The Eastern Front Week by Week

Last time we spoke about the accumulation of mud and continued sieges on the eastern front. In the autumn of 1941, a winter-thin road stretched from Leningrad to Moscow, watched over by two immense armies. On one side, the Germans, Panzer power blazing, hunger for a swift victory, pushed from Ukrainian plains toward a hoped-for triumph. On the other, the Soviets, led by Zhukov, then hastily recalled to defend the capital, laid brick by brick a stubborn defense, rebuilding lines and bracing for the storm. The Rasputitsa arrived like a living obstacle. Mud swallowed wheels, bridges sighed under strain, and supply lines twisted into knots. Yet the air carried more than fuel and fear; it carried a stubborn resolve. Across the front, pockets formed and dissolved in a dance of encirclement. Bryansk and Vyazma blazed with brutal fights; attempts to seal the gaps faltered as weather, logistics, and tenacious Soviet resistance frustrated even the boldest panzers. By October’s end, the battlefield wore a quiet, haunted truth: endurance, unity, and a city’s stubborn heartbeat could hold against a siege. The roads remained muddy, but hope steeled the spine of a defense that would echo through the winter to come. This episode is Mud and Blood Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    City after city falls on the road to Moscow. Zhukov’s new defensive line has already been breached through by the panzers. From the map tables of the Wolf’s Lair, it is clear that Hitler’s army is only days from capturing the Soviet capital. Yet what the map tables cannot show is the mud. It drags men, machines, and beasts into a sucking morass that cannot be bypassed. The Red Army has endured the worst streak of defeats in military history, but they are far from defeated. Soviet soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder with Soviet civilians, willing to defend their capital with their lives. As the second week of October ended, Operation Typhoon could still be considered a success. Yet it was clear that the Red Army would not yield. Next, we approach the third week. Zhukov and Bock will again face off as time runs out on the German offensive.    First I want to talk about how the Soviet Union managed to rebuild its field forces in the face of devastating losses during the early months of the campaign. On June 22, the Red Army had 303 divisions on its rolls, of which 81 were cadre formations still in the process of organization. As discussed in previous podcasts, during the early stages of Operation Barbarossa most, if not all, Red Army divisions were under strength. This weakness stemmed largely from a peace-time organizational framework, in which units were kept weaker to conserve manpower and resources. After the invasion began, Stalin mobilized the classes of 1905–1918, producing five million three hundred thousand men by July 1. By the end of the year, 3,544,000 were brought into the active army, forming 291 new divisions. These numbers dwarfed the German high command’s pre-invasion understanding of Soviet manpower capabilities. In Halder’s diary, he estimated roughly 200 divisions in the Red Army, and believed that once these were gone, there would be little left worth fighting. The falsity of this perception was evident to Halder even before August ended. By mid-October, there seemed to be no end in sight for the Wehrmacht. The reality of the Red Army’s manpower in 1941 was not captured by the Wehrmacht’s shifting opinions. They had begun the war underestimating Soviet potential, and by October this had evolved into fantastical notions of endless Red Army hordes. In truth, the Red Army was developing an effective replacement system based on creating new units from veterans and new recruits. This system had both positives and negatives. On the positive side, it allowed rest and refit for veterans and enabled them to pass on knowledge to newcomers. On the negative side, many half-formed units were rushed into battle to meet emergencies requiring immediate action. These cadre forces would be built up in the field, if they survived long enough; often they did not.   The Stavka had planned a large offensive from both sides of the Shisselburg Corridor to begin on October 20. The Germans had also been planning a renewed attack under Hitler’s direction to seize Tikhvin. The city was an important rail junction with significant mineral resources. There were reasonably productive bauxite mines in the area. Sources are unclear whether they were still producing as the Germans approached. The aluminum plants had been relocated earlier in the year as part of the mass industrial migration. The mining equipment had been evacuated at some point, though the timing remains uncertain. The rail head offered a convenient base for the Stavka to build up supplies and units on the exposed flanks of Army Groups North and Center. Army Group North struck first on October 16. Though under-resourced and little more than a diversion from the campaign’s main effort, the direction of this attack drew Hitler’s attention. The impact of Nazi ideology is neatly reflected in this attack. To the regime, any objective could be achieved with enough willpower. The dictator’s personal involvement was meant as both a blessing and a reminder that he embodied the ultimate expression of the Nazi will. He sought to direct the counter-offensive with limited resources, even in the face of his generals’ objections, as a demonstration of that will. The assault was supervised by him directly, though the chain of command remained nominally in place.   Infantrymen from the 21st and 126th Infantry Divisions crossed the Volhkov River early on the morning of the sixteenth. They trudged through several centimeters of snow, but they managed to breach the defending 4th Army in several sectors. However, two of the three divisions involved were able to pull back in good order. The withdrawal opened a substantial gap between the 52nd and 4th Armies. The Germans were prepared to exploit this, and the Red Army did not have the resources to close the gap before the 20th Motorized Infantry and 12th Panzer Divisions pushed through. They were followed by the 21st and 126th Infantry. They struggled through minefields and encountered deserters. Some of these deserters claimed to be Ukrainian. This is notable because it highlights how the Ukrainian people still held hopes of independence from the Soviet Union. Many greeted the Wehrmacht as liberators, but as time would prove, this was a mistake. The Nazi war machine regarded nothing but extermination and deportation for the Ukrainian people.   On the 20th, late in the evening, the 52nd Army attempted a counter-attack. Broadly speaking, this failed to accomplish much, but the next day was still miserable for the advancing Germans. They managed to push through the gap and fan out, creating a large bulge before the end of the day on the twenty-first, but it was clear that there would be no rapid exploitation. They were blocked everywhere by obstinate Red Army infantry units. The fighting for the city of Tikhvin was not easy as the weather continued to alternate between drenching rains, freezing mud, and light snow. The few tanks the Germans possessed were forced to run continuously through the night, or they would freeze up and become hard or impossible to start in the mornings. This aggravated the already short fuel situation even more. The attack began to falter, but Army Group North was not ready to call it off. They would fight well into November attempting to take Tikhvin. Operation Typhoon continued to expand in a mimic of the reverse funnel the entire campaign was undergoing. During the morning of the 14th, the 1st Panzer Division started probing the suburbs of Kalinin. Helmut Pabst, who took part in the advance to Kalinin, wrote home in a letter: “The going’s good on the frozen roads of this country of hills crowed with villages. But fifty-five kilometres is a lot. It took us from eight in the morning till 2:00 the next day. And then we didn’t find billets. The few houses in our rest area had been allocated long before. But the boys wormed themselves into the overcrowded rooms, determined to get warm even if it meant standing.” The Northwestern Front was responsible for the city’s defense, but there was not much in place when the panzers arrived. Vatutin was still serving as the chief of staff for the Front and promptly organized a force to counterattack. Two rifle and two cavalry divisions were put together in an operational group and marched out. They were spearheaded by the 8th Tank Brigade. Before the end of the day, they had marched over two hundred and fifty kilometers to reach the city. They were too late.    Early on 13 October, Krüger’s 1st Panzer Division rolled into Kalinin, having carved more than 70 kilometres from Staritsa and about 150 from Sychevka. Like Orel ten days earlier, streetcars clattered on, and the stunned inhabitants watched as German tanks threaded through their streets. The moment of surreal spectacle did not endure; soon brutal street fighting erupted, with civilians joining in. As in Mogilev, Dnepropetrovsk, and Leningrad , reaching the city was only the prelude to capture, not the

Last time we spoke about the beginning of winter. In October 1941, two vast armies stood toe-to-toe on a winter-thin road toward Moscow. On one side, the Wehrmacht, hungry for a swift triumph, reshaped its backbone: Panzer Groups now Panzer Armies, roaring across Ukrainian and Russian plains with tanks as headlines. On the other, the Red army, led by Zhukov who refused to yield, braided defense lines from Leningrad to Moscow and rebuilt the Mozhaisk line with stubborn grit. The air smelled of fuel and fear as Operation Typhoon began. The Germans punched across the Desna and Dnieper, their armor moving like clockwork, yet every bridge they crossed whispered a new limit, fuel shortages, stretched supply lines, and stubborn Soviet countermeasures. In the north, Hitler’s orders clashed with battlefield reality; in the south, stalwart cities like Orel and Vyazma flickered with hard-fought breakthroughs and costly retreats. As October wore on, the myth of easy victory dissolved. Hitler boasted that the end was near, while soldiers on both sides kept their heads above the smoke, counting casualties and praying for more favorable weather. The siege of Moscow loomed, a hinge that could tilt the war’s fate. This episode is Mud and Sieges Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Rain begins to fall across the Eastern Front as the dreaded Rasputitsa settles in. Autumn arrives just as Operation Typhoon climbs to its zenith. German generals speak of an inexorable victory, their voices carrying over mud-slicked roads and rain-soaked fields. Supply columns bog down in the quagmires, while infantry fight with dwindling ammunition, threadbare equipment, and the iron will to grind the enemy into submission. In Moscow, Stalin, unsettled and wary, recalls Zhukov to the capital to organize the defense as one fortress after another buckles under the German onslaught.   So what do I mean when I say “Rasputitsa”. It  is a term used to describe the annual mud season in parts of Eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Ukraine, when unpaved roads and the countryside become nearly impassable due to heavy rains in spring or the thaw of frozen ground in autumn. The word itself comes from Russian roots meaning “to trample” or “the laying waste,” but in practice it captures the practical impossibility of moving troops, vehicles, and supplies through the soft, waterlogged terrain. In spring, frost rules the ground: the soil switches from solid to glue-like as the thaw sets in, drainage is overwhelmed, and mud swallows wheels and tracks. In autumn, rains saturate the already soft earth after harvest, turning fields and ridges into a churned, sticky mire. Rasputitsa has had significant strategic implications in warfare by delaying or diverting movements, stranding logistics, and forcing commanders to rely on alternative routes, slower tempos, or temporary retreats. Its impact is not only military; it disrupts transportation, agriculture, and daily life, complicating aid delivery and civilian movement for extended periods. Rasputitsa repeatedly hinders warfare by turning military vehicles and artillery into mud-bound impediments. Coupled with winter conditions, this phenomenon is credited with slowing the campaigns of Napoleonic France in 1812, our story of Nazi Germany during Operation Barbarossa, and all belligerents in the recent 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.   Now last week, Army Group Center advanced rapidly into the Soviet defenses surrounding Moscow, with the Panzers achieving progress reminiscent of the war’s early days. The Red Army did not fare well during the first week of October 1941. We are now entering the second week as Zhukov assumes command of the defense of the Soviet capital. From October 8 to 14, the Soviet Union will strive to hold back the invaders as the situation continues to deteriorate. Operations in the farthest reaches of the Arctic Soviet Union had bogged down by mid-October. Operation Silver Fox aimed to seize Murmansk and its port facilities, placing them out of Communist hands.    Operation Silver Fox was planned as a two-stage pincer maneuver, executed in three operations. Phase one, Operation Reindeer or “Unternehmen Rentier”, involved the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions of Mountain Corps Norway under Eduard Dietl. They were to advance east from Kirkenes into the Finnish-held Petsamo area to secure the nickel mines. Phase two envisaged a pincer against the Soviet port of Murmansk, which remained ice-free in winter and, with Arkhangelsk, likely served as a route for Western Allied supplies to the Soviet Union. The first prong, Operation Platinum Fox (Unternehmen Platinfuchs), was a frontal assault from Petsamo toward Murmansk, with the aim of securing the Rybachy Peninsula with Finnish border support. The second prong, Operation Arctic Fox or “Unternehmen Polarfuchs”, would strike farther south to seize Salla, ceded to the Soviet Union after the Winter War and then push east along the railway to capture Kandalaksha, thereby severing the Murmansk Railway linking Murmansk with Central Russia. This operation involved the German 36th Corps under Hans Feige and the Finnish 3rdCorps led by Hjalmar Siilasvuo.   Aerial support for the offensive was to come from Luftflotte 5, based in Norway and the Finnish Air Force. For Silver Fox, Luftwaffe established a new headquarters in Finland. At the outset of hostilities, the Finnish air force fielded about 230 aircraft; Luftflotte 5 assigned 60 aircraft to Silver Fox in Finland, employing the Junkers Ju 87, Ju 88, and Heinkel He 111 for close air support. By late February 1941, German units had moved into Finland, and transit rights through neutral Sweden enabled the movement of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions into Kirkenes for Operation Reindeer. For 36th Corps, two sea-transport operations, Blue Fox 1 and Blue Fox 2 or “Blaufuchs I and II”, were arranged. Units embarked at Stettin and Oslo for Oulu, then traveled by train to Rovaniemi, where they linked with Finnish forces for the offensive under border-defense pretenses.   Soviet preparations were tentative; Stalin did not expect a German invasion along the entire border so soon. The primary Soviet opponent was the Northern Front, comprising the 7th and 14th Armies in the Arctic, commanded by Lieutenant-General Markian Popov. On 23 August 1941, the Northern Front was split into the Karelian Front (Valerian Frolov) and the Leningrad Front. Frolov, who had commanded the 14th Army, was succeeded by Roman Panin when he assumed command of the Karelian Front on 1 September. In the early weeks, Axis forces held numerical superiority, the Soviets having roughly 150,000 troops north of Lake Ladoga. Axis air superiority followed, as Soviet Karelia was defended only by the 1st and 55th Mixed Air Divisions, totaling about 273 serviceable aircraft of obsolescent types.   Operation Silver Fox began on 22 June 1941 to coincide with Operation Barbarossa. Mountain Corps Norway, comprised of the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions under Eduard Dietl, moved east from Kirkenes into the Finnish-held Petsamo area to secure the nickel mines. The appearance of a German corps on the Soviet border surprised the Russians, and the operation succeeded in establishing a foothold around Petsamo as Dietl began reorganizing for Platinum Fox. Farther south, Feige’s 36th Corps prepared its attack at Salla. On 29 June, Dietl launched an eastward assault with Finnish border units against two Soviet divisions of the 14th Army, the 14th and 52nd Rifle Divisions. The opening day saw the 2nd Mountain Division secure the neck of the Rybachy Peninsula while the 3rd Mountain Division breached Soviet lines at the Titovka Valley, capturing a bridge over the river. As the element of surprise faded, German momentum slowed under growing Soviet resistance and the harsh Arctic conditions. The rough terrain, lack of detailed maps, and freezing weather impeded progress, and by July the 2nd Mountain Division had halted at the Rybachy peninsula, taking defensive positions at its neck, with several units diverted south to aid the 3rd Mountain Division. With reinforcements scarce, the Germans advanced east to establish a bridgehead over the Litsa River, but a Soviet flanking landing threatened these positions. Dietl pressed for reinforcements, yet the German High Command limited relief, providing only marginal aid from Norway. Supply problems compounded the stalemate as Soviet and British naval activity along the Norwegian coast disrupted German shipments, weakening Mountain Corps Norway further. Renewed offensives failed, the Soviets closed the Litsa bridgehead, and on 21 September the operation halted. Mountain Corps Norway was ordered to defend the front and secure the Petsamo area and its nickel mines, ruling out a renewed offensive; the northern front then remained relatively stable for the remainder of the war, aside from small-scale ski patrol skirmishes. Parallel to Platinum Fox, Arctic Fox began on 1 July. The German main force at Salla consisted of the 169th Division, the SS-Infantry Kampfgruppe Nord, and the Finnish 6th Division, facing three Soviet divisions from the 14th Army, the 122nd Rifle Division, the 104th Rifle D

Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Typhoon. In September 1941, Leningrad faced a brutal siege. Amidst this chaos, General Zhukov rallied his troops with the grim order, “Not a step back!” While the Axis celebrated victories, soldiers at the front grew skeptical of the Nazi propaganda that inflated confidence. As the Germans prepared for Operation Typhoon, a decisive offensive aimed at seizing Moscow, logistical strains became apparent. The advance stalled, and any hope for quick victory faded. However, both sides braced for a monumental clash. Stalin and Zhukov vowed to defend the capital, with the latter asserting that they would hold Moscow at all costs. With over a million troops and abundant resources, the Germans believed victory was within reach. Yet, the Soviet defenses, fortified and resolute, stood in their way. Both the Axis and the Red Army prepared for battle, knowing the outcome would alter the course of the war. The struggle for Moscow loomed, a pivotal moment that promised a harrowing chapter in history. This episode is Winter is Coming  Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Massive formations of Panzers advance through the heart of the Soviet Union, sweeping aside all resistance. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers find themselves encircled, with little hope of breaking free to fight another day. The siege of Leningrad tightens as the Nazis press their advantage. In the south, the Southwestern Front still bears the scars of the devastating battle of Kyiv, where countless men now lie dead across the steppes. Meanwhile, Crimea faces a new assault, as the invaders prepare to drive towards the Don River. The conflict over Leningrad continues to devolve into a stalemate, and Army Group South grapples with the vastness of Ukraine while contending with its scarce resources. As we move into October, the weather shifts noticeably along the entire front. Snow has already begun to fall in the north, while rainstorms have caused intermittent delays. In summer, such storms typically lasted only days; now, they stretch on for weeks. Fall is firmly upon us, and winter approaches quickly. The weather was beginning to change. As Ned Stark said “Winter is coming”.    During the first week of October, significant changes were implemented in the organization of the Ostheer by Hitler and the OKH. Most notably, the Panzer Groups were re-designated as Panzer Armies. This change was more than just a new title; it reflected the increasing importance of armored units within the German military strategy. Previously, these groups had been subordinated to field armies, which often resulted in friction between commanders, particularly between Guderian and Kluge during the early phases of operations. This friction created significant challenges throughout the chain of command. It began even before the war and persisted into the campaign in France. Guderian and Kluge’s personal animosity added to the strain. However, they were not alone in their frustrations; other commanders also felt the negative impact of the previous organizational structure. This hierarchy caused confusion within the chain of command and left Panzer leaders feeling constrained, desiring greater independence in their operations. Now, with the new designation as Panzer Armies, they would report directly to Army Group Commanders. This shift was aimed at enhancing the coordination of resources and expanding strategic options across the front. In theory, this new structure would streamline decision-making and improve the effectiveness of armored units in combat.   By October 1, the offensive capabilities of Army Group North had diminished significantly. Leeb informed Hitler that he could not launch any major offensives without additional reinforcements. Given the limited reinforcements received in late September, he had to work with what he had. Leeb still commanded 2 Panzer divisions and 2 motorized infantry divisions within General of Panzer Troops Schmidt’s 39th Corps. He intended to employ these mobile forces in a limited offensive. Leeb considered 2 options for his attack. The first was to break through the Soviet 8th Army at Oranienbaum, a promising choice. However, Leeb ultimately decided to focus on linking up with the Finns. This plan involved launching an attack northeast toward Volkhov, aiming to destroy the Soviet 54th Army in the process.   Hitler intervened and rejected the proposed plan. He insisted that Leeb instead attack toward Tikhvin first, then counter-march northeast to encircle the 54th Army at Volkhov. This plan likely appeared more appealing on the map tables of the dictator’s bunker than Leeb’s modest proposal. However, it overlooked crucial factors. An operation of this scale required more troops than Army Group North could muster, and it disregarded the fragile condition of the forces besieging Leningrad. Nonetheless, in a clear demonstration of Hitler’s growing disconnect from reality, and the weak resolve of the Nazi generals, Leeb accepted the plan. After some back and forth, the dictator ultimately got his way. Schmidt’s Corps was designated as the main effort toward Tikhvin, supported by 4 infantry divisions on the flanks. The 11th, 21st, 254th, and 126th Infantry Divisions were positioned south of the Shisselburg corridor and would need to redeploy to support the Panzers. Due to this requirement and the need to stockpile supplies, the attack was scheduled for October 16. Notably, the distances involved were relatively short, at less than 100 kilometers. When accounting for the delays in redeployment and logistics, the contrast with the early days of Operation Barbarossa becomes stark. The Wehrmacht remained an extremely competent and dangerous adversary, but its period of absolute dominance was clearly fading. Meanwhile, the Stavka was not resting idly. Even while addressing the potential collapse of the Western Front, they had to focus on developments in the Northwest. The Leningrad and Northwestern Fronts were instructed to prepare for another attempt to breach the vital German corridor at Shisselburg. A launch date was set for later in the month, pending the completion of preparations and a reorganization of the command structure.   Further south, Operation Typhoon represented far more than just another offensive; it was the culmination of months of intense fighting and hundreds of thousands of German casualties. The Nazi state had convinced itself, from top to bottom, not only of the inevitability of victory but also of its swiftness. Although the disappointment over the failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy the Soviet Union was palpable, it was only mentioned obliquely.  On the night of October 1, 1941, just hours before Operation Typhoon was set to begin, Adolf Hitler issued a proclamation that was to be read aloud to the troops on the eastern front “Soldiers! When I called on you to ward off the danger threatening our homeland on 22 June, you faced the greatest military power of all time. In barely three months, thanks to your bravery, my comrades, it has been possible to destroy one tank brigade after another belonging to this opponent, to eliminate countless divisions, to take uncounted prisoners, to occupy endless space … You have taken over 2,400,000 prisoners, you have destroyed or captured 17,500 tanks and over 21,000 guns, you have downed or destroyed on the ground 14,200 planes. The world has never seen anything like this!”. While Hitler emphasized the unprecedented nature of the Ostheer’s success, his comments also hinted at Operation Barbarossa’s failure to eliminate Soviet resistance. “This time,” he confidently promised, everything would proceed “according to plan” to deliver the long-awaited “deadly blow” to the Soviet Union. With characteristic bravado, Hitler declared: “Today, the last great decisive battle of this year begins.” Yet not everyone was convinced. Wolf Dose, a soldier in the 58th Infantry Division, wrote in his diary “The Führer has told us that the decisive battle in the east is beginning, a battle that will finish off the Russians, but how and where he did not say. I do not believe that the Soviet Union will capitulate.”Others were more outspoken. “The last great decisive battle of the year, my God! And what is the decisive result supposed to be, Moscow, Kharkov, the Volga?” Throughout Germany, morale had been boosted by the recent wave of Sondermeldungen, but for those German soldiers in the forward trenches of Bock’s army group, those who had resisted fierce Soviet attacks for the past 2 months, there were far fewer illusions about the difficulties of ending the war in the east. The new drive on Moscow presented daunting challenges. In the immediate prelude to Operation Typhoon, Heinrich Haape recorded the activity observed on the Soviet side of the line “East of the Mezha, the Russians prepared a strong system of trenches, bunkers, tank-traps and barbed-wire entanglements. They laid minefields, reinforced their front-line troops, brought up supplies and gathered their strength to stand against us once more. We had to sit helplessly … and listen to stories brought back by our patrols of the rapidly developing

Last time we spoke about the fall of Kyiv. In September 1941, as the German forces encircled Kyiv under General Guderian's leadership, desperation loomed large for the Soviet Red Army. Despite their valiant efforts to withstand the siege, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers found themselves trapped, leading to mass surrenders. Amidst the chaos, General Zhukov took command in Leningrad, rallying his troops with the stern order: “Not a step back!”. This grim scene was compounded by the chilling decision by Nazi leaders to execute thousands of Jews at Babi Yar, demonstrating the brutal lengths to which they would go in retaliation for resistance. The battle marked a turning point; while Germany celebrated its victory, deep-rooted issues within its ranks, including dwindling supplies and morale, were beginning to surface. The horror of war had only just begun, marking a tragic chapter in history that echoed far beyond the battlefield. This episode is the Fall of Kyiv Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last week, we left off with the destruction of the Southwestern Front and the capture of Kyiv. The job of defending Leningrad was tossed over to Zhukov. Meanwhile a massive reorganization was unfolding for a new operation aimed at Moscow. Yet before we jump into that I wanted to first talk about something else, how was the German propaganda machine telling the folks back home what was going on in the east? Under Hitler’s regime, there was no clear structure for producing and disseminating state propaganda. Officially, Josef Goebbels served as the Minister of Propaganda, but he lacked absolute control over the nation’s various media outlets. Instead, he competed for influence with the Wehrmacht’s Office of Propaganda Troops and other branches of the civilian government.   While the Wehrmacht’s office was primarily supposed to focus on internal messaging, it often released reports to the press. This was a strategic move to amplify the OKW’s preferred narrative on the frontlines and promote a military-friendly storyline. Goebbels himself was less concerned with glorifying the military or its achievements unless it directly benefited the Nazi Party or bolstered his own power. For Goebbels, serving Hitler was the ultimate priority. While many others in the government were driven solely by a hunger for power, Goebbels was a true believer in Hitler's vision, which became evident in his reporting and propagandistic efforts. Despite the growing challenges of the eastern campaign, the German command remained largely convinced that a final major offensive could bring an end to the war against the Soviet Union. Recent successes in the North and South, namely, the encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Kyiv, had revitalized enthusiasm and heightened expectations that the Soviet state was on the brink of collapse.   A pivotal factor in fostering this belief was Goebbels’s series of Sondermeldungen, or special news bulletins, which publicly proclaimed that the war was nearing its conclusion. However, the soldiers at the front had a different perspective on the accuracy of such claims. While some were buoyed by the optimism, many voiced skepticism. General Wilhelm Groener, who directed the German occupation of Ukraine in 1918, had warned against complacency in campaigning in the East. He stated, “Anyone who wants to grasp the strategic nature of the eastern theatre of war must not overlook historical recollections. Beside the gate of the vast lowland between the Vistula and the Urals, which is the home of one state and one people, stands the warning figure of Napoleon, whose fate should implant in anyone who attacks Russia a sense of horror and foreboding.” On September 26, soldier Heinz Rahe wrote to his wife about the anticipated offensive toward Moscow. He expressed hope that Moscow would be reached within fourteen to twenty days, but then added with a hint of doubt, “—but not by us.” Similarly, a non-commissioned officer with the 79th Infantry Division expressed his reservations on September 24. He noted, “Whether Russia can be defeated this year, I doubt very much. The Soviet military might is indeed broken, but the country is too vast, and capitulation is not an option for the Russians. Because two men can’t agree on their ideas, millions of men have to bleed.” In another poignant letter dated September 28, Alois Scheuer shared his experiences in the East, hinting at the numerous difficulties he faced. He remarked, “What I have experienced and lived through in this quarter of a year in Russia, I cannot put into words. There is so much I wish to forget and never be reminded of again. I always try not to lose hope and courage, but there are hours when the loneliness and desolation are almost unbearable.”   While many soldiers at the front expressed their doubts and yearned for an end to the war, Goebbels's victory propaganda continued to resonate effectively, particularly within Germany. Classified reports from the SD or “Sicherheitsdienst”gauging public opinion revealed that, as of September 25, fears of positional warfare in the East and the likelihood of a winter campaign had largely faded. A follow-up report on September 29 confirmed that more and more people were beginning to believe in a German victory before winter set in. Despite this success, Goebbels was troubled by the extent of the rising optimism. In his diary entry from September 27, he observed, “The depression is now completely gone. At times, the mood of the people goes far beyond the real possibilities. Once again, there’s hope that this winter the war will be over, and we have much to do in the next weeks to temper this extreme optimism to a more realistic level.” This palpable sense of optimism was felt even at the front, where many desperately clung to the belief that victory was near. On September 28, Hans-Albert Giese wrote to his mother, “In the next few days, we will again march somewhat further. We look forward to it because the quicker we advance, the sooner we can return home to Germany. The news from the past few days has been really great. These Bolsheviks won’t last much longer.” Another soldier, Ernst Guicking, shared similar sentiments in a letter to his wife dated September 29. He stated, “Kiev is done. Now it’s the turn of Army Group Centre. The great final chord will soon be played in the East. All our hopes are pinned on the coming four weeks.   As the war progressed, Goebbels struggled to balance the expectations and morale of the civilian population with the harsh realities of the situation. The Wehrmacht was experiencing victories, but things had not unfolded as planned, despite what Hitler proclaimed to the public. While official reports boasted that the Red Army was on its last legs, Goebbels was increasingly anxious about public opinion, especially as the war inevitably stretched into 1942 and beyond. Throughout the conflict, the messaging from the German state regarding the situation in the East was anything but clear. Evidence suggests that this lack of clarity impacted morale both within the armed forces and among civilians. Hitler had never been entirely secure from the threat of an internal coup, and his security situation would continue to deteriorate over the coming months and years. This decline wasn't solely due to waning morale caused by inconsistent and vague propaganda that diverged from the realities of war. Initially, Hitler’s strategic management had helped stave off coup attempts during his reign. However, his forthcoming failures would ignite discontent in the future. Propaganda had been a crucial element of the Nazi state's success in maintaining control over Germany, but the cracks were starting to show in its armor. By the end of September 1941, even ordinary soldiers were beginning to openly question the wisdom of the war. For instance, in the aftermath of the fighting around Kyiv, one soldier reflected on these sentiments in a letter home “Three months ago today the campaign against Russia began. Everybody supposed at the time that the Bolsheviks would be ripe for capitulation within no more than eight to ten weeks. That assumption, however, was based on a widespread ignorance of the Russian war materiel...Just this morning we happened to hear that, for example near Kiev, 600 guns and 150,000 men were captured. What kind of figures are those! Russia is almost inexhaustible”.   Things began to grind to a halt at Leningrad. The German advance, now almost entirely devoid of armored support, was stalling at the Pulkovo Heights. The suburban areas surrounding the city proved to be a tough challenge. In the North, the Finns hesitated to attack, leaving their German allies struggling to push them further. Any hope for a link-up on the eastern shores of Lake Ladoga had to come from Army Group North, but with the 4th Panzer Group reassigned to Army Group Center for the foreseeable future, this prospect was all but impossible. On September 25, the 16th Army was pushed back from the eastern bank of the Neva River. The Soviets continued their assault, but by the 27th, Luftwaffe air support began breaking up their attacks. Throughout the remainder of the month, t

