Last time we spoke about the drive to Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea and the mysterious battle of the Pips. The boys on Green Hell were having a hell of a time trying to capture Mount Tambu. The Japanese had made a pillbox nightmare around Mount Tambu and reclaimed Ambush Knoll. Ambush Knoll was once again taken by the allies, by Warfe’s commandos to be exact, but Mount Tambu was proving to be a much tougher nut to crack. Then in the frigid northern waters of the Aluetians, the allies had just successfully retaken Attu, but at a horrifying cost. The heavy cost convinced the allies, Kiska would be a similar bloody affair so they sought some Canadian help for its invasion. Yet before the invasion would occur one of the strangest battle of WW2 happened, the mysterious battle of the pips. The Americans found themselves firing at ghosts. But today we are venturing over to New Georgia.

This episode is the Fall of Munda

Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

The New Georgia campaign in many ways was akin to Guadalcanal. The Americans had suddenly invaded the island, landing numerous troops before the Japanese could coordinate a way to thwart them. Once the troops were landed, then the Japanese decided to react, and by react I mean tossing troops of their own on the island to dislodge the Americans. But just like with the Guadalcanal campaign, the war of transportation was not one the IJN could seemingly win against the Americans. By 2nd of July US forces led by the US 43rd Division, held an overwhelming advantage of 15,000 troops compared to 9,000 Japanese, who had landed at Zannana with a view to attacking westwards towards Munda Point. It was a battle that took far longer than the Allies had envisaged. Stubborn Japanese resistance and their ability to infiltrate US lines and cut supplies meant an advance at a snail’s pace, despite their control of the air and sea. Yet while the Americans were chipping away, bit by bit at the outskirts of New Georgia, the real defensive position was of course, Munda. Up until this point Major General Minoru Sasaki had done a great job of delaying the Americans while pulling his forces back to make a stand at Munda. Indeed the Americans had a terrible time fighting the Japanese and mother nature, as Sergeant Antony Coulis described one advance thus “We alternatively crawled up and down greasy ridges. We forded numerous jungle streams and swam three of them. The repeated torture of plunging into icy streams; the chopping away of endless underbrush and foliage; the continuous drizzle of rain; the days without hot food or drink; the mosquitoes tormenting us at night. It was sheer physical torture …”

Sasaki had constructed a barrage of defensive entrenchments around the airport around Munda to halt the US advance. As Admiral Halsey recalled “Rugged as jungle fighting is by now we should have been within reach of our objective, the airfield. Something was wrong.” The now deceased Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plan to turn the Solomons into a killing machine in order to force the United States to parley for a negotiated peace, seemed to be working. With the battle turning into a stalemate, on 15 July Halsey sent the famously tough Major-General Oscar Griswold, of the 14th Army Corps to New Georgia. Major-General John Hester, who had turned down help from the Marines, was relieved from command of the 43rd Division and replaced by Guadalcanal veteran Major-General John Hodge.

A Landing Craft Tank Captain named Jack Johnson  described the operation as a “screw-up. General Hester was army. I had him aboard one time. He was a little fart. He wore these high lace-up boots and carried a riding crop.” However, a lot of the blame would be placed on Rear-Admiral Turner, the commander of the amphibious forces who had insisted that Hester should retain divisional command as well as overall command of the landing operations.It also did not help that the 43rd “National Guard Division” were untested in battle. Griswold would find them in a state of near psychological collapse, prompting him to request reinforcements from the 37th division.

The 37th division was led by General Beightler who was manning Reincke Ridge while to the south near the beach were the 43rd division under General Hester's command until the 29th and the 25th division of General Lawton Collins. Additionally Marine tanks of the 10th defense battalion from Rendova were arriving to replace recent losses and they would be critically needed to face the nightmarish Japanese pillboxes the Americans would be facing.

