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Is North Korea Really Ready for War?
Update: 2024-02-15
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In this episode, Dr. Victor Cha is joined by Dr. Sung-han Kim, Former ROK National Security Advisor and Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University, to discuss North Korea's current situation and recent developments as well as what to expect from North Korea in 2024.
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Transcript
00:00:00
(upbeat music)
00:00:02
North Korea is the impossible state.
00:00:09
It's a place that stumped leaders and policy makers for more than three decades.
00:00:13
(upbeat music)
00:00:16
It has a complex history and it has become the United States top national security priority.
00:00:28
(upbeat music)
00:00:30
Each week on this show, we'll talk with the people who know the most about North Korea.
00:00:37
(upbeat music)
00:00:40
(upbeat music)
00:00:43
- Welcome to another episode of the Impossible State podcast at CSIS.
00:01:04
This is Victor Cha, Senior Vice President for Asia, Korea Chair at CSIS and Professor at Georgetown University.
00:01:11
Today we'll be talking about what to expect from North Korea in 2024.
00:01:16
There's been a lot of speculation in the expert community and in the media about whether North Korea has made a strategic decision to go to war.
00:01:24
And we could not have a better person to discuss this with the Informer National Security Advisor, Dr.
00:01:30
Kim Sung-han.
00:01:31
Dr.
00:01:32
Kim Sung-han is currently Professor of Interact relations at the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University.
00:01:41
As everyone here in the DC community knows, Kim Sung-han was National Security Advisor to President Yun from 2022 to 2023.
00:01:52
And prior to that was Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2012 to 2013.
00:01:58
Many of the things that we are seeing in South Korea's foreign policy today, whether we're talking about Camp David, the Washington Declaration, the NCG, the Nuclear Consultative Group.
00:02:09
These are all things that Dr.
00:02:11
Kim Sung-han not only worked on, but was in many ways the architect of during his time in government.
00:02:17
I, in fact, actually remember one time when I was staying in a hotel and soul and there were a lot of very big men in black suits who were walking around and you were just doing,
00:02:31
this was when he was a candidate, you were just doing a day long briefing with him, President Yun, with experts that you were sort of running almost a class for President Yun.
00:02:43
Dr.
00:02:44
Kim Sung-han has served as Director of the Ilmin Institute for International Relations at Korea University.
00:02:53
He was dean of GSIS for four years from 2017 to 2021 and before that he was a professor for well over a decade at the foreign ministry of foreign affairs,
00:03:05
think tank the Institute for Foreign Affairs and national security, that was I think, that was when you and I first met when we were both young, when we were both young academics.
00:03:16
He's held numerous other positions that I can't go through.
00:03:19
He's president of CSCAP for Korea, vice president of the Korean Association of International Studies, a whole variety of things.
00:03:28
He is, he received his PhD in political science from the University of Texas Austin.
00:03:33
And you are writing a number of articles right now about deterrence and about North Korea, but it's a really a pleasure to have you with us,
00:03:44
my friend and to have you in the studio with us here in Washington, DC.
00:03:51
So welcome, welcome.
00:03:52
- Thank you, Dr..
00:03:53
So as I mentioned at the outset, there's a lot of speculation these days about whether North Korea has changed its position.
00:04:04
You know, they have stated that they are no longer seeking unification of the Korean Peninsula, that they have called South Korea an adversary or an enemy now.
00:04:15
Some experts have even said that they've made a strategic decision to go to war.
00:04:22
There is nobody I think in the community expert community today who has studied this topic more than you that has had policy experience at the very highest levels on this.
00:04:37
So I would like to get your expert opinion on how much you think has changed with regard to the situation with North Korea today.
00:04:45
- Thank you, Victor.
00:04:47
First of all, thank you for reminding me of our three decade old kind of a friendship.
00:04:55
It was a long time ago.
00:04:57
- That's right.
00:04:57
Now, first of all, whether North Korea is ready to go to war.
00:05:04
I don't think so.
00:05:06
Even though Kim Jong-un promised to make the year of 2023 to prepare a war and also expand its work capacity,
00:05:18
nevertheless, I think North Korea's strategic calculus is still the same,
00:05:29
remains unchanged.
