I’m so sorry: I meant to post this last night, but fell asleep while writing the show notes. (I don’t know why everyone goes on about the importance of not looking at screens before bedtime: I fall asleep in front of mine all the time.)

Here’s the article Dan wrote for The Forward:

There was no sign that the US understands what it will actually take to bring Hamas to heel.

Vance, Witkoff and Kushner’s rhetoric was managerial, not martial. It conveyed commitment without urgency. The measured tones implicit in the warnings that “time” and “hard work” are needed betrayed a deeper failure to grasp what the moment demands. Because words will not disarm Hamas—the single step most necessary to any effort to create a lasting peace.

Now is not the moment for carefully explaining how complex disarmament would be. It’s the moment for applying all possible pressure to get that disarmament done. If this does not occur soon, President Donald Trump’s peace plan will not just fall apart but become a joke. The best-case scenario would be the embarrassment of a prematurely declared victory. The worst would be an echo of Neville Chamberlain proclaiming “peace in our time” amid the failed effort to appease Hitler in the run-up to World War II.

If the US is serious about ending this war on terms that deny Hamas any path back to power, it must respond to Hamas by replacing rhetoric with leverage. What is needed now is not patience but a dramatic and public escalation of pressure—a demonstration that Washington is prepared to wield the world’s biggest baseball bat until Hamas yields.

The US should start by declaring, publicly and unequivocally, that no reconstruction money or aid will enter Gaza while any part of it remains under Hamas control. That is the red line, and it must be enforced, not implied. It’s essential to take every step possible to show Hamas that the material and political costs of them keeping their guns substantially outweigh any benefits. …

And for more about Hungary’s economic, demographic, and political decline, consult the most recent edition of GLOBAL EYES. (That link will take you to the right section.) Here’s the key part, but there’s more; I recommend the whole article, which is by Attila Juhász and Bulcsú Hunyadi. (You’ll notice I didn’t even try to pronounce their names in the podcast. I know my limits.) They published this article on VSquare—the name comes from “V4,” for Visegrád Four1—which was founded with a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy:

Today, the network consists of the top non-profit investigative journalism centers in the region: Fundacja Reporterow and its Polish-language outlet Frontstory.pl; Investigace.cz from the Czech Republic; Átlátszó.hu and Direkt36.hu from Hungary; and The Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak from Slovakia. In 2022, VSquare set up its core team and extended into collaboration with the Baltic countries, Ukraine, and Belarus. Our aim is to be Central Europe’s leading English language investigative platform.

I hope they survive the death of the NED, because they’re outstanding. They’re also one of the few places left where you can read truly independent reporting about Hungary. In any case, Attila Juhász and Bulcsú Hunyadi write:

Viktor Orbán is facing political challenges the likes of which he has not seen in 20 years. His system is cracking on the levels that matter most: stability, economic performance, and governance. Consequently, the “Orbán model,” considered successful in recent years, is looking less appealing around the world. The 2026 parliamentary elections will have implications beyond Hungary. National leaders with similar political systems will likely be watching closely to see if Orbán, who has established a unique information autocracy within the European Union, will remain in power.

… In recent years, the Orbán regime has devoted major public resources to promoting its political system as an exportable model and boosting its global influence. … [T]hese efforts have been successful from the regime’s perspective: Viktor Orbán has attracted far more attention than Hungary’s international weight would suggest, becoming the standard-bearer of illiberalism and a star of the global populist and far-right movement. … While this playbook has done little to advance Hungary as a country, it has worked from the regime’s perspective. The strategic goal of exporting illiberalism is to secure the long-term survival of Orbán’s political system by shaping a foreign policy environment favorable to it. With the backing of like-minded populist forces, the regime seeks an “illiberal hegemonic shift”—one in which it no longer faces criticism or sanctions for dismantling the rule of law or for systemic corruption.

… Many pillars of the Orbán model have crumbled. The Hungarian economy has struggled for years, eroding the system’s stability. A cost-of-living crisis—driven by the EU’s highest inflation—has fueled voter frustration. Over the past year and a half, the opposition party TISZA (short for Respect and Freedom—and also the name of a river in Hungary) has emerged as a credible political alternative, channeling public discontent. Hungary’s political system still falls far short of fair competition, so next year’s election remains highly unpredictable. Yet those in power are clearly uneasy about the regime’s future.

… Real wages began falling in late 2022, and by 2023 Hungary had the highest inflation rate in the EU. In the first quarter of 2023, real wages dropped by 15.6 percent, compared to an average 3.8 percent decline in OECD countries—the sharpest fall in Hungary in a decade. This collapse in purchasing power caused consumption to plummet, at times dropping to levels last seen during pandemic lockdowns. As always, the Orbán government deflected blame, pointing to external factors: the war, EU sanctions on Russia, “Brussels,” even the Biden administration. By 2025, the government went as far as claiming that EU funds—suspended years earlier—were blocked because of the opposition TISZA party, founded in 2024. But after 15 years in power, this ever-changing list of enemies and endless finger-pointing have lost credibility with many voters.

… [T]he myth of “political governance”—the idea that professional expertise could be sidelined in favor of one man’s willpower—began to fade in 2023. Dissatisfaction has since grown sharply, especially over healthcare, social policy, public services (child protection, housing subsidies), and public transportation. On these issues, the government has lost the support of much of society. It’s no coincidence that Péter Magyar and his TISZA party have made them central to their political platform since 2024.

Two areas are even more crucial for the declining international appeal of the Orbán model: migration and demographics. The regime has long presented itself as a model in both fields. … The data, however, tell a different story: the Orbán government has neither stopped migration nor reversed population decline. … Demographic policy has fared no better. … In 2024, just 77,500 children were born in Hungary—the lowest number since 1949. [D]ivorce rates are climbing, and emigration—especially among young, educated Hungarians—continues to rise. As a result, Hungary’s population is shrinking rapidly.

… Paradoxically, in today’s political climate, the Orbán regime—so proud of its so-called national sovereignty—appears to be looking abroad for help to stay in power. … Fidesz openly hoped for Donald Trump’s return, expecting that it would deliver salvation: an end to the war in Ukraine, economic recovery, and a “peace budget.” … But almost none of this has happened. … Meanwhile, Trump’s trade war has created a worse environment for Europe’s economy, including Hungary’s, than before. Orbán, despite his reportedly close personal ties to Trump, was unable to point to any concrete achievements in US–Hungarian relations in his annual Băile Tușnad speech. … Instead of the expected “peace budget,” Hungary is implementing crisis measures to cope with US tariffs.

… Hungary’s weakened international position is not just the result of failed diplomacy but also of its economic and military weakness. It is doubtful Hungary can meet the NATO target—agreed at the June summit in The Hague—of raising defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2030, with 3.5 percent for core military expenditures. Orbán himself has warned such spending would damage the economy. Systemic corruption further tarnishes Hungary’s image abroad.

The next part is a bit puzzling:

… It hardly reflects well on a country when its prime minister’s friends and family become inexplicably wealthy in just a few years. This, combined with frozen EU funds, slows economic growth and makes the Orbán model far less appealing compared to its regional peers. According to VSquare, right-wing populists from Eastern Europe—including those facing legal trouble at home—are now looking to Trump’s America for inspiration and protection, not to Hungary.

I’m not sure why they’d turn to the US if they’re looking for a country whose leaders aren’t becoming inexplicably wealthy at a breathtaking pace. Well, whatever—good luck being inspired by Trump, right-wing European populists!

Also on VSquare (and in GLOBAL EYES), by Kamilla Marton and Bence X. Sz