In front of the Americans was a complex of camouflaged and mutually supporting pillboxes and fortifications amidst thick jungle. These defenses dominated several high features including Shimizu Hill, Horseshoe Hill, Kelley Hill and Reincke Ridge. They were made out of crushed coral and coconut logs dug several feet into the ground, with just a small portion poking out for their machine gunners and riflemen. It was these types of defenses that had plagued Hesters assaults. Across a frontage of around 3200 yards, Sasaki had established a series of these defenses along a northwestern axis going from the beach to Ilangana. Before the offensive could be kicked off, 161st regiment led by Colonel James Dalton discovered the Japanese held the Bartley ridge due east of Horseshoe hill. Their reconnaissance indicated double-logged pillboxes. Bartley ridge would be the most forward of the defensive positions and thus needed to be seized first. 

To meet the enemy Sasaki ordered Colonel Tomonari’s forces to launch a second counterattack against whatever allied forces showed up on the northern flank and he also requested the recently landed Yano battalion to reinforce the northern flank. However Tomonari’s men had suffered tremendous casualties and he was still trying to rally the scattered men along the rugged highlands. Meanwhile Colonel Yano was only able to send his 7th company to take up a position northwest of the 3rd battalion holding Sankaku hill, because his other men were needed to defend Vila. Because of this Sasaki ordered the depleted 1st battalion, 229th regiment to reinforce the Ilangana line. Colonel Hirata placed the 1st battalion along the line between Sato’s 2nd battalion and Kojima’s 3rd, which would turn out to be a key position.

The offensive kicked off at first light on July 25th. Commander Arleigh Burke took 7 destroyers through the Blanche Channel and bombarded the Lambete plantation for 43 minutes firing more than 4000 5 inch shells. Nearly at the same time, the new commander of AriSols, Brigadier General Than Twining sent 171 bombers and 100 fighters to hit Munda, the largest air strike thus far in the area. As Burke’s destroyers were firing 5 inch shells, B-24’s and B-17’s led the air attack, followed by B-25’s, Dauntless and Avengers. It was described by many eyewitnesses as “the greatest show on earth”. The Japanese were only able to toss back 57 Zeros at 9:40 am who were intercepted quickly by a Rendova patrol of 29 fighters who shot down 6 zeros and lost 4 of their own. But from 6:30-7am, the 254 aircraft managed to drop 500,800 lbs of fragmentation and high explosive bombs over the target area, a roughly 1500 by 250 yard strip. The result was enormous clouds of smoke hanging all over Munda, but Japanese casualties were considerably light.

As the bombardment was quieting down, Griswold unleashed the ground forces supported by the 43rd divisions artillery who were firing more than 2150 105mm howitzer shells and 1182 155mm howitzer shells. Colonel Brown's 103rd regiment advanced upon Ilangana point while the 172nd tried to envelop Shimizu Hill, supported by 5 tanks. The 172nd tossed their 2nd and 3rd battalions around the left and right of Shimizu hill, but by 10am, even with the 5 tanks the Japanese pillboxes had halted them in their tracks. 3 of the tanks were disabled because of vapor lock and a ton of time was wasted by infantry trying to extricate them. THe 3rd battalion on the lefthand side, tried to fight through machine gun and mortar fire, but found it impossible. The men tried to move around the pillboxes but found themselves fired upon by other machine gun positions. The 2nd battalion, 103rd regiment attacked in the center of the 43rd divisions zone and managed to progress 300 yards against lighter opposition. bY 10:40 am Company E managed to advance 500 yards and by noon reached a beach near Terere. As Company E tried hastily to create a defendable position, the Japanese moved behind them cutting their telephone lines back to the battalion HQ.

Seeing the opening, General Hester tossed in some of his reserves in the form of Ramsey’s 3rd battalion, 169th regiment. They were ordered to charge through the same gap made by 3 Company. But as they marched towards the gap they were met with enfilade fire from the southern part of Shimizu hill and from some pillboxes to the south. The 169th were unable to exploit the gap and now E company was forced to pull back lest they be encircled and annihilated. To the north, Beightler kept his 145th and 148th regiments in reserve until Bartley ridge was neutralized. Dalto