Pacific Polarity

Arnaud Bertrand argues that the new US National Security Strategy signals a reluctant American acceptance of a multipolar world and a search for ways to coexist rather than dominate. He contends that China’s worldview is fundamentally non-missionary and oriented toward an integrated global system rather than bloc confrontation, shaped by history and cultural distance from the West. Arnaud suggests that hawkish shifts in Europe and Japan reflect anxiety over US retrenchment, even as Washington itself increasingly recognises China’s leverage and the need to accommodate its core concerns. Ultimately, he warns against a Cold War mentality, urging states to avoid rigid camps and instead pursue flexible, interest-based engagement in a more fluid global order. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Cyan Ventures' Shaun Chau discussed Australia’s failed COP bid, the global headwinds facing climate action, and what a pragmatic path forward might look like for the climate camp. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

James Laurenceson of the Australia-China Relations Institute at UTS shares his thoughts on China’s economic headwinds, the US–China trade war, and the state of Australia–China relations. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Zhao Long of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies shares how China sees its role in a shifting global order. Dr Zhao argues that China can break the historical cycle of great powers seeking spheres of influence, instead advancing a development-driven model for Asia within a multipolar world. He highlights initiatives like the Global Governance Initiative and the SCO Development Bank as concrete steps toward collective security. Dr Zhao also notes that many regional states view US-China rivalry as both risk and opportunity, leveraging competition to attract investment and diversify partnerships. On Russia-US dynamics, he sees little chance of genuine rapprochement but no major downside for China, and he emphasizes that dialogue and mutual understanding remain essential for stability. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Sheena Chestnut Greitens discusses how China is extending its internal security model abroad, and what that means for U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. She explains how Beijing’s campaign-style governance and surveillance technologies are being repurposed as tools of global security influence, raising risks of autocratization, but also potential blowback for China reminiscent of Cold War overreach. From the Solomon Islands to Taiwan, she outlines the implications for Australia, regional allies, and the U.S., where debates over securitization, alliance management, and even academic engagement with China reveal the difficult trade-offs of balancing security and openness in an increasingly contested order. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Former Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski discusses the shifting balance of power in Southeast Asia and what it means for Australia. From the risks of a potential U.S. retrenchment, to the stabilising role of competition between Washington and Beijing, he argues that Australia has few viable strategic alternatives to its alliance with the United States. Drawing on his experience across Southeast Asia and beyond, Goledzinowski highlights the opportunities in critical minerals, the challenges of sustaining immigration support at home, and why regional engagement requires both patience and long-term commitment. Above all, he stresses that international affairs resemble chaos theory, a “butterfly effect” where small shifts can ripple unpredictably. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

On this episode of Pacific Polarity, Natalie Sambhi, Executive Director of Verve Research, discussed how Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto is caught between protest and power politics, navigating domestic unrest while striving for a place on the world stage. Dr Sambhi explains how Prabowo’s push to be seen at major international fora reflects Indonesia’s ambitions as a Global South power, even as China looms large in its hedging strategy and Western partners fret over Jakarta’s openness to multiple alignments. At home, Prabowo faces mounting demonstrations and a legacy of military influence that continues to shape Indonesian politics, though the army remains a deeply trusted institution. The conversation explores how these internal and external dynamics intersect, and what they reveal about Indonesia’s balancing act between stability at home and relevance abroad. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Syaza Shukri, Associate Professor at the International Islamic University Malaysia, discusses how Malaysia is navigating deep-rooted ethnic politics at home and shifting geopolitical currents abroad under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. She highlights how Malaysia’s affirmative action policies and mono-ethnic party system continue to shape divisive domestic debates, while on the global stage, suspicions of both China and the West complicate foreign policy perceptions. Although Anwar has leaned into the language of “Asian civilisation,” Syaza argues his diplomacy is less about aligning with Beijing than about engaging all sides, even if that stance is less appreciated in Western capitals. Political Islam and Malaysia’s role as ASEAN summit host further underscore the country’s search for harmony between its domestic identity and international positioning. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Jersey Lee spoke with Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen about Australia’s strategic future. Roggeveen, author of The Echidna Strategy, argues for a continental defence posture rather than tying Australia to AUKUS and US forward defence priorities, warning that Washington’s interest in Asian dominance is inconsistent and driven more by prestige than necessity. He sees Australia as the largest Pacific power with the capacity to build a regional sphere of influence, while Southeast Asia risks falling into China’s orbit. He also warns that Trump’s second term would pose greater challenges than his first, reflects on lessons from Brexit for Australia, and stresses the need to rethink how to secure Australia’s independence and political traditions in an era of shifting power balances. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., former IMF executive director and founding VP of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), discusses why both institutions fall short in serving the Global South.He explains how IMF reforms to boost developing countries’ representation stalled because meaningful change would increase China’s voting share — something the West resists — while the U.S. insists on keeping veto power. This, he argues, entrenches geopolitical bias, with the IMF acting as a “North Atlantic Monetary Fund.”Paulo also critiques the NDB: voting rules that entrench founding BRICS power, weak transparency, politicized leadership, and no resident board to engage members. He calls ex-president Marcos Troyjo “totally unqualified” and explains why Putin kept Dilma Rousseff in charge rather than nominating a Russian.They also discuss the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement’s Melbourne origins, why private cryptocurrencies won’t drive de-dollarization, how the U.S. “GENIUS Act” could backfire, and why Trump’s tariffs might strengthen BRICS cohesion. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Will Glasgow, China correspondent for The Australian, talks about the complexities of reporting from China, the evolving state of China-Australia relations, and more This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

International Crisis Group's William Yang discusses about Taiwan’s increasingly precarious geopolitical position as it faces mounting pressure from China and shifting demands from the US. He unpacks the implications of US “reciprocal tariffs,” stalled trade negotiations, and the cancelled Latin America trip, as well as domestic political tensions heightened by a failed DPP-led recall effort. William discusses Taiwan’s constrained ability to hedge, the limits of “resist China” messaging, and the need for pragmatic policy shifts, such as rethinking energy and defence strategies. He also reflects on regional dynamics, the role of Japan and Australia, and the importance of coupling deterrence with reassurance in cross-strait relations. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Dr Nguyen Khac Giang discusses how Vietnam’s domestic politics and foreign policy are shaped by intensifying US-China rivalry. He discusses Vietnam’s adaptation of China’s development model, the political impact of its anti-corruption drive, and the country’s deep reliance on trade as both strength and vulnerability. Dr Nguyen explains how Vietnam balances ties with China (a regime and economic partner) and the US (a security partner), and outlines Hanoi’s long-term shift toward a “Banyan diplomacy” strategy, deepening domestic roots and diversifying international partnerships to reduce geopolitical risk. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

In this episode of Pacific Polarity, Donald Low elaborates on what makes the Singapore model click, as well as the lessons in governance that China and America can continue to learn from Singapore’s experience. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

In the latest episode of Pacific Polarity, Ambassador Kurt Tong offers sharp reflections on American diplomacy in Asia. He underscores growing demands on the State Department’s capacity, particularly as issues like trade increasingly intersect with domestic politics, requiring careful coordination across multiple U.S. federal agenciesJersey LeeWelcome to this episode of Pacific polarity. Today we’re speaking with Ambassador Kurt Tong. Ambassador Tong is Managing Partner at The Asia Group, where he leads consulting teams focused on Japan, greater China and Korea, and on East Asia regional policy matters. He is a former senior U.S. diplomat with around 30 years of experience, including roles as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, ambassador to APEC, consul general in Hong Kong, and as director for Asian economic affairs at the National Security Council. A key architect of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, he also played a leading role in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and U.S. economic engagement across the Asia-Pacific. Ambassador Tong, great to have you on.Kurt TongGreat to be here.Jersey LeeAs Consul General to Hong Kong and Macau through much of the first Trump presidency, were there ever times when you found out about a new US policy via tweet, and how did you handle that situation? What would be your advice to your former colleagues, given the higher stakes in this second Trump presidency, on managing diplomatic relations with this uncertainty looming over them?Kurt TongI think that President Trump is, as you note, well known for using a variety of ways to get out his message. He's used his social media, I think, more than any president has to both conduct political debates as well as make announcements about his objectives with respect to policy, so that's different. Every president will change policy and find different ways of explaining that, both to other governments, to their own government, to the congress, to the public, so I tend to focus on more the policy itself rather than the delivery mechanism.What you're implying, and I think it's quite self-evident, is that in the second Trump administration, the