On 17 February, Russian forces finally captured Avdiivka - once a city of 30,000 people - just ten kilometres from Donetsk. 110th Mechanised Brigade had defended the ruins for the last two years without relief. The end came when Russian forces infiltrated the south of the city using a concealed passage offered by a man-sized water pipe feeding Donetsk filter station.

More units advanced from the north in the area of the Terrikon (slag heap) and dachas adjoining the Koksokhim (Avdiiv chemical coke plant). With 80-110 glide bombs landing on the defenders every day, and with the threat of the city being cut in two, the Ukrainian command took the prudent decision to withdraw.

The next phase for Russian forces should have been an exploitation of the breach in the defence. In fact, the assault on Avdiivka which had started the previous October quite exhausted the attackers. 16,000 soldiers were killed according to a disillusioned Luhansk separatist. A staggering 531 pieces of equipment were destroyed, damaged or abandoned, including 169 tanks.

It was not until the end of March that Russian forces were able to resume the advance in an organised way (although small-scale and suicidal attacks never stopped across the front lines). This article reviews the action since and specifically examines the battle for the Durna river line.

Ukrainian and Russian dispositions

Ukrainian and Russian dispositions are shown on the map below. For both sides, unit and formation names do not correspond to actual size. A 'brigade' may be a weak battalion. 'Battalions' are commonly just companies. Russian prisoners routinely report how a company may start with 100 men but be reduced to as few as ten fit soldiers. Caution is also needed because units are rotated (withdrawn) when exhausted. This is especially true of Russian forces.

The map therefore represents all reported units/formations and where, but they may not have been present all the time, or in strength.

Russian troops on this front are referred to as 'Centre Group'. They are drawn from Central Military District (CVO) and 1st DNR Army Corps. Commander 'Centre Group' is the 48-year old infantryman Colonel-General Andrei Mordvichev. He has participated in the war from the beginning rising from army commander to army group commander.

CVO has been the best performing military district - ironically - as traditionally it is the reserve district in the Russian Federation and least favoured with resources. Ukrainian command in this sector falls under the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group (OSUV). The commander is a General Sodel [Sodol].

It is not possible to estimate troop numbers with any certainty. Both sides are depleted. The Russians continue to commit units to destruction further complicating estimation of strengths. Nor is it possible to estimate equipment numbers. With the exception of the battalion-level attack at the beginning, Russian attacks are typically platoon strength involving 1-2 tanks and as many as four AFVs. The ad hoc mix of vehicle types tells the story of Russian problems with replenishing combat losses.

Ukrainian counter-attacks typically involve a single tank or AFV. Artillery and rocket fire on the Russian side involves single guns or launchers that fire one salvo then scoot. Ukrainian indirect fire has been minimal due to 'shell starvation'. FPV and Mavic-style drones rule the battlefield and both sides go to great lengths to conceal themselves, in the case of vehicles, guns and rocket launchers; or to remain underground if infantry. Camouflage is insufficient.

The only true protection is total concealment. Saturated ECM has also become a prerequisite for survival.

Avdiivka front - Russian operational objectives

Cold War students of the Soviet Army probably remember the concept of immediate and subsequent objectives. This echeloning endures in the modern Russian Army. The immediate objective on the Avdiivka front was the Durna river line, just 10 kilometres from Avdiivka...