Last time we spoke about the Panzer’s Greatest Victory. Amidst the chaotic landscape of late August 1941, the siege of Kyiv escalated under General Guderian's command against the resilient Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Timoshenko. September brought relentless rain, complicating the push toward Leningrad, while Finnish forces threatened Soviet defenses. The German army, once poised for a swift victory, grappled with critical supply shortages as they aimed for a massive offensive on Moscow, codenamed Operation Typhoon. Hitler's altered directives and a deteriorating situation on the ground forced the Wehrmacht to cope with dwindling resources. Meanwhile, the Soviets, despite significant losses, began to regroup, bolstered by non-active reserves. They only needed to endure, allowing Germany's offensive strength to exhaust itself as winter approached. As the campaign wore on, deepening battles of attrition transformed the initially swift Blitzkrieg into a grueling war of attrition, marking a significant shift in the conflict. Both sides braced for a war that would last far longer than anyone anticipated. This episode is the Fall of Kyiv Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    So it's September 17th, and the Commander of the Southwestern Front has finally received permission from Stalin to order a retreat. But it's too late. His armies now find themselves completely surrounded by the German forces. As Kyiv falls, General Zhukov is making preparations in Leningrad, readying for a desperate battle to the last man. Meanwhile, in the center, Field Marshal Bock is poised to launch an offensive aimed at bringing an end to the war once and for all. Now last week we covered the dramatic closing of the Kyiv pocket. The capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, along with a significant portion of the Southwestern Front, has become a giant trap. Generals Guderian and Kleist have fought vehemently for weeks, successfully linking their forces southeast of the city. Many of Stalin's generals fervently urged him to allow a retreat, yet he refused to grant them this option. Now, hundreds of thousands of soldiers are encircled.   The battle for Leningrad was reaching a critical juncture. General Zhukov had been appointed to take command in the second week of fierce fighting. With his usual energy and determination, he set about overhauling the city's entire defensive strategy. Prior to his arrival, the defenses were on the brink of collapse, and Zhukov was not willing to let morale deteriorate further. He made the tough decision to dismiss several officers who had lost their fighting spirit, replacing them with trusted subordinates. This was not merely a matter of favoritism; the men he replaced were demoralized, and Zhukov needed leaders who still had the will to win. This aspect of command is often overlooked: the ability to maintain composure and inspire resilience after weeks of setbacks is crucial in any army. For the Red Army, it was vital to continue fighting after experiencing some of the most significant defeats in military history. On September 17th, Zhukov issued an order to all his subordinate commands "Not a Step Back! Do not give up a single verst of land on the approaches to Leningrad!"   On September 16th, the 8th Army found itself completely surrounded and cutoff from Leningrad. This grim encirclement would come to be known as the Oranienbaum Pocket. The fighting around the city had grown increasingly desperate. During early September, Hitler made the pivotal decision not to directly assault Leningrad. Instead, a strategy was devised to encircle the city and starve its defenders into submission. To achieve this, Army Group North needed to connect with Finnish forces to the east of Lake Ladoga. However, merely cutting off land connections would not suffice. Everyone knew that the Soviets were already supplying Leningrad across the lake. The only way to prevent this was to expel the last remaining Red Army units from the eastern shore, a task that seemed nearly impossible. Leeb's Army Group was on the brink of exhaustion, and the expected transfer of Hoepner's Panzers to Army Group Center proved to be the final straw. By the end of the third week of September, Army Group North was left with little to no offensive power.   Zhukov ordered counterattacks to push back the German forces, but by the 20th, it became clear that these efforts wouldn't yield significant results. Nonetheless, there were three key benefits from Zhukov's initial counterattack. First, it bolstered the morale of the Leningrad Front. Zhukov proved that he would fight to the last man, and his decision to remove incompetent and broken leaders from command was crucial. Second, the counterattack took the German command by surprise. Generals Leeb and Halder had assumed that the Soviets were on the verge of collapse. This misjudgment would not be the first, or the last, time they underestimated the fighting spirit of the Red Army. This unexpected resistance, combined with Hitler's relentless order to transfer panzer units to Army Group Center for a renewed offensive towards Moscow, sent shockwaves through German command. In response, Halder arranged to transfer several infantry units to Leeb’s command to compensate for the loss of the Panzers. Finally, the fierce combat had dulled the strength of Army Group North. Since July, they had suffered losses of around sixty thousand men, with replacements failing to match the quality of those who had fallen. The Heer, as of June 1941, was staffed with experienced non-commissioned officers and junior leaders who served as force multipliers. Non-commissioned officers, along with platoon and company leaders, form the backbone of a any modern industrialized army. They play a crucial role in maintaining discipline and possess vital institutional knowledge about tactics and weapons handling. The losses sustained in the early months of the campaign drained their ranks of many of these capable men, making their absence felt far beyond mere numbers. The battle for Leningrad was far from over; it remained a grueling fight rather than a static siege. The casualties suffered in the latter half of September pushed the conflict towards a siege mentality, with both sides paying dearly for every inch of territory. As the month drew to a close, both the Soviets and Germans focused on reorganizing and redeploying for one last major attempt to seize the city before winter set in.   The commander of Army Group Center finalized his plan for the decisive offensive. After weeks of heated discussion, Field Marshal Bock had secured his objective: Moscow would again be the focal point of the German campaign, and he was to spearhead the effort. As the third week of September began, the plan had been named, Operation Typhoon. Hitler had designated Army Group Center to receive the bulk of the panzer units, even permitting some enhancements to their capabilities. Yet, Bock often voiced his frustrations, claiming he was expected to achieve great things with inadequate resources. While Hitler refused to allocate everything at his disposal, he believed Bock was equipped with everything necessary for success. The reality, however, lay somewhere in between. Army Group Center was far from receiving the full support one would anticipate for such a crucial offensive. Hitler had declined to release sufficient spare parts to fully repair the panzer units, let alone provide additional tanks. Although the panzer divisions received some replacements, it was nowhere near enough to restore them to full strength. August’s losses had been too great, and the limitations of Germany's supply capabilities in September 1941 were evident. As we discussed last week, Hitler released only a small portion of the reserve production of new tanks.    The logistical buildup was also lackluster. The harsh Russian winter, notorious for decimating Napoleon’s army, loomed on the horizon. Every soldier in the German army understood the challenges winter would bring. Yet, supplies of winter uniforms were grossly insufficient. Even before the end of the third week, some units were informed they could only expect to receive 25% of their required winter clothing. To make matters worse, the 19th Panzer Division was notified they would no longer receive replacement boots due to leather shortages. Leather production had long been a persistent challenge in prewar Germany. The country was never self-sufficient in the textiles industry, with leather particularly dependent on imports. In 1934, as Germany began to recover from the Great Depression, leather and textile goods accounted for 26% of total imports. The demands of the greatly expanded army, combined with intense campaigning in the east, placed significant strain on the German economy.  It wasn't solely production issues that hampered the buildup for Operation Typhoon. The rail supply lines were wholly inadequate. By mid-August, the 9th and 2nd Armies were surviving hand to mouth, unable to allocate any ammunition for future operations. The supply of fuel, oil, and lubricants was equally insufficient, failing to account for the poor condition of the engines, which significantly in

Last time we spoke about the Drive to Kyiv and Leningrad continues. In late August 1941, the German siege of Kyiv intensified, led by General Guderian amidst a fierce defense from the Soviet Red Army under Marshal Timoshenko. As the Nazis pushed forward, their initial confidence waned under severe logistical strain and significant casualties, while the Soviets showcased resilience and tactical evolution. The month ended in bloodshed, with both sides suffering staggering losses. As September arrived, rain soaked the battlefields, further complicating efforts toward Leningrad, where Finnish troops advanced, threatening Soviet hold on the city. The Germans faced a critical moment as they lost vital supply routes. Fierce combat ensued, with the Soviets and Finnish forces engaged in relentless skirmishes that emphasized the human cost of war. Then in a enormous reversal, Hitler issued directive no. 35 altering the course for Moscow. After fighting tooth and nail against it, Hitler ultimately succumbed to the alure of taking the capital of the USSR. This episode is the Panzer’s Greatest Victory Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Leningrad is now encircled. Guderian and Kleist, are on the brink of merging their forces just outside the ancient city of Kyiv. As the war rages on, the Red Army unleashes a relentless assault on German positions in the center. We find ourselves in the 11th week of Operation Barbarossa. The weary German Army is eyeing what could be their greatest achievement yet, but meanwhile, the Red Army plunges to new depths. Supply trucks are mired in mud as the Panzers struggle to complete the encirclement against the Southwestern Front. Last week, we witnessed the Southwestern Front and the Bryansk Front fiercely fighting to retain control over Ukraine and its capital, Kyiv. We also observed the renewed momentum of the advance on Leningrad as the Stavka reorganized the city's defenses. In a challenging turn, Army Group Center had to retreat from the Yelna salient, suffering significant casualties in the process.  The Wehrmacht now faced two daunting logistical issues involving men and machines. Neither was in massive supply by the end of the summer of 1941. By late September, an official report would put German casualties above 500,000. 14 divisions were more than 4,000 men short, 40 divisions were over 3,000 men short, and 30 divisions were more than 2,000 men short. Meanwhile, the Heer had lost nearly 1,500 tanks and artillery pieces. This accounted for about one-third of the starting force. Only 47% of the tanks across all four Panzer Groups were operational, according to a report from September 4, with many tanks requiring spare parts for repairs. Hitler had ordered that all new tank production be held in a strategic reserve in Germany, aiming to form new Panzer divisions. It would take until mid-September for Halder to convince Hitler that the plans for capturing Moscow, Operation Typhoon, required some replacements to be released. Only 96 tanks had been sent forward, just over 10% of the new production from June to the end of August. When Hitler finally allowed the strategic reserve of vehicles to be allocated for replacements, the Panzer arm was in desperate straits. On September 15, he authorized the release of 60 Czech 38(t)s, 150 Panzer IIIs, and 96 Panzer IVs along with an additional 310 replacement engines for the Panzer III. These numbers were completely inadequate. His only other concession was the transfer of two more complete Panzer divisions to the 4th Panzer Group under Hoepner. The 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions had been unable to participate in the initial invasion due to their poor state of readiness following the Yugoslavia campaign in April. They had since been rebuilt and brought along about 450 new tanks. However, even the entire stock of production could not have rebuilt the Panzer arm to its original numbers. Most of the new production was of modern designs, which would replace some of the obsolete models they began the invasion with. Yet, that statement doesn't capture the whole truth. Seventy-one of the approximately 800 tanks produced by German factories from June to the end of August were Panzer IIs. These vehicles had proven inadequate in France in 1940 and were certifiably obsolete by the end of the summer of 1941. Nevertheless, production did not cease that year. Remarkably, production of the Panzer II as a mainline tank continued until 1942 with production of derivatives and specialised variants continuing until 1944. As it stood, the Panzer arm was significantly reduced from its June starting point. A complete rebuilding of the force was out of the question, as there simply weren't enough available tanks. Additionally, Hitler forbade any attempts to fully restore the Panzer divisions. Instead, they were forced to amalgamate and make do with what they had. The Heer would have to undertake Operation Typhoon with their diminished resources. There was no other option. Highlighting the logistical issues facing the Germans, might lead you to believe that the situation was much worse on the Soviets. The summer of 1941 indeed represented a Soviet debacle of grand proportions, marked by mass confusion and enormous waste of men and material. However, it remains a fact that these losses, while dreadfully costly to the Soviet war effort, were bearable. In fact, far from crumbling, the Red Army was growing in size, fueled by a vast pool of non-active reserves. Moreover, unlike the German Army, the Red Army didn't have to win the war in 1941; it only needed to survive long enough for Germany’s offensive strength to exhaust itself. The winter granted the Soviet Union a reprieve, further sweetened by the entry of the United States into the war. Thus, despite the Red Army's weaknesses in the summer of 1941, it succeeded fundamentally in one key respect,it confounded the German leadership’s plan to conquer the Soviet Union in a Blitzkrieg-style campaign during the early weeks of the war. As Historian Jacob Kipp concluded in his study on the Battle of Smolensk “At a horrible cost in losses, Russia gave up her sons and her land to bleed the Wehrmacht white, even if the losses were 10 to 1 in favour of the German invader. Nazi ideology and occupation policies in the end made such sacrifices seem justified and legitimized Soviet totalitarianism . . . After Smolensk it was clear that this would be a long war, not a Blitzkrieg. The Soviet state and society, which Lenin and Stalin had cast as a vast mechanism for mobilization and militarization, had begun that process in earnest”.  By the time German armies were able to reassemble for their renewed drive on Moscow designated Operation Typhoon, it would already be September 30. The available combat strength and logistical support had fallen far below what would be required to seize the Soviet capital. Following the pattern of earlier offensives, the attack began well and again took advantage of the dreadful Soviet strategic direction to capture another huge haul of Soviet prisoners in two enormous pockets. As Halder recorded on October 4: ‘Operation Typhoon is following an altogether classic course... The enemy is standing fast on all parts of the front not under attack, which gives hope for the creation of pockets.’ However, as in past German offensives, the pace could not be sustained. Over vast distances, the spearheads weakened as their flanks grew, and their supply lines became impossibly long. Soviet counterattacks became relentless. Road conditions worsened along with the weather, and soon German troops everywhere found themselves in freezing temperatures with little more than their worn-out summer uniforms. Deprived of the chance to win the war, or even to escape the slogging battles of attrition, Germany's stalled eastern front underwent rapid de-modernization. This intensified the bitter deprivations of life at the front, especially as winter took hold. As one German soldier wrote in December 1941: ‘Technology no longer plays a role... The elemental power of nature broke the operations of our engines. What do we do?’ Summarizing the first two years of the war, Michael Geyer observed: ‘However successful the first two years of the war, the Third Reich never came close to escaping the dilemma posed by the fact that the political and military-strategic costs of expansion continuously outran the benefits of a newly gained hegemonic position.’ When the hoped-for lightning victory against the Soviet Union proved beyond the Wehrmacht’s capacity, a longer-term, war-winning solution was all that remained open to Germany. However, the prospects of success for this option can be immediately dismissed. As Historian Omer Bartov has written “Once blitzkrieg failed, production, industrial capacity, material and manpower resources, organisation and technical skill, all became more important than tactics, training, and courage. Of course blitzkrieg itself depended on technology, indeed, it made a fetish of modern fighting machines. But now technological innovation had to be paralleled by quantities produced, while the initial psychological impact of mass (but spatially and temporally limited) use o

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany marched toward Kyiv, their confidence began to falter. General Fedor von Bock’s forces, fresh from capturing Smolensk, faced a fierce defensive from the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko.  The grim reality of warfare set in as soldiers from both sides endured harrowing conditions. German units struggled with their dwindling resources, suffering immense casualties that shattered morale. Conversely, the Soviets demonstrated remarkable resilience, with commanders like Georgy Zhukov evolving their tactics to counteract German advances. By month's end, both armies faced staggering losses, with the Soviets suffering catastrophic casualties. This fierce battle would become a pivotal moment, illustrating the fierce determination of the Red Army and altering the course of history on the Eastern Front. This episode is the Drive to Kyiv and Leningrad continues Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  September has arrived on the Eastern Front, bringing with it the late summer rains. General Guderian is pushing his tanks southward, aiming to cut off the defenders of Kyiv. Behind him, Field Marshal von Bock is tasked with holding the line at Yelna, while the Soviet High Command is prepared to sacrifice tens of thousands of brave soldiers to reclaim it. Last week we talked about how the Bryansk Front struggled to fend off Guderian as his armored divisions advanced, threatening to encircle Kyiv. In the area of Army Group North, the push towards Leningrad is recovering from earlier setbacks. General Vatutin’s offensive was swiftly repelled by Manstein’s Panzers, and the 18th Army successfully cleared Estonia. The rapid advances of Leeb's offensive have devastated the Soviet forces. To address the dire situation, the Stavka has deployed three armies: the 54th, 52nd, and 4th Armies, arriving in early September to bolster defenses in front of Leningrad. Their focus is on the eastern side of Volkhov, aiming to prevent a connection between the Finnish and German forces. In August, the Germans captured Mga, but an NKVD division briefly retook it for a day before being driven out by the 20th Motorized Division. A see-saw battle unfolded throughout the first week of September, but by the end of the week, the Germans had gained firm control. The 48th Army was struggling to maintain its position, and on September 7th, the combined might of the 20th Motorized and 12th Panzer Divisions captured Sinaivino, with Shisselburg next on their list. These towns were the last land connections to the rest of the Soviet Union. Losing Mga, the last rail connection, was a significant blow to the defense of Leningrad. With the fall of Shisselburg and Sinaivino, the options for leaving the city without traversing Axis lines grew grim. The only escape route left was across Lake Ladoga. Army Group North had originally advanced an average of 5 kilometers a day in July, which slowed to 2.2 kilometers in August, and dropped to just 1.5 kilometers a day in September. Lengthening supply lines, growing fatigue among soldiers, and fierce Soviet resistance have begun to take their toll. Now, with Leningrad isolated, many soldiers of Army Group North believe their mission is nearly complete. All that remains is to wait for Leningrad to starve, surrender, and for Army Group Center and South to achieve their objectives. The OKH announced  "the Iron Ring around Leningrad has been closed”.  The Finnish forces had advanced across the Karelian Isthmus, posing a significant threat to Leningrad. Back on August 22, the Finnish 4th Corps entered Soviet territory north of Vyborg, swiftly advancing toward the Vuoksi River in the early stages of their offensive. By the 24th, the Finnish 8th Division successfully crossed Viipuri Bay, landing south of Vyborg and severing the coastal road leading to the city. In an attempt to re-establish this vital road link, the Soviet 43rd, 115th, and 123rd Rifle Divisions initiated a counter-offensive against the 8th Division. Despite being heavily outnumbered, the Finnish Light Brigade T managed to delay the Soviet advance for several crucial hours while 4th Corps continued its southward march on August 25. In the ensuing days, both sides regrouped their forces and prepared for a clash in the heavily forested area surrounding Porlampi, located between the coastal and central Karelian highways. The battle began on August 30, when advanced elements of the Soviet 43rd Rifle Division encountered the Finnish 8th Division in the Porlampi forests. Both armies called in reinforcements, with the Soviets largely unaware that the Finnish troops they were engaging had crossed Viipuri Bay, mistakenly believing the 8th Division was part of the main body of the 4th Corps. In reality, 4th Corps was advancing uncontested to the north and east, posing a threat to encircle the Soviet forces. Over the next several days of intense combat in the Porlampi region, the Finns effectively employed motti skirmishing tactics to counter the numerical superiority of the Soviets. Finnish artillery proved particularly effective, disabling many Soviet vehicles, obstructing roads, and creating significant bottlenecks. By the late afternoon of August 30, the 43rd Rifle Division succeeded in pushing the 8th Division out of Porlampi and into the nearby village of Somme, located several miles northwest. Fighting continued fiercely throughout the night. On the morning of August 31, the main body of the IV Corps arrived, launching attacks on the 123rd Rifle Division at Porlampi and the 115th Rifle Division at Ylasomme. This assault effectively collapsed the northern flank of the Soviet army, forcing a retreat. However, the 8th Division remained engaged in heavy combat with the 43rd Rifle Division northwest of Porlampi and was unable to complete the encirclement. Utilizing the dense forest terrain, the Soviet 123rd and 115th Rifle Divisions withdrew southwest toward Koivisto. Vyborg fell on August 31, allowing more Finnish forces to focus on the remaining troops of the 23rd Army. The 43rd Rifle Division, which had advanced the farthest west, was nearly annihilated by Finnish forces on September 1. A handful of survivors retreated south and were evacuated by the Soviet Navy from the Baltic coast in November. The Red Army incurred heavy losses during the engagement, with 7,000 soldiers killed, 1,000 wounded, and 9,000 captured, primarily from the decimated 43rd Rifle Division. In comparison, the Finnish 4th Corps suffered 700 fatalities and 2,700 injuries. The Finns also seized a substantial amount of Soviet equipment, including 164 artillery pieces of various calibers. Notably, they captured Major General Vladimir Kirpichnikov, marking him as the highest-ranking Soviet prisoner of war taken during both the Winter War and the Continuation War. On September 2, Finnish forces marched to the village and port of Koivisto but did not pursue the remnants of the Soviet divisions that had fled into the surrounding archipelago; these units were later evacuated by the Soviets in November. While fighting near Viipuri continued, the Finnish advance toward Leningrad persisted. The Finnish IV Corps spearheaded the advance along the western shore, the II Corps operated in the center, and the recently arrived I Corps moved along the eastern side of the Isthmus. Finnish Commander-in-Chief Marshal Mannerheim ordered the forces to hold their position short of the Soviet fortifications. The Finnish troops reached the old border on August 31 and halted their advance shortly thereafter at the Soviet fortifications. Back on August 20, General W. Erfurth informed Mannerheim that Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel would send a letter outlining where Finland would be requested to attack Leningrad. Mannerheim, articulating the practical challenges of this proposal, highlighted the opposition from both political and military leadership regarding any assault on the city. The government had previously decided against attacking Leningrad, and only after pressure from military leaders did they agree to make a limited advance across the old border to secure better defensive positions. The Social Democrats were particularly opposed to crossing the border. When Keitel's letter arrived, President Risto Ryti and Mannerheim prepared a negative response. On August 31, Erfurth contacted Mannerheim again and suggested canceling the attack on East Karelia in favor of an attack on Leningrad, but both Ryti and Mannerheim refused. On the same day, Mannerheim ordered that the offensive be halted at a line stretching from the mouth of the Rajajoki River to Ohta. The exact boundary between Ohta and Lake Ladoga would be determined later when the Finns had reached the old border in that area. This strategy aimed to shorten the front line without having to assault the Soviet fortifications north of Leningrad. In this last phase, the Soviets had six infantry divisions along with various separate battalions and regiments defending Leningrad from the north, but all were operating at half strength due to the recent heavy fighting with Finnish forces. The Finnish 12th

