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Special Discussion with Secretary General Yongho Tae
Update: 2024-11-15
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In this episode, Mr. Sydney Seiler and Secretary General Yongho Tae discuss the latest developments in North Korea. Topics will include updates on North Korean human rights issues, South Korea's policy toward North Korea, and the current situation in North Korea.
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Transcript
00:00:00
Next on the Impossible State, North Korea, human rights, current crisis, future scenarios, this and more everything North Korea today on the Impossible State.
00:00:12
North Korea is the impossible state.
00:00:16
It's a place that stumped leaders and policy makers for more than three decades.
00:00:22
It has a complex history, and it has become the United States' top national security priority.
00:00:30
Each week on this show, we'll talk with the people who know the most about North Korea.
00:00:34
Welcome everybody to the Impossible State.
00:00:42
I'm Sid Siler sitting in today for Dr.
00:00:45
Victor Cha.
00:00:46
We have a very, very special guest today.
00:00:50
He served as the Deputy Ambassador London for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one of the most high visibility defections.
00:00:58
And since then, it has proven to be an expert commentator on all things North Korea, and we come to talk about all the things that are on the table here in his role as the Secretary General of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council.
00:01:14
And hopefully, Deputy Ambassador Tae-young-ho, you can share some of your opinions on that, and then share your opinions on what's going on on the peninsula,
00:01:27
so many different lines of effort in terms of things we're focusing on.
00:01:32
And so let me open up first of all by asking Peaceful Unification Advisory Council.
00:01:38
What is it, and what is your role as the Secretary General?
00:01:40
Thank you for your invitation.
00:01:43
Now, as I'm introduced, I'm the Secretary General of Peaceful Unification Advisory Council.
00:01:53
This organization is a constitutional organization, and it advises the policy on re-lification to the President.
00:02:05
And I am the Secretary General to support the management of this advisory council.
00:02:15
As I was introduced, I used to be the Deputy Ambassador of North Korea to United Kingdom.
00:02:24
So far, the post of Secretary General was appointed by the President or South Korean backgrounds.
00:02:36
And I am the first one with North Korean background to be in that post.
00:02:41
So, the message, the President and the my organization wants to deliver to not only to South Korea,
00:02:51
but also to North Korea is that the future policy on North Korea would not be the outcome of South Koreans alone.
00:03:05
But it would also study, and we would try to reflect the aspirations of North Korean people as well by inviting the North Korean defectors like me,
00:03:19
so that my government wants to present the repellanced pragmatic approach on the policies on North Korea.
00:03:30
It sounds like a big challenge.
00:03:33
When people hear Unification, they think about how hard it must be.
00:03:39
The Unification of East and West Germany now is decades behind us.
00:03:44
And it seemed to be a natural outcome of the collapse of the socialist block and a restoration of a single Germany.
00:03:52
With this, with the current North South standoff, and with Kim Jong-un declaring that reunification from the North's perspective no longer is on the table,
00:04:03
where should our efforts be at this time?
00:04:07
Where should our focus be?
00:04:08
What are you seeking to promote other than preparing for the day that the Unification may come?
00:04:15
What can we actively do today?
00:04:17
First of all, as you have said that North Korea, Kim Jong-un regime announced the hostile two-state policy.
00:04:28
So in such North Korea, Kim Jong-un carries out a lot of policies of two states making two states to make Korean division permanent.
00:04:43
But it is along the aspiration of Korean people, no matter whether you are in North or South,
00:04:53
to be reunited in the future.
00:04:56
So now is the time for South Korean government and South Korean public to raise the voice of reunification so that the issue of reunification of Korean peninsula must continue to be alive,
00:05:13
not a kind of dead issue.
00:05:15
And you want to deliver a continuation of the message to North Korean population that South Korea still wants to be reunited with North Korea.
00:05:27
And on that issue, I think my government and my organization can do a lot of the things.
