Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

A kohen gadol is obligated to bring a special bull offering only if he issues an erroneous halachic ruling unintentionally and then personally acts upon that ruling. A braita derives this from the verse “לְאַשְׁמַת הָעָם” (“for the guilt of the nation”), which compares the kohen gadol’s actions to those of the community when they bring a communal sin offering. This drasha is necessary because one might have assumed that the kohen gadol’s obligation could be learned directly from the communal offering paradigm, given their similarities. However, since the kohen gadol could also be compared to the nasi (king), who brings a sacrifice without issuing a mistaken ruling, the comparison is not straightforward. The drasha clarifies that the kohen gadol’s case aligns specifically with the communal model. Another drasha teaches that if the kohen gadol issues an erroneous ruling but the people act on it while he himself does not, no special bull offering is brought. The offering is only required when the kohen gadol personally commits the sin. The Mishna rules that if the kohen gadol and the court issue rulings simultaneously but on different matters—where the community follows the court and the kohen gadol follows his own ruling—he must bring an individual sacrifice. However, if he rules with the court on the same issue and acts together with the community, he is atoned through the communal bull offering, not the unique one designated for the kohen gadol. A braita attempts to derive this latter case by comparing the kohen gadol to the nasi, but this is rejected. The nasi is included in the communal Yom Kippur offering, whereas the kohen gadol receives atonement through his own unique Yom Kippur sacrifice. Ultimately, the source is derived from the verse “עַל חַטָּאתוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא” (“for the sin which he sinned,” Vayikra 4:3). Rava and Abaye disagree about whether the earlier case—where the kohen gadol and the court ruled simultaneously—refers to rulings made in the same location or in different places. The Gemara explores various scenarios in which the kohen gadol and the court ruled on different matters. Some cases are obvious, while others remain uncertain. The Mishna further explains that the kohen gadol’s sacrifice resembles the communal sin offering in that both require two conditions: (1) a mistaken ruling that leads to erroneous instruction, and (2) an unwitting action based on that ruling. The same principle applies to idol worship—to be liable, there must be both an erroneous ruling and a subsequent action. A braita derives this from a gezeira shava based on the phrase “מֵעֵינֵי” (“from the eyes”). When the Mishna states that the same applies to idol worship, it does not explicitly say, “And the same is true for the kohen gadol,” as it did earlier. Initially, the Gemara interprets this to mean that the Mishna follows Rebbi, who holds that the kohen gadol brings a sacrifice for idol worship based solely on an unwitting action, even without a mistaken ruling. However, this interpretation is rejected, and the Mishna is re-explained as the sentence “And such is true for the kohen gadol” would apply to both the sentence before and the sentence after, as is the case in the upcoming Mishna.  

Today's daf is sponsored by Tina Lamm’s children in memory of their grandfather, Mike Senders z”l, from Cleveland, Ohio, and later Boca Raton, Florida.  "He dedicated much of his life to growing strong Jewish institutions, and his passion for Judaism, Torah, and Tefilla serves as a constant inspiration for us. May his neshama have an aliya and his memory be for a blessing." A braita is brought to raise a difficulty on Rabbi Meir’s position. The braita mentions two specific sin offerings whose meat is not eaten – the Levites' miluim offering and the offerings brought in the time of Ezra by those who returned to Zion. The latter offering consisted of twelve bulls and twelve goats. The Gemara assumes they were a communal sin offering for idol worship by the people during the time of Zedekiah. This number of sacrifices accords with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion that each tribe brings a bull and goat, and Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that both the tribes and the court bring (in a case where eleven tribes sinned), but it does not accord with Rabbi Meir’s opinion that only the court brings the sacrifice, as there should be only one bull and one goat. This difficulty is resolved by the suggestion that they sinned on twelve separate occasions.  Two other difficulties are raised on the braita. One, if the people of that time were already dead, how could the sin offering be brought, as an animal designated for a sin offering whose owners died is left to die, as the sacrifice can no longer be offered? Rav Papa suggests that the sin offering is left to die only for an individual offering, but not for one brought by the community. Three potential explanations are brought as a source for Rav Papa’s view, but all are rejected, and Rav Papa’s answer is rejected as well. The Gemara then answers that the people were still alive and proves it from a verse in Ezra 3:12. The second question is, didn’t they sin intentionally, in which case a sacrifice would not be able to be offered? They answer that it was a horaat sha’ah, unique circumstances, under which this was permitted. This answer can also resolve the previous difficulties. A braita teaches that if one of the community died, the communal sin offering would still be brought, but if one of the judges who issued the ruling died, the community is exempt from bringing the offering. Which tanna is the author of this braita? Rav Chisda attributes it to Rabbi Meir, while Rav Yosef questions why it cannot be attributed to Rabbi Shimon as well. Abaye disagrees with Rav Yosef’s suggestion, and there is a back-and-forth discussion between them. Ultimately, the Gemara sides with Abaye, based on a different source. In what cases does a kohen gadol bring a bull sin offering?