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced towards Kyiv, their confidence in a swift victory began to wane. General Fedor von Bock's forces had captured Smolensk, yet the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted an unexpected and resilient defense. The Soviets, despite their heavy losses, rallied and mobilized millions, initiating counteroffensives that demonstrated their vast potential. Amidst the chaos, logistical troubles plagued the German troops, stretching their resources thin and leading to growing unrest among soldiers grappling with devastating casualties. As the battle for Kyiv intensified, the realization dawned on German commanders that their aggressive strategy was failing, with victory slipping from their grasp.  This episode is Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Tension stretches from Berlin, the capital of Germany, to Moscow, the heart of Russia, as military commanders and powerful leaders strategize their next moves. One side contemplates a decisive action, while the other fears that too much territory has already been surrendered. The Red Army must now prepare to confront the Wehrmacht, in a critical battle just outside Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. Last week marked a turning point as fighting in the sector of Army Group Center came to a standstill, largely due to exhaustion among the troops. In response, Adolf Hitler commanded General Guderian to redirect his forces south toward Ukraine, while General Hermann Hoth provided support for Army Group North, advancing from the north. On August 20, a report from the 2nd Army's 267th Infantry Division noted that over the preceding six days, the division had suffered around 1,000 casualties, bringing its total losses since the war began in the east to approximately 2,700 men. Within the LIII Army Corps, which included the 267th Infantry Division, overall losses reached 192 officers and 5,500 soldiers by August 22. At the war's outset, the average German infantry division consisted of about 17,000 troops. By the end of August 1941, the impact of casualties on these divisions was significant. In 14 of the divisions, losses had exceeded 4,000 men; in 40 divisions, over 3,000; in 30 divisions, over 2,000; and 58 divisions recorded losses of fewer than 2,000. On August 21, fighting around the Yel’nya salient, a bulge in the front line near the Smolensk region, began to ease as the Soviet 24th Army regrouped and received reinforcements in preparation for a major offensive expected by the end of the month. Even during this period of relative calm, the German IX Army Corps, tasked with defending the northern flank of the salient, was so severely understrength that engineers, desperately needed to build roads behind the front, were forced to fight as infantry for weeks. The term “quiet” seems almost ironic considering the continuous losses being inflicted. The 137th Infantry Division was reportedly losing over 50 men daily in localized skirmishes between August 20 and 30, while the neighboring 263rd Infantry Division lost around 1,200 men from August 20 to 27, averaging about 150 losses per day. Following an inspection of the Yel’nya frontline, Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder was told, “Troops are very strained. Enemy artillery activity is unpleasant, and our munitions are limited. Mines and wire are absent.” As August came to a close, the anticipated Soviet offensive finally commenced, featuring eight rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and one motorized infantry division, all supported by 800 artillery guns, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. The Soviet forces, under General Georgy Zhukov's Reserve Front, were organized into two shock groups positioned north and south of the salient. For the first time, this offensive was coordinated with simultaneous attacks by the Western Front in the north at Dukhovshchina and the Bryansk Front in the south at Roslavl and Novozybkov. On the offensive’s first day, August 30, the Soviets penetrated ten kilometers into the southern flank of General Günther von Kluge’s forces, prompting Field Marshal Fedor von Bock to dispatch two divisions, including the 10th Panzer Division, to stabilize the situation. Heavy fighting ensued until September 2, when Bock decided to abandon the Yel’nya salient, deeming it purposeless and noting that the divisions there were being "bled white" over time. Thus, after six weeks of fierce combat and staggering losses, the Yel’nya salient ultimately proved ineffective, an appalling illustration of the aimless strategic direction of Army Group Centre. As soldier Franz Frisch, who fought in these battles, later reflected… “Officially it was called a ‘planned withdrawal’, and a ‘correction of the front lines.’ . . . But to me it was so much bullshit. The Russians were kicking us badly and we had to regroup . . . The next day – or maybe a few days later – we heard on the radio, in the ‘news from the front’ (Wehrmachtsbericht) about the ‘successful front correction’ in our Yel’nya defensive line, which was east of Smolensk, and the enormous losses we had inflicted on the enemy. But no single word was heard about a retreat, about the hopelessness of the situation, about the mental and emotional stagnation and numbness of the German soldiers. In short, it was again a ‘victory’. But we on the front line were running back like rabbits in front of the fox. This metamorphosis of the truth from ‘all shit’ to ‘it was a victory’ baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think”. Franz Frisch was not the only German soldier to be taken aback by the stark contrast between the glorified wartime propaganda and the harsh reality faced at the front lines. Georg Grossjohann, an officer who had been stationed in France during the early weeks of Operation Barbarossa, later recounted his experiences after the war: “When I was moved to the east [in the late summer of 1941] I was actually convinced that I would be too late to see action. Reichspressechef [German press chief] Dr Dietrich declared on the radio that all that was needed in Russia from that point in the late summer would be ‘police actions’. Well, I was taught differently when I arrived there . . . There was tremendous bitterness amongst the infantry soldiers at the front over the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the realities of their situation”. In the late summer of 1941, images of victorious advances into enemy territory had become relics of past wars, often propagandized in news reels. For the average German soldier, or Landser, the grim reality of life on the Eastern Front began to mirror the harrowing experiences of trench warfare. Corporal W.F. expressed his despair on August 22, stating, “We have suffered greatly under the Russian artillery fire, and we must live day and night in our foxholes for protection from shrapnel. The holes are filled with water, and lice and other vermin have already made their way in.” Another soldier, Erich Mende, observed how digging deeper was nearly impossible, as ground water would appear after just 50 centimeters. Meanwhile, fellow soldier Harald Henry wrote in a letter home on August 18, “It would be no overstatement to say that ‘a dog wouldn’t want to go on living like this,’ as no creature could endure such primitive conditions. All day long, we huddle in the ground, twisted in narrow holes, facing the sun and rain without respite, desperately trying to sleep.” If the living conditions were harsh, they were only compounded by the constant terrors of combat that dominated life on the front. Just days later, on August 22, Henry expressed his mental anguish in another letter, capturing the toll of war on his psyche. “Yesterday was a day so immersed in blood, so full of dead and wounded, so blasted by crackling salvoes, shrapnel from shells and groans and shrieks of the wounded, that I can not yet write about it . . . As if by a wonder I was drawn from the heaviest fighting in the afternoon and remain until now unhurt . . . At any rate my old non-commissioned officer Grabke and many other comrades are dead.” In contrast to the chaotic early weeks of the war, when Soviet armies struggled with command and control, the stabilization of the front alleviated much of the pressure on the Soviet forces, enabling them to improve the coordination of their operations. This shift was evident in German assessments of Soviet combat performance. On August 6, Strauss reported that the Red Army had become a "well-led, tough, powerful enemy with a great deal of artillery and a strong air force." Three days later, a command conference at Panzer Group 3 described the enemy as a "[g]reat mass" still capable of fighting. Their armaments were characterized as “good,” and their artillery was reported to be "much more proficient than in the early days" of the conflict. This analysis reflected a radical shift from the dismissive evaluations made just three weeks earlier. A crucial question arose: "How much longer until the Russian fighting strength is broken?" The answer was uncertain, with a statement declaring, "We must stand behind the Fuhrer in th

Last time we spoke about how the Germans had underestimated the Soviets. General Fedor von Bock’s forces captured Smolensk, yet the Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, fiercely defended their territory, demonstrating an unexpected resilience despite heavy losses. Struggles for control intensified around Kyiv, as logistical issues plagued the Germans. Their supply lines grew thinner, causing unrest among troops facing devastating casualties. Amidst desperate counteroffensives, the Soviets mobilized millions, revealing the vastness of their manpower and determination. By mid-August, German command recognized a grim truth: they had underestimated the "Russian colossus." What started as a confident assault evolved into a prolonged struggle where victory was no longer assured. The Germans were stretched thin, while the Soviets regrouped, heralding a change in the tides of war that would resonate through the Eastern Front. This episode is The Battle for Kyiv Begins Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Red army was exhausted as she entered her third week of being invaded by Nazi Germany. However she was striking back where she could, and little by little it seemed like she was chipping at the armor of the allegedly invincible Wehrmacht. We left off last week with Army Group North advancing towards Leningrad while also attacking Vatutin. Meanwhile Guderian began a turn southwards as the Red Army frantically tried to fill gaps in their lines north of Kyiv. In June, the Soviet Air Force, known as the VVS, suffered a devastating setback. Throughout July, their operations were able to continue, but only due to their reserve aircraft and the Luftwaffe's challenge in covering such a vast front. Although the vast majority of this reserve was made up of old planes, sheer numbers allowed the Soviet Airforce to continue the fight and cover most of the front. On August 7th, they launched a long-range bombing mission targeting the heart of Nazi Germany, Berlin, the political center of the Third Reich. In a desperate bid to halt Army Group North's advance, the Soviet military committed all available resources. The Soviet Naval Staff devised a daring strategy, determining that their best chance of success lay in launching Ilyushin DB-3T torpedo bombers from a small island off the coast of Estonia, nestled in the Baltic Sea. Strategists calculated that if the twin-engine bombers were loaded with approximately 3,000 kilograms of fuel and no more than 750 kilograms of bombs, they could undertake an 1,800-kilometer round trip to Berlin with 10-15% of reserve fuel remaining. However, this approach meant the pilots would lack the extra fuel necessary for evasive maneuvers when facing German defenses, including anti-aircraft fire and intercepting fighters. The only viable option was to fly at high altitudes in a straight line both to and from their targets, which significantly compromised the accuracy of their bombardments. Tactical precision was, however, not the primary goal of the Berlin raid. On August 2nd, fully loaded Soviet DB-3T bombers set off from the makeshift airfield to test the feasibility of using such an airstrip. The test revealed that skilled pilots could indeed take off under such challenging conditions. Then, on the night of August 4th, five Soviet aircraft embarked on a reconnaissance flight over Berlin, departing from the island airstrip. The Germans had established a formidable anti-aircraft perimeter that extended 100 kilometers around their capital, complete with powerful spotlights capable of illuminating an area of 6,000 cubic meters. Remarkably, the Soviet planes successfully traversed Berlin without detection. The pilots were now ready for an audacious bombing raid. On the evening of August 7th, 1941, fifteen Ilyushin DB-3T torpedo bombers from the Baltic Fleet ascended into the sky, heading straight for the German capital. With Soviet fighters lacking the range to escort them, altitude became their sole defense. Surprisingly, the German military did not anticipate such a mission originating from the Soviet Union. In fact, despite previous small-scale bombing raids by the British, Nazi propaganda perpetuated the belief among German citizens that there was no threat from the East, insisting that the Soviet Air Force had been decimated following Operation Barbarossa. The idea of a Soviet bombing raid on Berlin in the summer of 1941 seemed almost unfathomable to the German military leaders and Nazi officials. At that time, Berlin's streets were illuminated by the warm glow of apartment windows and streetlights, as blackouts were not enforced. The clear night of August 7th allowed the Soviet bombers to navigate directly toward the heart of the city. Approaching their targets from an altitude of 7,000 meters, the bombers encountered no anti-aircraft fire, and the searchlights remained dormant. As the bomb bay doors swung open, over 11,000 kilograms of bombs cascaded through the night sky, raining down upon central Berlin. With their loads released, the aircraft, now significantly lighter, turned to return to Estonia. The stillness of the night at 7,000 meters was suddenly shattered by the explosion of anti-aircraft shells. Miraculously, the Soviet bombers returned unscathed, accomplishing their mission. Initially, the German propaganda machine claimed that British RAF planes had conducted the raid, reporting six downed aircraft. This narrative was quickly refuted by newspapers in the UK, forcing the German government to reluctantly concede that it was, in fact, Soviet aircraft that had struck Berlin. While the bombing raid caused no notable damage to the German capital, the Kremlin celebrated it as a major victory over the enemy, mirroring the triumphant spirit witnessed the following year when the U.S. executed the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. In both instances, such bold strikes represented a crucial morale boost for populations that had only experienced defeat at the hands of Axis powers up to that point. The Soviet Union continued its bombing missions against Berlin, but the German defenses thereafter became ever more vigilant in preparation for the VVS bombers. The second raid, executed on August 10th, echoed a similar fate. This time, twenty-six bombers took off with a mission to strike Berlin. Of those, only six made it to the city, and tragically, just two returned to base. Nevertheless, this series of operations highlighted the VVS's resilience and growing power, a testament to their ability to conduct missions deep into enemy territory, even amidst adversity. Throughout the early weeks of the war, the Luftwaffe struggled to recover from even the relatively mild losses it had sustained. As the conflict expanded, new aircraft production was being stretched thin across three theaters of operation. In the Mediterranean and Africa, the demand for air support grew increasingly critical as Italian forces began to falter, while British forces intensified their assaults on Axis shipping routes. If you want to hear a 10 podcast rundown of the entire Africa Campaign, might I interest you over at the Pacific War Channel for the video version or Echoes of War for the audio only version. Me and my co-host Gaurav go through the entire campaign with a lot of detail on the issue of logistics, honestly it was a fun and great series! Now Back in Germany, the British Bomber Command initiated a campaign targeting industrial sites since the summer of 1940, during the height of the Battle of Britain. Initially, these bombing raids inflicted only minimal damage on German infrastructure and morale. It wasn’t until 1942, with the launch of the combined bomber offensive, that British attacks began to seriously threaten German capabilities. However, even at this early stage, the presence of Bomber Command’s operations required the Luftwaffe to divert fighters and anti-aircraft installations that could have been deployed elsewhere. This constant need for defensive resources added pressure on the Luftwaffe, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a balanced and effective response across all fronts. On the Eastern Front, the conflict was intensifying as the Soviet Air Force began to recover from the initial shock of invasion. The Red Army demanded more air support across broader fronts than ever before, pushing the limits of their already strained resources. As the front lines advanced, the Air Corps found themselves moving squadrons further away from their well-equipped bases. The forward airfields they established were often little more than dirt strips, making supply logistics a daunting challenge for the Luftwaffe, just as it was for the army. In the vast, undeveloped areas where they were forced to operate, spare parts, fuel, and even medical attention for pilots and crew members became increasingly scarce. By the third week of August, as the assault on Leningrad intensified, the 1st and 8th Air Corps had been conducting nonstop missions for weeks. They targeted VVS airfields and rail lines leading into the city, provided crucial close air support, and attempted to disrupt concentrations of the Red Army. However, with too few planes and personnel available, the effecti