00:05:35
Is it inevitable to see unification as one based upon liberal democracy, free market economy, respect for human rights?
00:05:46
In many ways, unification by Seoul's model in a way that threatens the North Korean system in the North Korea regime, is that inevitable?
00:05:58
Or are there ways in which we can make even the elite in North Korea more receptive to more comfortable with the idea of a unification that is inclusive in terms of the North Korean people benefiting from the process,
00:06:14
not being marginalized or sidelined?
00:06:16
Yes.
00:06:18
Now, if we compare the economic, the might between North and South, the gap is to the great.
00:06:30
So now in such North Korea, most of North Korean people now know that South Korea is rich country.
00:06:40
They are very much developed nation.
00:06:45
And this naturally put a question to North Korea, why North Korea is so poor and less developed.
00:06:54
Since North and South were same nation, you know, same culture, same language.
00:07:01
So many North Korean people now have this kind of, you know, suspicions and questions inside North Korea.
00:07:10
Another fact which I want to mention is that young generations of North Korea are now met with South Korean cultural content.
00:07:21
Because, you know, in the past 10 or 20 years, North Korea also was changed.
00:07:30
Now, there are around 7 million cell phones inside North Korea.
00:07:36
Now, North Korean high schools introduced computer educations.
00:07:43
So after this, the compulsory computer education in such North Korea, all North Korean young generations ask their parents to buy either desktop or notebook or tablet,
00:07:57
you know, for their families.
00:07:59
So now in North Korea, most of the families have the desktop.
00:08:05
So this kind of new infrastructure of IT technology started to change the mentality of North Korea.
00:08:14
For instance, in the past, North Korean people were only able to listen to a government controlled radio or TVs or newspapers censorship by North Korean regime.
00:08:29
But now this is different because of the computer, anybody who can watch a South Korean movies or dramas can copy it in the computer and deliver that USB to his friends or family members.
00:08:45
So now inside North Korea, the government now cannot control the vast movement of these informations among young generations.
00:08:57
Now, inside North Korea now, more than 53% of North Korean population have seen South Korean movies and dramas.
00:09:07
So that's why the aspiration of unification and aspiration to be in South Korea is ever growing.
00:09:16
So that is one of the reason why Kim Jong-un wants to put forward two hostage state policy.
00:09:24
He wants to kill the dreams of young generations to go to South Korea or, you know, one day living in South Korea,
00:09:36
whatever.
00:09:38
So I think two state policy is a kind of, you know, sensation of the failure of North Korean system.
00:09:48
And also this is the kind of, you know, new policy tried to kill the new dreams of young generations to be united with South Korea.
00:09:59
So you sound very optimistic that ultimately the efforts by the Kim Jong-un regime will fail in this regard.
00:10:07
That trying to establish the Korean people as not one kin, but rather two separate countries in hostile enmity, irreconcilable enmity to each other.
00:10:19
And somehow the South Korean culture and South Korea things being a threat to the North Korean system, the North Korean people aren't going to buy it.
00:10:28
Is that your sense?
00:10:29
Yes.
00:10:29
So for instance, you know, when Kim Jong-un developed his nuclear weapons, he said that he need nuclear weapons to fight against America and South Korea because America and South Korea is the main threat to the North Korean system.
00:10:46
But now Kim Jong-un learned that it is not America, South Korea are the main threat to North Korean system, but it is South Korean cultural contents which actually threatens North Korean system and young generations of North Korea.
00:11:04
So that's why Kim Jong-un should do something, you know, to stop this escalating, you're threatening, you know, the issues of North Korea.
00:11:15
It is very funny in such North Korea that after this kind of long division of North and South, physical division of North and South, now North Korean young generation all of sudden started to sing South Korean songs,
00:11:31
start to imitate the South Korean dialect.
00:11:35
For instance, there are great difference to say hello or good morning between North and South.