There are multiple opinions regarding who is responsible for bringing the communal sin offering. Is it the Sanhedrin that offers it? Do individual tribes that sinned each bring their own offering? Could it be both? If only some tribes transgressed, are the others still obligated to bring a bull offering? And is a communal offering required only when the Sanhedrin haGadol issues a mistaken ruling? What are the Torah sources and rabbinic interpretations that support these different views?

This week's learning is dedicated by Medinah Korn in loving memory of her mother, Rosalie Katchen, Shoshana Raizl bat Avraham Yehoshua ve-Baila Toibe, z"l, on her 25th yahrzeit. She left a profound legacy for her family and many devoted friends who continue to learn from her to this day. Yehi zichra baruch. Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of David's mother Ethel Petegorsky Geffen, on her 21st yarhzeit. She was devoted to her family and the Jewish community, volunteering on many synagogue and community committees and projects. Her two sons made aliyah to Israel and her daughter has had a long career in service of the American Jewish community. Today's daf is sponsored by Ayla Ginat in loving memory of Barak ben Lipa and Shlomit. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? While the Msihna brought two opinions, a braita brings four. Rabbi Meir obligates the individual to bring a sin offering, Rabbi Shimon exempts, Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus view it as a case of doubt, but Rabbi Elazar obligates in a provisional guilt offering, while Sumchus does not. Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yossi bar Avin bring examples of other cases of doubt to explain the difference in approach between Rabbi Elazar and Sumchus – to what extent do we expect the individual to be aware that the rabbis corrected their mistake? Rava explains the disagreement in the Mishna between Ben Azai and Rabbi Akiva to be regarding a case where the court realized their mistake on the day that the individual in question was still in the city but preparing to leave. As in the previously mentioned debate, the question is to what extent the individual is expected to be aware of the court’s reversal of their decision while they are busy involved in their upcoming travel plans.  The Mishna taught that the case of a communal sin offering is only in a case where the court’s erroneous ruling was to uproot part of a mitzva, not a complete mitzva. A braita brings one derivation, Chizkiya has another, and Rav Ashi brings a third. Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the ruling has to relate to something that the Saducees do not agree with, i.e. something rabbinic in origin and not able to be understood from the simple reading of the verses in the Torah. The reason for this is simple – if it is clear from the Torah and the court rules otherwise, and the people follow, this cannot be understood as unwitting, as it is closer to an intentional violation. Three difficulties are raised against Rav Yehuda from the examples brought in the Mishna, but each one is resolved. Rav Yosef asks: If the court rules there is no prohibition to plow on Shabbat, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? The Gemara tries to answer the question by deriving it from cases in our Mishna, but is not able to. Rabbi Zeira asks if the court rules that there is no Shabbat observance in the Shmita year, is that considered uprooting a complete mitzva or a partial one? Ravina brings a source from a false prophet to answer that it is considered a partial mitzva, and they would be obligated to bring a communal sin offering.  There are several cases where there is an issue with judges – either disqualified judges, or the head judge was not there, where there is no communal sin offering, as the case is considered closer to intentional.    

