Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Study Guide Bava Batra 147 Today's daf is sponsored by Esther Kremer in loving memory of Manny Gross on his 2nd yahrzeit. "May his memory forever be a blessing." Today's daf is sponsored by Marc and Debbie Pershan in loving memory of  Marc's mother, Perel Bayla bat Simcha, on the occasion of the shloshim. From where do we learn that a declaration of a person on their deathbed is effective as if an act of acquiring was performed? The sages brought sources for the law from two verses in the Torah and two from the Prophets. Rava says in the name of Rav Nachman that this law is not derived from the Torah, but the rabbis instituted it to prevent the person from being overly distressed. The Gemara questions Rav Nachman from a different statement of Rav Nachman on a ruling of Shmuel. Shmuel held that if one sold a promissory note of a loan to another and then pardoned the original loan, the loan would be canceled, and even the heir of the original lender could cancel the loan. Rav Nachman explained that even Shmuel would agree though that if the promissory note were not sold to another but given as a gift from the lender on his/her deathbed, the heir cannot cancel the loan. This seems to show that the power of the words of a person on their deathbed is valid by Torah law as they are stronger than a regular gift. They resolve this difficulty by explaining that Rav Nachman gave it the strength of Torah law, even though it is rabbinic. Rava quoted Rav Nachman that one cannot transfer intangible items - like the right to live in a house or the right to future fruits from a tree, even on one's deathbed. This seems to show that Rav Nachman treats a gift on one's deathbed like laws relating to gifts of one who is healthy. The Gemara raises a difficulty on this assumption.

Today's daf is sponsored by Diana Bloom in loving memory of her Zayde, Israel (Ignacio) Marmurek on his 41st yahrzeit.  Today's daf is sponsored by Rhona Fink in honor of our fellow Daf learner Elana Weinberg and her husband Rabbi Brahm Weinberg on the occasion of the Bar Mitzvah of their son Joseph Asher in Silver Spring, Maryland, Parshat Vayera, this past Shabbat. "Joseph is already following in the footsteps of his parents with his demonstration of confidence, knowledge, and humility." After a betrothal, a groom would bring gifts to the bride called sivlonot. If the marriage was canceled, under what circumstances would the sivlonot be returned? This depends on what kinds of gifts were given (perishable or long-lasting), whether they were (small) gifts meant to be used in her father's house or (large) gifts for the couple's future home. If the groom ate in her father's home when bringing the gift, he would not be able to retrieve the gifts. What if the husband drank but did not eat, or ate outside the house, or the husband's messenger ate the food? If the groom ate less than a dinar's worth, can he claim back all the presents or only a percentage? If the gift went up in value and was then returned, who gets the enhanced value? Rava asks: If the gifts were to be consumed, but were not yet consumed when the marriage was canceled, are they returned? Almost all these questions remain unanswered. Two stories are brought relating a situation that happened with an engaged couple. In one, the husband sent gifts and in the other, there was a rumor that the bride had no sense of smell and the groom wanted to cancel the betrothal, but he tested her to see if it was true, and it was not. Each comes to teach something unique either about Israel or about a claim a husband could make and whether it would be accepted. Ravin ruled that even though we distinguished between perishable and non-perishable gifts, this distinction does not hold if the woman is the cause of the canceled wedding. In that case, all gifts are returned, even a bundle of vegetables. What assumptions can be made about a declaration on one's deathbed? A distinction is made between one who gives away all of their possessions and one who only gives away part. If they gave it all away, it is assumed they thought they were dying. Therefore, if they heal, the gift is ineffective. If only part were given away, the gift would be effective.  This is based on an "umdana" - an assessment of their intent. The Gemara tries to match the opinion in our Mishna to tannaim who said the same thing regarding other cases in other places to determine who is the author of the Mishna.

