Discussing sexism in philosophy, Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting comment on the fact that "women are often remembered as women first: they are seen more as women than they're seen as philosophers” (2021, The Philosophers’ Magazine). This sort of complaint is common from those who are marginalised in a given domain; these individuals tend to receive a surplus of attention on their marginalised identity. There are many helpful initiatives existing in part to combat this issue, including 'Women in Philosophy' groups. In this talk, I suggest that certain salience-based tensions can arise for such initiatives. In combatting the ‘salience structure’ that treats a woman philosopher’s gender (for example) as her most prominent feature, these initiatives can end up replicating that salience structure; they draw attention to womanness in, for instance, the names chosen for those initiatives. This can counterproductively make that salience structure feel apt, which in turn can license conventional ways of understanding that aptness—specifically, womanness is considered aptly salient in philosophy because it is exotic and/or deviant. I conclude with constructive suggestions regarding how these initiatives can continue the incredibly valuable, urgently-needed work they perform, in ways that might mitigate this proposed problem.