00:11:44
But now, young generations in North Korea are saying, "Annyeonghaseyo" in South Korean dialect, not "Annyeonghaseyo" before they say "Annyeonghaseyo" come up습니다.
00:12:00
But now, by the influence of South Korean cultural contents, they are saying, "Annyeonghaseyo" come out "yo".
00:12:08
So even they change, you know, the dialect and language of South Korea.
00:12:13
And inside North Korea, now also a lot of cultural changes are taking place.
00:12:19
Now, North Korean, you know, the girls start to wear the very skirts, you know, because of the South Korean, you know, the contents.
00:12:29
Many North Koreans sending the texts, you know, through their cell phones, copying the South Korean, the languages, whatever.
00:12:38
So that is the reason why Kim Jong-un made a lot of laws to punish young generations watching South Korean cultural contents and using South Korean language dialect.
00:12:53
So I don't think, you know, the Kim Jong-un could win this war against young generations.
00:13:00
In human history, no governments or no regime ever won against their own young generations or against cultural change.
00:13:14
So if we could look at US and ROK shared policy interests in regard to North Korea, you know, three broad lines of effort come to mind.
00:13:25
One is how we move towards denuclearization.
00:13:29
And two, second short of denuclearization, or while denuclearization is being pursued, threat reduction, tension reduction.
00:13:38
So denuclearization, peace, and then finally, promotion of improvement of human rights, which as you, there's a lot of overlap with reunification,
00:13:49
unification efforts to try to get information into the North Korean people, to try to lay the foundation for this day of reconciliation, which you describe.
00:14:00
Traditionally, people have said what you described is it reinforces that the United States and the Republic of Korea have a hostile policy that we're seeking to overthrow the system.
00:14:15
If you're not seeking to overthrow Kim Jong-un, somehow we're seeking to change the system in a way that's perceived by North Korea as potentially bringing an end to the current regime.
00:14:27
How do you reconcile the apparent incompatibility of a robust unification policy seeking to improve human rights, and our efforts to achieve denuclearization and tension reduction?
00:14:40
If we push too hard here, do we undermine our objectives here, or is there way to reconcile those?
00:14:46
Or a verification?
00:14:48
I think now North Korea are now possess nuclear weapons, and from time to time, Kim Jong-un threatens the possible use of nuclear weapons against America and South Korea.
00:15:03
So nobody now knows whether he could actually use on it.
00:15:09
So it is very, I think, a practical matter for America and South Korea to prevent the possible outbreak of nuclear war on Korean peninsula.
00:15:21
After all, Kim Jong-un regime thinks that America could not use nuclear weapons against North Korea,
00:15:35
if North Korea proves that it has ability to strike America.
00:15:42
So they continue that process for the past 10 years.
00:15:47
So I think now is the time for American government to give a very strict and clear message to North Korea that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against South Korea or Japan or America,
00:16:03
America would not hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
00:16:08
There is no way that America withdraws from South Korea under the threat of North Korea, so that Kim Jong-un must understand clearly that he should not use nuclear weapons.
00:16:22
That is, I think, a first thing.
00:16:25
And not only the clear message, but America should show some kind of actions together with South Korea, something like joint military exercise,
00:16:37
whatever, introduce American nuclear access to Korean peninsula so that America is always ready to use nuclear weapons if North Korea uses nuclear weapons.
00:16:50
So that is the only way to shrink and give right message to Kim Jong-un not use nuclear weapons,
00:17:00
and buy the time and keep the peace as it is.
00:17:03
Another thing is that human rights, because Kim Jong-un now invests all its available investments on the development of nuclear weapons at the cost of North Korean people's sacrifice.
00:17:19
So we should continue to tell Kim Jong-un that with nuclear weapons, he can't solve the North Korea's difficult issues.
00:17:29
And also worldwide, our Americans, South Korea could do a lot of things to improve or North Korean human rights issues, something like.