Last time we spoke about Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front. In the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht aimed to capture Moscow, bolstered by early victories under General Fedor von Bock. However, the Red Army, under Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted a fierce defense, demonstrating unexpected resilience despite heavy losses. The Germans encircled Smolensk, celebrating its capture on July 16, yet their supply lines grew perilously thin. As battles intensified, Soviet forces reorganized, relocating factories to ramp up production of tanks and aircraft. In August, the Germans found their advance stymied by a revitalized Soviet spirit, which mobilized millions to replenish its ranks, even amid staggering losses. The Uman encirclement concluded, forcing the Soviets into a desperate fight, but German victories came at an alarming cost. Encountering manpower shortages, the Wehrmacht faced a critical juncture as the harsh realities of war set in.  This episode is “We Have Underestimated the Russian Colossus” Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As the fierce battles of Smolensk and Uman reached their climactic moments, the Wehrmachtwas gearing up for a critical third offensive movement. The Panzers of Army Group Center, which had previously borne the brunt of the assault against the Soviet Union, were now poised to transition into a supporting role. Their mission was no longer directly targeting the heart of Soviet defenses but instead to bolster the ongoing attacks on Leningrad in the north, renowned for its strategic importance as a major port city and Kyiv in the south, the capital of Ukraine and a vital economic center. Before embarking on their new assignments, the Panzers were tasked with securing the flanks of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's forces. This maneuver was essential to ensure the stability of their front lines as they prepared to assist their comrades engaged in combat in both the northern and southern sectors. Last week, we concluded our discussion with a deep dive into the strategic plans for the impending renewal of the offensive, focusing particularly on the precarious situation surrounding Smolensk. At that juncture, Soviet General Semyon Timoshenko was desperately trying to batter his way back into the city, a vital stronghold that had seen fierce fighting. This week, we will explore how this dramatic saga unfolds during the second week of August, specifically from the eighth to the sixteenth. As the fighting intensified, the other two army groups were left anxiously awaiting the support of the panzer divisions led by Generals Hermann Hoth and Heinz Guderian. These armored units were crucial to the German strategy, their mobility and firepower essential for breaking through Soviet defenses. In our previous discussion, we delved into the manpower reserves of both the Axis and Soviet forces, examining how these reserves were being translated into replacements on the battlefield. This week, however, we'll shift our focus slightly to investigate the status of military aid being dispatched from the United States and the United Kingdom, a critical yet often misunderstood aspect of the War in the East. To set the stage for this discussion, let’s begin with a brief overview of how military and economic assistance was organized and handled in America, an essential factor influencing the overall dynamics of the conflict. The 1930s began with the Great Depression and experienced a minor recession in 1937-1938. In response to the aftermath of World War I and ongoing war debts, the U.S. Congress enacted several Neutrality Acts aimed at maintaining non-interventionism by prohibiting Americans from selling arms to warring nations. However, as the situation escalated in Europe and Asia, President Roosevelt sought to amend these acts to allow cash sales of military goods to Britain and France, leading to the Neutrality Act of 1939, which marked a shift from isolationism toward interventionism. After the Fall of France in June 1940, the British Commonwealth became the primary force against Axis powers, but Britain faced dwindling resources. In response, Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease program, allowing the U.S. to provide military support to Allied nations. Public opinion began to shift favorably towards this aid as Americans recognized the need to support Britain against Nazi Germany, despite initial isolationist sentiments. The United States had specific legal limitations regarding the aid it could provide, which the United Kingdom did not face during World War II. These limitations are often referred to as Lend-Lease, but it’s important to understand that Lend-Lease was not so much about what aid could be delivered, but rather how it should be funded. This program evolved from the Neutrality Act, which had initially imposed an arms embargo on the nations engaged in conflict. The Neutrality Act was eventually amended to permit military equipment purchases on what was known as a cash and carry basis, an essential framework that allowed belligerent nations to acquire supplies as long as they could pay for them upfront. Cash and Carry was shorthand to mean that purchases had to be made with gold or US dollars and the goods had to be carried on non-American ships with no insurance from the US. This was to limit exposure of the American maritime industry to risk of serious loss by naval action. By 1941, the United Kingdom desperately needed to continue acquiring military equipment and economic supplies to sustain its war effort against Nazi Germany, but its gold reserves were dwindling alarmingly. The Lend-Lease bill was passed in March 1941, permitting Roosevelt to supply defense materials to any nation deemed vital to U.S. security. Over time, significant aid was extended to the Soviet Union, China, and others, with a total expenditure of about 51 billion. In May of that year, the Act was further modified, allowing the transfer or sale of military equipment to certain governments at the President’s discretion. Crucially, this amendment meant that payment was not necessarily required for the goods transferred, which was a lifeline for the British war machine. Notably, the Soviet Union was not initially included under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. As a result, they could still place orders for equipment, but these orders had to be paid for in gold or U.S. dollars. Thus, during June and early July, the Soviets began placing massive orders with American industrial suppliers. The first of these orders alone totaled nearly $1.8 billion, an enormous sum at the time. The requests included thousands of aircraft, artillery pieces, trucks, and additional military supplies. Moreover, they sought essential raw materials such as rubber, steel, aluminum, and oil, resources critical for sustaining their wartime industry. As the desperate situation on the Eastern Front deepened, Joseph Stalin took the extraordinary step of reaching out to American Envoy Harry Hopkins with a bold request: he asked that President Franklin D. Roosevelt consider sending American troops to fight against Hitler's forces. Stalin proposed that these American soldiers could be deployed anywhere along the Eastern Front, operating under the command of American leaders, a significant step that highlighted the urgency of the Soviet plight. This offer mirrored a similar one Stalin had made to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill around the same time, illustrating the level of desperation and anxiety the Soviet dictator felt as he witnessed the Red Army retreat from a series of catastrophic defeats throughout June and July. However, both of these offers were ultimately declined by the democratic leaders of the West, who were cautious about directly engaging in the Eastern Front conflict. Even as United States forces in Europe and the Pacific reached full operational strength during the critical years of 1943 and 1944, the Lend-Lease program continued to play a vital role in the Allied war effort. By this time, most remaining Allies, particularly those in Europe, had become largely self-sufficient in frontline military equipment such as tanks and fighter aircraft, although arms shipments persisted. However, Lend-Lease logistical supplies, including essential motor vehicles and railroad equipment, remained indispensable for sustaining military operations. World War II marked the first major conflict where entire formations of troops were routinely motorized. Soldiers were not only supported with vehicles specifically designed for combat, but also with a diverse array of transportation and logistical vehicles, enabling rapid movement and supply distribution across vast distances. Despite this, the warring powers significantly reduced the production of non-lethal materials to concentrate on munitions, leading to severe shortages of products necessary for industrial and logistical purposes, particularly unarmored vehicles. Consequently, the Allies became almost entirely dependent on American industrial production for unarmored vehicles, including those specially designed for military purposes. A prime example of this reliance is found in the Soviet Union, which was heavily dependent on ra

Last time we spoke about the how Hitler’s summer triumph turned bitter. Initially buoyed by early victories, the Wehrmacht, led by General Fedor von Bock, aimed to capture Moscow by encircling the critical city of Smolensk. However, under the leadership of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, the Red Army mounted an unexpectedly resilient defense. Despite suffering heavy losses, Soviet forces regrouped and undertook strategic reforms, relocating factories to enhance their production of tanks and aircraft. The situation intensified on July 15 as intense battles erupted in Smolensk, with German troops managing to encircle the city. Still, the Red Army's tenacity began to emerge. As the Germans celebrated capturing Smolensk on July 16, the broader picture reflected a grim reality; their supply lines stretched thin, and casualties mounted. Amidst shifting dynamics, the Red Army showcased formidable spirit and adaptability, hinting at a turning point in the war. Though Smolensk fell, the fierce resistance and evolving tactics foreshadowed challenges to come for the Wehrmacht, revealing the struggle and determination of those fighting on the Eastern Front.  This episode is the Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As August 1941 unfolds, the once-unshakeable illusion of a swift German victory begins to show signs of fracture. In this ninth podcast of our Eastern Front Week-by-Week series, the Wehrmacht finds itself in a precarious position, trapped between encircled Soviet forces and a resilient Red Army that refuses to succumb to defeat. At Smolensk, a significant city located in western Russia, the Soviets defy expectations by reopening the encirclement just days after it had been sealed. This audacious maneuver compels the German panzer groups, renowned for their rapid mobility, to delay their much-needed rest and refitting. The harsh reality of warfare sets in, as the promised quick victory turns into a struggle against the relentless Soviet defenders. To the south, the Uman encirclement, a brutal confrontation in Ukraine, concludes with staggering losses for the Soviet forces. While the Germans achieve a tactical victory, the cost in terms of men and resources begins to mount alarmingly for the invaders. The expansive fields of Ukraine become a graveyard for both sides, with each loss fueling the fires of conflict. Meanwhile, the Red Army is not standing idle. They mobilize millions of personnel from their vast reserves, forming new field armies even as their older counterparts are systematically dismantled on the battlefield. This resilience is a testament to the Soviet spirit, embodying their commitment to defending their homeland against the Axis onslaught. In the northern sector, Army Group North prepares for a decisive push toward Leningrad, the jewel city in the east, known for its historical and cultural significance. The forces commit their remaining strength in a desperate, last-ditch effort to seize this vital urban center. The stakes are incredibly high, as the city holds not only military importance but also symbolic value in the hearts of the Russian people. While the German offensive strength was increasingly waning, the Soviet Union launched one of the most remarkable mobilization programs in military history. During much of the 1920s and 1930s, the Red Army developed an extensive cadre system, which maintained a small number of active-duty soldiers during peacetime but could be rapidly expanded by reservists in times of war. To support this system, the Universal Military Service Law of 1938 extended the age of enlistment for army reserves to 50 years old and established numerous new military schools to accommodate the influx of trainees. By the eve of the German invasion, the Red Army had built a mobilization base of 14 million men. By the end of June 1941, approximately 5.3 million reservists had been called up, with further mobilizations occurring in rapid succession. This cadre system allowed for an extraordinary rate of force generation, effectively outmaneuvering German intelligence estimates and obscuring the true strength of the Soviet military. In July 1941, no fewer than 13 new field armies were formed, followed by an additional 14 in August. Although these newly constituted reserve armies were not as well equipped or trained as the professional soldiers they replaced, the changing tide of warfare began to favor them as German mobile forces weakened. As the conflict transitioned to positional warfare, these new armies had the opportunity to improve their training and tactics. While it is essential not to trivialize the scale of the military disaster experienced on the Western Front in Belorussia, it remains true that the Soviet Union's force generation scheme allowed for quick replenishment of its losses and a dramatic expansion of the Red Army's size. On June 22, 1941, the Red Army numbered 5,373,000 men; by August 31, despite suffering significant losses, this figure had grown to 6,889,000, and by December 31, 1941, the army reached an estimated eight million personnel. After the war, German military leaders, such as General Fritz Blumentritt, acknowledged the fundamental issue of latent Soviet military strength. Reflecting on the German offensive plans aimed at encircling and destroying the Red Army before they could regroup behind the Dnepr and Dvina rivers, Blumentritt posed a haunting rhetorical question: "But what if armies, millions strong, had not yet even been mobilized and only parts of the Red Army were in western Russia?" While the Soviet loss of tanks proved acutely felt, given that tanks were harder to replace, many historians have overstated the extent of German successes. At the onset of the war, the Soviet tank inventory numbered an impressive 23,767 tanks; however, this total reflected Soviet production dating back to the 1920s and included many models that had become obsolete on the modern battlefield. Of this number, around 15,000 tanks were from older T-26 and BT series, with estimates suggesting that the majority were in dire need of repair. Moreover, untrained crews, severe shortages of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts, as well as the absence of supporting arms like air cover, contributed to the scene of Soviet tanks littering the battlefields, even if they made it that far at all. Thus, the apparently staggering German successes, often highlighted by the sheer number of Soviet tanks destroyed, can be better understood as a disaster waiting to unfold for the Soviets. Inept planning and direction within the Soviet military profoundly affected the outcome, as the large quantities of outdated equipment inflated the perception of German victory. In reality, even without the specific blunders committed by the Soviets, the great bulk of their mechanized army was likely to struggle against the German forces. Yet, what was fundamentally crucial for the future of the conflict was the production of new and more effective tanks. In this regard, Soviet leadership acted with notable resolve. Amid the relentless advance of the German forces, the gigantic evacuation of Soviet industry to the east in 1941 became essential for ensuring the economic resilience of the Soviet Union. Undertaken with remarkable speed and under the most adverse circumstances, including aerial bombardments from the Luftwaffe, hundreds of factories were uprooted, transported deep into the interior, and rapidly reassembled. The scale and complexity of such an undertaking are hard to fathom, especially in light of the national crisis gripping the country. Here, the post-war Soviet literature’s use of grandiose terms such as "heroic" and "historic" seems justified. Between July and November, a staggering 1,523 industrial enterprises were relocated to the Volga region, Siberia, or Central Asia, amounting to an impressive 1.5 million railway wagonloads of equipment and materials. More remarkably, production of vital war materials actually increased in the latter half of 1941, with official production figures for items like tanks being exceeded. Indeed, the Soviet Union produced more tanks in 1941 than Germany, with 66 percent of these being the newer T-34 and KV-1 models. Additionally, Soviet industry outproduced Germany in aircraft and artillery pieces, effectively meeting the immediate needs of the Red Army. In assessing the outcome of Germany’s first major encirclement battle on the Eastern Front, it becomes apparent that the German military leadership overestimated the ramifications of their victories on the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain a coherent front. Conversely, the Germans failed to effectively balance the demands of securing a tight perimeter around the eastern edge of their encirclement with the necessity of swiftly capitalizing on their successes by continuing their advance. The root cause of this oversight, evident even in the early stages of the war, lay in a shortage of sufficient mobile forces needed to accomplish the tasks at hand. Consequently, as losses mounted and the campaign expanded toward more ambitious objectives over vast distances, the specter of over-extension loomed ever larger. Th