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that the exemption discussed in the Mishna—for an individual who follows an erroneous ruling of the court—is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. However, the other rabbis disagree and require the individual to bring a sin offering. In contrast, Rav Nachman, also quoting Shmuel, asserts that the Mishna reflects Rabbi Meir’s view, with the rabbis again dissenting. This dispute between Rabbi Meir and the rabbis appears in a braita, though it is unclear whether the braita is actually addressing this specific issue. Rav Papa offers an alternative interpretation of the braita, followed by three additional suggestions. Rav Asi maintains that the majority required for a communal sin offering refers specifically to the majority of Jews living in Israel, as supported by a verse in Melachim I (8:65). A question arises: if the people sinned while constituting a majority, but by the time the offering is to be brought, they are no longer the majority (e.g., due to death), are they still obligated to bring the offering? The Gemara links this to a debate between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding a king who sinned before ascending the throne and only later realized his error once he had become king. The rabbis hold that he must bring an individual sin offering, since obligation is determined at the time of the sin. Rabbi Shimon, however, argues that both the sin and its realization must occur while the individual is in the same status—thus exempting the king entirely. The Gemara then explores whether this principle can be applied to a case where the people sinned as a minority and later became a majority. It concludes that the comparison is invalid, since Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning hinges on the sin and realization occurring during the same period of obligation, which does not apply in this scenario. A series of unresolved questions is posed regarding whether two distinct teaching errors could combine to obligate the community in a communal sin offering. None of these questions receives definitive answers. Rabbi Yonatan holds that a communal offering is only warranted if the court’s ruling was unanimous. However, after three challenges are raised against his position, the final one leads to its rejection. Ultimately, all judges—and even students present during deliberation—share responsibility for the verdict. As a result, rabbis would often invite others to participate in the judgment process, thereby distributing the responsibility more broadly. If the Beit Din realized they made an erroneous ruling, but an individual is unaware and transgresses based on their original ruling, do they need to bring an individual sacrifice? Rabbi Shimon does not obligate in a sacrifice, but Rabbi Elazar requires an asham talui, a provisional guilt offering. However, their debate only applies in cases where the person was in the city. If they were out of town, all agree that there is an exemption, as they had no way to know about the corrected ruling. A communal sin offering is relevant for erroneous rulings regarding details of a Torah law, but not if they rule to uproot a Torah law completely. Rav explains Rabbi Shimon’s position and the Gemara raises a difficulty to Rav from a braita, but resolves it.      

This week's learning is sponsored by Helen Danczak. "My dear Uncle Phil passed on August 27 with family at hand. He was the kind of uncle that the kids (of all ages) gravitated to. I am not alone in saying he was my favorite uncle. He is missed. May his neshama have an aliyah." Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Deborah Dickson. "Happy birthday to Hadran’s newest wonderful addition to the team. I’m excited to start another (school) year of learning with you, my friend!” The Mishna teaches that if the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and an individual follows, the individual does not have to bring a sin offering. However, the Gemara will later explain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, but the rabbis disagree and obligate the individual. If the Beit Din teaches an erroneous ruling and a judge or student who has reached a stage of one who can issue halakhic rulings realizes they have made a mistake but follows their ruling anyway, he is obligated to bring a sin offering. If the court issues an erroneous ruling and the majority of the community follow it, there is an obligation to bring a special sacrifice called ‘the bull offering of an unwitting communal sin (par he’elem davar shel tzibur). Shmuel and Rav Dimi disagree about the language that must be used by the court for it to be considered “an erroneous ruling of the court.” Three sources are brought to support Rav Dimi’s position. In a second version of the debate, they switch positions, and the sources are raised as difficulties against Rav Dimi. The Mishna described the actions of the individual who is exempt when sinning by following an erroneous ruling of the court using the words “shogeg al pihem, unwitting by their words.” In two different versions of Rava’s explanation of this term, it either refers to two different cases or to one. If it refers to two, it would include an exemption in an additional case – if the court ruled by mistake that a piece of forbidden fat was permitted, and the individual meant to eat a piece of permitted fat, but accidentally ate the piece that the court permitted. Even though Rava had an answer to that question (obligated or exempt, depending on the different versions of Rava’s explanation), Rami bar Hama asked the same question and did not know the answer. Again, in two different versions, Rava answers the question by explaining the term in the Mishna. However, Rami bar Hama rejects his answer as the term is ambiguous. The Mishna lists various ways in which the individual or a judge/student can potentially follow a ruling of the court. What is the significance of the order in each case? How is a “teacher capable of issuing halakhic rulings" defined, and why was it necessary to include this category in addition to that of a judge? The Gemara quotes two braitot, one explaining the source for Rabbi Yehuda’s position in the Mishna, exempting an individual who follows the court, and the other explaining the source for the rabbis' dissenting opinion obligating an individual who follows the court. The latter braita is complicated to understand, and the Gemara irons out its meaning and shows how it reflects the rabbis' position.  