00:17:39
Now, China now continues to repatriate North Korean defectors from China to North Korea, so maybe America and South Korea continues to say through a UN system that China should stop this forceful repatriation of North Korean defectors back to North Korea.
00:18:02
And also the America as South Korea also continues to deliver a message that if Kim Jong-un actually gives up its nuclear weapons or program,
00:18:16
then American South Korea is ready to give a lot of economic incentives to Kim Jong-un.
00:18:24
I think back on a foreign ministry statement that was issued in early July 2008, 2009, right before the inauguration of Barack Obama.
00:18:37
And it basically said the United States thinks that our weapons are up for negotiation, that we would sell our, we would get rid of our weapons for normalization of relations with the United States.
00:18:48
The truth is, they're not up for bargaining.
00:18:50
We've lived without relations with the United States.
00:18:53
We can't live without nuclear weapons.
00:18:54
Nevertheless, the Obama administration, of course, a Trump administration, even the Biden administration, all tried to engage North Korea in dialogue that would give them some type of assurances that if they move down this path,
00:19:09
good things would come, that the regime would not be threatened.
00:19:13
Why hasn't that, and that's been a central point of our negotiations, frankly, going back to the agreed framework.
00:19:19
Why has that not been persuasive?
00:19:21
Is it because ultimately, kind of ontologically, they can't trust the United States, or as they look at the United States, and somehow blame us for not living up to their expectations in terms of heavy fuel oil under the agreed framework or delivery of promises under the six party talks.
00:19:41
Is there anything that you think we could have done differently, or is North Korea from the very very beginning been so committed to nuclear weapons, they never really were on the table?
00:19:52
Oh, as strong as Kim Jong-un regime is in place.
00:19:57
I don't think a denuclearization of North Korea could be achieved because Kim Jong-un regime, things that the regime and nuclear weapons are the same thing.
00:20:10
So they will stay on it, no matter what kind of incentives America could provide.
00:20:20
So I think the peaceful re-eification of Korea could be the only practical way to fundamentally solve this denuclearization and human rights issue of North Korea.
00:20:35
Because with this nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-un can justify all his policy failures.
00:20:42
For instance, North Korean people are very poor, they are very well, they are melt nourished, but Kim Jong-un may justify this economic failure by saying that economy is not good,
00:20:58
but North Korea has nuclear weapons.
00:21:01
So that's why the nuclear weapon could serve many purposes for Kim Jong-un to justify his so-called failures in many policies.
00:21:15
Excellent point.
00:21:16
So turning to kind of the hot topic of today, which is North Korea's intervention in Russia's war with Ukraine, very briefly, what is Kim hoping to achieve?
00:21:28
And strategically, we know he'll be payments, he'll get paid for troops going, he'll get paid for equipment going, he'll get paid from munitions being sent.
00:21:38
But what are the more bigger strategic objectives Kim Jong-un has in this alignment with Vladimir Putin and Russia?
00:21:47
Kim Jong-un wants to achieve many things with just sending North Korean troops to Russia.
00:21:55
First, you know, she wants to get as much as hard currency, you know, the prosper from Russia's side.
00:22:04
Now Russia is rich, but Putin lacks human forces to send the front.
00:22:16
But on the meanwhile, Kim Jong-un's side is that the economy is very bad in North Korea.
00:22:22
He has great flood in North Korea a few months ago, so he needs a lot of hard currency.
00:22:34
So now he may ask great payments by Putin for sending the troops.
00:22:41
Another thing is that Kim Jong-un has made too much unrealistic military promises to North Korean people.
00:22:53
For instance, sending a spy satellite the space before the end of this year.
00:22:59
Maybe the building, nuclear submarine, it's like a grand plan, you know.
00:23:06
But if we go back to North Korea's defense industry, it is really a very difficult and heavy burden on it, like a country, North Korea,
00:23:17
to send, you know, good satellite to the space.
00:23:20
So he made too many promises.
