold these weapons to any nation that had the coin for them. Even the Republic of Texas Navy employed explosive shells fired from cannons. Explosive shells were great equalizers in naval combat. Armored warships appeared in the 1850s to counter improved artillery. France was the first nation to use armored warships during the Crimean War. Armored ships were impervious to the explosive shells of the age. The naval question of the second half of the 19th century was how to defeat armored vessels while naval guns improved sufficiently to threaten armored warships. The see-saw between warships' armor and artillery lasted until the end of the battleship era. Ramming Austria, Prussia, and Italy fought a war in 1866. Most historians know the War of 1866 as the Austro-Prussian War, but in Italy it is known as the Third Italian War of Unification. Ashore, the Austro-Prussian War was decided at the battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz). In Italy, Austria defeated the Italian army at Custozza again and at sea at Lissa. The Austrians were commanded by Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff. His officers all understood his battle plans and they had painted their ships different colours to help identification. Although Tegetthoff's ships were smaller and carried smaller guns they would attempt to break the Italian line with three V-shaped formations. The first V composed his ironclads, the second V composed his large steam frigates, and the third V composed the fleet's smallest ships. Just before the battle the Italian commander, Admiral Persano shifted his flag to another ship. This caused tremendous confusion in the Italian Fleet because the shift was not planned for. Italian commanders looked to the old flagship for leadership and direction but found none. Tegetthoff's fleet broke the line in two places. The first V, led by Tegetthoff, engaged the central portion of the fleet. The second V of unarmoured ships broke the line n...

It was our own fault, and our very grave fault, and now we must turn it to use, We have forty million reasons for failure, but not a single excuse!" Rudyard Kipling Context This short story aims to bring tactical lessons from contemporary conflicts to life for junior commanders. Inspired by Captain (later Major General) Ernest Swinton's classic work The Defence of Duffer's Drift, it follows a young British officer and a small group of soldiers tasked with defending a key position, using a series of 'dreams' as a device to enable the defenders to iteratively improve their tactics. While Swinton's original was set during the Second Boer War (a "drift" being a vernacular term for a ford), this updated version shifts the setting to a near future war in the Baltics. Each failed attempt to defend the position, in this case a bridge, resets the scenario, giving the defenders another chance for success. The memories of the previous failures remain available to the protagonist, allowing a series of lessons to emerge through trial and error. This narrative device may feel familiar to modern audiences from the Duffers-inspired Tom Cruise film Edge of Tomorrow (or Live. Die. Repeat. for American viewers). No new resources are available at the commencement of each attempt. No new tech, no new kit, no external support. Much like the contemporary British Army, the defenders must adapt to fight tonight with what they have. It must be stressed that this is not an 'academic' piece. It is intended to be a light, quick read for the junior commander. The lessons are also not intended to be definitive or prescriptive; rather, they represent a curated set of observations drawn from military, academic, and open-source material. Indeed, many of the basic lessons have not changed since Swinton's original text and simply need to be re-learned. The chosen dream sequence for this story focuses on the infantry platoon the bedrock of our warfighting capability, but the style could (and should) and should beused as a prism through which to teach and refine other capabilities. As the character of conflict continues to shift, in evolutions and revolutions, this specific story will also likely need to be augmented by new 'dreams' to address new tactical challenges. How we defended the bridge over the Šventara By Lt Foresight Backthought, 5 LOAMS. Prologue Upon a still summer's afternoon, after a long and bone-rattling journey across the flatness of the Baltics, we arrived at our objective: the bridge over the River Šventara. The long day of travelling, and the Vegetarian Mushroom Omelette ration pack that I had consumed, was likely responsible for the unsettled sleep and the resultant repetitive series of dreams I experienced that night. Each dream began the same, with our arrival that afternoon to that key bridge over the river, but each one played out differently. With each new dream I learnt new lessons and, somehow, I carried the lessons of each dream forward with me to the next. The First Dream - relearning the basics I felt a pang of dread and elation as the last of the column of vehicles rumbled across the bridge, down that straight tarmac road amongst the Baltic pines, and away into the distance towards the front line. This was the first time that I, Lt Backthought, had ever been alone in command of soldiers on a real operation. My platoon's task was clear: as part of the Division's Rear Area Security Group, we were to hold this bridge, some distance behind the FLOT and on a secondary route, to enable future operations. We would be here for 48hrs, after which time we would be relieved by follow-on forces. I had some thirty-odd soldiers with which to achieve the task, the rest of the company having now rumbled off to secure other bits of key terrain. The rest of our division was committed away to the east, towards the border, where it remained engaged in efforts to break through the enemy's frontage. It was doing its best to manoeuvre, to try and ave...

