099 Nina Jankowicz and the political aspect of disinformation
Description
We sat down with Nina Jankowicz, an American researcher and writer, currently working as the Vice President at the UK-based Centre for Information Resilience, to talk about fight against disinformation and online harassment, the role of different actors in this area and the differences between EU and USA in this field.
Nina is the author of How to Lose the Information War, on Russian use of disinformation as geopolitical strategy, and How to Be a Woman Online, a handbook for fighting against online harassment of women.
She briefly served as executive director of the newly created United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s Disinformation Governance Board, resigning from the position amid the dissolution of the board by DHS in May 2022.
Transcript of the episode:
00:00:06 Domen Savič / Citizen D
OK, welcome everybody. It’s the 12th of April 2024, but you’re listening to this episode of Citizen D Podcast on the 15th of May 2024. With us today is Nina Jankowicz, an American researcher and writer currently working as the vice president at the UK Based Center for Information Resilience.
She’s the author of how to lose an information war on Russian use of this information as geopolitical strategy and how to be a woman online, a handbook for fighting against online harassment of women. She briefly served as an executive director for the newly created United States Department of Homeland Security disinformation Governance board resigning from the position amid the dissolution of the board in May 2020.
Welcome, Nina. First of all, thank you for joining us. It’s really a pleasure.
00:00:56 Nina Jankowicz
Thanks for having me on Citizen D, yeah, I’m excited to be here.
00:01:00 Domen Savič / Citizen D
Excellent. First let’s start at the beginning, right. This information government board, your brief tenure, the critique which you wrote for Foreign Policy where you highlighted the issue of political say squabbles that are limiting the fight against this information.
Uh, it seems that no matter where you go in the US, in the UK, it’s always the same, right? Every time somebody tries to do something in terms of regulating the disinformation, fake news, propaganda and other issues, the backlash, it’s always, you know, they’re going to take our freedoms, we have to defend democracy, free speech and everything else.
Would you say that this is something that just needs to be taken into the account or is there a correct approach to these types of regulatory bodies where people actually feel that the body will have an actual benefit on the entire of society, not just the political parties or sides or whatever.
00:02:08 Nina Jankowicz
Sure. So let me start with kind of a little description of what the board actually was and what people say it was. For the listeners that may not be familiar, so prior to joining DHS, I’ll say a little bit about myself too.
I had been an expert on disinformation and analyst, focusing particularly on Russia and Eastern Europe, but increasingly especially during the pandemic in the lead up to the January 6th insurrection, looking at some of the domestic disinformation that we had seen so that’s my background.
I had testified before Congress for both Republicans and Democrats. I had worked with members of Congress across the aisle as I was a fellow at the Wilson Center and I had done a lot of work kind of supporting policymakers all around the world and trying to put forward solutions to disinformation that upheld democracy right that made sure that our democratic freedoms were protected.
I came to the job optimistic because I didn’t really expect to get a political appointment from the Biden administration, and so when they came and said, you know, will you serve your country? I said, of course, this is in my area of expertise. It seems like there’s actually room to do something here, so let’s get something done. And I’m bringing with me everything I’ve learned in my research, including a lot of policy analysis of the things that had been tried in Central and Eastern Europe that that may or may not have worked right, which is what I write about in my first book.
The Disinformation Governance Board was meant to be an internal coordination body bringing together all of the different components as we call them of the Department of Homeland Security, which have very disparate missions. It’s a huge organization, and in some ways of Frankenstein, right?
It includes everything from our emergency and disaster management agency, FEMA, to our Customs and Border protection to TSA, the guys that make you take your shoes off at the airport to our cyber security and Infrastructure Security Agency, SISA, which actually dealt with election security and kind of beefing up local and state election partners ahead of elections and potential incursions by the Russians or the Chinese, so a lot of different missions and the idea was to bring everybody together, make sure that we had a shared definition of disinformation, make sure that in the work that each agency or component was doing, that it was upholding civil rights, civil liberties and the right to privacy which Americans of course hold dear.
That was the brief that I was given that I was going to bring these people together. I was going to assess what was going on in the agency and make recommendations for the board to adopt or not adopt. And we would go forward and make policy as a policy making body. How was to in the policy part of DHS, right, the policy shop, as we say.
When the board was announced, I had been working at DHS for about 8 weeks at that point, at the very beginning of my tenure, I said to my bosses, I think it’s important that we announced this and that we announced it transparently. There had been incidents for similar agents announced that they there were I wouldn’t even call it backlash, there were rumors there were lies about them.
I’m thinking in particular of the Czech Center against terrorism and hybrid threats when they were announced, there was a lot of excitement among disinformation researchers and, you know, people in the national security space. And then people on kind of who were skeptical of the government in in the Czech Republic really didn’t like the idea of this center against terrorism and hybrid threats, which in part was dealing with disinformation. And that was because they communicated poorly about it.
They weren’t going to be doing any fact checking, they were very narrowly focused on the mission of the Ministry of Interior and, you know, threats related to terrorism. But they didn’t communicate that very, very well and I write about that in my book. So I said to my bosses we need to make sure we communicate well, that did not happen.
You know, I wasn’t actually a very high-ranking person within DHS, I wasn’t confirmed by the Senate. There were, you know, a lot of people who outranked me there. And my job is to give them advice. And I gave lots of advice about different approaches to communication that I thought we should take. And they were all kind of rejected in favor of an approach that was announced to the board but didn’t give a lot of detail about it and the problem with that was that we left a vacuum for the adversaries, both political adversaries.
But I will also say Russia wrote about this to fill in the blank and what they filled in the blank with was wise. They said that this information governance Board was going to govern what was true and false on the Internet, which was not true. They said that I was going to have the power to send men with guns to the homes of Americans with whom I disagreed – also not true. I was not a law enforcement official. I had no budget. I had no operational authority.
That operational authority lied with all lay with all the components, but even they were not going to send men with guns to the homes of Americans with whom they disagree. That was just preposterous. And also, in that vacuum, because there was so little information about the board it was ironic, of course, having written about online abuse and studied online abuse that I would then be subjected to a very widespread hate and harassment campaign that looked it.
I mean, my family was doxxed, our personal information was released on the Internet at the time I was pregnant, people were saying horrible things about my reproductive status, my baby, my husband, whatever.
There other members of my family were targeted. There was wide skepticism about my personal life, I got death threats and all sorts of other nasty, unsavory, violent threats. And also, it’s not the same, like the violent stuff is worse, of course, but people just lied about me, they lied about all sorts things they said that the Hunter Biden laptop was a Russian disinformation operation.
I actually never said anything like that. I urged people to be skeptical about the laptop given when it was released and who was shopping it around. Rudy Giuliani. He does not exactly have a very good track record of telling the truth. Right. And I said, listen, we don’t know what this is. It can’t be independently veri