DiscoverGame Theory - Video13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions

13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions

Update: 2009-10-09
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We consider games in which players move sequentially rather than simultaneously, starting with a game involving a borrower and a lender. We analyze the game using "backward induction." The game features moral hazard: the borrower will not repay a large loan. We discuss possible remedies for this kind of problem. One remedy involves incentive design: writing contracts that give the borrower an incentive to repay. Another involves commitment strategies; in this case providing collateral. We consider other commitment strategies such as burning boats. But the key lesson of the day is the idea of backward induction.
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13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions

13 - Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions

Ben Polak