Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak in loving memory of Lucille Fliegler on her yahrzeit. "Thinking about her warmth and her love of family. We honor her memory with our learning." This week's learning is sponsored by Rachel Savin in honor of the upcoming marriage of her daughter Lior to Daniel this Thursday. The various halakhot about a borrower (sho'el) that are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah are derived from rabbinic interpretations and extrapolations from the biblical text. First, the borrower's responsibility for items that are captured. While the Torah explicitly states that a borrower is responsible if an item is damaged or dies (Shmot 22:13-14), the rabbis extend this responsibility to cases where the item is captured from the extra word "or". Second, the borrower is responsible for theft and loss. Although the Torah mentions a borrower being liable for damages and death, the rabbis also include theft and loss under the borrower's responsibility. This inclusion is based on a kal v'chomer argument from a paid bailee who is liable for theft or loss, as a borrower takes on a higher level of responsibility since they benefit from using the item without paying for it. Third, the exemption of she'ela b'baalim (borrowing while the owner is working for the borrower) also applies to theft and loss. The rabbis derive this from a paid bailee, but need to also explain the source for this law for a paid bailee and what method of derivation is used to extend the exemption from a paid bailee to a borrower. Regarding shmira b'baalim, there is a debate about whether the exemption applies if the shomer (bailee) was negligent and the owner was working for the shomer. Two difficulties are raised against the position that one is exempt. However, both difficulties are resolved. Rav Hamnuna holds a narrow view of this exemption, limiting it to cases where the owner was working with the borrowed item at the time of its break or death and was with the borrower from the time of borrowing until the time of its death. However, the Gemara discusses and ultimately rejects Rav Hamnuna's limitations, suggesting that the exemption can apply in broader circumstances.

Today's daf is sponsored by Ruth Leah Kahan, Jessica Shklar, and Emily Michelson in loving memory of their mother, Kadimah Michelson, Kadimah bat haRav Avraham Tzvi Bentzion v'Chaya, on her 6th yahrzeit. "May her memory be a blessing." What is considered circumstances beyond one's control that a shomer would be exempt from? One animal attacking or two animals?  Does it depend on what type of animal? One can stipulate that one will be a shomer but will not be obligated to pay according to the Torah laws. How is this different from a condition that goes against Torah law that is not a valid condition? Other laws of conditions are discussed.  The Mishna discusses in which circumstances one is exempt as a borrower because the owner was "with the shomer" - she'eila b'baalim.  The Gemara then discusses the derivation of the laws of shomrim from the verses in the Torah.  

Study Guide Bava Metzia 93 Today's daf is sponsored by Becki Goldstein in honor of a double family simcha. "My cousin became a kalla and her brother and sister-in-law, Rabbi Zvi and Laurie Engel are celebrating the bat mitzvah of Aderet Bina in Chicago. During these trying days, we are grateful for the loving kindness bestowed on us all. May we continue to learn and grow together and see soon geula shleima. Mazel tov!" The Gemara concludes that it is a tannaitic debate whether the worker's rights to eat on the job are considered an added wage or a gift awarded by the Torah. Is one who guards a field considered "working" to the extent that the guard can eat from the field or not? The Torah did not permit it but the rabbis did. Rav and Shmuel disagree about which type of field (at what stage of development) is the case in which the Torah did not permit but the rabbis did. What is at the root of their debate? Two difficulties are raised against Shmuel's position. The Mishna discusses the four types of shomrim and what is the level of responsibility of each of them. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about the level of responsibility of a renter - is it the same as one who guards an item for free or one who gets paid? There is a disagreement about who holds which position. One who gets paid for guarding is responsible for circumstances beyond their control. Rabba and Abaye disagree about what is the level of "out of one's control" necessary to be exempt. Is one expected to go beyond what is expected of a regular person since the shomer is getting paid (Abaye) or not (Rabba)? Other rabbis sided with Abaye and ruled accordingly. The Mishna delineates what cases are considered beyond one's control and what are not.