Siyum Masechet Avodah Zarah is dedicated with love and pride to Terri Krivosha from her husband, Rabbi Hayim Herring, her children, Tamar, Avi and Shaina, and her grandchildren, Noam, Liba, and Orly, for completing her first Daf Yomi cycle. You embody the words of Micah 6:8, and “do justice, love goodness, and walk modestly with HaShem.” A contradiction arises between the Mishna and a Mishna in Zevachim regarding the proper method for kashering a spit. Several sages present different approaches, prompting five proposed resolutions—though many are ultimately rejected. When it comes to kashering knives, the Mishna recommends polishing as the preferred method. However, Rav Ukva offers an alternative: inserting the knife into the ground ten times. The Masechet concludes with an intriguing anecdote involving the Persian king Shabur Malka, Mar Yehuda, and a Canaanite slave named Bati bar Tuvi. Before serving Mar Yehuda, the king inserts the knife into the ground, adhering to Rav Ukva’s method. Yet he omitted this step before serving Bati previously. When Bati questions the discrepancy, the king responds with a dismissive remark, implying that Bati lacks the same level of halachic stringency. In an alternate version of the story, the king’s reply is even more pointed and accusatory.

Introduction to Masechet Horayot

Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Elon in honor of her steadfast chevruta, Rhondda Ma Today's daf is sponsored by Lisa Elon in honor of her steadfast chevruta, Rhondda May, "May G-d grant us many more years of great learning together. " Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Alexander Levy in memory of Jack Schuster, father of my chevruta, Rabbi Jordi Schuster. May his memory be for a blessing. Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Dicker in honor of Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker on her birthday. There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the kashering process known as niguv. In one version of the debate, Rav requires that ashes be used once during the process, while Shmuel requires them to be used twice. In another version, there is no actual disagreement—Rav simply omits the final step of rinsing with water, since its sole purpose is to remove the ashes. Shmuel, however, includes it as part of the process. How are wicker nets in a winepress kashered? Rabbi Avahu derives from the laws of purifying wicker nets that they require niguv. If the nets are made of reeds, which are more absorbent, they must be left unused for twelve months—or, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, until the next wine-making season. What is the practical difference between these two opinions? Rabbi Yossi offers an alternative to waiting a year: pouring boiling water over them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel cites Rabbi Yossi, suggesting instead that the nets be placed under running water for an onah. What is an onah? Some define it as either a day or a night, while others say it means twelve hours. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak explains that both interpretations ultimately mean the same thing. How? The strainer and baskets used in the winepress are kashered differently depending on the material they are made from, since the level of absorption varies. If grape clusters are placed in the winepress and surrounded by the juice from the grapes, are they considered a single unit for the purposes of impurity? This has practical implications: if an am haaretz—someone who may not be trusted regarding purity laws—touches one cluster, does that render all the surrounding clusters impure? If one purchases utensils from a non-Jew, how are they to be kashered? The method depends on how the utensil was used: if used with cold food, rinse with water; if used with hot water, perform hagala (boiling); and if exposed to direct fire, apply libun (burning with fire). A knife must be polished. All these utensils also require tevila—immersion in a mikveh. Two different phrases in Bamidbar 31:23, following the battle with Midian, are cited to derive the requirement for tevila. Why are both phrases needed? Rav Nachman explains that even new utensils purchased from a non-Jew require tevila, since kashered old utensils are considered equivalent to new ones. Borrowed utensils from a non-Jew do not require tevila, but a question arises regarding utensils given to a Jew as collateral. Metal and glass utensils require tevila, but earthenware does not. If an earthenware vessel is coated with a lead glaze, should it be treated as earthenware or as metal? If utensils were used without being kashered, is food prepared in them forbidden? The answer depends on when the vessel was last used and whether one holds that a substance imparting a bad flavor is permitted or prohibited.   