president has come in with a high degree of determination to change a lot of things about US policy and about the conduct of the US government.So that's a well-known fact and, I haven't worked for the administration for six years, so I don't have any direct experience with the second Trump administration. But it's certainly a different type of administration than a lot of people are used to.Richard GrayAt a recent congressional hearing, Wendy Cutler argued the cultural challenge within the state department is that economic affairs tracks are viewed as less desirable than the political affairs tracks. Do you agree that this is a substantive issue, and if so, what can be done to remedy the undervaluing of economics within American diplomacy? Especially as we think about Asia, where politics, security, and economics are pretty intricately intertwined.Kurt TongI don't know the context in which Wendy said that. I was, for a couple of years, as you noted in the introduction, the principal deputy to the Assistant Secretary and the Economic Bureau of the State Department. And when a gentleman named Charles Rivkin was my boss, the Assistant Secretary, Charlie and I were conducting a very concerted effort to strengthen the economic function within the State Department. Because for decades, really, the question of how economic policy get made and how does the State Department get involved in that process and shape it, and then coordinate the other aspects of foreign policy together with economic policy.I've thought about this problem a lot. It's not a recent thing by any means. I actually think that the recognition both publicly and internally of the importance of economic policy in diplomacy is continuing to go up year by year, including in the current administration; the difficulty is how do you institutionalize that and then how do you carry it out in practice.So one of the problems for the state department is that it doesn't have statutory authority over the making of international economic policy; financial policy is made by Treasury Department, trade policy by USTR—all this is more complicated than just one agency, but the lead agency is USTR; agricultural by Agriculture; industrial promotion and trade controls, which have become more and more important recently because of US-China friction, by the Commerce Department; energy policy by the Energy Department, and so on down the line.The State Department traditionally only had management over a few narrow areas. Back when the US had textile quotas, the State Department did textile quotas. The aviation negotiations have traditionally always been done by the State Department. And then the State Department has had some statutory authority over economic sanctions and also has had some authority over licensing of military related exports. Having foreign service officers at embassies work in the state department in Washington and then still know enough about this very complex policymaking process, to do a good job, is really complicated.So what we were trying to do is increase the opportunities for diplomats to get experience on US domestic economic policy formation, because unlike human rights policy for example, something that affects other countries more than affects the United States, trade policy affects the US as much or more than it does the counterparty country, so it's absolutely a matter of both domestic policy and foreign policy.In that context, it's unrealistic for the State Department to think that it's going to be put in charge of everything, and be allowed to decide everything for the U.S. So in that context, knowing more is the way to empower the diplomats to make them more effective. A lot of efforts have been made over the years to try to strengthen that—the individual capability to understand the issues and negotiate them with foreign governments—because that's often required of economic issues focused diplomats. And I think a lot of progress has been made.Recently, I'm quite concerned about the downsizing of the State Department functions and the removal of one of the most important tools of foreign economic policy, which is overseas development assistance.So more than the issue that you cited and the way that you cited it, I think the deeper concern is, is the State Department maintaining its full functionality given the intense budgetary and political pressure that it's been put under? And is the U.S. giving away some of its most important tools of foreign economic policy, which is development assistance? And I think I'm very concerned that the answer to both of those is bad.Richard GrayYeah. And as a related note, one of the things that I wanted to talk about was the role of investment, both public and private. And so, through your work at the Asia Group, how do you think about the role commercial relationships play in enhancing these bilateral relations?While the United States currently is restricting market access through tariffs and some upping the ante of export controls, it still is a pretty large recipient of and disperser of FDI in the Asia-Pacific. A little over a year and a half ago, I attended an event with Singaporean Ambassador Lui, and he says something along the lines of, China is our largest trading partner, but America is our most important investor. And while investment and trade in consort would certainly be an ideal for more comprehensive economic engagement, to what extent can private sector investment be a stopgap for these market restrictions? And as you're indicating, this is perhaps even more pressing with the closure of USAID, where private investment is both going to have to fill the diplomatic gap for trade access and public investment. How do you think about these things playing out, the role that companies are playing, and perhaps the broader aperture of what U.S. diplomatic relations might be like with some of