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of the birth of a granddaughter to our friend and co-learner Tzippy Wolkenfeld, born to her children Hannah and Jacob Finkel. "May the new princess grow l'Torah, l'chuupa ul'maasim tovim and may the joy of her arrival be a harbinger of smachot for all." Is a worker limited to being able to eat only up to the value of the worker's wages? Tana kama and the rabbis permit this, but Rabbi Elazar Chasama does not. The Gemara offers three possible suggestions to explain the disagreement between tana kama and the rabbis. Is the food that one is allowed to eat while working viewed as an addition to a worker's wages - meaning it belongs to the worker and can be transferred to others, as in a salary - or a separate right granted by the Torah (a gift from God) which would be permitted only to the worker and cannot be passed on to others? Nine sources are quoted, each in an attempt to get to an answer to this question, but all are inconclusive.

If someone rents an animal and muzzles it while it is threshing, they must receive lashes as punishment and also compensate the owner for the food the animal should have eaten while working. The Gemara questions how this can be allowed since it appears to be a double punishment, and the court cannot give one a double punishment for one action. Abaye, Rava and Rav Papa each suggest a possible answer. Rav Papa rules on two unrelated issues - one prohibiting baking bread that is dairy or meat, and another prohibiting putting a male and female animal of different species in the same pen to prevent mating between different species, even though this latter ruling is not explicitly prohibited by the letter of the law. Rav Achdevoi bar Ami raises a difficulty against Rav Papa's second ruling, but this difficulty is resolved. He also brings the same source to question a ruling of Rav Yehuda on animal mating, but it is also resolved. The Mishna discusses the laws regarding a worker eating while on the job, including whether the obligation to allow them to eat is only if they are engaged in work with both hands and legs like an ox who can't be muzzled and works with all fours. If one works with one type of produce, one cannot eat a different type of produce in the field. Even though workers are only permitted by Torah law to eat while actively working, the rabbis permitted them to eat while walking between rows to prevent financial loss for the employer. The Gemara raises a question about whether a worker can eat from the same type of produce in a different area and attempts to answer this from three different rulings in the Mishna, but rejects each suggestion.

Two contradictory sources are brought regarding the prohibition to muzzle an animal while the animal is threshing trauma and maaser produce. One source suggests it's not prohibited, while another asserts it is. Various explanations attempt to reconcile this contradiction, suggesting differences in the type of truma/maaser or differing opinions. If the food on the threshing floor is causing the animal to be sick, is it still prohibited to muzzle - is the prohibition meant for the best interest of the animal or is it meant to not be cruel to the animal? Is it prohibited to tell a non-Jew to muzzle the animal and thresh with it as with laws of Shabbat or is it forbidden only on Shabbat on account of the stringency of Shabbat laws? Two sources are brought to answer this question, but in the end are not conclusive. Rami bar Hama asks a series of questions about whether there is a prohibition of muzzling in a case where there is some external factor that is in place (not put there by the owner) that may prevent the animal from eating. His questions remain unanswered. Rabbi Yonatan asked if one muzzled another's animal and then brought it to the threshing floor, is that forbidden? Rabbi Simai answered from the case of kohanim coming into the Temple drunk that obviously, the verse did not mean only when drinking as one goes into the Temple. If one person muzzles and the other brings it to thresh, the second one gets lashes. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish debate about whether one gets lashes for muzzling an animal by words alone, i.e. telling the animal not to eat.

Ravina adds an additional method to derive that a worker is permitted to eat while working with detached produce and that it is prohibited to muzzle an ox even from attached produce. Four tannaitic sources are cited that derive details of the laws regarding the employer allowing a worker to eat from the produce. Each source derives a different detail from the word "thresh" in the verse about the ox - that it refers to items that grow from the ground, at a stage that the produce is ready to be picked and until the stage that it is obligated in tithing or separating challa. A question is asked whether one can toast grains or produce to sweeten them. Is this considered like eating grapes with another substance, which is not permitted, or not? Four sources are cited to address this question, but each is rejected as inconclusive, and the question remains unanswered. The last source states that one may not add salt to fruit, but this contradicts another source that permits it. Abaye and Rava each reconcile the contradiction differently, but both understand the salt issue to be relating to the obligation to tithe and not to what is permitted/not permitted for a worker to eat. 