00:05:31
If I elaborate North Korea's strategic calculus, that is as follows.
00:05:38
Most of all, North Korea needs to increase its nuclear arsenal as many as possible and also complete its ICBM capability as early as possible.
00:05:51
Then they believe the United States will come to the negotiating table where North Korea is going to transform it into kind of a nuclear arms control negotiation,
00:06:05
not de-nuclearization negotiation.
00:06:08
And then at the end of the day, North Korea will try to trade its own ICBM capability for North Korea,
00:06:19
US diplomatic normalization while keeping the minimum number of its own nuclear warheads for its own regime security.
00:06:32
This kind of strategic calculus is still the same, despite harsh and hawkish rhetoric of Kim Jong-un.
00:06:42
If Kim Jong-un wishes a war against the South, I think this kind of calculus is going to be disrupted because the United States will have to respond to the war in quite opposite ways against its own North Korea as a strategic calculus.
00:06:58
So that's why North Korea needs to threaten to go to war so that the South Korean people may suspect the US extended deterrence and United States may respect North Korea as a strategic calculus.
00:07:19
That is still North Korea's game plan, I believe.
00:07:23
So in the end, the goal is to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state.
00:07:31
Nuclear weapons state.
00:07:32
That is North Korean wish, but I still believe that that is not going to happen.
00:07:41
We need to distinguish nuclear arms the state from nuclear weapons state, which is recognized by NPT.
00:07:49
If it is recognized as a nuclear weapons state, we have to lift our sanctions against North Korea and we have to see US North Korea diplomat normalization,
00:08:03
which means North Korea will be acting like a normal entity of the international community, which is unacceptable to our okay, which is unacceptable to the US either.
00:08:15
So that's why I think we need to keep watching whether North Korea is a sticking to this kind of a game plan or not.
00:08:25
And in the meantime, they are continuing just to amass their capabilities, perfect their weapon systems, think things of that nature.
00:08:35
They believe if they are able to demonstrate their ICBN capability, like demonstrating a normal angle,
00:08:49
kind of a test launch of ICBN, and also nuclear warheads dropping to the service kind of as they are,
00:09:01
by enduring almost seven to 8,000 degrees of temperature while penetrating into the atmosphere and also maintaining the precessness of the trajectory.
00:09:17
This kind of a homework still remains.
00:09:23
If it is demonstrated to the US, North Korea believes United States will come to the negotiating table and then things will change it in favor of North Korea.
00:09:34
- So you think eventually they will test something on a flattened trajectory.
00:09:39
You think eventually they'll have to do that, not just on a lofted trajectory, but as a normal angle.
00:09:44
- A normal angle.
00:09:45
- You think they'll have a test launch.
00:09:47
They have to do that.
00:09:48
Otherwise, lofted angle, kind of a test launch is easier than normal angle, kind of a test launch.
00:09:56
- Nice, I see, quite, well that's quite worrying.
00:09:58
So I see what you're saying though.
00:10:03
They've not made a decision to go to war.
00:10:06
War would basically mean the end of the regime and that's certainly not what Kim Jong-un is looking for.
00:10:12
Having said that, could you love your thoughts on what you expect from North Korea this particular year?
00:10:20
I mean, we have elections in South Korea, we have elections in the United States, probably some sort of election in Japan, certainly in LDP, election in Japan before September.
00:10:29
What are you thinking about in terms of actions that North Korea might take particularly against South Korea?
00:10:36
I mean, they will launch missiles.
00:10:37
We expect that they will launch missiles.
00:10:40
Kim Jong-un even said he wants to launch at least two more military satellites.
00:10:44
So that means at least two long-range rocket launches.
00:10:49
But in terms of South Korea, what sort of things are you tracking or concerned about?
00:10:56
- Excuse me, when I was in the government, the YPO, the Yongsan Presidential Office together with the Minister of National Defense and Chief of Staff headquarters,
00:11:16
we made some bunch of scenarios of North Korean provocations.