these valves cut off?Kurt TongYeah, that's a very complex question that you've asked. The U.S. is both the number one source of outbound direct investment, portfolio investment, financing in general, as also the largest licensor and supplier of productive technology. And those often go together. the money and the technology and the managerial capabilities that go with them.It's also the biggest host of inbound investment because it's the largest economy, and traditionally has been very, very open for the most part to foreign investment in the US, because foreign investment is good for an economy.The political view of outbound investment over the years has varied and been a bit contradictory; so when people think about, do we want these Fortune 100 companies to be successful and have their stock prices go up and create more jobs in the United states, the answer is yes; these companies often say that in order to grow and be successful, they need to be globally competitive, not just competitive inside the United States, and they say that in order to be globally competitive, they often need to invest overseas and produce overseas and often produce and import things back to the United States that have been produced overseas, because those are cost-effective approach to making money and growing their companies.The political contradiction comes not from, if you ask any politician or American citizen, do you want your most successful companies to be successful? They say, oh yeah, we want that. If you ask them, should they be allowed to invest freely in other countries and leverage economic growth in other countries to the benefit of US shareholders? They say, yeah, that sounds great. But then if you say, should US companies build factories overseas to produce stuff and sell it back to the United States, you get a very mixed view because

What's driving dynamics across Asia? In our latest Pacific Polarity episode, Dr. Evan A. Feigenbaum of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace breaks down the key geopolitical trends reshaping the Indo-Pacific.Our expansive dialogue covered several topics, including:* Climate change in the Pacific,* A prospectus of AUKUS and U.S.-Australia relations,* China’s hardware-software tech ecosystem,* The future of rule-setting in Asia,* U.S.-China economic statecraft, and* The importance of American strategists to understand the concerns and aspirations of Asian states as independent actors, as opposed to pawns in the competition between the United States and China. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

Richard GrayWelcome to today's episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we're speaking with Dr. Kazuto Suzuki, who is director of the Institute of Geoeconomics at the International House of Japan and professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo. Dr. Suzuki also serves as president of the Japan Association of International Security and Trade, and an advisor of the Japanese government on National Space Policy Committee of the Cabinet Office. Dr. Suzuki, pleasure to be speaking with you.Kazuto SuzukiPleasure is all mine. Thank you.Richard GrayRecently in Japan Times, you argued that we were witnessing a transition from a defensive economic security to an approach of geoeconomics, which combines both offensive and defensive tools of economic statecraft. Can you describe this transition and Japan's role within Japan?Kazuto SuzukiWell, initially Japan has been interested in the concept of economic security, largely because we have been under pressure from China with regard to the export of rare earth minerals, various critical minerals, and also because Japan has been involved in a lot of supply chain network with China.But because of the intensive confrontation between the United States and China, especially after the first Trump administration, I think the economic relationship, especially in China using the economy as a weapon, and imposing various mechanisms such as export control on critical minerals and also controlling much harder in the Chinese domestic market.So in that regard, Japan had to take certain actions to improve the resilience of the Japanese industry and Japanese economic relationship with China. And therefore, we launched the concept of economic security. In 2022, Japan has established a law called the Economic Security Promotion Act, or ESPA, which targeted mainly improvement of the resilience of the supply chain, and also protecting the critical infrastructure, including the 5G network. After the establishment of ESPA, Japan, of course, took various measures to improve its economic resilience.But we gradually understand that the world is getting much complicated, including the tariff policy by the second Trump administration. So, we are now thinking of using the Japanese economic capabilities, especially focusing on the indispensability of the Japanese products in the global market, especially in terms of material, machine tools, or the manufacturing equipment. So these are the strengths of Japanese industry and Japan is indispensable in the upper stage of the production cycle. And we think that having this sort of strength in economic statecraft or economic indispensability in the global market we would be able to take advantage of this as the tools to express ourselves in the global supply chain.But unlike China, Japan has much less or little leverage against the global market. And we do need to maintain the free trade and free exchange of goods, in order to survive, because obviously Japan is a resource poor country. We depend heavily on the international trade. So we think that it is important to use this economic statecraft or economic indispensability in the global supply chain as the tools to build up the much stronger international frameworks such as CPTPP.Perhaps some of you may not know, maybe