A contradiction was brought from a braita against the Mishna regarding returning reciprocal gifts for a wedding (shushbinim). There were three resolutions. The third established the case of the Mishna of one when the groom died and left a yabam, a brother to perform levirate marriage. When the gifts are given to the yabam, he must share them with his brothers. To raise a difficulty against this answer they compare the case to one where the groom dies after betrothal and before the marriage. Just as in that case, the money from the betrothal does not have to be returned as the woman can claim that it is not her fault that they are not getting married, likewise with the shushbinim, the family that first received gifts can claim that there is no need for them to send gifts if the groom is no longer alive since they did not rejoice with him at the wedding. However, Rav Yosef explains that the cases aren't comparable as the case with the yabam was one where the other family did join the brother's wedding before he died and rejoiced with him, but did not yet bring the gifts. The Gemara attempts to establish that the opinion mentioned previously, that a woman does not have to return the money of the betrothal if the husband died as she can claim it was not her fault they never got married, is a subject of a tannaitic debate. However, this suggestion is rejected and the tannaitic debate is explained to be regarding a case where the woman, not the man, died and the debate is whether or not betrothal money was meant to be given and kept even if the marriage never happened. If one holds that it was not intended to be kept even if the marriage never happened, the woman's heirs would need to return the money if that was the custom in the place where they lived. That issue was not only a debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda haNasi in the source quoted previously, but also can help explain a debate in a different braita between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yossi. In the time of the amoraim, there were different opinions about whether the betrothal money would be returned or whether other gifts given from the groom to the bride were to be returned. The five unique laws that govern the shushbinot gifts. The court can enforce its collection. It is returned only when the one who gave first gets married. There is no interest if the reciprocal gift is larger than the first. It is not canceled in the shmita year like other loans. And a firstborn would not collect a double portion if the father was owed shushbinot gifts for his sons. If one doesn't attend the wedding, one is still obligated to bring reciprocal gifts. However, if he was not invited to the wedding, while he still needs to pay, he can hold a grievance against the person. However, since he did not eat at the wedding, he can deduct the amount he would have eaten from his gift. How is the amount of the deduction calculated? A braita sets up various cases in which one is not obligated to return the shushbinot. In the context of that braita, they mention a public wedding (pumbi) and therefore another braita that mentions this word pumbi in a different context is brought. That braita quotes various drashot comparing one who is wealthy in different types of property to one who is wealthy in different types of Torah knowledge. What is the ideal? Rav and Rava deliberation about whether it is better to master Mishna or better to matter Talmud. They each derive their opinion from Proverbs 15:15. Other drashot are brought on that verse which relate to middot or other things that will make a person happy or will cause them to lead an unhappy life. Some of these sources view having a happy life as a good thing whereas others do not view it in a positive light.

How are estate profits divided if only some or one of the heirs invested either time or money in improving it? What are the factors that affect the law? When are some exceptions to the rules? It was customary that a father who married off his oldest son in a house adjacent to his own house, would give that house to the son as a gift. Since this was the generally accepted practice, even if the father didn't specify it as a gift to the son, the law presumes that the house was given to the son. This is one of three laws that are declared "A halakha without a clear explanation." If brothers are living off the father's estate, in what situation would a brother's salary be shared with the other brothers? Are doctor bills for one of the heirs paid for by the estate? The Gemara differentiates between those who get sick because they brought it upon themselves and those who get sick due to circumstances beyond their control. Reciprocal marriage gifts (which were common in those days and could be demanded in a court) - how are they divided among heirs? On what do those laws depend?