00:11:21
I can say the number of scenarios, but a bunch of scenarios, including North Korean,
00:11:33
you know, sudden kind of absorption of one of five islands in the West Sea and the many kinds of test launches of missiles,
00:11:50
you know, the ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, etc, etc.
00:11:58
So that belong to kind of a local, not full-scale provocations, that belong to kind of a peacetime operation control,
00:12:11
which means only Korea will respond to them, that U.S.
00:12:17
That kind of a local provocations will be regarded as peacetime op-con in which Korea is holding the leadership role to respond.
00:12:29
So that kind of scenarios can be thought as future kind of a, you know,
00:12:40
the local provocation that can be conducted by North Korea this year.
00:12:47
In addition, I think North Korea is going to threaten the United States so that South Korean people may continue to suspect U.S.
00:13:08
provided nuclear umbrella.
00:13:11
And also, North Korea has its own preferred presidential candidate of the United States.
00:13:22
So in my personal view, North Korea is expected to show that Biden administration's North Korea policy has made a total failure and try to contribute something to make its preferred presidential candidate win the elections by doing some provocative actions.
00:13:50
That is, you know, threatening a war and U.S.
00:14:00
kind of a strategic patience has not been working.
00:14:06
So we need to think about kind of a new strategy in which North Korea's game plan may be treated as one of those options.
00:14:19
So that is, I think, North Korea is thinking at the moment and trying to make it more workable within D.C.,
00:14:33
particularly before U.S.
00:14:36
presidential elections.
00:14:36
Before November, before the elections in November.
00:14:39
So they have a preferred candidate that they would like to see win, I think is what you're saying.
00:14:44
On the first point, so just for our viewers, I know many of our viewers and listeners understand that, but on the first point about North Korean provocations against South Korea,
00:14:56
there is something called wartime operational command control and then there's peacetime operation control.
00:15:03
And your point is that in peacetime operational control, the South Korean military, South Korean general has autonomy is the right word,
00:15:14
but has more autonomy in terms of how to respond.
00:15:17
- And the command and the command has command.
00:15:22
So that, so most of the actions that North Korea might take in these scenarios would be limited.
00:15:30
So they would certainly not be all out war and therefore we would be under peacetime op-con.
00:15:35
That's one point.
00:15:37
The second question falling from that is for the UN government and when you were national, have the rules of engagement changed or have they stayed the same?
00:15:47
To the extent you can speak in the public domain, but there's how much have the rules of engagement for South Korea, change.
00:15:55
If North Korea sees as an island or fires artillery, I would expect that South Korea will respond almost certainly, but anything that you can say on from that.
00:16:07
- I think starting a UN government, we have been saying that the rules of engagement should be based on proportionality.
00:16:19
In other words, we need to take actions corresponding to North Korea's provocations.
00:16:26
As an example, in January 5th this year, North Korea fired more than 200 rounds of artillery to the buffer zone of the West Sea.
00:16:41
And in response, UN government fired 400 rounds of shares to the buffer zone.
00:16:50
So it's two times, right?
00:16:53
And at the cabinet meeting, President Nguyen pointed out we need to punish North Korea multiple times than North Korean provocations,
00:17:08
which means two times or three times.
00:17:11
And they don't have to, the local commander doesn't have to report to a YPO, they just to respond quickly to North Korean provocations.
00:17:25
So that is the rules of engagement, based on proportionality.
00:17:30
We are not backing off.
00:17:34
We need to deal with it immediately.
00:17:38
And that is the way of pre-burning them in the future.
00:17:43
- Okay.
00:17:45
Thank you, thank you for that clarification.
00:17:47
Let me, you mentioned one of the North Korea strategy is to try to rattle the credibility of extended deterrence.
00:17:57
You and your counterpart here in the US, Jake Sullivan or instrumental in creating the Washington Declaration,
00:18:07
the NCG, the nuclear consultative group.
00:18:10
Really, if you think about a historic documents, new documents in the US Korean alliance, I think when a student is learning about the US Korean alliance,
00:18:22
the first thing they will look at is at the mutual defense treaty of 1953, but then they will look at the Washington Declaration and the NCG as documents.
