Timbs v. Indiana, 2019 SCOTUS (February). Episode 594 (Duration 24:32 )

Eight Amendment ban on excessive fines and forfeitures extends to the states.

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In This Episode...

"Often when the defense wins one, you know, we get excited and we want to apply it to everything." -- Anthony Cameron.

About Anthony Cameron

Anthony Cameron is a lawyer in Quincy, Illinois. Anthony was Adams County state's attorney from 1980 to 1984. Now, his practice does it's fare share of criminal defense.

However, Anthony does not limit his practice to only criminal justice cases.

Any dilemma involving conflict with a government agency is in his wheelhouse.

"Can't Miss" Moments:

✓ What does Timbs v. Indiana have to say about Illinois DUI vehicle forfeiture? Do innocent owners now have a stronger claim? (Go to 8:41 )

✓ Illinois already had a built in Eight Amendment protection clause into its Article 36 Forfeiture statute. To their credit they actually mention the Eight Amendment, but... (Go to 9:41 )

✓ Here's a solid example of how Timbs v. Indiana could effect the outcome of a current Illinois based asset forfeiture. (Go to 10:54 )

Links & Resources

• Illinois Crime Related Forfeiture of Vehicles
• Illinois Crime Related Forfeiture of Property
• Eight Amendment of The United States Constitution
• Illinois Innocent Owner Hearing
• Article 36 Eight Amendment Statement on Proportionality

Issue

The question presented: Is the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause an “incorporated” protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?

Facts

Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft.

The trial court sentenced him to one year of home detention and five years of probation, which included a court-supervised addiction-treatment program. The sentence also required Timbs to pay fees and costs totaling $1,203. At the time of Timbs’s arrest, the police seized his vehicle, a Land Rover SUV Timbs had purchased for about $42,000.

Timbs paid for the vehicle with money he received from an insurance policy when his father died. Timbs had recently purchased the vehicle for $42,000, more than four times the maximum $10,000 monetary fine assessable against him for his drug conviction.

The Bill of Rights

“The constitutional Amendments adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War,” however, “fundamentally altered our country’s federal system.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 754.

With only “a handful” of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the protections contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States. Id., at 764–765.

A Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, we have explained, if it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”

The Eighth Amendment

Under the Eighth Amendment, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

Part Of Our History

For good reason, the protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American history: Exorbitant tolls undermine other constitutional liberties. Excessive fines can be used, for example, to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies, as the Stuarts’ critics learned several centuries ago.

Even absent a political motive, fines may be employed “in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,” for “fines are a source of revenue,” while other forms of punishment “cost a State money.” In short, the historical and logical case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause is overwhelming.

Protection against excessive punitive economic sanctions secured by the Clause is, to repeat, both “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767.

This Includes Asset Forfeitures

In Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), however, this Court held that civil in rem forfeitures fall within the Clause’s protection when they are at least partially punitive. We thus decline the State’s invitation to reconsider our unanimous judgment in Austin that civil in rem forfeitures are fines for purposes of the Eighth Amendment when they are at least partially punitive.

As a fallback, Indiana argues that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies to civil in rem forfeitures. We disagree.

Broad Rights Are Protected

In considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a protection contained in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right guaranteed—not each and every particular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply rooted. Indiana’s suggestion to the contrary is inconsistent with the approach we have taken in cases concerning novel applications of rights already deemed incorporated.

Look At These Recent SCOTUS Cases

For example, in Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), we held that a North Carolina statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing certain commonplace social media websites violated the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause was “applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. We did not, however, inquire whether the Free Speech Clause’s application specifically to social media websites was fundamental or deeply rooted.

See also, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373 (2014) (holding, without separately considering incorporation, that States’ warrantless search of digital information stored on cell phones ordinarily violates the Fourth Amendment).

Similarly here, regardless of whether application of the Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted, our conclusion that the Clause is incorporated remains unchanged. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court is