Welcome to Ideas Untrapped podcast. In this episode, I speak with economist Sugandha Srivastav about the hidden political economy of electricity in developing countries. Using examples from her study of Pakistan's electricity market, we explored how opaque power purchase agreements, regulatory capture, and poor procurement practices drive high costs and unreliable supply in many developing countries that are in desperate need of energy. Sugandha also shares bold insights on how competitive markets and renewable energy, especially solar, can transform the power sector and deliver affordable electricity for all. Dr Sugandha Srivastav is a Lecturer in Environmental Economics and a Senior Research Associate at the University of Oxford - and a Fellow at Energy for Growth Hub.

Transcript

Tobi: Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. It's nice to have you on the show. I've been looking forward to this, so thank you so much for doing this with me.

Sugandha: Yeah, thanks for having me, Tobi.

Tobi: Yeah. So, why I wanted us to have this conversation was I read your paper on power. By power, I mean electricity, and the corruption, and basically surrounding power purchasing agreements in Pakistan last year. So briefly, can you just summarise what that paper was about, what you found, and what were the general lessons that we can draw from that?

Sugandha: Yeah, sure, so basically about two years ago, we started looking into contracts in the power sector. And as all of your listeners know, electricity is so important to all of our lives. It's very important for businesses. It is hard to overstate how critical electricity is to our lives, so we were just really curious about how is electricity being procured by the government? What are the contracts that underpin this electricity? And, um, can we learn something about how much we are paying for electricity? So we wanted to dig into these power purchase agreements, which is what the contracts are called, but we very quickly realised that they're not disclosed most of the time. So even though this is government money, which is going towards paying for something as basic as electricity. The public has very, very little information on what these contracts are and one of the few places in the world where we could find information about power purchase agreements was Pakistan because they actually released a law which said that tariff agreements have to be disclosed. So what we then did was we spent, many, many months actually downloading all of these agreements and contracts and, in the end, I think it was over 6000 PDFs with very detailed contract information and we put together a database. And that's when we started discovering a lot of very interesting things. It became very obvious to us that some of these contracts seemed extremely generous and that raised some questions on why electricity is being procured with these particularly generous terms and conditions. And whether that means that the electricity sector is enabling transfers from the public to a certain groups of vested interests. So the long and short of it is that we think that these contracts are really important to study, and what we found from our investigative work is that a lot of these contracts are extremely lopsided and, you know, there isn't any competitive procurement, and we know when there isn't competitive procurement, you have no idea whether you're getting value for money, whether you're getting the best product. They're just being solicited bilaterally through these very, very opaque contracts.

Tobi: So, I mean, in that situation, and reading through your paper. After going through all the details and all, did you find out whether that was specific to Pakistan or is there a pattern across poor countries who have no power generally.

Sugandha: It's definitely a pattern. So one of the striking things is that across so many parts of the world electricity is not procured competitively and by competitively I just mean the normal process of firms submitting bids and choosing the least cost bid.

You know, that seems like an obvious way to do this, but that isn't what's happening. To give examples of countries where there are these very opaque power purchase agreements, um, Indonesia has them. Ghana has them. I think Nigeria, by the way, also has them. Mozambique has had them. And till date, we have just had very limited evidence. So what typically happens is that some journalist goes out there and finds a very specific scandal related to this power purchase agreement. And they report that.

So, for example, in Pakistan, journalists have said that the cost of coal being used by these power plants is much more than the market rate. Sometimes it's 50% higher than the market rate. And that's a very strange thing to observe. You know, why aren't power plants using cheaper coal? It turns out that power plants get reimbursed for the cost of coal. So if they say it's more expensive, they get a bigger reimbursement and that is the incentive behind lying. We've also seen that happen in India. So, to answer your question, this type of rent-seeking behaviour in the power sector is not unique to one country. We have seen it across the developing world. And one of the reasons it's there is that there isn't competitive procurement and a symptom is that the price of electricity becomes higher. And it also becomes more unreliable. And in general, you have this situation where public money is not being used efficiently. Unfortunately, yeah, it is a common story.

Tobi: Yeah. to use Nigeria example, not that I want you to respond to that specifically. Um, so in Nigeria, all sides of the bargain in the electricity market is complaining. Uh, the government complained about the fiscal burden of the subsidies. Consumers, citizens complaining because the electricity supply is not stable and the power companies do complain that they are not charging market rates, they are not making money, they are heavily indebted. What is it about the structure of the electricity market that creates this kind of dysfunction?

So, for example, some will argue that power purchase agreements are so structured because electricity is capital incentive and hence you need these lopsided contracts as an incentive for people who are willing to invest that kind of money. So what is it about the structure of that market broadly?

Sugandha: Yeah, so you do need risk reduction to incentivise entry in developing countries. I mean, that is a feature of developing countries. The question is how much risk reduction do you need? So you want enough so that people invest in your electricity sector, but if you give too much, then you'll create a debt crisis. And so there's a sweet spot in the middle where you allow entry into your electricity sector, but you're not going to create a debt crisis which creates havoc for your government.

This is where we think that some of these power contracts have gone too far on the other side. They're creating way too much burden on the government, and to put some numbers here, you know, often like the return on equity that is offered in these contracts, at least in Pakistan, we've seen can be up to 30%. But when you account for the corruption and cheating, so for example, as I mentioned before, power producers can get reimbursed for input costs. So sometimes they lie about their input costs and say that they're higher than in reality because they get reimbursed. So once you factor that in, we've seen some power plants making a return on equity of 83%. Which is much, much higher than the contracted value of 30%. So in that case, what we're documenting is actually explicit cheating.

Now to go back to your question of why this causes dysfunction in the entire power sector? If you think about it, essentially each step of the system is breaking and you know, so the power producers are making super normal profits in some cases. Then the utility, which is in between the power producer and the customers, they often can't charge higher tariffs because they're politically constrained. So they are buying this expensive electricity, but at the same time they can't pass on the higher cost. So they're making a loss. Then because they're making a loss, what they do is that they cut off power. So, because they make a loss per unit, they don't want their total losses to go above a certain threshold. So then their option is to simply switch off the power. That's something called economic load shedding.

So to your listeners, you can have load shedding for many reasons. Sometimes it's because of technical losses. Sometimes it's because you don't have electricity supply. But other times it can be just because your utility turns it off. Because they're not making a profit or in fact they're probably making a loss per unit of power, so they just turn it off. And that's a very under-appreciated reason why electricity is unreliable because it has nothing to do with supply. It has to do with the economics of it. And then you go to the government side because now that the utility is making a loss, eventually this utility has to be bailed out and the government does the bailing out. So then the government fiscally is in a bad position. This is how the entire system starts basically breaking down and the solution is simple. I mean, we need to have a meritocratic electricity system. So if an electricity generator can provide good quality, low cost electricity, they should be able to enter the market, sell and outcompete the old generation. It's as simple as that. And if that's risky, then you can provide risk hedging mechanisms that don't fundamentally distort the market the way they are doing now. Because right now