00:18:32
So I guess the question here is, do you think that the Washington Declaration, the NCG is doing enough at this point to assuage concerns about the credibility of extended deterrence,
00:18:50
whether it's from South Korean allies or whether it's vis-a-vis North Korean adversaries.
00:18:55
Do you feel like the NCG is fulfilling its role in terms of shoring up extended deterrence or is there more that should be done?
00:19:04
(silence)
00:19:06
- I, myself, had spent a lot of time talking to my counterpart, Jake Sullivan, about how to reduce subsequent people's concerns about the credibility of the US extended deterrence for our okay.
00:19:27
We considered several options, including the creation of NCG and some others,
00:19:37
like the redeployment of technical nuclear weapons back to our okay.
00:19:44
We reached the consensus that NCG is a lot more useful because this is the way of kind of eliminating kind of a long-time US legacy so-called nuclear mysticism.
00:20:04
In other words, the United States has been saying to its own allies that you guys just trust me, trust us,
00:20:14
and I will take care of you.
00:20:17
I will protect you in a crisis.
00:20:20
But don't try to know about our own kind of mechanisms, how to use nuclear weapons and how deterrence is working.
00:20:30
That is nuclear mysticism.
00:20:33
I believe that kind of a nuclear mysticism has contributed to the increase of skepticism on the part of the South Korean people.
00:20:43
So, NCG has been created to share the nuclear weapons operation mechanisms with our okay.
00:20:56
So, this is a big progress as compared with before.
00:21:03
So, we are consulting with each other on the standing basis.
00:21:12
That is one of the reasons why we reduce the level of chief to the assistant secretary level.
00:21:19
Ministers and vice-minister, they are excessively busy.
00:21:23
So, on a standing basis, we need to consult with each other and the United States need to teach how its deterrence mechanism is working at the assistant secretary level,
00:21:36
which is more realistic, I believe.
00:21:40
So, that is why Jake and I wish the consensus.
00:21:44
This is the proper level for future consultation.
00:21:49
And this is making a lot of progress like second session of NCG.
00:21:59
We agree to make some sort of guidelines for extended deterrence.
00:22:08
And we to implement it to the force coming, joint military exercises coming summer.
00:22:17
So, this kind of a guidelines could be upgraded like joint operational plans even though United States is not using that kind of a particular terminology.
00:22:32
I think if we work together on a standing basis and trust each other at a strategic level,
00:22:43
there is a likelihood that we can reach that level of joint kind of operational plan, how to deal with the nuclear attack from the North.
00:22:58
So, this kind of things are working at the moment.
00:23:03
I believe this is not quite sufficient to totally eliminate or reduce the South Korean people's worries or skepticism about US nuclear umbrella,
00:23:16
but I believe it will contribute on a gradual basis if we kind of can demonstrate our outcome of our joint consultations.
00:23:34
- Yeah, so when you say joint operational plans or joint operations, are you thinking more along the lines of, so South Korea has incredibly sophisticated precision strike,
00:23:47
conventional precision strike abilities.
00:23:50
That in combination with US nuclear assets is that sort of the direction in which you're talking about.
00:23:59
- And also, South Korea itself can join the decision making procedure about the usage of nuclear weapons.
00:24:12
Ultimately, it belongs to the US president, but what I'm saying is that at the working level, okay,
00:24:22
we need to help them to make a decision, right?
00:24:27
At the presidential level.
00:24:29
So, this kind of things need to be conducted at the joint ministry exercises coming summer.
00:24:36
- Yeah, yeah.
00:24:37
So what I hear you saying is that there is a lot of progress that has taken place.
00:24:42
In fact, the sea change in progress that has taken place at sort of the operational strategic level, but not things that are as readily invisible to the public because we're dealing with very classified,
00:24:57
very secret.
00:24:58
So we're talking about nuclear operations.
00:24:59
That's about as secret as they get.
00:25:02
At the same time on the public side, though, North Korea is firing all these missiles.
00:25:05
It's very obvious, it's very public.