y, "May G-d grant us many more years of great learning together. " Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Alexander Levy in memory of Jack Schuster, father of my chevruta, Rabbi Jordi Schuster. May his memory be for a blessing. Today's daf is sponsored by Adam Dicker in honor of Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker on her birthday. There is a debate between Rav and Shmuel regarding the kashering process known as niguv. In one version of the debate, Rav requires that ashes be used once during the process, while Shmuel requires them to be used twice. In another version, there is no actual disagreement—Rav simply omits the final step of rinsing with water, since its sole purpose is to remove the ashes. Shmuel, however, includes it as part of the process. How are wicker nets in a winepress kashered? Rabbi Avahu derives from the laws of purifying wicker nets that they require niguv. If the nets are made of reeds, which are more absorbent, they must be left unused for twelve months—or, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, until the next wine-making season. What is the practical difference between these two opinions? Rabbi Yossi offers an alternative to waiting a year: pouring boiling water over them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel cites Rabbi Yossi, suggesting instead that the nets be placed under running water for an onah. What is an onah? Some define it as either a day or a night, while others say it means twelve hours. Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak explains that both interpretations ultimately mean the same thing. How? The strainer and baskets used in the winepress are kashered differently depending on the material they are made from, since the level of absorption varies. If grape clusters are placed in the winepress and surrounded by the juice from the grapes, are they considered a single unit for the purposes of impurity? This has practical implications: if an am haaretz—someone who may not be trusted regarding purity laws—touches one cluster, does that render all the surrounding clusters impure? If one purchases utensils from a non-Jew, how are they to be kashered? The method depends on how the utensil was used: if used with cold food, rinse with water; if used with hot water, perform hagala (boiling); and if exposed to direct fire, apply libun (burning with fire). A knife must be polished. All these utensils also require tevila—immersion in a mikveh. Two different phrases in Bamidbar 31:23, following the battle with Midian, are cited to derive the requirement for tevila. Why are both phrases needed? Rav Nachman explains that even new utensils purchased from a non-Jew require tevila, since kashered old utensils are considered equivalent to new ones. Borrowed utensils from a non-Jew do not require tevila, but a question arises regarding utensils given to a Jew as collateral. Metal and glass utensils require tevila, but earthenware does not. If an earthenware vessel is coated with a lead glaze, should it be treated as earthenware or as metal? If utensils were used without being kashered, is food prepared in them forbidden? The answer depends on when the vessel was last used and whether one holds that a substance imparting a bad flavor is permitted or prohibited.

This week's learning is dedicated by Carolyn Hochstadter, Adam Dicker and family on the 17th yahrzeit of Fred Hochstadter, Ephraim ben Kayla v'Baruch this Monday, 8 Elul. "'Dad' was a holocaust survivor who was saved via the Kindertransport, came to Canada and met 'Ma' in Montreal. Together, they built a family, business, community, and legacy of support and love for Medinat Yisrael. We miss you and are managing to catch up on some of your reading material, including Menachem Elon's Mishpat Ivri — to which Hadran's Daf Yomi has given so much background and context. We continue to laugh at your jokes and follow your wise guidance. And also in honor of today's pidyon haben of our first Sabra grandchild, Zecharia Ami - Zach. Saba and Savta would be proud." Today's daf is sponsored by Rochel Cheifetz in commemoration of her husband’s, Aryeh Leib ben Yehuda, Lenny Cheifetz's,  33rd yahrzeit. "You were taken much too soon. But I thank HKB"H for the time we were blessed with your smile, goodness, sense of humor, and love. Yehi zichro baruch."  Today's daf is sponsored by Emma Rinberg for a refuah shlemah for her son Joseph, Yosef Yitzchak Nisan Ben Nechama Leah Esther, who is having surgery today to repair a broken femur after a bike accident. The Mishna lists various items that are forbidden to derive benefit from and remain prohibited even in the smallest amount when mixed with permitted substances. The Gemara asks and explains why certain items are not included in the Mishna’s list. If yayin nesech falls into a pit, the entire quantity of wine becomes forbidden. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel ruled that the mixture may be sold, provided the value of the yayin nesech is deducted from the sale price. There is a debate among the amoraim about whether we rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in all cases, or only in specific situations—such as when a barrel of yayin nesech is mixed with a barrel of permitted wine, as opposed to a smaller quantity of forbidden wine that is mixed into a jug or barrel of permitted wine. To kasher a winepress that was used by or prepared by a non-Jew, the process depends on the material from which the winepress is made and whether it was lined with pitch.

