Hey guys, what you are about to listen to is basically a “what if” Japan performed Hokushin-ron instead of Nanshin-ron, ie: What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2? Before I jump into it I just want to thank all of you that signed up for the patreon, you guys are awesome. Please leave a comment on this episode to let me know what more you want to hear about in the future. With all of that said and done lets jump right into it.

Part 1 The Geopolitical context

Ok so, one of the questions I get the most is, what if Japan invaded the USSR. I’ve actually already tackled this subject, albeit lightly with Cody from AlternatehistoryHub and once with my friend Eric. Its too complicated to give a real answer, a lot of this is guess work, though I really will try to provide hard numbers. I think off the bat something needs to be made clear since we are dealing with alternate history. I am not doing a “what if Japan developed completely different, or what if the IJA got their way in the early 1930’s” no no, this is going to be as realistic as possible…even though this is batshit crazy. 

Japan faced the decision of whether to go to war with the USSR in 1941 during Operation Barbarossa. They held meetings, made plans, and ultimately it was decided they would not engage the Soviets. Our scenario will follow exactly what they did to a T, but when the made the decision not to go to war, we will see them go to war. 

Now before I jump into our this timeline, I think its very important to explain the actual situation Japan faced in 1941.

There were two major strategies that emerged during the 1930’s within the Japanese military. Many junior officers in the IJA favored the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” strategy against the USSR. Many officers in the IJN with some in the IJA favored the Nanshin-ron “southern strike” strategy, to seize the resource rich dutch east indies by invading Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The idea of Hokushin-ron was to perform an invasion into Southern Siberia and outer mongolia ending around Lake Baikal where they would set up defenses. They had already tried to establish this during the Russian civil war as part of the Siberian Intervention, but failed to create a buffer state. From 1935-1939 there were 108 border clashes between the USSR and Japan. In 1938 one of these border clashes turned into quite a catastrophe, it was called the battle of Lake Khasan. 

The Soviets suffered nearly 800 deaths, more than 3000 wounded, perhaps nearly 50 tanks were destroyed with another 100 damaged. The Japanese suffered about 600 deaths with 2500 wounded. The result ultimately was a ceasefire, but for the Kwantung army it seemed to them like a victory. In May of 1939 they had a much larger and more famous battle known as the battle of Khalkhin Gol. 

During the early part of the battle the IJA sent 80 tanks crossing over Khalkhin Gol, driving the Soviets back towards Baintsagan Hill. Zhukov was waiting for the attack and sent 450 tanks and armored cars unsupported by infantry to attack the IJA from three sides. The IJA were practically encircled and lost half their armored units as they struggled to fight back as it withdrew. The two armies spared for the next 2 weeks along the east bank of the Khalkhin Gol. Problem was the Japanese were having issues getting their supplies to the area as they lacked motor transport while Zhukov whose army was over 460 miles away from its base of supply had 2600 trucks supplying them. On july 23rd the Japanese launched attacks supported by artillery and within two days they had consumed half their ammunition stores. The situation was terrible, they suffered 5000 casualties and made little progress breaking the Soviet lines. Zhukov then unleashed an offensive on august 20th using over 4000 trucks to transport supplies from Chita base. He assembled around 500 tanks, 550 fighters and bombers and his 50,000 infantry supported by armored cars. This mechanized force attacked the Japanese first using artillery and the aircraft as his armor and infantry crossed the river. The IJA were quickly flanked by the fast moving Soviet armor and encircled by August 25th. The IJA made attempts to break out of the encirclement but failed. They refused to surrender despite overwhelming artillery and aerial bombardment; by the 31st the Japanese forces on the Mongolian side of the border were destroyed. The Japanese suffered nearly 20,000 casualties, the lost 162 aircraft, 29 tanks, 7 tankettes, 72 artillery pieces a large number of vehicles. The Soviets took a heavy hit also suffering almost 25,000 casualties, 250 aircraft, 250 tanks, 133 armored cars, almost 100 artillery pieces, hundreds of vehicles.

While these numbers make it seem the Japanese did a great job, you need to consider what each party was bringing to this fight. The Japanese brought roughly 30,000 men, 80 tanks and tankettes, 400 aircraft, 300 artillery pieces, 1000 trucks. The Soviets brought nearly 75,000 men, 550 tanks, 900 aircraft, 634 artillery pieces, 4000 trucks.