00:23:24
But now, because of Ukraine war, he sees a very, you know, a slight opportunity or slight possibility to realize this ambition,
00:23:37
because if Russia gives North Korea this advanced spy satellite technologies or ICBM reentry technologies,
00:23:48
whatever, he can easily overcome these shortcomings.
00:23:53
So we have to be very carefully and conscious what kind of new technologies Russia would give if Kim Jong-un succeeds in a spy satellite or,
00:24:06
you know, sub-nuclear submarines or ICBM reentry, whatever.
00:24:12
Kim Jong-un would not say to North Korean public that he achieved this thanks to Putin's help.
00:24:19
No, he wouldn't say that.
00:24:21
He said that because under his wise leadership, blah, blah, blah, he achieved this tremendous military development, you know.
00:24:30
So that's why now I think Kim Jong-un's ambition and targets are very clear.
00:24:37
Right, yes.
00:24:39
You know, it's interesting because if you look at how North Korea has approached the relationship since it first came out a few years ago, two years ago now,
00:24:49
almost to the date, that the two sides were in negotiations for possible provision of North Korean munitions and missiles and exchange for other things from North Korea,
00:25:02
from Russia, technologies, etc.
00:25:05
And they've been very reluctant to be open about that in the media, of course, when eventually Russian officials began to visit Pyongyang and Kim Jong-un himself visited North Korea.
00:25:17
The advances in the relationship were being more widely known.
00:25:23
Now we have people saying that perhaps the family of these soldiers will be isolated so that when they begin to come home and caskets, the people won't know about the sacrifices being made.
00:25:34
But then there's also people saying that like you noted, there are going to be people who know about this.
00:25:40
How do you expect the regime to portray this internally?
00:25:45
Who will know the true nature?
00:25:47
And when something like this happens, there's obviously a national security and foreign policy elite who has access to Western media, etc.
00:25:56
And then there will be people that don't know anything at all.
00:25:59
How do you think the information, the messaging campaign will be managed by Pyongyang going forward?
00:26:06
Particularly if we see growing casualties, DPRK casualties on the battlefield.
00:26:12
Nowadays all North Korean diplomats working abroad know well that North Korean troops have been a start to be deployed in the Russian front.
00:26:26
But inside North Korea, this is still kept secret.
00:26:32
So maybe the families of those young soldiers are not aware of their sons being sent to Russia.
00:26:42
But how long this secret could be kept?
00:26:45
It could be dependent on how much casualties North Korea suffer.
00:26:53
If thousands of North Korean soldiers died in the war, the Russian military to some extent and they send a kind of,
00:27:05
you know, death notice to the families.
00:27:09
And when the families received that, you know, the sacrifice notice from the military or from the government, I think they would be very much upset because inside North Korea now,
00:27:21
even North Korea is a very low both-rate.
00:27:24
So there are only one or two, one child or two children in each family.
00:27:31
So the parents cannot accept that their sons were killed not in defense of North Korea but in defense of Russia.
00:27:44
So this could be a great, you know, I think the things which actually North Korean regime is petting.
00:27:58
So in the coming months could be a very decisive, you know, moments for North Korean regime.
00:28:07
If North Korean troops prevent large casualties but played a kind of, you know, gain change in the front and actually advanced,
00:28:22
advanced territory from Russian, you see, front, then all of sudden Kim Jong-un may use this kind of victory in the front as kind,
00:28:36
the way of to consolidate his power over North Korea.
00:28:42
For instance, in April of 2018, when Kim Jong-un announced the accomplishment of nuclear,
00:28:52
you know, development, he boasted that North Korea has now upgraded its level of status to the level of strategic state.
00:29:02
So at that time many people did not understand what does that mean.
00:29:07
Now Kim Jong-un, if he is successful in Ukraine case, he may say to the leaders and of North Korean people domestically that because of this nuclear weapons,
00:29:21
North Korea can even, you know, take these troops out of North Korea and help the big country like Russia.