On June 1st 2025, Ukraine carried out well-coordinated drone attacks on four airbases deep inside Russia. In the operation codenamed 'Spider's Web', 117 drones were utilized to allegedly hit over 40 Russian strategic bombers inflicting a damage of around seven billion dollars. As part of the operation, drones were first smuggled into Russia, hidden inside wooden sheds and subsequently loaded onto the trucks. When the trucks were in close proximity to the air bases, the roof panels were remotely lifted, allowing the drones to initiate the assault. Ukraine claims that the targeted bomber fleet was being used by Russia to strike infrastructure inside the Ukrainian territory. The increased utilization of drones in contemporary times is indicative of the future face of warfare. While the Ukraine-Russia war has seen widespread drone use, similar patterns have emerged in other conflict zones including the Azerbaijan-Armenia war and the India-Pakistan conflict of May 2025. It is pertinent to note that the India-Pakistan conflict did not witness the same level and intensity of drone usage, possibly due to its short four-day duration, contrary to the Ukraine-Russia and Azerbaijan-Armenia wars. However, these instances collectively signal the pattern of future warfare, which would be dominated by the increasing use of drones, particularly drone swarms. During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, drones played a prominent role in countering Armenian ground forces on the battlefield, highlighting the vulnerability of conventional military equipment to drones. Utilization of drones by Azerbaijan played a significant role in determining the outcome of the war. The war concluded with Armenia accepting a ceasefire agreement under severe terms. Similarly, the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, saw the use of drone from both sides. During the four-day conflict, India used a variety of drones in an attempt to saturate air defence environment and take out the air defence and radar installations deep inside Pakistan. However, after detecting the threat, Pakistan likely switched to radar silence to prevent emission of signals and intercepted the incoming drones using soft and hard kill mechanisms. In response to India's use of drones, Pakistan also launched drones that hovered over the Indian military installations and major cities making it the first instance of drone warfare between the two nuclear armed states. All of these instances suggest that drones are dominating the present conflict environment and future conflicts might see a surge in the employment of drones. Previously, countries were investing in large drones, however, more recently these platforms are optimized for targeted strikes and are less suited for the dynamic and saturated threat environments of modern conflicts. Recognizing this limitation, countries are now shifting their focus towards developing scalable and cost-effective drone swarms capable of overwhelming enemy air defences. In this context, the US, in August 2023, announced Replicator initiative with the goal to harness advancements in autonomous technology to mass-produce expendable systems capable of providing a strategic edge in contested operational environments through Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) missions. The program focuses on developing drones, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs). Similarly, China's military drone capabilities have seen significant growth. Chinese President Xi Jinping has portrayed, drones as capable of "profoundly changing war scenarios" and pledged during the Communist Party's Congress in 2022, to "speed up the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities". In this context, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) operates an arsenal of diverse drone types, with estimates suggesting a fleet size in tens of thousands, vastly outnumbering the drone fleets of the US. Besides this, countries are also raci...

