DiscoverGame Theory - Video17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining

17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining

Update: 2009-10-09
Share

Description

We develop a simple model of bargaining, starting from an ultimatum game (one person makes the other a take it or leave it offer), and building up to alternating offer bargaining (where players can make counter-offers). On the way, we introduce discounting: a dollar tomorrow is worth less than a dollar today. We learn that, if players are equally patient, if offers can be in rapid succession, and if each side knows how much the game is worth to the other side, then the first offer is for an equal split of the pie and this offer is accepted. But this result depends on those assumptions; for example, bargaining power may depend on wealth.
Comments 
In Channel
00:00
00:00
x

0.5x

0.8x

1.0x

1.25x

1.5x

2.0x

3.0x

Sleep Timer

Off

End of Episode

5 Minutes

10 Minutes

15 Minutes

30 Minutes

45 Minutes

60 Minutes

120 Minutes

17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining

17 - Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining

Ben Polak