00:29:31
Even big country like Russia come to ask for help to North Korea, like a small country, like North Korea.
00:29:40
Because of this nuclear weapons, you can send conventional weapons out of North Korea and even soldiers in return for huge, you know, hot currency.
00:29:50
So he may do a lot of, you know, the things to justify his nuclear development domestically.
00:29:58
Would this also encourage Kim to believe he can be more aggressive, potentially even using force such as he did in 2010 with the sinking of the Cheonan or the,
00:30:08
the shelling of Yongpengdo Island that now, perhaps even with Russia's backing, even either rhetorical/diplomatic or Russian military backing,
00:30:19
he now has military options to establish dominance over South Korea on the Korean Peninsula.
00:30:25
Or is that too far fetched to scenario?
00:30:28
Oh, uh, first of all, uh, by sending the troops to Russia and receiving the hot currency and the other economic benefits,
00:30:40
Kim Jong Un almost now succeeded in breaking U.N.
00:30:44
sanctioned regime.
00:30:46
Because now Russia does not support any more U.N.
00:30:50
sanctioned regime.
00:30:52
That is the first achievements Kim Jong Un already got.
00:30:56
The second thing is that so far North Korean military has never used new advanced technologies like missiles or multiple launches together with these forces.
00:31:11
But now it's the time for them to test these new technologies and equipments together with those armies in the real action at the field.
00:31:21
So in the long run, it can, it may increase a kind of confidence in Kim Jong Un using his conventional, you know,
00:31:32
forces in relation with South Korea.
00:31:36
So that's why I think it is the time, not only for America, but also South Korea trying to join efforts to frustrate this Kim Jong Un's,
00:31:47
this kind of strategic move in Ukraine war.
00:31:51
It seems like though, you know, with Kim being thrown a lifeline, uh, essentially by Russia, that the, the incentives he might have to engage the new U.S.
00:32:02
administration following the inauguration next January or any incentives he may have had to engage the Union administration are basically out the window.
00:32:13
I mean, is it, is it, or even China maybe Kim's perceptions of needing to rely in any way upon China, whether it be, you know, aid assistance,
00:32:24
investment, Chinese tourism, that now he can afford to ignore China as well.
00:32:29
Do you believe that's the case?
00:32:31
And for the near future, we might see in North Korea that basically disengages from the United States and are okay and, and ignores China?
00:32:39
I think as long as Kim Jong Un is paid by his soldiers and military cooperation with Russia, he would not open the dialogue with America or China because now the currency is,
00:32:55
keep on coming, you know.
00:32:58
So that's why he may concentrate all on the relations with Russia.
00:33:04
But if Ukraine war is a finish, then Kim Jong Un may come back to his relation with China or whatever.
00:33:14
But so far, after now, Kim Jong Un is just, you know, concentrating on the relations with Russia alone.
00:33:25
And so I think in the future, the new American administration must make a very strategic move with the North Korea.
00:33:37
I think the new administration of America should continue to say to North Korea that denuclearization of North Korea is unchangeable goal of America.
00:33:52
America would never compromise on this goal.
00:33:57
That is, I think, very important.
00:34:00
And also, I think America should try every possibility to invite China to be on the front of America and South Korean side by convincing Chinese what they have seen by cooperation between Russia and North Korea.
00:34:22
So we should try very hard, everything possible to bring China into sanction regime against North Korea,
00:34:34
I think.
00:34:35
So that is, you know, what the American administration should do in the near future.
00:34:44
That's very encouraging because I think that comes from an assessment that you're making about Beijing's view that the relationship with South Korea is still important enough to be responsive possible approaches to cooperate on North Korea.
00:34:59
I know many people have given up hope on China.
00:35:02
You really believe that they could be a viable partner going forward.
00:35:06
Yes.
00:35:06
I think the American policy with the China could be very important in the coming future.