This week’s learning is sponsored by Marcy Farrell in loving memory of her mother, Joan Behrmann, Yonina bat Shalom, on her shloshim. "We honor her memory with our collective learning." Various halachot concerning how a worker can eat in the field they're laboring in stem from the verse regarding harvesting in a vineyard. According to one derivation from this verse, a worker is considered akin to the owner and is not required to tithe the produce if consumed before "g'mar melakha," the stage at which the produce becomes obligated in tithes. Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yochanan hold differing opinions on when precisely g'mar melakha occurs: one asserts it happens upon bringing the produce into the courtyard, while the other contends it is upon bringing it into the house. Each base their position on verses in the Torah elucidating the "vidui ma'asrot." Three tannaitic sources are introduced to challenge both Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yochanan's positions, as each assumes an obligation to tithe before bringing the food inside. However, each challenge is addressed and resolved. The verse allowing a worker to eat while working specifically pertains to labor on produce still attached to the ground, while the verse prohibiting the muzzling of animals pertains to labor on detached produce. From where do they derive the principle that one cannot prevent a worker from eating while working on detached produce or an animal while laboring on attached produce?

In the expanded narrative of Avraham's encounter with the angels, numerous interpretations delve into the lessons embedded within his actions, offering insights into behaviors to emulate. Regarding the consumption of produce by a worker in the field where they toil, the Mishna lays out the conditions under which such consumption is permissible. What circumstances warrant this allowance? What are the boundaries to be observed? From where in the Torah are these laws derived?

Rabbi Yehuda haNasi and Rabbi Natan were the last from the Mishna period and Ravina and Rav Ashi were the last of the Talmudic period. This statement is likely referring to the editing of the Mishna and Talmud. Raba bar Nachmani was killed out of fear of the king. Raba bar Nachmani's tragic death is recounted and how it related to the need for him in the heavens to resolve a debate between God and the rabbis in the yeshiva in the heavens. The Mishna related to the custom in the land and a story about Rabbi Yochanan ben Matia and his son's commitment to their workers. On account of that story, the Gemara digresses into a series of drashot on the story of Avraham and the angels and the food that he served to them.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the father of Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi, is commended for his humility, a trait shared by Yonatan, the son of King Saul, and the descendants of Bnei Beteira. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi himself endured significant suffering, which eventually abated. His suffering was attributed to his actions, and likewise, his healing was credited to his actions. Following Rabbi Elazar's passing, Rabbi Yehuda haNasi sought out Rabbi Elazar's estranged son and guided him back to the path of Torah learning. He extended the same attention to the grandson of Rabbi Tarfon, nurturing him into a Torah scholar. Numerous statements underscore the significance of Torah study, emphasizing its paramount importance. Rabbi Chiya distinguished himself by disseminating Torah knowledge among numerous students, empowering them to become teachers in their own right. Stories abound of Rabbi Chiya's exceptional greatness and his impactful contributions to the spread of Torah.

Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in honor of our fellow daf Sister, Gitta Jaroslawicz-Neufeld on the marriage of her granddaughter Esti to Baruch. "Having four generations at the wedding is a tremendous zechut. May Gitta together with David have continued nachat from Esti and all of their children and grandchildren." The story of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, leads to discussions about his obesity, alongside those of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosi. Rabbi Yochanan, renowned for his beauty, used to sit by the mikveh, hoping that women who saw him would conceive and bear children as beautiful and learned as he was. One day, while bathing in the Jordan River, Reish Lakish, a bandit, mistook Rabbi Yochanan's reflection for that of a woman and leaped in after him. Rabbi Yochanan, recognizing potential, encouraged Reish Lakish to channel his strength into Torah, becoming his esteemed student-colleague. Yet, a rift formed when in the context of a halakhic debate, Rabbi Yochanan's remarks about Reish Lakish's past led to a fatal argument, resulting in Reish Lakish's demise, and ultimately, Rabbi Yochanan's own death due to the loss of his closest companion. The Gemara then revisits Rabbi Elazar's story, haunted by his past deeds, he beseeches God for suffering as penance. The narrative follows his remaining years, culminating in his passing, where he requests to be left in an attic, anticipating reluctance from fellow rabbis to bury him. Eventually, approximately two decades later, he is interred in a cave adjacent to his father's resting place. Rabbi Yehuda haNasi proposes to Rabbi Elazar's wife, who rejects the offer as he cannot compare to Rabbi Elazar in greatness. 