President Putin has only been able to sustain his war by bribing the poor, desperate and marginalised. The deal has been straightforward: sign up and you will be paid a fabulous lump sum and generous salary. You will receive benefits and a veteran's pension. In the event of your death your family will be compensated. A surprising majority believe they are signing one-year contracts and are unaware that service is indefinite until the end of the war. Even when told they still sign on, taking the gamble that the war will be over soon and anxious not to miss out on a get-rich-quick scheme. Just five percent of volunteers have a higher education and 40% are 50-year olds and older (last year the recruitment age was increased to 70 years-of-age, and the oldest recorded death has been a 72 year-old). The sums offered are stupendous. The one-time signing on bonus in Nizhny Novgorod can be as high as 3 million roubles ($38,300). Impoverished Bashkortostan - which has suffered the most war losses with over 3,100 confirmed volunteer deaths - offers 1.5 million roubles. 'You'll earn 3.7 million roubles [$44,000] your first year!' shouts an advertisement in Novosibirsk. Who wants to be a millionaire? The reality, naturally, is different and the subject of this article. The reality of life in occupied Ukraine A volunteer may earn a monthly salary of between 200,000-300,000 roubles $2,550-$3,800). This is many times higher than the average Russian salary and unimaginable in the poorer regions of Russia. Yet the soldiers are not kings of the castle. The costs of serving in occupied Ukraine swallow salaries. Some of those costs are itemised below: Food: Soldiers have to supplement inadequate rations by buying their own food. Locals routinely double and triple prices to Russian soldiers because they know they can pay. A monthly bill can run to 20,000-30,000 roubles ($255-$380). In one unusual case, a Russian soldier serving in 68 Motor Rifle Division on the Kupyansk front saved on food money by turning cannibal and eating a dead comrade. Reportedly this provided him with sufficient meat for two weeks. Water: Occupied Donbas is a water disaster area with daily rationing and water cuts. Tap water - when it runs - is undrinkable ('you cannot even wash in it', one soldier has averred). A daily five litres of water costs 100-150 roubles, or around $38-$57 per month. Sex: The Donbas has been transformed by a sex industry chasing roubles. As much as 500,000 roubles ($6,380) can be earned in week. Roughly one third of prostitutes work from stationary brothels and the remainder do 'shift work', or two-week shifts in rented houses in Mariupol, Berdyansk, Melitopol, Donetsk and Luhansk. A chat with a prostitute can cost 15,000 roubles ($190). One night costs 120,000 roubles ($1,530). Payments are in cash. 'It seems to me that 90% of my clients feel regret [about joining the war],' one prostitute has opined. Another has said that every second order she gets is 'just to sit down and talk, because they don't see anything there except men and corpses.' Cigarettes: The issue cigarettes are unsmokable and thrown away. Cigarettes are sold at inflated prices in the Donbas (around 200 roubles or $2.50 per packet) and are smoked apace. Roughly half of all Russian males smoke, one of the highest rates in the world. Smoking in the army is widespread. Alcohol: There are no numbers for alcohol consumption. There is abundant anecdotal evidence that the high alcohol consumption rates of Russian civilian society - and alcoholism - have been exported to the frontline. Indeed, some volunteer to get their lives in order, having lost control to alcohol in their home towns and villages. Clothing: Soldiers invariably resort to buying their own uniforms, especially cold weather clothing. There are mobile 'uniform shops' operating in the Donbas. They can charge as much as 10,000 roubles for a uniform ($125), or twice the going rate in a shop in 'the mainland' (it is telling th...

The publication of Human Augmentation - The Dawn of a New Paradigm by the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) in 2021 demonstrated the importance of this topic within UK defence.1 Human Augmentation (HA) is also referenced in the recent Defence Command Paper (Defence's response to a more contested and volatile world)3 relative perceived effort,4 reduction in muscle EMG activity,5 cognitive function,6 and metabolic activity7 inter alia. In addition, translation of these outcome measures to military utility is not yet convincing. Another fundamental challenge with exoskeletons for military applications is power requirement. The reported improvements in physical performance in tethered systems described in these studies need to be viewed with scepticism as they will be reduced significantly once the systems carry their own power supply. Finally, there is evidence that while performance in one domain (lifting / carrying) may be augmented, this comes at the cost of reduced performance in another (walking).8 Remote sensing and measurement has been explored as a means to prevent injury and assure the health of our fighting force. Several remote sensing systems have reached an advanced technology readiness level and have shown promise in the field.9 However, there are several key problems that range from technological challenges (e.g. signal noise, calibration, drift, attachment-related artefact, etc) to the lack of causal evidence in the literature to link injuries or illness states with particular measurable parameters.10 This last problem is a fundamental barrier to this technology finding a military utility. We are currently at the stage of discovering what we can measure, but to be useful we need to know what we should measure. This problem of lack of fundamental knowledge is profound in the more invasive areas of HA. Much of the means by which HA can be delivered remains entirely theoretical. For example, the specific genetic modifications of the human genome to