00:35:13
I think America should convince and also South Korean government as well that the future reunified Korean peninsula could be beneficial to China,
00:35:27
not threat to Chinese security, so that we should try to invite and bring in Chinese elements to our,
00:35:37
you know, field.
00:35:39
Yeah, I think that's an important message.
00:35:42
We face a month or so coming up where I think there'll be a lot of geopolitical changes on a global scale.
00:35:48
What happens in the Middle East?
00:35:50
What happens with the DPRK support to the Ukraine and for what happens in terms of the U.S.
00:35:57
election?
00:35:57
And then, you know, what happens to China, China, U.S.
00:36:02
relations.
00:36:03
But the fact that, you know, you remind us we need to keep our eyes focused in particular on China and to use the fact that right now Beijing is being ignored by both Moscow and Pyongyang in terms of,
00:36:20
you know, being surprised at the intervention.
00:36:23
Maybe China won't take the actions necessary to try to coerce North Korea to terminate or scale back its support.
00:36:31
But nevertheless, these are times for us to have more strategic discussions with China, whether it's the United States or the ROK, but certainly together to kind of lay out the possibility for a more peaceful future.
00:36:45
Let me close with one, you know, question.
00:36:48
And you can do with it what you want.
00:36:50
You've been out for a number of years.
00:36:53
And even before you defected, you had that unique opportunity to look at the DPRK from the outside.
00:37:00
And now you've dealt with and you've spoken with a number of U.S.
00:37:04
experts.
00:37:05
Certainly you've probably talked to every everybody willing to call themselves a DPRK expert within the South.
00:37:11
What is it we most often get wrong that you think is so critical that we need to refocus on it and have a better understanding of the nature of North Korea,
00:37:23
the North Korea system, the North Korea challenge?
00:37:26
Oh, I think in the past, America, the administration or some experts had a kind of,
00:37:37
you know, the illusion that if there is a proper incentive to convince North Korea or invite North Korea to reach a certain destination,
00:37:50
I think that is really wrong.
00:37:53
Whatever incentives America deliver, North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons.
00:38:01
All those negotiations between North Korea and America from the point of North Korea, they always use those dialogues just by the time,
00:38:13
you know, to develop their nuclear weapons.
00:38:17
And so if there is any new opportunity for American government to open again the dialogue with North Korea on nuclear issues,
00:38:27
from first a start of the dialogue, I think America should make it very clear that America's fundamental goal is to denuclearization,
00:38:38
not nuclear this armament.
00:38:41
I think that is the most important thing.
00:38:43
And as long as there is Kim Jong-un regime in power, there would be no denuclearization of North Korea.
00:38:51
So that's why free reunification of Korean peninsula is the only way to solve nuclear and human rights issues of North Korea.
00:39:03
And America should support South Korea's, you know, unification policy.
00:39:08
Well, I think you raised some very good points about the nature of North Korea.
00:39:14
It's strategic goals going back.
00:39:17
I think one of the powerful dimensions of the U.S.
00:39:21
effort over the years is we've shared a lot of skepticism in the cynical view of what would be possible.
00:39:31
But it never stopped us from exploring negotiations when DPRK, you know, would activate the New York channel or put something in the KCNA or otherwise signal us.
00:39:43
So I think remaining open to test that hypothesis is been in particular over the past few years a good way for us to reassess that truth.
00:39:57
And I think, you know, as we come into the next administration, so you're looking for how to approach this issue.
00:40:02
A lot of what you spoke to us today about will be very helpful.
00:40:05
And I thank you so very much, Secretary General Tae, for your time and for your efforts.
00:40:10
I know in your heart, even as you went from serving the DPRK and the diplomatic corps, you are now serving the people of DPRK and trying to create a better future for them.
00:40:22
And for that too, I thank you.
00:40:23
To our listeners, that's it.
00:40:25
Thank you so very much for tuning in to this edition of the Impossible State.
00:40:30
Look forward to seeing you next time.
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