Australian audience understands very well about the CPTPP. This was a free trade agreement after the Trump administration left the TPP negotiation. The TPP was originally started with the 12 countries, but when the first Trump administration came into power, Mr. Trump decided to leave the TPP, and the TPP was on the verge of collapse. But Mr. Abe, Prime Minister then, he took initiative to restore the TPP negotiation and reframed the TPP to the CPTPP. So that was one of the examples that Japan took leadership in maintaining the free flow of global trading goods and to make sure that we will be engaged in the free trade.I think this is getting more and more important under the second Trump administration, where the tendency of protectionism is much stronger. And I think Mr. Trump's economic policy against US allies is now being very severe, and really hit on the capabilities of the economic activities of both Japan and Australia. I think it is in a sense the reason why Japan is using the economic statecraft not in an aggressive way, but for the cooperative way, is probably the reflection of the change of the international economic system.Jersey LeeYeah, so we will get to the longer-term challenge posed by China later on. Right now, as you mentioned, Japan has this current conflict in the economic realm and the trade realm with the US. Many had thought that Japan might be the first country to sign a trade deal with the US, including many in the current US administration. So first of all, why do you think that did not materialize? And given that China's had a preliminary deal with the US, that also came as quite a surprise to the world in terms of how much tariff reduction China received, particularly as it came on the heels of a notably less significant deal with the UK. So how do you think this was received in Japan? And do you think that all of this makes a deal with the US more or less likely?Kazuto SuzukiWell first of all, I think being a first does not necessarily mean a good thing. I think the reason why the UK was the first to make a deal is because the UK does not have the trade surpluses against the United States. In other words, from a US point of view, it's not a trade deficit country. So it's easier to use the tariff as a leverage to negotiate with the UK; and even when there is no trade deficit, the US still imposed a baseline 10% tariff against UK. The 10% of tariff is still a very large scale tariff and UK will face a very difficult moment for exporting its goods to the United States.But in terms of the automobile tariff, which is 27.5%, UK has the quota for the low tariff, which is 10%, for 100,000 vehicles per year. But UK is exporting almost 100,000 vehicles, which is okay for UK. The problem is that Japan is exporting 10 times more than the UK. So the conditions are quite different. And tariff negotiation with the United States and Japan is more complicated than the UK.The tariff agreement with China was basically, it is just an adjustment of the excessive escalation. So it was an escalation control mechanism rather than the negotiation. Basically, there's no deal with China. It is just simply bringing down these very excessive tariff level, like 145% to the 30%. If there is no agreement in the 90 days, then it will come back to the 54% (note: initial rate after “Liberation Day”). These are basically the beginning of the trade negotiation. It's not the conclusion of any tariff negotiation. Apart from that, there's no agreement.Fiji is another one, but Fiji is a very small economy and it's easy to deal. So I think Japan needs to take more time to negotiate with the United States because we are still far apart of our demand and the U.S. demand. And there's no reason that we accelerate the negotiation, because time is on our side. Even if it passed the July 9th, which is the end of the 90 days postponement of the so-called reciprocal tariff, even after the July 9th, probably it is the United States which face the more difficult situation. So I think the United States will have more incentives to conclude the negotiation. So in that regard, I think we can make the deal in a stronger position. So I think taking more time for negotiation is not a bad thing.And after all, the negotiation is to make an agreement which is acceptable for both countries. We cannot accept such high tariff on automobile, which is the bread and butter of Japanese economy. And there is no reason that we need to haste for the negotiation.Richard GrayAnd so to transition on from this, while it's important to coordinate on economic security and geoeconomic challenges between allies, it's also somewhat important for there to be a positive agenda of having reliable and continual investment relationships. And so this is where it's sort of the continual derailing of the Nippon steel acquisition of US Steel is in many ways very confusing. So on one end, Japan is an ally of the United States, but the Biden administration commented that the purchase was a national security concern. On more of the logistical and corporate specific challenges, Nippon Steel had cutting edge technology that would boost US steel manufacturing. And what's more, the union's preferred purchaser, Cleveland Cliffs, had recently laid off 950 workers in Illinois and Pennsylvania. And so there was going to be some downsizing in staffing regardless of who the purchaser would be.So with all of this in mind, a question of the US as a reliable place to invest in and to receive investment from, I think there's some level of ambiguity, which is not helpful to U.S.-Japan relations at large. And at this moment, President Trump has indicated his support of the acquisition, and it looks like it will go through. But there are many questions that still remain, including but not limited to his claim that the acquisition will lead to 70,000 new jobs. I don't know if Nippon Steel knows where that number exactly came from. In your view, what are some of the lessons that the Japanese government and Japanese companies have drawn from this saga?Kazuto SuzukiWell, the first lesson is don't propose the acquisition of the national interest of the country during the election time. The second is that steel and Aluminium has been a major U.S. interest for many, many years, ever since 1970s. And I think this is the hardest sector to penetrate into, and it is understandable that the United States is trying to restore the manufacturing jobs and manufacturing capabilities. Of course, the competitiveness of the US steel industry is much, much less, and I don't think it is economically reasonable, but I think when it comes to a question of maintaining

