“It will cost you nothing to ‘bribe’ a Utilitarian” by Gabriel Alfour
Description
Audio note: this article contains 41 uses of latex notation, so the narration may be difficult to follow. There's a link to the original text in the episode description.
Abstract
We present a formal model demonstrating how utilitarian reasoning creates a structural vulnerability that allows AI corporations to acquire a public veneer of safety at arbitrary low cost.
Drawing from the work from Houy [2014], we prove that an organisation can acquire _k_ safety minded employees for a vanishingly small premium _epsilon_.
This results formalises a well known phenomenon in AI safety, wherein researchers concerned about existential risks from AI joins an accelerationist corporation under the rationale of "changing things from the inside", without ever producing measurable safety improvements.
We discuss implications for AI governance, organisational credibility, and the limitations of utilitarian decision-making in competitive labour markets.
1) Introduction
The title is a play on It will [...]
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Outline:
(00:22 ) Abstract
(01:13 ) 1) Introduction
(02:06 ) 2) Formal Framework
(04:42 ) 3) Implications
(06:22 ) 4) Future Work
(08:10 ) Conclusion
The original text contained 2 footnotes which were omitted from this narration.
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First published:
October 15th, 2025
Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/MFg7nvR2QGd6KkLJZ/it-will-cost-you-nothing-to-bribe-a-utilitarian
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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.
United States