Today's daf is sponsored by Audrey Levant in honor of Geri Goldstein Geudalia's grandson, Moshe, on his bar mitzvah in Ottawa, Canada this Shabbat.  In explaining why the commitment of the father to his son, "I will give you a portion with all your yet-to-be-born children" is ineffective, it is compared to one who says "Acquire it like a donkey." If one says to another, "You and a donkey shall acquire the item" is the kinyan effective? Rav Nachman holds that the person acquires half, Rav Hamnuna holds this is entirely ineffective and Rav Sheshet holds that the person acquires the entire item. Rav Sheshet brings a source regarding teruma to prove his position. However, this proof is rejected. Rav Avia brings a difficulty against those who were against Rav Sheshet's position from a case regarding a man who betrothed five women, two of whom could not be betrothed by him in this way as they were sisters (kiddushin that are not able to be consummated, shelo nimseru l'bia). Since the betrothal is effective to some, it can be compared to the "you and the donkey" case. However, this is also rejected as the case was misunderstood by Rav Avia and in fact, the man only had already excluded the sisters in the act of betrothal as he said, "Whoever is eligible to have relations with me will be betrothed." Therefore, the case is not similar at all to the donkey case. If one says, I will give my wife and my sons my possessions, does she get 50% or an equal share with all the sons? Rav Yosef ruled that she receives half and proved it from a verse about the lechem hapanim (shewbread) being divided between Aharon and his sons, where Aharon received half. Abaye rejects the comparison and rules that she receives an equal share. This is questioned in light of rulings where rabbis granted the wife half, and a ruling of Rebbi regarding a division of taxes. However, the ruling of Rebbi is rejected as it is more similar to the case of Aharon and his sons, than to the case of the woman and her sons. A difficulty is raised against Rav Yosef's ruling from the laws regarding dividing up a large meal offering into two vessels. However, the comparison to the meal offering is rejected as well. The halakha is like Rav Yosef in this case and in two others previously cited in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12b and Bava Batra 114a). If one sends silk to his family, how is it divided between sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law? If one has one son and one daughter and promised his property to his "sons", does that wording include the daughter as well? If one has one son and a grandson and promises his property to his "sons" does that include his grandson? When the estate is not yet divided and the older children invest the property, are the proceeds divided evenly between all the brothers or only the ones who invested? On what does it depend?

If one gives a gift to an unborn child, while it is a fetus, Rav Huna rules that the gift is not acquired. Rav Nachman holds that one can give a gift if they say, "I am giving this gift when the baby is born." Rav Sheshet holds that a fetus can acquire items in all cases and brings a braita to support his position. Abaye and Rava each provide different explanations for the ruling in braita to show that it does not necessarily prove Rav Sheshet's position. The Gemara brings a Mishna in Nidda 44a to reject Rav Sheshet's opinion. But this is dismissed as Rav Sheshet himself explained the Mishna as referring to a particular case, without ramifications for this debate. Another explanation of that Mishna is brought in the name of Rava can also resolve the difficulty raised against Rav Sheshet. Rabbi Yochanan holds that in most situations, a gift given to an unborn fetus is not effective, but our Mishna is an exception to the rule as a father feels a closeness to an unborn child and it can therefore effectively transfer ownership of the gift to the fetus. The Gemara rules like Rabbi Yochanan. A case is brought where a man promised his wife that the sons she would have with him in the future would inherit all of his property, excluding his sons from a previous wife. When the son of the other wife complained, the father promised him a portion with his future brothers. The rabbis were split about whether or not that son would receive an extra portion when the inheritance was later divided between him and the other sons. Those who hold he does not deserve an extra portion claim that the promise was that he would get a portion like his unborn brother, but since the father cannot give them a portion at that point, as they were unborn, the statement was meaningless.

Abaye and Rava disagreed on their understanding of the Mishna regarding the ruling of a tumtum who tries to collect money form a father's estate. A difficulty is raised against Abaye's explanation from a braita, but is resolved. Why in the case of the Mishna did the husband commit 200 zuzim to his unborn child if she is a girl and 100 if he is a boy - wasn't there a preference in those days for male children, as per the words of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai? Three answers are brought. Two tannaitic sources are brought with cases similar to the ones in our Mishna but without enough details so the Gemara establishes the details of the cases discussed. A case happened where a man on his deathbed promised all of his property to his unborn baby. Rav Huna ruled that this was ineffective as one cannot effect a transaction with someone who is not yet in existence, Rav Nachman questions this ruling from our Mishna where in all the cases the father promised money to an unborn child. Rav Huna rejects the Mishna saying, "I don't know who is the author of this Mishna!" The Gemara questions why Rav Huna couldn't have given a different answer. It raises seven possibilities but ultimately rejects them all.