For this episode, we spoke with Ambassador Jane Hardy, non-resident senior fellow at the United States Study Centre, University of Sydney, and served as ambassador to Spain, Australian Consul General in Honolulu. Ambassador Hardy discusses her diplomatic postings, in particular the work that goes into engaging with America, and comments on the state of the alliance in Trump 2.0. She reveals that, even though she only left the post of Consul General to Honolulu in June 2021, she had no prior knowledge of AUKUS, which was announced in September 2021. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

For this episode, we spoke with Professor Michael Green, who is CEO of the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, and served in the U.S. National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration. Dr. Green advocates for America’s allies to remain committed to the alliance, but notes the many counterproductive moves by the Trump administration that, while mostly reversible, are damaging America’s global strategy at a privotal moment in the competition with China.Richard GrayWelcome to Pacific Polarity. Today, we're speaking with Dr. Michael Green, who is CEO of the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney and Senior Advisor and Henry Kissinger Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Green served as Senior Vice President for Asia at CSIS, and is on leave from Georgetown's Walsh School of Foreign Service. Previously, he taught at Johns Hopkins SAIS and served in the U.S. National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration. Dr. Green received his PhD from SAIS and is the author of numerous books, including most recently, Line of Advantage, Japan's Grand Strategy in the Era of Shinzo Abe. Dr. Green, pleasure to be speaking with you.Michael GreenThank you, guys. Glad to join you.Richard GrayAs a starting point, throughout your career working on U.S. policy in Asia, what have the historic strengths been for U.S. as a strategic ally and partner? Why have countries decided to collaborate with the United States out of choice, not necessarily out of the lack of options?Michael GreenWhen the U.S. sent its first diplomatic mission to China in 1784 on board the sycophantically named Empress of China, which sailed out of New York Harbor with ginseng from Pennsylvania and other goods to trade, they sent a diplomat, major Shaw, who'd been in the Continental Army. And his instructions from Washington were, be very nice, say that the U.S. doesn't interfere in other countries' internal affairs, that we're interested in commerce, that we're not imperialists like the British.For a lot of our history, really, into the early 20th century, the U.S. approach to the world was just be nice to everybody, and focus on commerce. The rest of the world figured, that is not exactly a consistent pattern, if you were in Latin America in the 1840s or the early 1900s, you didn't feel that way about the U.S.; big power rivals like Japan in the early 20th century—you know, Japanese people liked the U.S. actually, but they realized that the US, in fact, was not this Jeffersonian “peace and friendship with all”, but had hard power interests. And that's probably good because we do, the US does.My book argued that the US will compete, it had competed starting in 1783 and 84, and it will compete now to prevent China from having hegemonic control of Asia. That's built into the DNA. The American colonists were fighting tooth and nail for their independence, they'd turn to the French, the Spanish, whoever would help them.So that's one thing that allies get today, because the Japanese, the Indians and Australians, any ally worries about abandonment: will the US really be there? The consistency of American competition and not letting another hegemon take over, that frankly provides a really important base for an alliance. It's not just that we're nice. It's that actually, we don't like getting pushed around. And that is somewhat reassuring.The other thing that has really built American credibility as an ally is the economic power of the United States. After World War II, 50% of global GDP was American because most of the world was blown up or not yet developed. By the 1970s, the U.S. had about 25% of global economic output.In the post-Cold War years in the 90s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and everyone talked about American unipolarity, we had about 25%. You know what it is today? About 25%. So there's a consistent critical mass of American economic power that also makes it really important if you want to develop your country, have access to technology.And then the third thing is, while American engagement in the world is based on realpolitik and hard power and preventing rival hegemons from dominating Asia or Europe or the Western Hemisphere, it's also built around the idealism and rule of law that the founders of the country built into the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. There's a theory that Charlie Kupchan at Georgetown and others have advanced, John Ikenberry at