Today's daf is sponsored by Max Shapiro in honor of his mother Judy Shapiro. "Your daf yomi learning motivates me to continue doing so daily!" Another issue of Rabbi Elazar on Rabbi Meir's opinion is elucidated through the viewpoint of Isi ben Yehuda, who asserts that in cases with witnesses, one cannot simply take an oath to absolve oneself; instead, witnesses must be brought forward. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba quoting Rabbi Yochanan provides a second explanation for the seeming discrepancy between Rabbi Meir's stance in our Mishna and in the sugya in Bava Kamma regarding the liability of one who trips. According to him, the oath mentioned in our Mishna, which exempts one from damages, is a rabbinic provision aimed at ensuring that individuals won't refrain from moving barrels for others due to fear of potential compensation obligations in case of breakage. Several anecdotes illustrate instances where Rava aligned with Isi ben Yehuda's requirement for witnesses to establish innocence. Additionally, a narrative recounts the expectations placed on Torah scholars (or perhaps others as well) to uphold standards beyond mere legal requirements (lifnim meshurat hadin). The seventh chapter delves into labor relations, exploring questions such as the typical duration of a workday, an employer's authority to mandate longer hours, and the obligation of the employer to provide food. It also addresses whether travel time is considered part of the standard workday. Within this discourse, a verse from Tehillim is invoked, drawing parallels between the eventual retribution for evildoers and the reward awaiting the righteous in the afterlife. An anecdote featuring Rabbi Elazar, the son of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, illustrates his methods for identifying and punishing sinners. Despite facing criticism for his actions from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha, he remains resolute.

The Mishna rules that one who loans with collateral has the level of responsibility for the collateral akin to a paid worker. It seems that the Mishna does not follow the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that if the collateral is lost, the lender can take an oath and be exempt, like a shomer chinam. The Gemara then attempts in two different ways to reconcile the Mishna's ruling even according to Rabbi Eliezer. However, this is rejected because Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Eliezer, and since most unattributed Mishnayot accord with Rabbi Akiva's opinion, the Gemara prefers to reconcile the Mishna according to Rabbi Akiva. There are four different explanations suggested to explain the situation in which Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree and the basis of their disagreement. The halakha follows Abba Shaul, as quoted in the Mishna, that one can rent out a collateral of a poor person and deduct the rent amount from the loan. If one is moving a barrel of another and it breaks, there is a debate between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda about whether the halakha distinguishes between one who was paid for the job and one who was not. Rabbi Meir rules that both are exempt if it was not intentional. However, this contradicts Rabbi Meir's opinion in Bava Kamma that one who trips is considered negligent. Rabbi Elazar explained that there are two different opinions about what Rabbi Meir held. Rabbi Yehuda considers one who broke the barrel as similar to an item getting lost or stolen and therefore distinguishes between one who was paid and one who did it for free. Rabbi Elazar claims the ruling is like Rabbi Meir, but he does not understand how each can swear and exempt themselves.

The Mishna rules that once a contracted worker says to the owner, "Pick up the item and then pay me," the worker transitions from being responsible for the item as a paid guardian (shomer sachar) to being responsible as an unpaid guardian (shomer chinam). This situation is compared to another Mishna which states that a borrower is responsible for oness (unforeseeable) damages until the item is returned. Rav Chisda qualifies this by stating that the borrower is only liable for unforeseeable damages if the item is returned within the borrowing period; if the period has ended and the borrower is no longer using the item, the borrower is no longer responsible for unforeseeable damages. The Gemara presents three different versions of how these sources are compared. Ameimar rules that while the borrower may no longer be responsible for unforeseeable damages after the borrowing period, they are still considered a shomer sachar and are thus responsible for loss or theft. A braita is brought to support this ruling. The concept of shmira b'baalim, where one is exempt from liability for an item belonging to their employer, is brought up to question the Mishna which ruled that if one says "Watch my item and I will watch yours," both parties are considered a shomer sachar. To resolve this, it is explained that the case in the Mishna involves each person watching the other's item on different days. Two cases are brought where guardians were held responsible despite seemingly being cases of shmira b'baalim. These cases are clarified to not be instances of shmira b'baalim. Additionally, there is a discussion about the interpretation when someone says, "put it down" in response to a request to watch an item: does it mean "put it down and I will watch it" or "put it down and take care of it yourself"? This is compared to a Mishna in Bava Kamma 47 to suggest that this issue is the subject of a tannaitic debate, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. 