The Mishna established the division of the father's possession when there is a lot of money and when there is not a lot of money. What if the financial status of the estate changes after the father's death? Does the distribution change as well? After the Gemara had discussed how the amount in the estate is determined, Rabbi Yirmiya asked if other things enter into the calculation - do we deduct the amount needed to feed the deceased's widow until she gets remarried or dies, or her daughter from a previous marriage in a case where the husband committed to supporting her for some time, or a loan that is owed to a creditor? If there is a widow and only a daughter left to inherit and not enough money for both of them, which one receives money from the estate? Why did Admon disagree with the rabbis and hold that the male children should receive inheritance at the expense of the daughters losing their food payments? Rava and Abaye each suggest different explanations. How is a tumtum viewed regarding these laws - as a lame, female, or neither? If a man on his deathbed left a pregnant wife and stipulated: if the baby is male give him this gift, if female, this gift, what do they receive if twins are born or if the baby is a tumtum?  

Study Guide Bava Batra 139 Today's daf is sponsored by Judith Shapiro in loving memory of her brother David Tychman z"l on his eleventh yahrzeit. "He was a passionate Zionist and a wonderful uncle to my children." If a father gives their land as a gift to one son "from today and after death," the father has exclusive rights to all the produce detached from the ground throughout his lifetime. Upon his death, the heirs receive any produce detached from the ground, not the gift recipient. However, in Tosefta Ketubot, the ruling is that if the son sold the field and then the father died, the buyer would have to return the value of produce attached to the ground at the time of the father's death to the heirs, as even produce attached to the ground belongs to the giver. Ulla resolves the contradiction by differentiating between the generosity of a father to a son as opposed to a non-relative (the buyer). If a father died and left older and younger children, before the inheritance is divided, they all get an equal portion for their needs - food, clothing, dowry. However, if some children were married in the father's lifetime, the younger children who were not yet married cannot demand the same amount of money for the wedding/dowry as the older ones received when the father was still alive. Rava brings an exception to the rule - if the oldest brother is managing the inheritance money and he takes money from the estate for clothing so he can dress respectfully when dealing with the inheritance, we do not insist that all the other brothers receive an equal share for their clothing. The son of Geneiva asked Rava: If a woman takes out a loan without a document (oral loan) and then gets married - since her husband has rights to her possessions, is he considered a "buyer" in which case, the creditor can't collect the loan (as an oral loan is not collected from land that is sold) or is he considered an inheritor and the loan can be collected. Rava tries to prove that he is considered an heir from our Mishna, but the proof is rejected. Rav Papa and Abaye each bring other sources to prove that a husband is considered an heir, but Rava raises a difficulty based on the takana in Usha which treats the husband as a buyer since a woman who sells her usufruct property and dies, the husband can demand it back from the buyers. This would only make sense if he was considered a buyer. Rav Ashi resolves the contradiction by explaining that sometimes the rabbis gave the husband status like an heir and sometimes like a buyer, depending on the situation - whatever is in the husband's or someone else's best interest, i.e. providing for a widow. Sons have rights to the inheritance but daughters have rights to sustenance from the estate. If there aren't sufficient funds for both, the rabbis give the girls rights to sustenance before giving rights to the sons. The sons are expected to ask for charity. Admon questions their position and Rabban Gamliel supports Admon. The amoraim discuss what is considered sufficient funds for both the sons and daughters.