improve muscle strength or prevent MSK injury are not known. Our literature search has not revealed any human research in these areas, meaning that deficits in understanding are unlikely to be resolved soon. If the HA technology is to transform our fighting force within a generation then significant investment in basic human research is required now. The scientific problems discussed above are not the only difficulties in this area. Key ethical, legal, societal, and economic problems will need to be overcome for HA to deliver meaningful performance gains. Ethical issues are discussed clearly in the original paper (1) and relate to permanence, harm, societal acceptance, military proportionality, and fairness. Another ethical problem that has not been discussed in the literature is the question of whether HA is a medical therapy. HA intended to mitigate traumatic injury may be argued to be analogous to preventative medicine such as vaccination and may be considered within the remit of our current understanding of healthcare and medical ethics. However, HA that has no preventative medical application has no current medical analogy and cannot be considered part of healthcare as we currently understand it. Multiple unanswered legal questions will need to be answered before HA can be used in practice (table 2). However, the UK government has no legislative agenda to clarify the law surrounding this area so these questions are likely to remain unanswered for now. Legal Concept Legal Questions Informed consent Montgomery ruling: patients must have individualised discussion of potential risks, benefits, alternatives, and implications. If HA is not defined as a medical technology, what consenting safeguards apply? Liability Who is liable if harm is caused to the individual as a result of augmentation if something goes wrong during augmentation procedure or during use? Who is responsible for the removal of HA technology in the case of obsolescence or request from the use...

At around the same time the video headlining this article was recorded, President Putin was hosting Russian Language, or Pushkin Day. This precedes Russia Day which is celebrated on 12 June. Putin spoke virtually from Novo Ogaryovo, his favoured residence on the outskirts of Moscow which boasts a heated, indoor, Olympic-sized swimming pool. Russian was one of the most expressive languages in the world, he extolled, 'reflecting our spiritual and moral traditions, culture, and unique identity.' The Russian president often blathers about Russia as a great 'civilisational-state'. It is even written into the country's national security doctrine: 'Russian World'(Russkiy mir) as counterpoint to the wicked 'Collective West'. A reader glancing at the image would likely imagine it shows two Ukrainian soldiers at the bottom of a sand pit. Not so. The two unfortunates are Russian soldiers - refuseniks. Not visible in the footage is another Russian firing live rounds into the sand around them and taunting them. This 'Russian World' - a reality far removed from the scented, polished corridors of presidential villas in Moscow - is the subject of this article. 'On the Russian Peasant' In 1922, the Russian writer Maxim Gorky wrote a later much-quoted essay 'On the Russian Peasant'. Why, Gorky mused, were Russians capable of apparently bottomless cruelty? 'I experienced and saw many atrocities. I could never find a justification for their existence …Where does this human cruelty come from?' His view of the Muscovite (Russian) national character was low and deserves to be quoted in full: 'It seems to me that the most striking feature of the Moscow national character is actual cruelty, just like English humour. This is a special cruelty, and at the same time a cold-bloodedly invented measure of the degree of endurance and resistance in patience that man can attain… The most interesting feature of Moscow brutality is its devilish finesse, its, I would say, aesthetic refinement. I do not think that these features can be explained by such words as "psychosis", "sadism" or similar. Because in essence, they do not explain anything. A consequence of alcoholism? - But I do not think that the people of Moscow were more poisoned by alcohol than other European nations. However, it must be admitted that the influence of alcohol on the psyche of a Muscovite is particularly fatal because our nation is worse off than others. I am not talking here about cruelty, which appears sporadically, like an explosion of a sick or perverted soul. These are exceptions that will chill a psychiatrist: here I am talking about mass psychology, about the nation's soul, about collective cruelty.' In Russia, he concluded, almost everyone enjoys beating someone. On the 'Special Military Operation' Putin's 'Special Military Operation' will be remembered for its barbarism. The Russian president arrogantly presumed to take Kyiv in three days and the rest of eastern and southern Ukraine in two weeks. Instead he has mired Russia in a disaster and revealed to the world the true nature of 'Russian World'. The Donbas, which he presumed to 'liberate', has been turned into a ravaged, depopulated wasteland, a region drained of children, jobs, hope or a future. Scores of settlements and towns have been erased from the map. The 'Russian way of warfare' has proved to be naked banditry. 'This is not the 'second army' of the world,' as one Ukrainian expressed following the invasion, 'this is a bunch of marauders, degenerates, executioners and rapists.' From Kherson to Kharkiv, daily and nightly drone attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure have not stopped for over three years. Russian contempt for the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Red Cross (IRC) has been breath-taking. Ukrainian PoWs are currently dispersed in around 300 prisons across Russia (Ukraine maintains five transit centres and five permanent prisons). Moscow will not allow the IRC anywhere near Ukrainian PoWs and...