The Mishna discusses the laws of nullification regarding yayin nesech (wine used for idolatry) that becomes mixed with permitted wine. It distinguishes between wine mixed with wine (min b’minu—same substance), which is forbidden in any amount, and wine mixed with water (min b’she’eino mino—different substance), which is prohibited only if it imparts taste. Rav Dimi quotes Rabbi Yochanan as saying that if one pours yayin nesech from a barrel into a pit of kosher wine, each drop is immediately nullified upon contact. The Gemara raises three challenges to Rav Dimi’s interpretation based on the Mishna, and resolves them by reinterpreting the cases in the Mishna. Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef offers a narrower understanding of Rabbi Yochanan’s ruling—limiting it to pouring from a jug into a barrel, but not from a barrel into a pit. Ravin also transmits a halakha in Rabbi Yochanan’s name regarding a mixture that includes a forbidden item combined with both a similar and a different substance. In such a case, the forbidden item is nullified by the different substance (e.g., yayin nesech mixed with wine and water), while the similar substance is viewed as if it is not there. Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda also quotes Rabbi Yochanan, but there are two versions of his statement. In one version, he disagrees with Ravin and limits the ruling to cases where the different substance was present first. In the other version, his comment refers to the Mishna, and he actually agrees with Ravin. A debate between Chizkiya and Rabbi Yochanan also concerns a case where a forbidden item is mixed with both a similar and a different substance. What is the underlying basis of their disagreement? Rav and Shmuel dispute the position of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding whether the distinction between mixtures of the same type and mixtures of different types applies universally to all prohibited items, or only to yayin nesech and tevel (untithed produce). The Gemara explains why the rabbis would have adopted a stricter approach with those two prohibitions.

The resolution to the second difficulty against Rav Ashi's position is rejected, and the Gemara concludes that pulling does affect acquisition for a non-Jew. The Mishna on Avodah Zarah 71 stresses the issue of agreement on price as a precondition for acquisition. Some situations arose regarding this issue in selling property. At first, Rav Yosef and Abaye disagree about whether or not the same principle applies in a sale, as the Mishna only discussed it about yayin nesech. However, the Gemara concludes that Abaye is correct, that the same logic applies for both, based on a ruling of Rav Huna, which was based on a Mishna in Bava Batra 85b. However, in a different case, there is a further debate about whether this holds, albeit under more unique circumstances. The Mishna discusses two cases. In the first case, a Jew pours wine through a funnel into the non-Jew's jug. If there are some droplets of wine in the funnel, they are prohibited. If the Jew pours wine from a vessel into another vessel, the wine in the first vessel is permitted, while the wine in the second vessel is prohibited. The Gemara first quotes a Mishna in Taharot 8:9 relating to the issue of nitzok, a stream of water, as regards impurity. If water that streams down becomes impure, i.e., is poured into an impure vessel, it does not affect the water at the top that has not entered the vessel. Rav Huna, however, ruled that the upper liquid would be forbidden in a parallel case of yayin nesech.  