If one receives a gift and doesn't immediately say, "I don't want it," the gift is acquired by that person, even if they later scream that they don't want it. However, if someone else accepted the gift on their behalf and they were in the room and did not protest, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the rabbis about whether or not the gift is acquired. If on one's deathbed, one promised different amounts of money to a few different people in one sentence, it is assumed that the person intended to gift it to them each at the same time. Therefore, if a creditor of the deceased comes to collect a debt, it is collected proportionally from each of them, depending on the amount they were given. However, if the person promised the gift in a particular order, the creditor collects first from the one who received last, and then from the second-to-last, etc. If on one's deathbed one said he was giving an amount of money to one who was "owed" money by them (i.e. a firstborn, wife, or creditor), was the intention to return the money owed or was this a gift in addition to money owed. This depends on how the promise was worded. If he said, "as is appropriate for him/her," the money is considered an addition to what was owed. But if the promise was "for his portion as a firstborn/for her ketuba, then the son/wife receiving can choose to accept either the amount of money promised on the deathbed or the double portion/ketuba. If it is a creditor, the amount promised is taken for the debt. Rav Nachman explains that this is based on Rabbi Akiva's position that if one adds unnecessary words, they must be adding something. Therefore, when one says "as is appropriate," it is understood to be adding something more than what was owed. If on one's deathbed one says that someone owes him/her money, can witnesses document the statement without verifying? Is there a concern the court will act upon it without checking into it (therefore the witnesses can't write it) or can we assume the court will do their homework (and therefore the witnesses can write it)? According to a braita, Rabbi Meir holds that it can be written without verifying and therefore when the heirs want to collect based on the document, they must prove they are owed the money. The rabbis hold that it cannot be written unless it is verified and therefore do not require any further proof to collect. However, Rav Nachman explains that there is a different version of the braita that Rabbi Meir says the document cannot be written based on the statement of the person on their deathbed, whereas the rabbis permit. He further explains that Rabbi Meir is concerned about a court that may rule without checking for further proof and therefore the document should not be written. The ruling is that we are not concerned that a court will err and not check into the details. However, this is true for a case of witnesses, not for a previous court ruling. If a court supervises a chalitza or mi'un, they must check the details carefully as a later court will rely on it, permitting a woman to remarry, without checking that it was all done properly. However, a document signed by witnesses testifying to what a person said on their deathbed can be written without checking the details, as the court will check the veracity of the contents of the document before ruling based on it.

In resolving a contradiction between two braitot, the Gemara answers that there is a tannaitic debate (between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) regarding the same issue that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish were debating - when one acquires the produce do they acquire rights to the property itself, meaning do they have rights to sell it? The case where they disagree is one who promised one's possession to one person and after that person's death, they will go to another person and after them to a third person. If the first person sold the property, would the second person be able to demand the property after the death of the first person? Rebbi holds a sale of the property would be invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the sale would be valid even though in the case discussed, he thinks one should not be able to sell it ab initio. Rabbi Yochanan held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with one exception. He also added a few cases that would be included within this ruling.   If one received an etrog as a gift that was to be passed on after their death to another or taken from the estate's funds before they were divided, is one able to fulfill the mitzva or not? While in the former case, they can fulfill the mitzva, Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would disagree about whether they could sell the etrog. Is a gift given upon the condition that it be returned considered a gift? Can one fulfill a mitzva with an etrog that they received in this manner?

What is the language in a document that makes it clear that the document itself only served to strengthen the commitment of the person on their deathbed, and was not meant as a document necessary for affected the transaction? What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when he is healthy? Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must write "From today and after my death." Rabbi Yossi does not require adding "From today." Once this is written, the property is considered to belong to the recipient, while the proceeds belong to the giver. Can either of them sell their rights to their share? Why does the language of "From today and after my death" work here, but it is not effective in a divorce document? Raba bar Avuha accepted Rabbi Yossi's opinion because the date on the document makes it clear that it is in effect from the date it was written, even without adding the words "from today." If an act of acquiring was performed from the giver to witnesses on behalf of the recipient, this would preclude the need for writing "from today," even according to Rabbi Yehuda. However, there is a debate about whether this applies across the board or is it dependent on the language used in the document. If the recipient sells their rights and then predeceases the giver, does the buyer acquire the property upon the giver's death or does it revert to the giver's heirs? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this based on a debate about whether one who acquires proceeds to an item (in this case the giver retains rights to the proceeds) is considered the main owner of the item. They debate this issue in another case as well. Why is there a need to mention their debate here if it could be inferred from the other case? To answer this question, the Gemara explains why one could have differentiated between the cases. Rabbi Yochanan raises a difficulty from a braita on Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved. 