00:25:08
And so there can sometimes be a perception gap between what the public understands versus the policymakers.
00:25:14
My sense from you is that the policymakers feel like quite a bit of progress has been made.
00:25:19
There's still more to do, but a lot of progress has been made.
00:25:24
And really, I mean, from the perspective of the outside, the changes that we've seen in this area really have been something that we haven't seen before.
00:25:35
And there's a natural resistance on the US side inside our bureaucracy.
00:25:40
There's a natural resistance to do things differently.
00:25:43
But the order clearly has come down from the top that they need to do things differently.
00:25:48
And I think we're seeing the results of that.
00:25:51
Do you, in terms of what else to expect from North Korea in 2024, there's been for a long time this speculation about the seventh nuclear test?
00:26:03
Do you think that we should expect to see a seventh nuclear test or maybe that's more than that?
00:26:11
Like what else does North Korea need to demonstrate with a nuclear test that they haven't done yet?
00:26:18
What is it that they need to test?
00:26:19
Is it miniaturization?
00:26:22
Is it tactical?
00:26:23
What are your thoughts on this whole question of a seventh nuclear test?
00:26:27
The technical speaking, they need to complete the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the lightning,
00:26:37
the weight of nuclear bombs.
00:26:40
You know, they are ready.
00:26:46
Already.
00:26:49
Since 2022, June 2022, I still remember that I decided not to accompany President Nune when he was visiting NATO Summit in June 2022.
00:27:11
In Madrid?
00:27:12
In Madrid, myself, I went to the Presidential Office and said, I will stay here because North Korea's seventh nuclear test is somewhat likely.
00:27:31
So that means, even at the time, North Korea was ready to conduct another nuclear test.
00:27:38
I don't know why they postponed or canceled that test.
00:27:42
But from the strategic point of view, North Korea has many reasons to conduct seven nuclear test symbolism.
00:27:57
Another nuclear test can demonstrate Biden's North Korea policy is a total failure.
00:28:09
Look, North Korea, nuclear arsenal is getting much more and their nuclear missile capability is getting a lot more advanced.
00:28:25
So, you know, our OK US extended deterrence could be seen less effective, even if there is no court relation between successful nuclear test and effective extended deterrence.
00:28:44
So this is related with kind of a symbolism at the strategic level.
00:28:53
And also, seven nuclear tests were provoked.
00:28:57
South Korea is kind of a nuclear armament voice and it will help make nuclear arm North Korea a kind of a feta complete.
00:29:10
So this kind of a strategic conservation could be considered in the process of, you know,
00:29:21
making, conducting another nuclear test.
00:29:26
OK, next question I want to ask you is about Russia and North Korea.
00:29:35
This is a new variable in the way we look at the North Korea situation.
00:29:41
As you know, well, historically North Korea was always the supplicant in the relationship, always asking for debt relief,
00:29:54
right?
00:29:54
And we're asking for nuclear umbrella from the Soviet Union asking for technology.
00:30:00
But now we're in this situation where Russia needs North Korea.
00:30:03
Russia actually is the one who needs North Korea.
00:30:08
And it's very likely now that Putin will make a summit visit to North Korea at some point, after Kim Jong-un's visit there.
00:30:17
Foreign Minister Chesson, he was in Moscow.
00:30:21
Met Sergei Lavrov and Foreign Minister Lavrov.
00:30:26
And clearly that was to set up a meeting.
00:30:30
Your thoughts on this, I mean, when you were in the seat, North Korea was supportive politically of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
00:30:42
But at least I don't think at that point they were providing munitions.
00:30:49
Putin didn't need them just yet.
00:30:51
But now we're in a situation where North Korea is providing millions of rounds.
00:30:55
I mean, as you prolonging the war in Ukraine, it's quite critical now at a time when US support for Ukraine looks like it's decreasing.
00:31:02
And if Trump were to win it, it would almost certainly disappear completely.
00:31:09
So how do you, as-- well, I guess if you are still in the government now, how would you be dealing with this issue right now?
00:31:17
I mean, it's a very difficult issue because we have very little control over what the two of them are doing.