Today's daf is sponsored by David and Mitzi Geffen in loving memory of Mitzi's brother Dr. Dennis Lock on his yahrtzeit. He was a loving husband, father, uncle, and grandfather, a devoted physician; and had a love of learning Talmud. He is sorely missed. Today's daf is sponsored by Rachel Bayefsky and Michael Francus in honor of their baby daughter Avital Temima, born 12 Av/August 6. "She is already listening to Rabbanit Farber’s podcast during feedings! May she grow up to love learning." If a fleet enters a city during peacetime, any open wine barrels are deemed forbidden due to the concern that the soldiers may have drunk from them. In contrast, during wartime, it is assumed they would not have had time to drink, and therefore the wine is not considered to have been used for libations. However, a conflicting source suggests that even in times of war, the women of the city may have been raped. Rav Meri resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between the concern of rape and the concern of wine consumption. The Mishna discusses how a Jewish laborer who is paid in wine by a non-Jew can request monetary compensation in a manner that avoids the prohibition of benefiting from yayin nesech (wine used for idolatrous purposes). It raises the question: can a non-Jew pay a wine tax to the king on behalf of a Jew, or would that be prohibited due to the Jew deriving benefit from yayin nesech? The Mishna further rules that when a Jew sells wine to a non-Jew, the price must be agreed upon before the wine is poured into the non-Jew’s container. If not, the wine is considered to be in the non-Jew’s possession before the sale is finalized, and the Jew would be benefiting from yayin nesech. Ameimar and Rav Ashi debate whether the act of pulling an item (meshicha) constitutes a valid acquisition (kinyan) for non-Jews. Rav Ashi, who holds that it does not, cites Rav’s instruction to wine sellers to ensure they receive payment before measuring out the wine. However, the Gemara offers an alternative explanation for Rav’s directive. A challenge is raised against Ameimar’s view, and two difficulties are posed against Rav Ashi—one stemming from our Mishna. Ultimately, all objections are resolved.

Rava ruled that if a Jew is with a non-Jewish prostitute and there is wine present, one can assume that the Jew ensured the prostitute did not come into contact with the wine, and therefore it is permitted. Although he may not be able to control his sexual desires, he is not presumed to be lax in the laws of yayin nesech (forbidden wine). However, in the reverse case—where a Jewish prostitute is with a non-Jew—since the non-Jew holds the dominant position in the relationship, we assume she has no way to prevent him from touching the wine, and thus it is forbidden. There are nine different cases in which a Jew’s wine was left with a non-Jew, and Rava issued rulings on whether the wine was permitted or forbidden in each instance. In many of these cases, he permitted the wine based on his assessment that the non-Jew would likely not have touched it, due to the possibility of being caught by the owner or another Jew. In other cases, there was uncertainty about whether the non-Jew had even come into contact with the wine, or whether the individuals present were Jews or non-Jews. Two additional cases were brought before other rabbis. In the second case, Abaye introduces a comparison to the laws of impurity, and the Gemara addresses this comparison. It notes that the rabbis were stricter regarding impurity laws than they were with wine, citing a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan to support this point. Three challenges are raised against the positions of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan—two against Rav and one against Rabbi Yochanan—and each is resolved.

This week's learning is sponsored by Danielle & Jason Friedman in honor of Anabelle Friedman on her siyum of Mashechet Rosh Hashana on the occasion of her Bat Mitzvah, and in honor and appreciation of Rabbanit Michelle for inspiring and enabling multiple generations of women, in our family and around the world, to engage in Talmud study. Today's daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in memory of Myer Senders a”h, beloved father of our friend and co-learner Tina Lamm. "May the Torah learned today by all of us be a zechut for his neshama ותהא נשמתו צרורה בצרור החיים." What is the law regarding a mouse that falls into vinegar? Is the mouse nullified, and if so, at what ratio? The Mishna presents three distinct scenarios involving a Jew and a non-Jew, where wine is left in a location accessible to the non-Jew, raising concerns about potential libation (נסך) and thus rendering the wine prohibited. In each case, the Mishna outlines whether there is reason to suspect that the non-Jew offered the wine as a libation. The determining factor is whether the Jew stated they would be gone for a while or whether the Jew is considered to be supervising. The Gemara defines supervision as a situation in which the Jew could return at any moment, even if they are not physically present. The amount of time that must elapse to prohibit the wine (in a case where the Jew leaves for a while) is debated between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The Rabbis hold that the wine becomes prohibited if enough time passes to pierce the stopper, reseal it, and allow it to dry. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintains that the required time is that needed to break the stopper entirely, fashion a new one, and let it dry. A fourth case involves a non-Jew dining in a Jew’s home, with wine left either on the table or on a side table. If the Jew leaves the room, there is concern that the non-Jew may touch the wine on the table, but not the wine on the side table—unless the Jew instructed the non-Jew to dilute the wine. If the bottle is sealed and enough time has passed for the stopper to be broken, replaced, and dried, the wine is prohibited. Why are all three cases necessary? What is unique about each, and why did the Mishna include them all? Rabbi Yochanan limits the scope of the debate between the Rabbis and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to stoppers made of lime plaster, excluding those made of clay. If a non-Jew were to pierce a clay stopper and reseal it, the tampering would be visibly noticeable. A difficulty is raised against Rabbi Yochanan’s explanation from a braita, but it is ultimately resolved. Rava rules in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as the final case in the Mishna reflects his opinion exclusively, without presenting the view of the Rabbis. The sugya concludes with a practical question: If the halakha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—requiring a longer time to prohibit the wine—and also follows Rabbi Eliezer (Avodah Zarah 31a), who permits leaving a barrel with a single seal in the possession of a non-Jew without concern for tampering, why is the current practice to avoid leaving wine in a non-Jew’s possession? The Gemara answers that the concern lies with the bunghole, which was used to smell the wine. The worry is that the non-Jew might widen the hole to drink from it and offer the wine as a libation. Bungholes were apparently not present in barrels during the time of the Mishna but were commonly used at a later time in Babylonia when the question was asked.