Princeton, that American hegemony is very different from ancient Rome or Nazi Germany, because it's based on the rule of law. So the UN, the World Trade Organization, the Bretton Woods system, all these things allow countries like Japan, Germany, former rivals to get rich because the Americans allow people who participate as partners and allies to get a say and to have constraint over American choices in the UN or the World Trade Organization.I'm sure we'll ask about the Trump administration, but what worries a lot of people is that last part, keeping people on your side because you play by the rules is now really being questioned. And then the other two parts, American economic power, American hard power count, but the secret sauce has always been this willingness of Gulliver to let the Lilliputians tie him down. And Trump isn't going for that. And so we'll see what happens.Richard GrayYou did predict the follow up, which is the question of looking at the status quo situation of U.S. strategic positioning. More narrowly on this question, you talked about a lot of things, which is consistency of commitment, economic power and commitment to some level of international rule setting. Specifically on the commitment side of things, how has that changed? And how do you think other countries are reacting to a perception, perhaps, that American commitment is less stable and predictable as maybe it had been five or 10 years ago?Michael GreenHenry Kissinger was asked, when Trump was elected in 2016, to explain Donald Trump in the context of world history, very Kissinger kind of question. And Kissinger said, sometimes the international system changes and you don't realize it has changed until some figure comes along to remind you that it's broken. And he said that was Donald Trump.And then the interviewer asked him, so what is Trump's vision for the new world order and Kissinger hesitated and said, I don't think he has one. He was an accident. So my view is that Donald Trump is the most disruptive American president in history. And that is obviously nerve wracking for allies and confusing for adversaries.But he's not speaking for the American people. And frankly, I don't think he's speaking for American interests as the Congress defines them, which is to say he got elected mainly because of… there's new polling out that is much more reliable than the exit polls on the day of the election, and it pretty much shows he got elected because of inflation and the economy, and because people thought Biden was old and Kamala Harris wasn't elected in an open way, she was anointed, plus immigration and culture stuff, the woke DEI agenda, which was probably fourth on the list; that's why he was elected.He was not elected to break American alliances, tariff everyone, because consistently in polls, the U.S. Studies Center polls we do, CSIS, Chicago Council, you name it, Pew, Gallup, consistently the American people really like having allies and think they're really important. And by the way, polls also show that two-thirds of Americans think tariffs are not good because they raise prices.So Trump is disruptive. His leadership style is built around being unpredictable and threatening. And that's not how you run an alliance. But it's not a mandate that he has from the American people or the Congress. So my view is the disruption could get deeper, but it's not a new world order and it's not a new American strategy. It's a period of great disruption. And the question is, what comes next? Allies like Australia or Japan will have some say in that, because we need allies.And it's interesting, even in the tariff wars, which are pretty harsh with Japan right now, the U.S. trade representative, the lead negotiator, has said, we are not going to bring defense into this. We're not going to talk about defense spending. So there is a recognition, even in the most protectionist parts of the Trump administration, that we really need allies because of China.So as the French saying goes, plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, the more it changes, the more it looks the same. There's huge disruption and change, but it's also revealing, I think, the depth of support for alliances in the major institutions of American power, the Congress, the public, think tanks, universities.There is really no constituency in the U.S. that is against alliances right now, which for the first time ever, by the way, because in the 80s, when we had trade friction with Japan, a lot of trade unions were critical of the alliance. That's not the case now. So anyway, it's small comfort. Doesn't mean this won't be hard.Richard GrayAs a point on the unions, I think the Nippon Steel situation points slightly in the other direction, but I take your point.Michael GreenLet me say something about Nippon Steel, which was a supremely stupid decision by both Biden and Trump to not approve the purchase by Nippon Steel of a U.S. steel company that would have increased U.S. competitiveness in steel, saved jobs, and lowered prices for manufacturers. But in the context of the 2024 presidential election, swing state votes in Pennsylvania in particular, where my family's originally from, steel mill workers, foremen, way back 100 years ago, those people were so fixated on those votes, they didn't want to do anything that would signal they weren't 100% supporting unions, because the unions didn't like the Nippon Steel deal, because they were worried the Japanese would restructur

For this episode, we spoke with the Honourable Gareth Evans, who served as Australia’s foreign minister from 1988 to 1996. Mr. Evans is a strong advocate for Australia pursuing a more independent foreign policy. In our conversation, we discussed how Australia should navigate the Asia-Pacific, between a less reliable U.S., and a more assertive China. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com