  Last time we spoke about the Fall of Smolensk. The Wehrmacht, having swiftly advanced through the Soviet Union, aimed to open the path to Moscow. Under General Fedor von Bock, the Germans launched a major assault against Soviet defenses, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. Despite early successes, German forces underestimated the resilience of the Soviet Army, which regrouped and mobilized hidden reserves. As the Luftwaffe dominated the skies, the Soviets, under General Vasily Vatutin, organized a counteroffensive. On July 15, intense combat erupted in Smolensk, with German troops steadily encircling the city. The Red Army, despite suffering heavy losses, showcased determination by relocating factories eastward and outproducing their enemies in tanks and aircraft. By July 16, Smolensk fell to the Germans, yet the battle revealed underlying vulnerabilities in the Wehrmacht. The fierce resistance from Soviet soldiers hinted at a critical turning point in the war.  This episode is the Hitler’s Summer Triumph Turns Bitter Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As July 1941 draws to a close, the Eastern Front plunges into a harrowing new chapter, characterized by escalating brutality, adaptive strategies, and profound exhaustion. Amidst this chaos, the Red Army grapples with staggering losses. Yet, while they are battered, they also begin to exhibit a remarkable capacity for strategic learning and resilience under relentless fire. Often overshadowed in discussions of the Eastern campaign, naval operations emerge as a crucial element in this conflict, unfolding across vital waterways such as the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and even the Arctic. These operations highlight the expansive and interconnected stakes of this monumental struggle. Key developments during this period include significant reorganizations within Soviet command, intense encirclement battles in Ukraine, and renewed offensives around the city of Smolensk, a strategically important location approximately 400 kilometers west of Moscow. Smolensk's position makes it a critical hub for transport and supply in the region, influencing the broader course of the war. As the fighting intensifies, the outcome of this encounter hangs in the balance. Both the Axis and Soviet forces are faced with mounting challenges amidst the chaotic escalation of warfare.  The Eastern Front during World War II was predominantly a land and air conflict, a reality shaped largely by the vast and varied geography of the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe was assigned a critical dual role in the Eastern Front: to establish complete control over the airspace by decimating the Soviet air force and to provide essential ground support for the army’s main operations. In the initial phase of the campaign, long-range air attacks targeting industrial centers in the distant Ural Mountains would not be prioritized; instead, these operations were planned to follow the completion of the mobile offensives. While it is commonly believed that Germany's navy, the Kriegsmarine, played a minimal role in the Eastern Front campaigns, this perception overlooks the nuanced involvement of naval forces. While the Kriegsmarine was a large, powerful, and professional force, its effectiveness was hampered by the need to divide its assets across multiple theaters of war. This limitation significantly restricted the number and size of ships that could be deployed in the Baltic Sea, particularly as the conflict intensified. At the onset of Operation Barbarossa on June 21, 1941, the German naval forces operating in the Baltic Sea comprised a modest yet effective fleet, including: 28 Schnellboote “fast attack boats”,5 submarines, 10 minelayers, primarily converted from passenger liners and ferries, 3 squadrons of M-class minesweepers, 3 squadrons of requisitioned minesweepers, which were often trawlers, 2 squadrons of R-boats “light coastal defense craft”, 2 squadrons of patrol boats, typically made up of trawlers, 3 Sperrbrecher “block ships designed to create obstacles”, 2 depot ships for minesweepers, a variety of naval tugs, transports, and auxiliary vessels. Later on in September 1941, Germany established the provisional Baltenflotte, a naval task force designed to confront the Soviet Baltic Fleet. This flotilla boasted impressive assets, including the battleship Tirpitz and several cruisers: Admiral Scheer, Emden, Köln, Leipzig, and Nürnberg, as well as destroyers Z25, Z26, and Z27, along with the 2nd torpedo boat squadron. The primary mission of the Baltenflotte was to eliminate the Soviet Baltic Fleet if it attempted to escape to neutral Sweden. However, this scenario did not materialize. Aerial reconnaissance indicated extensive damage to the remaining vessels of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, leading to the disbandment of the Baltenflotte before the end of October 1941. Germany’s ally in the Baltic Sea was the Finnish Navy and while small, was a professional force equipped to meet the demands of its strategic objectives during the conflict. In 1941, Finland's naval strength comprised the following key assets: Two coastal defense ships: Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, which provided essential firepower and protection for Finland's coastline. Five submarines: Vesihiisi, Iku-Turso, Vetehinen, Vesikko, and Saukko, which played a vital role in disrupting enemy shipping and gathering intelligence. Four sloops: Turunmaa, Karjala, Uusimaa, and Hämeenmaa, tasked with various missions, including escort and minesweeping operations. Three minelayers: These ships were crucial for establishing minefields in strategic areas to impede enemy movement. Twelve minesweepers: Essential for clearing navigable waters, allowing safe passage for friendly vessels.Seven motor torpedo boats: Fast and agile, these boats were capable of launching surprise attacks against larger enemy ships. In addition to these primary vessels, the Finnish Navy also utilized several auxiliary craft, enhancing its operational capabilities during the war. Notable among these were: Four sloops: Reassigned mainly as escorts and minesweepers, further expanding the Navy’s capacity for coastal defense. Six cutters: Smaller vessels employed for escort duties and minesweeping operations, demonstrating versatility in combat situations. Seventeen VMV-class patrol boats: These small vessels served multiple roles, acting as torpedo boats, gunboats, and sub-hunters, showcasing their adaptability on the water. Their enemy was the Soviet Baltic Fleet, commanded by Admiral Vladimir Tributs throughout World War II, was the largest of the four fleets that comprised the Soviet Navy. Initially, the fleet was limited to bases in the eastern corner of the Gulf of Finland, but it quickly emerged as the most formidable naval power in the Baltic Sea. As the war unfolded, the fleet expanded its operational capabilities by utilizing naval bases in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This expansion began with agreements imposed by the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939 and was solidified following the occupation of the Baltic states in June 1940. Additionally, the Soviet Baltic Fleet benefited from territorial gains made in the peace treaty after the Winter War, acquiring valuable naval assets, including a base at Hanko, Finland, and access along the coast of the Karelian Isthmus. Prior to Operation Barbarossa, the main naval bases of the Baltic Fleet were located at Liepāja and Tallinn. As of June 1941, the Soviet Naval strength in the Baltic included a diverse array of vessels: Battleships: 2 (Gangut class), Cruisers: 2 (Kirov class), Destroyer leaders: 2 (Leningrad class), Modern destroyers: 17 (comprising 3 Type 7, 13 Type 7U, and Opytny), Older destroyers: 7 (including 2 Izyaslav-class and 4 Orfey-class, plus the Yakov Sverdlov), Submarines: 65, Escort vessels/gunboats: 7, Mine warfare vessels: 39, Motor torpedo boats: 48, Despite these assets, the fleet faced increasing challenges as German forces advanced, which would soon impact its operational effectiveness in the region. The Winter War, along with the occupation of the Baltic states, had positioned the Red Banner Baltic Fleet robustly within the region. By June 1941, it was the largest navy on the Baltic Sea, boasting two battleships, two heavy cruisers, 19 destroyers, and 68 submarines, supported by a naval air arm of 709 aircraft. With well-established bases along the entire Baltic coast and in Hanko, the fleet posed a significant threat, particularly as the long and vulnerable southern coast of Finland became exposed to Soviet naval presence. The Finnish Navy consisted of two main branches: the first included the old but well-maintained coastal fortifications built by the Russians before World War I, known as Peter the Great's Naval Fortress; the second was the active navy, featuring two coastal defense ships, five submarines, and various smaller craft. However, the Kriegsmarine could only deploy a small portion of its naval forces in the Baltic, as the majority were engaged in the ongoing battle of the Atlantic. Germany's primary concern in the Baltic Sea was to safeguard the supply routes through the Archipelago Sea that were vital for importing iron ore from Sweden to support its war ind

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Smolensk. The Wehrmacht, having swiftly advanced through the Soviet Union, prepared to engage the Red Army in fierce combat. The Luftwaffe had dominated the skies, severely diminishing Soviet air power. However, unbeknownst to the Germans, the Soviets, under General Timoshenko, were regrouping and mobilizing hidden reserves, readying themselves for a counteroffensive. Amidst logistical chaos and heavy losses, the Soviets utilized their cadre system, rapidly generating new field armies. While the Germans celebrated captures, they failed to recognize the Soviets' latent strength. As the Germans advanced toward Smolensk, the Red Army struggled but exhibited resilience, relocating factories eastward to maintain wartime production. This industrial mobilization became vital, allowing the Soviets to outproduce the Germans in tanks and aircraft by late 1941. The intense fighting around Smolensk evidenced the brutal realities of warfare, with both sides suffering greatly.  This episode is the Fall of Smolensk Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  A heavy smoke of battle clings to the air above the city of Smolensk, a crucial location in western Russia. It’s July 15, 1941, and the gates to Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union are creaking ominously under the relentless pressure of the German advance. Army Group Center, under the command of General Fedor von Bock, is launching a fierce attack against the newly fortified defenses of the Western Front, commanded by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. He is desperately fighting to hold Smolensk, a strategically vital city that stands as a key to unlocking the road to Moscow. We witnessed the Wehrmacht commencing their assault on Smolensk. Meanwhile, in the north, their drive toward Leningrad continued relentlessly, and in the south, Army Group South had pivoted to encircle Uman after being thwarted in their advance on Kyiv. In the early days of July, while army commanders were focused on the day-to-day challenges of the campaign, Adolf Hitler began to look further ahead. His well-known hesitance about continuing the operation beyond the great rivers towards Moscow was a source of concern for both General Franz Halder and General Walther von Brauchitsch. However, they believed that the ongoing successes of the campaign offered the best assurance for maintaining a forward advance across all fronts. As early as July 3 and 4, Hitler voiced his interest in halting the panzer groups under General Heinz Guderian and using them to support flanking advances instead. On July 5, General Alfred Jodl contacted Brauchitsch by telephone, urging him to meet with Hitler and present his views on the strategic choices for the northern and southern fronts. Jodl posed several crucial questions regarding both the necessity and feasibility of these operations, highlighting the growing tension between the OKW and OKH over the future direction of the campaign. He stressed the urgency of the army's involvement in the discussion, stating, “Given that the Führer’s thoughts, and those of others, are shifting towards an early turning of the panzer groups toward the northeast or south, General Jodl considers it essential that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army promptly meets with the Führer for a discussion.” The meeting took place at Hitler’s headquarters on July 8, with Halder accompanying Brauchitsch. Both men presented before Hitler and his staff. Brauchitsch began by summarizing the latest tactical reports, after which Halder outlined the army’s assessment of the enemy situation and progress within the three army groups. The tone of Halder’s presentation was characteristically optimistic, aimed at instilling confidence in the army's management of the war and reaffirming its strategic direction. Halder firmly believed that the German forces were now in a commanding position to secure victory. He cited the most recent intelligence report from Colonel Kinzel, which indicated that of the 164 identified Soviet rifle divisions, 89 had been either completely or largely eliminated. From the remaining 75 divisions, 46 were actively opposing the German front, while 18 were engaged on other fronts, 14 in Finland and four in the Caucasus. The last 11 divisions were likely held in reserve deep within Soviet territory. Kinzel’s report also stated, “The enemy is no longer able to organize a continuous front, not even behind strong terrain features.” He emphasized that Army Group Centre, already stronger than its opponents, now enjoyed a crushing superiority that could be maintained even if the Soviets brought up fresh units. The environment created by Halder’s buoyant report fostered a sense of confidence about the war's progress and minimized the urgency to make a decisive operational decision regarding Bock’s panzer groups. This optimistic atmosphere briefly inspired a sense of reconciliation between Hitler and Halder, opening up avenues for compromise that had previously seemed impossible, particularly concerning the direction towards Moscow. Hitler articulated his ‘ideal solution’ for continuing the campaign: Army Group North was to accomplish its assigned tasks in the Baltic states and Leningrad using its own resources. Meanwhile, Army Group Centre was tasked with eliminating the last remnants of organized Soviet resistance along the overstretched front north of the Pripet Marshes, which, he suggested, would thereby open the road to Moscow. Upon reaching their designated positions east of Smolensk, Hoth’s forces could halt and either assist Leeb, if necessary, or press on eastward with the goal of encircling Moscow. Guderian’s forces could then strike in a southern or southeastern direction in coordination with Army Group South. Meanwhile the Soviet Air Force, commonly known by its acronym, the VVS, was still grappling with the repercussions of the disastrous events of June. The early campaigns of Operation Barbarossa had decimated their fleet, resulting in the loss of more than half of their available aircraft. By mid-July, however, the VVS began to regain some footing, managing to contest the Luftwaffe’s previously assumed air superiority. Despite the Luftwaffe's dominance during the initial stages of the operation, they faced their own limitations: there were simply not enough planes, infrastructure, or trained pilots to sustain their aggressive tactics. This shortage meant that some of the Red Army's counter-attacks went unnoticed in the early stages of their planning, but it also allowed the VVS to harass and distract Wehrmacht columns as they advanced. By mid-July 1941, the Luftwaffe’s capabilities were being pushed to the breaking point. The VVS was actively strafing and bombing German troops on the southern approaches to Smolensk, a city critical for both sides. Though these attacks often amounted to little more than a nuisance, they had a significant psychological impact on the German soldiers. Many in the Wehrmacht had been led to believe that the Soviet Union was all but defeated, that its military might lay in ruins, and that their only task now was to mop up the remnants of resistance. Yet, they found themselves facing a determined adversary, launching air attacks that the Luftwaffe seemed unable to stop or prevent. This unexpected persistence from the VVS not only challenged the German advance but also forced the Wehrmacht to reconsider their assumptions about a swift victory. The relentless drive towards Leningrad was taking a significant toll on Army Group North. After the explosive initial success of Operation Barbarossa, the campaign was now encountering a series of stumbling blocks in the north. On the northern flank of Army Group Centre, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb’s Army Group North was making more favorable progress. However, as the esteemed General Erich von Manstein, commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, would later note, “the enemy, though pushed back to the east, was still not destroyed, something that would soon become evident.” After successfully capturing Riga, the capital of Latvia, Leeb was compelled to continue his eastward push to support the left flank of General Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Centre. Simultaneously, he needed to mount a significant offensive northward into Estonia to protect his own left flank. This strategic situation was stretching Army Group North's front width rapidly. As the smallest of the three German army groups, this expansion would soon prove to heavily tax its offensive momentum. On July 16, Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, the commander of Army Group North’s Panzer Group 4, expressed his dissatisfaction with the stalled advance towards Leningrad in a letter to his wife. He wrote, "The deciding cause remains our weakness. The number of divisions is as inadequate as their equipment. The men are tired, the losses are increasing, and the rate of vehicle breakdowns is on the rise." His candid assessment highlighted the growing strains on the German forces as they faced not only the challenges of combat but also the detrimental effects of fatigue and equipment shortages. While the Red Army had not succeeded in completely halting the Wehrmacht's advance in th

Last time we spoke about the Red Army on the Run. In the second week of Operation Barbarossa, the progress of the German forces was marked by swift victories and severe challenges. The Luftwaffe's dominance in the skies led to significant destruction of Soviet aircraft, with Germany claiming thousands downed. However, the Soviet Air Force, with hidden reserves, began to regroup under General Timoshenko, setting the stage for resilience. Amid these chaotic battlefields, disorganization plagued the Red Army, which struggled to adapt its tactics against the more cohesive German forces. Despite losing heavily, Soviet commanders sought to turn the tide, but logistical issues and fierce German assaults exacerbated their plight. As the Germans captured crucial territories like Riga, their strategic goal conflicted with rising concerns from within their command. While Hitler believed victory was within reach, generals like Halder worried about underestimating Soviet strength. The relentless advances led to fierce fighting at the edges of Smolensk, where both armies braced for an inevitable and consequential clash.  This episode is the beginning of the Battle for Smolensk  Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Well hello there, we are back and its week three of Operation Barbarossa. On July 8, Army Group Centre officially proclaimed that it had captured 287,704 prisoners, destroyed or seized 2,585 tanks, and taken 1,449 guns. While these numbers do reflect considerable gains, they do not necessarily indicate that the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse, in fact, the opposite was true. As the German offensive strength began to wane, the Soviet Union was implementing one of the most remarkable mobilization programs in military history. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Red Army had developed a cadre system, maintaining a small number of active-duty soldiers in peacetime that could be rapidly expanded by reservists during wartime. This system received a boost with the 1938 Universal Military Service Law, which extended the age of enlistment for army reserves to 50 and established numerous military schools to accommodate the influx of recruits. By the time of the German invasion, the Red Army boasted a mobilization base of 14 million men. By the end of June 1941, 5.3 million reservists had been called up, with subsequent mobilizations continuing to swell the ranks. This cadre system allowed for an unprecedented rate of force generation, catching German intelligence completely off guard and concealing the true strength of the Soviet military. In July 1941, an astounding 13 new field armies emerged, followed by another 14 in August. While these reserve armies were not as well-equipped or trained as their professional counterparts, as the German mobile forces weakened, many of the frontlines began to settle into positional warfare. This shift granted the new armies the time they needed to improve.   While it would be unreasonable to downplay the magnitude of the Western Front’s military disaster in Belorussia, it is important to recognize that the Soviet Union’s system for generating forces allowed it to quickly replace losses and expand the size of the Red Army. On June 22, 1941, the Red Army counted 5,373,000 men. By August 31, despite heavy losses, this number had surged to 6,889,000, and by December 31, 1941, it reached an estimated 8 million. After the war, German military officer Blumentritt acknowledged the fundamental issue of latent Soviet military strength. He recalled the German offensive plans aimed at encircling and destroying the Red Army before reaching the Dnieper and Dvina Rivers, ultimately asking, “But what if armies, millions strong, had not yet even been mobilized, and only parts of the Red Army were in western Russia?”   The loss of tanks weighed heavily on the Soviets, as these assets were much harder to replace. However, historians have often overstated the extent of German victories, particularly regarding the Soviet tank fleet. At the war's outset, the Soviets had an astonishing total of 23,767 tanks, but this figure included many that were already obsolete. Around 15,000 of those were older T-26 and BT models, most of which were in need of repair. Compounding the issue, untrained crews faced a severe shortage of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and critical support such as air cover. It’s little wonder that Soviet tanks often sat abandoned on the battlefield if they even made it that far. Thus, the seemingly impressive numbers of Soviet tanks destroyed can be better understood as a disaster waiting to happen. Ineffective Soviet planning and direction significantly contributed to what became the Germans' first major triumph, inflating the narrative of an overwhelming victory through the sheer volume of outdated equipment. However, what proved vital for the future of the war was the production of new tanks. In this regard, Soviet leadership demonstrated impressive resolve.    As the powerful German war machine charged eastward, another kind of battle raged behind Soviet lines, a battle not fought with tanks or rifles, but with wrenches, train cars, and sheer determination. Entire factories were uprooted and transported east, beyond the towering Ural Mountains, in a frantic race against the relentless advance of the enemy. As the Wehrmacht relentlessly pushes toward Smolensk and Leningrad, the Soviets are embarking on an extraordinary industrial mobilization, one of the most staggering efforts in military history.  What was unfolding was nothing short of remarkable: the relocation of hundreds of Soviet factories from the devastated western front to the safer haven east of the Urals. It all began on June 24, when a dedicated committee sprang into action, tasked with the monumental challenge of evacuation. By the first week of July, the effort was in full swing and rapidly gained momentum as the month progressed. This evacuation would stretch on until December 1941, and its importance cannot be overstated, the survival of the Red Army depended on it. As the field forces suffered staggering losses of equipment, the situation grew even graver. Much of the stockpile was outdated, a relic of a bygone era. Modern war machines were rolling off assembly lines, but they were being deployed to the front lines faster than they could be replenished. Just last week, we witnessed KV-1 tanks being dispatched directly from factories to participate in fierce assaults. The emergency deployment of arms and ammunition to frontline units would continue throughout the war, but to sustain this momentum, the factories had to be relocated. And while the Lend-Lease equipment would only begin arriving in significant numbers in 1942, the Soviets were determined not to lose ground. Their resolve, ingenuity, and relentless spirit would be tested like never before in this pivotal moment of history.   It was decided that entire factories would be dismantled, sometimes down to the wiring carefully packed, and transported eastward. This monumental task was anything but easy. Surprisingly, the Germans appeared largely unaware of what was unfolding, showing little effort to disrupt the evacuation. Yet, even without German interference, the process of dismantling, moving, and reassembling the industrial base presented staggering challenges. The invasion itself turned this effort into a Herculean task, fraught with difficulties. Many factories arrived at their new locations incomplete, delayed, misplaced, and in some cases, all three. Throughout most of 1941, the fighting was carried out with weapons that had already been produced. However, one must wonder: how much would the Red Army’s rebuilding efforts for the 1942 campaigns hinge on the output from these relocated factories in 1941? Not everything necessary for the war effort could be evacuated. Crucial infrastructure, like mines, roads, and dams had to be abandoned. In many cases, Soviet forces resorted to sabotage, deliberately undermining these assets to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Perhaps most famous of these acts of sabotage by the retreating Soviets was the destruction of the dam at Zaporozhye in August 1941. The resultant flood may have killed upwards of 100,000 people. This was no trivial matter; sabotage often came at a steep cost, claiming lives and destroying years of hard work by countless men and women who had toiled during the five-year plans. Yet, despite the risks, Stalin and his inner circle understood that this grim decision was essential for the survival of their war effort.   Between July and November, 1,523 industrial enterprises moved to the Volga region, Siberia, or Central Asia, totaling about 1.5 million railway wagon loads. Even more astonishingly, production of essential war materials actually increased during the latter half of 1941, with some official production quotas, particularly for tanks being exceeded. In fact, the Soviet Union produced more tanks in 1941 than Germany did, with 66 percent of these being the newer T-34 and KV-1 models. The Soviets also manufactured more aircraft and artillery pieces than Germany, effectively meeting the immediate needs of their armed forces. When e