This week's learning is sponsored by Rabbi Lisa Malik and Professor Adi Wyner in honor of the birth of their first Israeli grandson, David Rafael, son of Rivkah & Charlie Gottlieb. Davidi was born at Sheba Medical Center on 26 Tammuz/ July 22. He is named after his great-grandfathers, David Malik z"l and Dr. Donald Stoltz z"l. As we begin the month of Elul with the recitation of Tehillim 27 (“L’David HaShem Ori v’Yishi”), we continue to pray for Davidi’s refuah shleima as he meets the challenges of a cleft palate, including surgery sometime before his first birthday. דוד רפאל בן רבקה אריאנא ואליעזר בנימין Today's daf is sponsored by Terri Krivosha in memory of her mother, חני מנדל בת שימה פיגה וירחמיאל הכהן, on her second yahrzeit. She was an eshet chayil whom we miss and think of every day. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir dispute whether a mixture is prohibited when the forbidden component imparts a bad taste to the permitted food. Ulla and Rabbi Yochanan differ on the scope of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Meir: Ulla holds that they disagree when the forbidden item initially gives a good taste and only later turns bad, while Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in a case where the bad taste is immediate. A challenge to Ulla’s view is raised and resolved. The Gemara then asks whether Rabbi Yochanan holds that they disagree in both scenarios, but the question remains unresolved. Rav Amram raises a difficulty with Rabbi Yochanan’s view, noting that this debate is absent from the Mishna. After further searching, he identifies what seems to be the same dispute in Mishna Orlah 2:9. Rabbi Zeira, however, rejects the connection, explaining that the prohibition there rests on a different principle. A braita is then brought that directly supports Rabbi Yochanan: it describes a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the rabbis regarding two leavening agents — one of truma, one of chullin — each potent enough to leaven dough on its own. Since adding both would cause over-leavening and produce a bad taste, this proves that there is indeed a debate in cases where a prohibited item imparts a bad taste. The braita lists another disputed scenario — when both leavening agents are added simultaneously. Abaye explains the need for this case: it was brought to clarify Rabbi Shimon’s position that even when the prohibited agent initially aids leavening, if it acts in tandem with the permitted agent, it is not considered to have been beneficial to the dough initially, and therefore, the dough is permitted. A case is brought where a mouse fell into a barrel of beer, and Rav prohibited the consumption of the beer. Some assumed Rav ruled like Rabbi Meir, prohibiting mixtures even when the forbidden element imparts bad taste. Rav Sheshet instead interprets Rav’s decision as a special stringency regarding sheratzim (creeping creatures), and two objections to this reading are resolved. Rava rejects Rav Sheshet’s explanation and holds that if a prohibited item imparts bad taste, the mixture is permitted, and suggests either that the halakha is not in accordance with Rav, or that Rav held the mouse imparted a good taste to the beer.

Today's daf is sponsored by Laura Warshawsky in loving memory of her mother, Evelyn Margolis, on her second yahrzeit.