00:31:25
So your thoughts on that?
00:31:28
I still remember that when I had a national security adviser's meeting in Honolulu in 2022 together with US and Japanese counterparts,
00:31:49
I myself emphasized, you know, Russian, North Korean, military cooperation could take place in the near future.
00:32:01
Oh, interesting.
00:32:03
And we were sharing the same concerns.
00:32:07
Now it is happening, due to many reasons.
00:32:12
But what I'm most concerned about is ballistic missile cooperation.
00:32:26
For example, Hwasong 18, which was test fired last July, is virtually the same as Russian ICBM,
00:32:41
which is called SS27.
00:32:44
That means Russian technology, technological assistance, was made to DPRK.
00:32:52
And also after a couple of times of failure, North Korea successfully launched its surveillance satellite last November.
00:33:06
I think Russian assistance was made for this part too.
00:33:14
Another thing North Korea is expecting out of Russia is a high resolution of the lens of the surveillance satellite,
00:33:25
because the resolution level is so low at the moment.
00:33:32
But North Korea is expecting high resolution lens out of Russia, because North Korea has no factories or facilities,
00:33:44
making those high resolution lens for surveillance satellites.
00:33:51
That's one area.
00:33:52
And the second one is nuclear power submarine.
00:34:00
Yeah.
00:34:02
Which requires a Russian technology.
00:34:05
So that North Korea may approach near to the west coast of the United States and launch nuclear missiles to the US.
00:34:18
So that is another strategic kind of threat to the US.
00:34:26
That is the area where DPRK is expecting out of Russia.
00:34:33
And also the reentry technology, as we all know, North Korea is still lacking in certain technology,
00:34:44
like the surface of nuclear warheads that can endure 7 to 8,000 degrees of heat when going through the atmosphere.
00:34:59
That is called carbon-carbon technology.
00:35:05
That is not easy technology.
00:35:08
So probably North Korea is expecting it out of Russia.
00:35:13
And also automated the precision controlling mechanism so that nuclear warhead maintains its trajectory and hit the target precisely.
00:35:27
So that is kind of a last hurdle.
00:35:30
North Korea wishes to overcome which requires, I guess, a Russian technology assistance.
00:35:39
So this is the area why I'm concerned about.
00:35:46
I believe already Washington is sending some warning signals or messages to Moscow so that Moscow may not cross the red line.
00:35:59
Otherwise, US homeland may be subjected to North Korea and ICBM directly.
00:36:08
And also Russia's point of view, if Russia crosses the red line and then complete all homework,
00:36:18
North Korea might be thinking of, then Russia has no card to play to the DPRK later on.
00:36:30
So and also Russia has to think of the scenario in which they can improve its relationship with the US.
00:36:43
At some point in the future.
00:36:44
So considering all of those factors, I believe Russia must be taking some cautious actions in terms of military cooperation with North Korea.
00:36:59
But who knows?
00:37:00
We have to keep watching how Russia will be behaving with respect to this issue.
00:37:07
On this first point about the Ha Sung 18, looking a lot like the SS27.
00:37:14
So I mean, in the past, North Korea, as you know, well has gotten this technology from third parties and then reverse engineered it and then added their own little thing to it.
00:37:26
And then they call it a North Korean engine or whatever.
00:37:29
But it looks just like a Soviet engine.
00:37:31
I mean, but the similarities between the HS18 and the SS27 are really amazing.
00:37:38
Striking, it's striking.
00:37:41
Do you think that's something that they reverse engineered or do you think that's something that Russians are providing?
00:37:46
Because I mean Putin's in for the fight of his life in Ukraine.
00:37:50
If he does not win that war, that's the end of him.
00:37:54
So in many ways, he's desperate.
00:37:56
So North Korea, as we both know, well, drive a hard bargain.
00:38:01
So I don't know.
00:38:03
I mean, what are your thoughts on whether Russia would cross that red line?
00:38:08
Or if they've crossed it already?
00:38:09
I don't know, but Russia has some reasons to help North Korea to the extent that Russia may not play into North Korea's game plan.