There are some sources that indicate the IJA brought as many artillery rounds as they could muster from Japan, Manchuria and Korea, roughly 100,000 rounds for the operation. The Soviets fired 100,000 rounds per day. A quick look at wikipedia numbers, yes I know its a no no, but sometimes its good for quick perspectives show:

USSR: Bomber sorties 2,015, fighter sorties 18,509; 7.62 mm machine gun rounds fired 1,065,323; 20 mm (0.80 in) cannon rounds expended 57,979; bombs dropped 78,360 (1,200 tons).

Japan: Fighter/bomber sorties 10,000 (estimated); 7.7 mm (0.30 in) machine gun rounds fired 1.6 million; bombs dropped 970 tons.

What I am trying to say is there was an enormous disparity in military production. And this is not just limited to numbers but quality. After the battle the Japanese made significant reforms. They increased tank production from 500 annually to 1200. The Japanese funded research into new anti-tank guns, such as the Type 1 47 mm. They mounted this gun to their Type 97 Chi-Ha tanks, the new standard medium tank of the IJA. Because of the tremendous defeat to Soviet armor they send General Yamashita to Germany to learn everything he could about tank tactics. But they simply could not produce enough tanks to ever hope to match 10% of the USSR. The Soviets had mostly been using T-26’s, BT-5’s and BT-7’s who were crudely made, but made en masse. The Japanese would find most of their tank models with less effective range, less armor and some with less penetration power. It took the Japanese a hell of a lot more time to produce tanks, they were simply not on par with the Soviets in quantity or quality. Their tank tactics, albeit improved via Yamashita after 1939, were still nothing compared to the Soviets. 

The major outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol was the abandonment of the hokushin-ron strategy and adoption of the nanshin-ron strategy. But, that didnt mean Japan did not have a plan in case they had to go to war with the USSR.

Part 2 Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū

Kantōgun Tokushu Enshū or the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers was an operational plan created by the General Staff of the IJA for an invasion of the Russian Far East to capitalize on Operation Barbarossa. Here our story truly begin.

Between 1938-1939 the IJA General Staff and Kwantung Army formed two “Hachi-Go” plans. Variants A and B examined the possibility of an all out war with the USSR beginning in 1943. In both plans they expected to be facing 60 Soviet divisions, while they could deliver 50 divisions, delivered incrementally from China and Japan. Plan A called for attacks across the eastern and northern borders of Manchuria while maintaining a defensive stance in the west. Plan B, much more ambitious, called for striking into the vast steppe between the Great Khingan Mountains and Lake Baikal, hoping to cut off the trans-siberian railway. If this was done successfully it was believed the whole of European Russia would be doomed to be defeated in detail. Defeated in detail means to divide and conquer. This battle would take place over 5000 kilometers with Japan’s final objective being to advance 1200 km into the USSR. That dwarves Operation Barbarossa in distance, let that sink in. Both plans faced impossible odds. First of all the railway networks in Manchuria were not sufficiently expanded for such far reaching offensives, especially for plan B. Furthermore the 50 divisions required for them would be impossible to come by, since 1937 Japan was bogged down in a war with China. When Japan went to war with the west in 1941 she had 51 divisions. She left the base minimum in China, 35 divisions and tossed nearly 20 into southeast asia and the pacific. On top of not having the men, the IJA estimated a fleet of 200,000 vehicles would be necessary to sustain an offensive to Lake Baikal. That was twice the number of military vehicles Japan had at any given time. After the battle of Khalkhin Gol, plan B was completely abandoned. Planning henceforth focused solely on the northern and eastern fronts with any western advance being limited in scope.

Now Japan formed a neutrality pact with the USSR because of her defeat at Khalkhin Gol and Molotov Ribbentrop pact between Germany and the USSR. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact came as a bitter and complete surprise to Japan. It pushed Japan to fully adopt the Nanshin-ron strategy and this began with her invasion of French IndoChina, which led the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and United States to embargo her. The Netherlands Dutch East Indies refused to sell oil to Japan, the UK refused to sell oil from Burma and the US gradually cut off selling oil to Japan, with her oil exports alone being 80% of Japans supply, the rest from the Dutch east indies. The United S