Dive into a thought-provoking discussion on the dramatic shift in U.S. national security strategy. Simone and Malcolm Collins break down the recent changes in American foreign policy, exploring how the U.S. is moving away from its traditional role as “world police” and adopting a more pragmatic, self-interested approach.

In this episode, you’ll learn:

What the new U.S. national security strategy means for America’s relationships with Europe, Russia, China, and other global players

Why the U.S. is prioritizing sovereignty, border security, and domestic interests over global intervention

How these changes impact alliances, migration, trade, and the future of international cooperation

The philosophical and cultural shifts driving this new era in American geopolitics

Whether you’re interested in politics, international relations, or just want to understand the forces shaping our world, this conversation offers clear insights and lively debate.

Simone outlined this episode, so links and basic points are below and you’ll find the episode transcript at the end. :)

Based Camp - A Shift in US National Security

The Gist

The days of Team America: World Police are over; we’ve gone from “America, F Yeah” to “America: Don’t look at me ask Qatar.”

In November, the Trump Administration released a new national security strategy that is… pretty based

• It reframes the EU from partner to “problem”

• It insists countries need to handle their own problems

• It makes redditors mad: When prompted to explain the new strategy release, they said things like:

  • “the eu is in Putin’s way. The US is currently in the habit of agreeing with Putin on everything, word for word. Also, the leader of the US is making a lot of noise to distract from being the name mentioned the most on those ‘trump files from epstein’s pedophile island” that everyone that isn’t on the list wants released. This is a good distraction.”

  • “The EU didn’t allow Trump’s shady real estate businesses. So there are no Trump Towers here. He is now making deals with Hungary and other right wing led countries to finally get a foot on EU soil. But as for business opportunities, he is rather friends with russians and arabs who flatter him as much as they can.”

• Quotes from the document:

  • “Our elites badly miscalculated America’s willingness to shoulder forever global burdens to which the Ameri\can people saw no connection to the national interest”

  • “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over”

  • “We will assert and enforce a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine”

  • “[Europe’s] economic decline is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure”

  • “We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.”

  • “[America’s goal is] cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”

THE US IS SHIFTING FROM HELICOPTOR PARENTING TO F AROUND AND FIND OUT PARENTING!! YES!!!!

But in all seriousness, we as citizens—and we’d argue that all people—should probably be aware of what this shift in strategy entails, so let’s get into it

What is Changing About US Strategy?

In what way does this strategy represent a shift from the United States’ national security strategy up to this point?

• Replaces global “rules‑based order” and democracy‑promotion language with a much narrower definition of U.S. interests focused on sovereignty, borders, and domestic strength rather than universal values.

• Elevates the Western Hemisphere to top priority, making migration, drugs/cartels, and China’s regional footprint the central threats, instead of putting great‑power competition with China/Russia and the Indo‑Pacific or Europe at the core.

• Treats mass migration itself as a primary national security threat and justifies using military force, including cross‑border strikes on cartels, as a routine tool of hemispheric enforcement—far beyond prior strategies’ law‑enforcement and humanitarian framing.

• Downshifts the Middle East from central theater to secondary concern, framing it mostly in terms of energy markets and transactional deals, in contrast to decades of “war on terror” and regime‑change or stabilization ambitions.

• Reorients alliances and Europe policy around burden‑sharing, trade balances, and “Western identity,” openly criticizing European migration and regulatory policies instead of emphasizing cohesive liberal institutions and shared democratic values.

• Places economic nationalism at the heart of security, prioritizing tariffs, re‑shoring, and industrial policy over support for multilateral trade regimes that earlier strategies still treated as broadly beneficial for U.S. power.

• De‑emphasizes international law and the “rules‑based international order,” signaling more transactional, case‑by‑case cooperation and fewer self‑imposed constraints on U.S. action than in Obama‑era and Biden‑era documents.

What is Shifting About the United States’ Relationship with the EU?

• Signals a much more adversarial and instrumental approach to the EU than previous U.S. documents.

• Shows less deference to EU institutions

• Puts more direct pressure on EU internal politics

• Sets stricter conditions on U.S. security guarantees.​

How it changes cooperation with the EU

• Frames the EU less as a core partner and more as a problem case, depicting it as economically stagnant and facing “civilizational” decline because of migration and regulation.​

• Calls for “cultivating resistance” to the EU’s current trajectory by encouraging and working with Eurosceptic or “patriotic” parties and governments inside member states, rather than primarily channeling relations through Brussels.​

  • GREAT way to handle dealings with feckless and broken bureaucracies

• Links U.S. security commitments more tightly to European burden‑sharing, expecting Europe to assume “primary responsibility” for its own conventional defense while the U.S. acts mainly as a nuclear backstop and focuses elsewhere.​

Makes support more transactional: emphasizes trade concessions, action against China’s economic practices, and higher defense spending as conditions for close partnership, instead of assuming automatic solidarity based on shared liberal values.​

Signals reduced enthusiasm for NATO expansion and more skepticism about long‑term alignment with European states whose demographics and policies diverge from Washington’s preferences, challenging the previous consensus on open‑ended enlargement and cohesion.​

Are New Allies Surfaced?

It clearly elevates some alliances and de‑prioritizes others, with a new emphasis on partners in the Western Hemisphere and selected “like‑minded” but not necessarily liberal governments elsewhere.​

Western Hemisphere partners

• The document defines a strategy of “Enlist and Expand” in the Western Hemisphere, prioritizing “regional champions” that will help the U.S. block migration, fight cartels, and secure supply chains.​

• It signals that such hemispheric partners could receive more U.S. troops, security assistance, and economic integration than many traditional allies outside the region.​

Alliances of “illiberals”

• Analysts note that the strategy implicitly favors governments aligned with U.S. nationalist and conservative priorities—even if they are not liberal democracies—over some traditional Western European elites.​

• This hints at deeper political‑values alignment with certain Central/Eastern European, Latin American, Middle Eastern, and Asian leaders who share its stance on migration, culture, and sovereignty.​

Traditional allies and Asia

• The document still names NATO and Indo‑Pacific allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia) as important, but conditions close cooperation on higher defense spending and tougher economic policies toward China.​

• It also gestures toward a de facto great‑power tier with the U.S., China, and Russia as the key shapers of order, implying that many other states will be treated more as swing partners or sub‑regional allies than as full strategic peers.​

Does This Change Our Stance vis a vis Conflicts?

Taiwan

What the strategy actually says

• It elevates “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch” to a stated priority, and calls for the ability to deny aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain, including Taiwan.​

• It reaffirms the “longstanding declaratory policy” of not supporting unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, rather than introducing a new formal commitment to defend Taiwan.​

Expected U.S. moves before any invasion

• Accelerate military buildup and posture with Japan and other allies (more forces, long‑range fires, maritime and air assets) to make a successful invasion or blockade militarily unattractive for Beijing.​

• Expand arms sales, training, and coordination with Taiwan to strengthen a “denial” strategy (asymmetric defenses, resilience, and joint planning) while pressing allies to spend more and do more around the First Island Chain.​</