00:38:31
From that strategic point of view, the ICBM technology without reentry capability will be acceptable to Russia.
00:38:47
That is what Russia has thought about it.
00:38:52
So that is why these kind of worrisome things are taking place at the moment.
00:39:00
That's why I think Washington needs to keep sending warning signals to Russia.
00:39:07
And also some positive signals to Moscow, so that at some point in the future, US-Russian kind of a cooperation will be needed for US who is likely to be preoccupied with the strategic competition with PRC.
00:39:32
So from the strategic point of view, it is not such a wise policy for the US to deal with both PRC and Russia at the same time.
00:39:46
So we need to think about it from the prudent point of view.
00:39:51
Yeah, I want to ask you one other question based on your last answer.
00:39:59
I mean, there are a bunch of questions I want to ask, but for time purposes, just ask you one other question.
00:40:07
We had our conference that you participated on trilateralism we talked about, relations with Japan, where you, the young government, just made a major shift.
00:40:18
Historic shift, really, in policy towards Japan and towards trilateral relations culminating in the Camp David summit, not even culminating because that was sort of the centerpiece,
00:40:30
but there are so much that has happened after that.
00:40:32
Really historic changes in the alliance and in Korean foreign policy.
00:40:38
But what I wanted to ask you about was China.
00:40:41
Because there too, I think we've seen major changes, quiet, but major changes.
00:40:48
And of course, all of these things, all of these directions were mapped out in the transition period as you were sort of leading the strategic rethink GPS,
00:41:02
if you will, global pivotal state.
00:41:05
And then of course, in your role as national security advisor for the first year of the UN government, what all of this policy direction was set.
00:41:11
Can you just explain sort of what was your thinking on China and where that relationship is going?
00:41:19
Because it's very different now from what it was in the previous government.
00:41:23
And I mean, not just the previous, but historically, very different from what we've seen in the past.
00:41:31
Because President Neon himself, even during the transition, he had a strong conviction that our strategic axis,
00:41:44
the central axis of our strategy, is anchored upon our alliance relations with the US.
00:41:52
But that doesn't necessarily mean we are just watching a deteriorating relationship with China.
00:42:04
Because our OK China relationship is somewhat related to our economy.
00:42:14
And a livelihood of middle-class people of our OK.
00:42:22
So that should be considered in a serious way.
00:42:27
So we are trying to come up with kind of a co-existence of these two sets of bilateral relationships.
00:42:37
But I re-emphasize that the central axis of our strategy is our OK US alliance.
00:42:47
In addition, in previous years, our OK as well as PRC were highly tempted to drive a wedge between our OK and the United States and our OK and Japan.
00:43:06
So even though we used to say a trilateral security cooperation to deal with the North Korean Shreds, but there was a missing link between Tokyo and Seoul.
00:43:19
We all knew that.
00:43:20
So President Neon took note of that kind of a strategic missing link that needs to be amended as soon as possible.
00:43:33
So that's why he made a very bold decision to amend the fence as soon as possible to come up with a trilateral security cooperation.
00:43:45
Should improvement of Seoul Tokyo relationship.
00:43:52
That is how Camp David Summit took place.
00:43:55
And we included many visions and policy directions, not just on North Korea,
00:44:06
but also China.
00:44:08
In terms of a free and open in the Pacific, we mentioned the peaceful, post-rate relationship and also freedom of navigation in the South China Sea area as well as others.
00:44:26
So to make it short, China is not an enemy of our OK.
00:44:35
China is not an enemy for our OK.
00:44:39
US alliance.
00:44:39
But China is posing a lot of challenges.
00:44:43
Our OK United States and Japan are ready to deal with them in constructive ways.
00:44:51
And on bilateral terms, our OK is well-poised to cultivate more constructive relationship with China on the basis of mutual trust.
00:45:05
Otherwise, we are also ready to correct them on the basis of mutual consultations.
00:45:15
So that is about our China policy.
00:45:21
And in that sense, I think we are making progress.
00:45:24
And also another strategic thing President Neon has in mind is that CZK Summit.