The Mishna continues to deal with cases where one rented an item under certain conditions and then used the item differently, resulting in damage. If the damage occurred because of the change in use, the renter is responsible. For example, what happens if the renter loaded more weight on an animal than standard, or if the renter used a different item that is lighter but results in a greater volume, such as barley instead of wheat? Abaye and Rava disagree on the details of the ruling in the latter case. The Mishna discusses various laws related to the responsibility of a worker regarding an item the worker is fixing or working on, or received as collateral, as well as other laws concerning shomrim. The implications of these discussions help clarify the extent of liability and responsibility in cases of damage under differing conditions and the specific usage of rented or borrowed items. The Gemara attempts to see if the first part of the Mishna can be attributed to Rabbi Meir, as at first glance it seems not the case.

If one rents a donkey or a boat and the animal dies or the boat sinks halfway through the journey, what is the law? What are the circumstances of the cases discussed? In the context of this discussion, a debate between Rav and Shmuel addresses whether one can sell the carcass of a rented animal in a way that the principal (the original animal) will no longer exist—specifically, whether the renter can sell it and use the money from the sale to rent a new animal. Rav's opinion is questioned by a Tosefta, which is then resolved. A case is brought regarding a boat rented to carry wine, which sinks. The Gemara examines the specifics of the rental agreement: whether the renter rented "this boat" or "a boat" and whether it was to carry "this wine" or "any wine." This distinction is crucial for determining the renter's obligations and rights. Two additional cases clarify other rights of the renter: How much can the renter load on a donkey that was rented for riding, and how much can the driver load? If the donkey was rented to a man to ride, can a woman ride instead, or vice versa? Is there a difference if the woman is pregnant or nursing? These discussions provide detailed insights into the legal nuances of rental agreements, the responsibilities of renters, and the permissible uses of rented property.

The Mishna brings cases where an individual rents an item, such as an animal, for a specific purpose and then uses it for a different purpose. The renter is held responsible if the animal dies because of this change. The first line of the Mishna states that the renter is responsible in all cases where a change was made. However, in the second line, the Mishna's ruling depends on the circumstances—specifically, how the animal died and the nature of the change made by the renter. The Gemara explores four possible answers to reconcile these two lines. The first three answers establish that the first line in the Mishna refers to a case where the animal died directly because of the change, regardless of whether the change was from mountain to valley or the reverse. The fourth answer differentiates the two lines of the Mishna as representing the opinions of different authorities. According to this view, the first line reflects Rabbi Meir's opinion, while the second line represents the rabbis' stance. Rabbi Meir holds a stringent view that anyone who goes against the owner's wishes is considered a thief, thus making them automatically liable for any resulting damage or death. The Gemara then seeks to find tannaitic sources to substantiate that this is indeed Rabbi Meir's position. The first two sources examined are rejected, but the third source is accepted, affirming that Rabbi Meir considers any deviation from the owner’s instructions to be considered theft. A case referred to as 'hivrika,' has two different interpretations. The Mishna describes a scenario where a donkey rented by an individual is seized by the king's men (angaria). In such a case, the renter is left without the animal, and the owner is not required to provide a replacement. Rav and Shmuel disagree about the specifics of this case. A Tosefta is brought to challenge Shmuel's interpretation, and two explanations are offered to resolve this difficulty.

If a worker is hired to do a job, such as irrigating a field, but circumstances change, like rainfall, rendering the job unnecessary, where does the responsibility rest, and what factors influence it? Rabbi Dosa and the rabbis hold differing views on whether a worker who backs out midway should receive full compensation for work already performed, or if the worker must reimburse the employer if the employer now incurs higher costs to complete the remaining task. Rav aligns with Rabbi Dosa's stance, although this contradicts another statement attributed to him. The Gemara proposes a solution to this contradiction but identifies two challenges with the proposed resolution, both of which are resolved. Within this discourse, a braita is cited regarding a seller or buyer reneging after the buyer has made a partial payment. Various segments of this braita are elucidated further.

Study Guide Bava Metzia 76 Our learning today is in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 76 years of independence. We also continue to pray for the swift and safe return of the hostages, and for the safety and success of our soldiers.  What are the rules surrounding a worker or employer retracting from an agreement? When the Mishna mentions one party "deceiving" the other, what does this mean? Is it referring to a worker canceling on the employer, the reverse scenario, or does it involve an instance where an employer directs an agent to hire workers, but the agent communicates a wage different from what the employer had stipulated? While seven potential scenarios of the latter circumstance are delineated, only certain ones conform to the legal principles expounded in the Mishna.