  Last time we spoke about Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine. As Operation Barbarossa unfolded, Army Group South advanced into Ukraine, driven by the need to secure critical oil reserves for Germany’s war machine. Initial gains were swift, as the German forces used air superiority to capture key positions. However, logistical issues quickly surfaced, revealing the vulnerabilities of their supply lines. Soviet General Kirponos, although initially caught off guard, managed to organize defenses and counterattacks thanks to a well-structured communication system. Despite their numerical advantages, the Red Army was plagued by disorganization and outdated tactics. The clash at Dubno highlighted this struggle, with Soviet forces launching piecemeal assaults that were easily countered by the more coordinated German defenses. As battles raged, both sides faced the brutal realities of war, heavy losses and the harsh conditions of the Eastern Front.  This episode is the Red Army on the Run Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Well hello there, welcome back, we have just got through week one of Operation Barbarossa and now its time to head into week two.   In the opening days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe achieved remarkable success, obliterating a staggering number of Soviet aircraft. The air battle on the Eastern Front was indeed a chaotic spectacle, yet it's important to note that it wasn't as one-sided as some histories have portrayed. In the early days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe unleashed devastation upon the Soviet Air Force, racking up staggering losses that reached into the thousands. One source reported that by the end of June, the Luftwaffe had destroyed 4,614 Soviet aircraft, with 3,176 of those taken out on the ground and 1,438 in aerial combat. In stark contrast, German losses amounted to just 330 planes. These figures highlight a clear German superiority in the skies, but for various reasons, this supremacy was fleeting. Following the doctrines of blitzkrieg, the Luftwaffe's primary objective in the East was to gain immediate control of the airspace above Soviet territory. In an impressive display of force, they achieved total domination of the skies within just two days, inflicting chaos on Soviet airfields in the western districts. This victory enabled the Luftwaffe to shift focus toward supporting ground operations.  However, lurking behind the front lines were thousands of Soviet aircraft, strategically stationed further back from the border and in the Soviet interior. These planes had managed to survive the initial onslaught and would eventually be relocated to new airfields. During this brief window of Luftwaffe dominance, concerns began to surface. Major General Hoffman von Waldau, head of the Luftwaffe's operations department, conveyed his worries to Halder on July 1st. "The air force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy," he warned. "It's quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes." Just two days later, he further reflected in his diary that the Soviet military capabilities were significantly stronger than pre-war assessments indicated. “The material quality is better than expected. Though we achieved great successes with relatively low losses, a large number of Soviet aircraft remain to be destroyed.” Despite the Luftwaffe's initial triumphs, they now faced the daunting challenge of balancing support for the army while contending with a resurgent Soviet aerial presence. As the operational theater expanded at a rapid pace, the Luftwaffe's already limited resources became stretched thin. Air bases had to be relocated eastward to newly established, poorly equipped airfields, where inadequate supply lines hindered their effectiveness just as much as they did for the ground troops. These new airfields were also particularly vulnerable to attacks from roaming enemy groups infiltrating the rear areas. While the Luftwaffe experienced significant successes, the Soviet Air Force was not without its victories. In July 1941, Soviet pilots managed to raid German airfields, inflicting damage on the Luftwaffe as well. One Soviet pilot vividly recalled an attack near Bobruisk: “Approaching our target, the Shturmoviks flew low to the ground. As our leader turned to launch the assault, missiles struck the rows of bombers, causing explosions. Tracer bullets shredded the wings adorned with black crosses. Just above the earth, our Shturmoviks released their hundred-kilo bombs, igniting Junkers and Messerschmitts prepped for takeoff. We arrived just in time to prevent the enemy from launching their operations! Our regiment repeatedly struck Bobruisk airfield, causing significant damage and destroying dozens of bombers and Messerschmitts.” As the frontlines surged forward, reconnaissance units struggled to keep pace with the fast-moving Panzer divisions. Even though the initial weeks of the campaign had seemed relatively light in terms of losses, skepticism lingered among key figures. On July 1st, Major General Waldau, commander of the 10th Air Corps, communicated a stark warning to the head of the Army High Command, General Halder. He expressed concerns that the Luftwaffe had drastically underestimated the strength of the Soviet Air Force, now estimating their numbers to exceed 8000 aircraft. Halder was taken aback, unable to accept such a figure. Just days before, the Luftwaffe's own strength had barely surpassed 3500 planes. The idea that the Soviets could have lost over four thousand planes and still possess a similar number ready for battle seemed implausible. Halder wasn’t alone in his disbelief. The senior leadership of the Luftwaffe shared his sentiment, dismissing Waldau’s grim assessment. They were riding high on the belief that they had secured a monumental victory, and any contrary evidence only dampened their spirits. To their credit, they had indeed decimated a significant portion of the Soviet Air Force, and their influence remained pivotal in the ongoing battlefield struggles around Minsk, Kyiv, and Leningrad. However, their major flaw lay in their unwillingness to acknowledge that the war was far from over. The early weeks of the conflict revealed a harsh truth: victory could not be seized in a single stroke. A decisive triumph was proving elusive, regardless of how fiercely the Luftwaffe's commanders clung to their beliefs. This goes to a larger point about whether or not Germany could ever have managed a truly decisive victory over the USSR. A decisive battle is one that decides a war. This is an elusive concept at any rate and one that is debated at the highest levels of intellectual circles in military theory. The now dominant understanding of the Second World War as an industrial conflict decided on the production lines and the mines of the combatants precludes any discussion of “decisive battles.” As the second week of the war unfolded, Army Group North continued to make significant strides. On July 1st, they captured Riga, and Pskov was now within reach. The Soviet Northwestern Front was in disarray, with roughly twenty out of the thirty-one divisions that began the campaign operating at less than half strength. In response to this dire situation, Colonel General F. Kuznetsov was replaced by Lieutenant General Sobennikov. Sobennikov had been the 8th Army commander during the first week of the war. He was replaced in this role by Lieutenant General Ivanov. To further bolster the command structure, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Stavka, Lieutenant General Vatutin, was sent to the front headquarters. This marked one of the early instances of a practice that would become a hallmark of the war. The Stavka regularly dispatched representatives to front commands, serving as both advisors and overseers to ensure that orders were executed precisely. For now, Vatutin faced the daunting task of restoring the front lines and preventing further German breakthroughs. However, he wasn’t given any additional resources to accomplish this monumental challenge. From the German perspective, the initial weeks in the North were marked by rapid advances interspersed with periods of regrouping. The only significant combat during the first week of the invasion occurred at Raseiniai, as discussed in our previous podcast. The Red Army fought fiercely wherever it could, but much of the early phase of Operation Barbarossa was characterized by a chaotic retreat. The Northwestern Front was sacrificing territory in a desperate attempt to stall Colonel General Hoepner’s Panzer spearheads. The 4th Panzer Group maneuvered between the infantry divisions of Army Group North as they swung northeast and then north through the Baltic region. Positioned as the southern spearhead was Colonel General Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps, which made rapid progress in the initial days of the war but faced a fierce Soviet counterattack that they had to fend off without support. Meanwhile, Colonel General Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps engaged at Raseiniai, participating in one of the largest tank battles witnessed thus far in the conflict. By July 3rd, the Panzers were once again on the move. Manstein managed to se

Last time we spoke about Day 3 of Operation Barbarossa, the encirclement of Bialystok-Minsk. The relentless German advance caught the Soviet forces off guard. As Army Group Center surged forward, equipped with nearly 1,500 Luftwaffe aircraft, they aimed to encircle Soviet armies. They swiftly captured vital positions, overcoming initial defenses with shocking ease. However, despite early successes, logistical challenges began to stifle their momentum, revealing cracks in their operational capabilities. The Soviet response, though disorganized, showcased unexpected resilience as they regrouped and launched counterattacks. The chaos within Soviet command hindered coordinated efforts, resulting in heavy losses during futile counteroffensives. Ultimately, the Germans achieved a substantial operational victory, encircling massive Soviet forces at Bialystok-Minsk, one of the largest encirclements in military history. The clash at Bialystok-Minsk marked a turning point in the campaign, revealing the grim realities of warfare and setting the stage for future confrontations as the Eastern Front unfolded. This episode is: Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Well hello again, we are now in day four of Operation Barbarossa. In this podcast we are going to now focus on Army Group South, who find themselves in a large campaign in Ukraine. Conquering Ukraine was critical to not just Operation Barbarossa, but Germany’s entire war plans. A critical challenge for the motorized supply system of operation barbarossa was the availability of fuel. Just nine days before the campaign began, Halder was informed of Germany’s oil reserves. He was warned that "fuel supplies will be exhausted by autumn," with aviation fuel projected to drop to half and regular fuel down to only a quarter of what was needed. Diesel and heating oil would be at just half of the required levels. Since the planning stages of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht’s operations department had been monitoring the declining oil stocks. They tried to advocate for economic goals, particularly focusing on the Soviet oil-producing region in the Caucasus. This meant that part of Army Group South needed to advance towards the Donets region and then on to Krasnodar and Maykop-Grozny. In line with these objectives, the War Economic Staff sent a request to the 17th Army back on June 12, urging the swift occupation of the oil-rich region of Drogobycz in Galicia. However, Halder rejected this request, writing in his diary the next day: "Political Questions I refuse to allow economic considerations to influence the operational direction." This not only underscored the urgency of Germany’s fuel shortage, according to the War Economic Staff, but also highlighted Halder’s commitment to his operational strategy, dismissing objectives he deemed unrelated to defeating the Soviet Union. Such thinking would prove detrimental to the German war effort.  Army Group South was backed by the 4th Air Fleet under Colonel General Löhr, which included the 4th and 5th Air Corps. This Air Fleet was equipped with approximately 392 light bombers and 248 fighters. Among these aircraft were the Ju-87 Stukas, the Luftwaffe's workhorses for close air support. However, there was always a shortage of these vital planes. Another challenge was the vast distances within the operational area, which limited the effective use of the Stukas due to their short range. In contrast, the Heinkel He-111 had almost double that range, but it was less maneuverable and more challenging to use for the close precision strikes needed in air support missions. On the first day of operations, the bombers of the 4th Air Fleet carried out similar missions to those of the other Air Fleets, targeting airfields, command centers, and supply depots. As the week progressed, they successfully established air superiority, edging towards complete air supremacy. Air Supremacy and Air Superiority are two different concepts. Modern USAF doctrine defines the terms as follows: Air Supremacy is complete control over the skies, such that opposing air forces are incapable of interfering within the operational area. Air Superiority is the level of control that allows for operations without prohibitive interference from enemy air forces. This is often constrained in time and space.  Army Group South was divided into two nearly equal halves. The southern half, stationed in Romania, wouldn't begin serious operations until the first week of July. However, during the initial week, they managed to seize several bridges across the Prut River using patrol-sized units. It is unclear how large these “patrol sized elements” were. It can be inferred that they were probably company sized operations. Significant enough to seize the bridges from any border forces but not large enough to invite serious attention from the Soviet Southern or Southwestern commands. These strategic positions were held to secure a passage for the German 11th Army, along with the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, to advance into Bessarabia and southern Ukraine when the time was right. No significant resistance was encountered, likely because Soviet forces were focused on the immediate areas where the invasion was actively taking place. It wasn't until June 25 that the Soviet Southern Front was activated to defend Odessa and the southern approaches to the Ukrainian Steppe. Although this activation was late in coming, it significantly improved the Red Army's readiness in the region when the Germans and Romanians launched their larger offensive across the border in early July. While the advance of Army Group Centre was crucial for German operations in the east, its success relied on the simultaneous progress of the northern and southern army groups. These groups not only had their own objectives but also needed to provide flank support for Army Group Centre. Rundstedt's Army Group South faced the toughest challenge, engaged with the Soviet South-Western Front commanded by Colonel-General Michail Kirponos. The Soviets mistakenly believed that Ukraine was the primary target of the German invasion. The Red Army in their pre-war planning had decided that Ukraine would be the scene of the main effort in a German invasion. This was incorrect as the Wehrmacht ultimately decided that Army Group Center aimed at Moscow would be the initial main effort. However, it did have basis in reality. There had been much discussion in the OKH and OKW about where the main effort should be directed. Hitler himself still felt that the economic objective of the war could only be achieved by taking the natural resources of Ukraine.  This tension would lead to significant friction in the command structure of the Wehrmacht.  Kirponos had successfully overseen the construction of formidable fortifications along the Ukrainian border. Additionally, he had established a well-organized communication system that allowed him to receive warnings about the invasion earlier than his counterparts to the north. This advance notice did not precede the invasion itself; rather, it confirmed that the invasion was indeed underway before other front commanders were aware. Thanks to this timely information, Kirponos could begin organizing his forces and planning counterattacks within minutes, rather than hours. The Southwestern Front boasted an impressive 4,780 tanks spread across eight mechanized corps. In contrast, the 1st Panzer Group, led by Colonel General Kleist, had only 715 tanks. Although the Soviet forces appeared to have a significant numerical advantage, this superiority was diluted by the dispersion of the Soviet mechanized corps, as well as deficiencies in communication equipment, training, and effective tactics. Despite these challenges, Kleist recognized the threat posed by the Soviet troops and could not afford to underestimate them. As he advanced into open country in the war’s early days, he faced counterattacks from multiple directions, sometimes simultaneously. He worked diligently to use his panzers effectively and skillfully navigated the complexities of each situation. It was clear that the battles ahead would not be straightforward. While the Soviets were disadvantaged in specialized weaponry, they did have superiority in  the sheer number of guns they could assemble and supply with ammunition. While there were certainly significant imperfections in the Soviet employment and handling of artillery early in the war, the Germans were frequently outgunned and struggled to bring up sufficient stockpiles of shells. Later on as the conditions of static warfare began to take hold along the vast eastern front, the importance of the infantryman grew much more. No longer just tasked with securing the territory won by the Panzers, they were responsible for holding the long front together. In this role, the German infantry demonstrated good training, but their equipment was lacking, especially when compared to their Soviet counterparts. One officer from the 4th Panzer Division remarked after the war, “The equipment, which had proved efficient in previous campaigns, was not robust enough for battle under the conditions prevailing in Rus