"Russia's hybrid attacks against NATO look like war", writes Deborah Haynes for Sky News. She is referring to grey-zone warfare, attacks that sit under the threshold of conventional war and include sabotage, cyber hacks, and assassination plots. Significantly, this is not the first caution published in the recent media of Russia's employment of this type of warfare and the risks of a failed NATO response. As Edward Lucas warns in The Times, Russia's war in the grey zone is actually chipping away at the heart of NATO. When I read these warnings, my gendered military experiences are at the forefront of my mind. I am a female, current serving RAF Reservist and former RAF Regular. I am also a PhD student, with my research centres around gender and RAF organisational culture. Whilst connecting diversity, inclusion and sub-threshold warfare may seem a stretch to some and arguably to others, a further distraction from the more immediate threat of war, I am well aware that the impact of grey-zone warfare has far reaching consequences. Grey-zone warfare conducted in 'peacetime' using information, money, or even physical force is powerful. Not only does it have a physical impact on UK and NATO defence through the seemingly endless impact of drones, hired thugs, and now "seabed sabotage" damaging infrastructure, energy, computer networks or transport systems; but most significantly, the cohesive nature in which we fight together, reducing the ability to defend against threats. By "posing dilemmas and stoking divisions" the MoD is being pulled in ways which undermine the foundations of the organisations purpose. The real target, as Edward Lucas writes, is decision making. The act of distracting and undermining decision making equates to sub-threshold warfare, reducing the ability to effectively operate. So where does gender and diversity link in? In the real world? In November 2024, the HMNZS Manawanui, a New Zealand Naval ship, crashed and subsequently sank under the command of Yvonne Gray, whose Naval career notably spanned over 30-years in both the New Zealand and Royal Navy. Despite this, her gender and sexuality were directly attributed to the incident. As a "diversity hire", she has faced a barrage of hostile and toxic abuse in the street. Quoted directly in The Times, John Mclean, author of A Mission of Honour: The Royal Navy in The Pacific, clearly outlines the problem. "The Navy is over-promoting women beyond their capacity in order to meet gender and sexual orientation goals". In New Zealand, other women in uniform received similar abuse in the wake of the incident. March this year saw one of the worst weeks for aviation history in the US, as a commercial jet and military helicopter collided in Washington DC. In immediate response, President Trump blamed D&I initiatives and so called 'diversity hires' as the reason for the accidents and a Transgender pilot was wrongly blamed and vilified for the crash. When only 2 days later a small medical transport plane crashed in Philadelphia, it was unsurprising that the mourning family of one of the pilots refuses to release their name, out of concerns for gendered attacks and abuse. Pervasive and closer to home, these type of gendered attacks are gaining momentum and increasing in prevalence. When a group of Palestine Action protestors recently broke into RAF Brize Norton and vandalise a Voyager aircraft, the Station Commander of RAF Brize Norton, a female Group Captain, was outwardly mocked as a 'woke wing commander' and forced to deactivate her social media due to gendered trolling attacks. The attacks against her cite her gender as the reason for her position, and it is because of this that the airfield security failed. In a paradoxical twist, the effort to resolve such issues of gendered discrimination is far reaching in its risk of being a mere rhetoric of inclusion. Within the same week of the sinking of the HMNZA Manawanui, Kevin Maher states in The Times, "I couldn't interview ...