Ambiguous Decisions in Bayesianism and Imprecise Probability

Update: 2024-10-31

Description

Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden, and Francesco De Pretis on whether imprecise beliefs lead to worse decisions under severe uncertainty

Read the essay here: www.thebsps.org/short-reads/bayesianism-radzvilas-et-al/

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Ambiguous Decisions in Bayesianism and Imprecise Probability

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

#box-pro-ellipsis-175979796185593{-webkit-line-clamp:2;}Ambiguous Decisions in Bayesianism and Imprecise Probability

Ambiguous Decisions in Bayesianism and Imprecise Probability

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Ambiguous Decisions in Bayesianism and Imprecise Probability