00:45:35
So we already had the AJK Summit, America, Japan, Korea Summit at Camp David.
00:45:41
And CZK, China, Japan, Korea Summit is expected to take place at some point this year.
00:45:51
So we have two triangles, OK, AJK and CZK.
00:45:57
These two triangles are not supposed to work against each other.
00:46:05
They can produce some sort of synergistic effect in a way of contributing to peace and prosperity.
00:46:17
Not just in Northeastern Asia, but also in the Pacific region.
00:46:21
That is our vision too.
00:46:23
I want to emphasize.
00:46:24
Yeah, no, very, very, very good.
00:46:26
Thank you.
00:46:26
Thank you for doing that.
00:46:28
Let me just ask you in closing that you know, in Korea, the system is somewhat similar to the United States in the sense that you have academic scholars who move in and out of government.
00:46:49
You know, for many years it was very unique, American thing, but we see this more and more in South Korea and you're sort of the quintessential example of that, right?
00:46:59
A scholar for a scholar practitioner, very folk, very much in the academic realm, but also very focused on policy.
00:47:07
And then you had these two stints in government at very high levels as vice foreign minister and then of course as national security advisor.
00:47:14
So I guess now that you're out, it's been about a year or so since you've been out.
00:47:20
This is your first trip to DC in your in your unofficial capacity since stepping away as as a national security advisor.
00:47:29
So what are your reflections sort of on moving from the ivory tower into policymaking and then back onto the campus?
00:47:41
Like what is your overall reflection of the two different lives and how they intersect, personal reflection.
00:47:51
Anyway, it was my privilege and great opportunity to work at the government in actually two two administrations,
00:48:02
Emyeong-Bug and Eun-sung-Yer governments.
00:48:06
One advantage academics have is to think out of the box as compared with the typical bureaucrats.
00:48:22
So that's why many presidential candidates want to listen to academics rather than bureaucrats because first of all they need to differentiate themselves from the previous government.
00:48:37
They need to differentiate themselves from rival candidates.
00:48:42
So they need ideas.
00:48:44
So that's why they need to rely on highly tempted to rely on academics rather than retired bureaucrats.
00:48:53
That is why President Yoon was not an exception.
00:49:01
By the way, the bureaucrats are really good at managing things, particularly managing crisis, you know,
00:49:11
due to their long time experience.
00:49:15
So in actuality, they have to work together in the government.
00:49:25
In managing crisis, you need to listen to bureaucrats.
00:49:33
When you think of some creative and visionary kind of policy directions, you need to listen to academic turned policy makers for the sake of creating some synergy effect.
00:49:50
So in that sense, I think Korean tradition, even though we have benchmarked the US tradition, has been creating a lot of positive outcomes rather than negative ones.
00:50:06
So I think this kind of tradition, I believe, will have to continue, will continue in the future.
00:50:13
Well, very good.
00:50:14
I mean, I think for the sake of the alliance, US career alliance, and for Korea sake, I agree with you.
00:50:20
I think it's important to have those fresh new ideas that come in with each administration.
00:50:26
Anyway, thank you so much for joining us on the impossible state.
00:50:31
Again, your first trip appearance in Washington DC since your time as national security advisor.
00:50:37
Hopefully, it won't be your last visit to CSI.
00:50:39
As I expect, we'll try to see you here as often as we can.
00:50:43
It's really a pleasure.
00:50:46
Thank you so much.
00:50:47
You're invitation just because of you.
00:50:48
Well, thank you for inviting me.
00:50:51
Of course, it's always our pleasure.
00:50:53
And thank you again to all of our listeners and viewers, another episode of the Impossible State.
00:50:59
We look forward to seeing you on the next episode until then be safe and be well.
00:51:04
If you have a question for one of our experts about the impossible state,
00:51:15
email us at impossiblestate@csis.org.
00:51:18
If you want to dive deeper into the issues surrounding North Korea, check out Beyond Parallel.
00:51:24
That's our micro website that's dedicated to bringing a better understanding of the Korean peninsula.
00:51:29
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00:51:34
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00:51:53
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