Two statements in the name of Rabbi Yochanan contradicted each other. In one he ruled that a husband is believed to say he divorced his wife and in the other, he is not believed. The resolution was that the former meant that we accept his statement regarding her status from this moment forward and the latter is retroactive. Despite this resolution, Rava was unwilling to rule using this principle in a case that was before him where a man said his wife was exempt from levirate marriage (and should be believed since he could have said he divorced her) and preferred to be stringent and require chalitza. In another case, where it was presumed the man had no brothers and as he was dying, he also said he had no brothers. Abaye was stringent as there were rumors that there were people far away who could testify that he had brothers. Even though in the case of a woman taken captive, Rabbi Chanina did not forbid her to her husband based on rumors that people far away could testify that she engaged in relations with her captors, Abaye distinguishes between that case and this one. The Mishna brought a case where one brother claimed they had another brother, but the other brothers denied the claim. The Gemara establishes that the other brothers must have said "We don't know if he is our brother," meaning, their claim was one of uncertainty. This qualification is meant to explain why they receive an inheritance from that brother if they deny he is their brother. Can we learn from here regarding other cases where one has a confident claim (bari) and the other is unsure (shema), such as, one claimed money from another and the other responded, "I don't know if I owe you"? If the comparison is true, the ruling would be that the claimant who is unsure would not have to pay, like the brothers who do not have to give up their inheritance to the others. Rava agrees with this comparison, but Abaye denies it and rather compares our case to one where the confident claim is that the other owes money to a third party, not to the claimant. In the ruling of the Mishna, if the brother whose status is unclear dies, the property he received from the inheritance from one of the brothers is returned to that brother. Rava asks what happens if the property goes up in value. Would the brother receive the added value as well or would it be like money that the brother in question acquired on his own, which would be divided evenly between all the brothers? If one has a will wrapped around one's leg at the timeof death, it is invalid, even if it is later found in the hands of the person to whom the money was promised in the will. But if before the person died, they transferred ownership of the document to someone else, it is valid. What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when the person is healthy? The person needs to say, "From today and after my death. If one intended to transfer money to another using a document, i.e. on one's deathbed one said, "Write and give this document to...," if the person dies before the document was given, we do not write and give the document as one cannot transfer items using a document after one's death. However, if it is clear that the document was intended just as proof of the property transfer, one can write and give the document even after the person dies.

A story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct. Yonatan ben Uziel was considered the greatest of Hillel the Elder's students. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakai was on the opposite end of the students. And yet, he was well versed in all areas of Torah study, and more. Is one believed for inheritance and levirate (yibum) marriage to say that one has a son or a brother? On what basis? With what claims is a man believed to exempt his wife from levirate marriage? On what basis is he believed? Can a court split testimony in half and accept only part of what a person says?

Some cases are brought, with different circumstances, where the wife received property from the husband with her children and the rabbis deliberated whether she was able to also demand her ketuba money. Rav Huna explained that if a person on their deathbed wrote all of his property to another without specifying a language of inheritance or gift, we see whether the heir was a relative or not. If the heir was a relative who was in line to inherit, they received it as inheritance. If not, they receive it as a gift. Rav Nachman questions Rav Huna, "Why didn't you say directly that you hold by Rabib Yochanan ben Broka!" Rav Nachman answers his own question by quoting a case where the ruling was worded in the same way as Rav Huna's ruling. Still, it was unclear what was the relevance of the inheritance/gift differentiation in both rulings. Rav Ada bar Ahava suggested that the ramification was whether the deceased widow could demand food supplements from the heir. However, Rava rejected this suggestion and explained the ramifications - if the deceased had promised it only to the heir until their death, and after the property would go to someone else. If it is considered an inheritance, this statement is disregarded, but if it is a gift, it is upheld. Is it permitted to bypass one's son's inheritance and give one's property to someone else? Does it make a difference if the son does not behave appropriately or does not behave appropriately toward the father? Is there a debate about the latter question in the Mishna or do both tannaim agree? Two sources are brought to answer this question. The first source explains that Yosef ben Yoezer bypassed his son and a story is told about the aftermath. However, the story is inconclusive regarding this question as there are two different versions of the punchline of the story. A second source, a statement of Shmuel to Rav Yehuda, proves that there is a debate between the tannaim. Another story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who in turn returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct.