Dr. Meryl Nass - A Historic Chance to Rein in Bioweapons
Description
In this episode of Science from the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with Dr. Meryl Nass—medical adviser to Robert F. Kennedy Jr., biological warfare expert, publisher of Meryl’s CHAOS letter, and founder of DoorToFreedom.org—about the urgent need to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
The conversation examines the escalating risks posed by bioweapons research, and why the current political moment—with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and President Trump openly calling for an end to bioweapons development—may offer the strongest opportunity in decades to close the gaps in the Biological Weapons Convention.
Dr. Nass recounts that President Nixon’s 1969–70 decision to renounce U.S. offensive bioweapons work led to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention—now joined by nearly 200 nations—but one deliberately drafted without verification, inspections, or penalties in order to secure rapid international agreement. She explains that in 2001 the Bush administration abruptly dismantled a nearly completed verification protocol, fracturing international trust and leaving the treaty effectively unenforceable.
Dr. Nass further notes that, since 2001, the surge in biodefense and “pandemic preparedness” funding has actively encouraged dangerous gain-of-function research—and that this research enterprise has itself become a significant source of global public-safety risk.
Still, she sees a historic opportunity to reduce this danger by finally fixing the BWC. President Trump’s May 2025 executive order restricting gain-of-function research, his September 23, 2025 UN speech urging all nations to end biological weapons development, and RFK Jr.’s continued focus on the issue at HHS together create an unprecedented chance to add the verification, inspection, and enforcement mechanisms the treaty has lacked for more than fifty years.
The episode offers a stark warning: today’s gravest biological threat is not nature but dangerous gain-of-function research. Dr. Nass argues that this moment must be seized—before the next accident or deliberate release makes COVID-19 look modest by comparison.
(Recorded November 24, 2025)
Timestamps
00:30 — Introduction of Dr. Meryl Nass02:37 — Discovering Pentagon-funded bioweapons work at UMass (1989)07:43 — Joining the Council for Responsible Genetics; early BWC history09:50 — Nixon’s renunciation and the intentional omission of verification11:49 — Failures of five-year review conferences; Bush’s 2001 sabotage14:10 — Context of the 2001 walkout: 9/11 and the anthrax attacks15:20 — Why the U.S. abruptly killed the verification protocol17:35 — Trump’s 2025 UN speech and executive order on GOF19:55 — The global boom in “pandemic preparedness” funding22:23 — USAID’s $44B budget and dangerous research abroad24:15 — Why narrow GOF definitions are misleading26:56 — The number of lab incidents that occur each year30:37 — Risks of basic research on natural Ebola-level pathogens31:24 — The 2018–19 Ebola vaccine rollout: unresolved issues35:06 — Rand Paul’s oversight bill vs. the broader Trump/RFK Jr. strategy36:03 — Financial incentives behind the global biodefense system40:45 — Rebuilding trust and addressing entrenched interests41:45 — The opportunity created by RFK Jr. at HHS46:22 — Concrete steps that signal real progress48:55 — AI, synthetic biology, and the future of bioweapons oversight52:33 — Why public understanding of biowarfare risks remains limited01:00:14 — Closing remarks
intro and outro by Tess Parks
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