Last time we spoke about Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa. On the campaign's second day, Army Group North, led by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, aimed to seize Leningrad and prevent Soviet retreats. Initial assaults caught Soviet troops off guard, leading to devastating German victories. However, logistical challenges in harsh terrain began to hamper their advance. As Germany celebrated these wins, Soviet forces regrouped and mounted fierce counterattacks, demonstrating unexpected resilience amid chaos. In Finland, leveraging the situation, local activists orchestrated a rebellion in Kaunas, declaring independence and collaborating with German troops, marking a brief surge of hope among the populace. Yet, the brutality of war soon took center stage as Nazi units began committing horrific atrocities against Jewish communities. Amid these grim realities, soldiers faced not only daunting battles but also the moral implications of their actions. The tide of war began to reveal the brutal consequences of conflict, foreshadowing a dark period in history as both sides grappled with the unfolding horror of human suffering on the Eastern Front.  This episode is: Day 3 Operation Barbarossa: The First Encirclement  Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Well hello again, we are now on day 3 of Operation Barbarossa. Over the past two episodes we covered Army Group Center and Army Group North as they made their initial thrusts into the USSR. As the conflict unfolded, Army Group Center burst into the Soviet Union, fueled by an unstoppable momentum. The thrust was bolstered by the most formidable deployment of Luftwaffe assets ever seen on the Eastern Front. Imagine nearly 1,500 aircraft from the 2nd Air Fleet soaring through the skies, unleashing a relentless barrage on Soviet airfields, critical supply lines, and concentrations of troops. At first glance, the initial air superiority seemed like a foregone conclusion. However, this early success of the Luftwaffe belied deeper challenges lurking beneath the surface. Reconnaissance gaps and a glaring lack of close air support were quietly starting to impede the operational effectiveness of the German forces on the ground. As the campaign roared into action, German troops, led by Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group and Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, initiated a swift, coordinated advance. Their goal? To encircle entire Soviet armies. Key locations like Alytus and Grodno became battlegrounds where fierce tank clashes unfolded. Here, the Germans encountered the formidable T-34s of the Red Army, a new and powerful adversary. Despite their bravery, disorganization and a failure to integrate combined-arms tactics ultimately doomed the Soviet counterattacks. Today we are going to continue the story and this will set the stage for one of the most significant encirclements in modern military history at the Bialystok-Minsk Pocket. We are now venturing back to the campaign led by Army Group Center, who are currently being supported by two air corps, 2nd Air Corps, under General of Aviation Loerzer, the 8th Air Corps under Colonel General Richthofen both of which were part of the 2nd Air Fleet, under Field Marshal Kesserling. The 8th Air Corps was tasked with supporting the 9th Army, especially Armoured Group 3, while the 2nd Air Corps  coordinated with the 4th Army, focusing primarily on Armoured Group 2. The previous successes of the Wehrmacht's land campaigns had showcased the enormous advantage Germany gained through effective combined-arms operations. Recognizing this critical synergy, Kesselring made it clear to his generals that the desires and strategies of the army were to be regarded as his own commands. This instruction underscored the necessity of collaboration, an essential element in the execution of their military plans. The commitment of air units to this campaign underscored the importance of Army Group Center as the spearhead of Operation Barbarossa. Around 1,500 planes took to the skies under the banner of the 2nd Air Fleet, boasting a formidable mix of modern light bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. In that crucial first week, these aircraft unleashed a series of raids on Soviet airfields and supply dumps, all in an effort to disrupt the Red Army’s ability to respond effectively to the invasion. By the end of this initial phase, it was clear: the Luftwaffe had overwhelmingly triumphed in the opening shots of the air war. Yet, even in this promising start, serious challenges began to emerge.  Despite the impressive number of aircraft, there was never enough close air support available to adequately assist the frontline troops. Gaps in air reconnaissance quickly became an issue. This lack of information allowed Soviet troop concentrations to go unnoticed, resulting in missed opportunities and surprise counter-attacks. This failure to gather intelligence left the Corps and Army commanders with an incomplete tactical picture. However, amid these challenges, there were also significant successes for the close air support units of the air fleet. Throughout this tumultuous beginning, the sky remained a battleground of innovation and conflict, where both sides wrestled for dominance as the war unfolded. Some of the reasons for this was because the 8th Air Corps had been heavily involved in the capture of Crete, and with the battle concluding in early June, there was barely any time to prepare for Barbarossa. By June 21, the 8th Air Corps was critically short on resources: approximately 600 motor vehicles, 40 percent of its aircraft, and essential communication equipment were all lacking. This significant shortfall loomed large just days before the invasion. On that same day, Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen, the commander of the 8th Air Corps expressed deep concern, stating, “We are greatly concerned that our units are as yet unready.” Maintaining hundreds of aircraft at peak operational readiness proved to be a constant technical challenge, obscuring the stark difference between the total number of aircraft and those truly combat-ready. For instance, out of 425 dive-bombers, only 323 were actually fit for combat, and of the 98 'destroyers', merely 60 were operational. Among the 384 fighters, just 284 were combat-ready, while the total bomber force of 299 aircraft saw only 222 remain serviceable. Overall, while Air Fleet 2 boasted a total of 1,367 aircraft across all types, but only 994 were capable of executing combat operations. This issue wasn't limited to Air Fleet 2; throughout the whole Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe faced an average 25 percent fallout rate among its aircraft. Consequently, a combined strength of 2,995 aircraft translated into just 2,255 that were truly combat-ready. By the summer of 1941, it became increasingly evident that the Luftwaffe would only be able to fulfill its commitments if the war in the east could be won swiftly and with minimal losses. Practical concerns, such as oil availability, and strategic considerations regarding Britain, made a prolonged campaign simply untenable. The Luftwaffe was already stretched thin across multiple fronts, with approximately 1,566 aircraft tied down in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and within Germany itself. This significant dispersion of strength across less critical theaters hindered their ability to concentrate on the most vital front, the one with the narrowest window for success. The left flank of Army Group Center was firmly anchored by the 6th Corps within the Suwalki salient. These determined troops advanced in a northwestern direction toward Vilnius, aiming to seize control of the critical bridges at Alytus on the Neman River. In their path lay several divisions of the Red Army. However, the Soviet 11th Army, led by Lieutenant General Morozov stretched thin across a wide front of 170 kilometers, offered little resistance to the relentless march of the German Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Group. It was no surprise, then, that in the early hours of the 3rd Panzer Group’s surge eastward, forward units reported encountering “only very weak or no enemy contact.” Luftwaffe reconnaissance confirmed this, identifying just one enemy artillery battery in their path. By the end of the day, Hoth’s panzer group had reached the Neman River, seizing captured bridges at Olita and Merkine. The penetration of the Soviet front was significant; Halder remarked that the panzer group had already gained the freedom of operational maneuver, but also noted in their war diary “Where the enemy appears, he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. As a result, the struggle will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign.” The strategic importance of Alytus was clear: it needed to be secured to maintain the momentum of the offensive. On June 22, the Germans achieved a crucial victory with the capture of Alytus. Under the command of Colonel General Hoth, the 3rd Panzer Group pushed forward with incredible speed, covering a distance of 65 kilometers from their starting point to the bridges at Alytus in less than ten hours.  After quickly brushing aside a small NKVD border

Last time we spoke about Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa. On June 22, 1941, Operation Barbarossa commenced, marking the beginning of one of history's largest military campaigns. German soldiers received the shocking news just hours before the assault, rallying under Nazi ideology with grim determination. At dawn, artillery and air raids erupted, catching Soviet forces unprepared. The Wehrmacht launched a surprise attack, swiftly advancing deep into enemy territory, achieving significant early victories against a disorganized Soviet defense. As the first day wore on, German forces encountered fierce resistance from Soviet soldiers demonstrating unexpected resolve. Despite initial success, logistical challenges soon became evident, as the harsh terrain of the Eastern Front complicated the advance. Roads were poor, forcing troops to abandon vehicles and rely on manpower to pull them free. While high-ranking German leaders celebrated their swift progress, the reality for individual soldiers was increasingly sobering; they faced a determined Soviet army far from the feeble force they had anticipated.  This episode is: Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa: The North Army Attacks Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Well hello there. In the last episode we opened up the can of worms that was Operation Barbarossa, only for day one. In this podcast we are going to continue that story, but for cohesive sack we decided to tackle this by army group. So for the remainder of the week each episode will cover the different groups and today we are talking about Army Group North. Prior to the invasion, Adolr Hitler emphasized that the most important objective was to prevent the Red Army from retreating in an orderly fashion. He stated that the blows against the Red Army must be sufficiently powerful to eliminate any chance of recovery. To achieve this, he asserted the necessity of deploying tank forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy's strongest units. Commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, Army Group North was stationed in East Prussia. Its strategic objective was Leningrad, with operational goals that included capturing the territories of the Baltic republics and securing the northern flank of Army Group Centre in Northern Russia, specifically between the Western Dvina River and the Daugavpils-Kholm Army Group boundary. Each of the German Army Groups was supported at the operational level by an Air Corps, except for Army Group Centre, which was supported by two Air Corps. A German Air Corps in 1941 was of variable strength but usually included at least 3 Air Wings of various types, including but not limited to Medium Bombers, Ground Attack and Fighter wings. There was a small Reconnaissance element in the Air Corps, but this was usually limited to a single flight of planes. Army Group North received support from the 1st Air Corps, led by Lt. General Förster, part of the 1st Air Fleet, led by Colonel General Keller. While this Corps lacked the dedicated ground attack Ju-87 Stuka wings found in other Air Corps, it compensated with a heavy concentration of Ju-88 medium bombers. In addition to the forces of the 1st Air Corps, there was also an ad-hoc organization led by Lieutenant Colonel von Wild, which was established to secure the coastline and ensure that the Soviet Navy could not disrupt the movement of the Heer along the coast. As was the case along the entire front, the 1st Air Corps launched surprise attacks on Soviet air bases in its sector with brutal effectiveness. The Soviet response was minimal, hindered by a significant lack of modern equipment, poor command and control, and the shock of being attacked without any warning. The few Soviet fighters that managed to take to the air were completely outclassed by their German counterparts. Soviet losses in the initial days of the war were so staggering that even the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe found them hard to believe. It is estimated that 1,800 Soviet planes were destroyed on the first day, with hundreds more lost throughout the week. In the far north, the war opened with a massive Soviet bomber raid on June 25, targeting cities across Finland with approximately 500 medium bombers. This attack was a critical demonstration of the Red Air Force’s continuing strength. The Luftwaffe could not intercept them all, and the Finnish Air Force was in a similarly precarious position. Ultimately, this situation led to Finland officially joining the war, providing a short-term boost to the Nazi war effort. So you might be asking yourself, how did Finland get sucked up into this? Let’s just summarize the bitter experience Finland had over the past couple of years. The 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact enabled the Soviet Union to exert pressure on the small Baltic republics and Finland, likely to improve its strategic position in Eastern Europe in the event of a broader conflict. The Baltic republics quickly acquiesced to Soviet demands for military bases and troop transfer rights, while Finland resolutely refused. When diplomatic efforts failed, military action was initiated, and on November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union launched its invasion of Finland, marking the beginning of the Winter War. The Winter War served as a rude awakening for the Finns regarding the realities of international politics. Condemnation from the League of Nations and global outrage seemed to have little impact on Soviet policy. Although Sweden permitted volunteers to join the Finnish army, it refrained from sending military support or allowing passage to French or British troops, who were also mobilized in fewer numbers than initially promised. Even right-wing extremists were disillusioned to find that Nazi Germany provided no assistance and actively blocked material support from other nations. The Moscow Peace Treaty, which concluded the Winter War, was viewed as a significant injustice. The losses at the negotiation table, including Viipuri, Finland's second-largest city were perceived to be greater than those suffered on the battlefield. Finland lost one-fifth of its industrial capacity and 9% of its territory. Of the 12% of Finland's population living in these lost territories, only a few hundred remained; the remaining 420,000 relocated to the Finnish side of the new border. Public opinion in Finland longed for the re-acquisition of the homes left behind by the 12% of the population who had been forced to flee Finnish Karelia in haste. Many placed their hopes in the peace conference that was generally expected to follow the war. Consequently, the term Välirauha "Interim Peace" gained popularity after the harsh terms of the peace treaty were announced. Although the peace treaty was signed, the state of war was not officially revoked due to the ongoing global conflict, the challenging food supply situation, and the poor condition of the Finnish military. Censorship remained in place and was utilized to suppress criticism of the Moscow Peace Treaty and blatant anti-Soviet sentiments. The continued state of war allowed President Kyösti Kallio to ask Field Marshal Mannerheim to remain as commander-in-chief, responsible for overseeing the reorganization of Finland's Armed Forces and fortifying the new border, a crucial task during these tumultuous times. Within a week after the peace treaty was signed, fortification work commenced along the 1,200 km long Salpalinja or "the Bolt Line", with a primary focus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Saimaa. Throughout the summer and autumn, Finland received military supplies purchased and donated during and immediately after the Winter War. However, it took several months before Mannerheim could provide a somewhat positive assessment of the army's condition. Military expenditures in 1940 rose to 45% of Finland's state budget, with military purchases prioritized over civilian needs. Mannerheim's position and the ongoing state of war allowed for effective military management, but this also created a troubling parallel government that occasionally clashed with civilian government structures. On March 13, the same day the Moscow Peace Treaty came into effect, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare requested the Foreign Office to initiate negotiations with Finland as soon as possible to foster positive relations. The under-secretary of MEW, Charles Hambro, was authorized to form a war trade treaty with Finland and traveled to Helsinki on April 7. He had previously exchanged letters with Ryti, and they quickly reached a basic understanding of the treaty's contents. The Finns were eager to commence trade; from their first meeting, a preliminary treaty was drafted and accepted immediately. However, Hambro needed approval from his superiors and emphasized that the treaty would not be considered official until a final version was negotiated. Under the treaty, Finland agreed to give control of its strategic material exports to Britain in exchange for armaments and other essential supplies. However, the following day, Germany invaded Norway, rendering the treaty unworkable due to the absence of safe trade routes between the two countries. Germany has historically served as a counterbalance to Russia in the Baltic regio

Last time we spoke about the myth of the German Blitzkrieg. As summer approached in 1941, Hitler readied his forces for Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union aimed at securing rapid victory. Despite Stalin's restructured Red Army, both sides faced logistical challenges. Hitler's goal was to annihilate the Red Army, while his generals prioritized capturing Moscow, leading to debates and miscommunication. The Wehrmacht’s initial successes relied more on luck and enemy blunders than revolutionary tactics like Blitzkrieg, a concept popularized after the war by German generals seeking to explain their swift victories in France. However, these tactics were not as groundbreaking as portrayed; they stemmed from long-standing principles of maneuverability. As the campaign progressed, the reality of a harsh Eastern Front began to set in, casting doubt among German leaders about their ability to sustain their rapid advances amidst logistical nightmares, foreshadowing the monumental struggles that lay ahead. This episode is: Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Its finally time to begin the Eastern Front. For the last few weeks we went through 11 prelude episodes and 1 special, but the time has come for Germany to unleash Operation Barbarossa. But before we begin I have to mention a few things going forward. We are now embarking on an incredible journey through the vast and complex campaigns of the Eastern Front, a scale that is truly monumental. While the distances involved might remind some of our Pacific War series, the nature of these land campaigns means that they engaged far more troops. Millions of soldiers from both sides were mobilized, organized into hundreds of divisions and thousands of regiments, creating a colossal theatre of war. Given the immense scale, it's important to note that we cannot possibly cover every movement of every unit within the confines of the youtube episode format, let alone this humble podcast. I am going to do my best to give you the macro and micro picture of this colossal event. Ironically the scope of it begins on a huge scale as I am sure most of you know, Barbarossa is simply insane.  The soldiers of the Heer remained largely unaware of Operation Barbarossa until the late afternoon of June 21st. Only then did they receive the shocking news through a proclamation from Adolf Hitler, announcing that the long-anticipated conflict would soon begin. For many of these soldiers, this revelation was breathtaking, yet it was met with a surprising sense of confidence rather than fear. Most soldiers had anticipated that such a day might eventually come, and their response was characterized by a grim determination. They firmly believed in the ideological righteousness of their impending invasion, convinced that their mission was justified and necessary. With the start time for the operation looming just a few hours away, sometimes as little as six hours after they had received Hitler's message, they swiftly set to work preparing themselves for the challenge ahead. In this charged atmosphere, there was little room for doubt. The soldiers focused on their tasks, their minds geared towards executing the orders that would soon propel them into one of history's largest military engagements. With the weight of their convictions behind them, they were ready to embark on a campaign that would forever alter the course of the war. Adolf Hitler was convinced that a series of decisive defeats would lead to the collapse of Joseph Stalin's government. He expressed this belief to General Alfred Jodl, stating, "We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down." This mindset reflected a broader expectation among many high-ranking officials within the German military, who shared the belief that a swift and overwhelming victory was imminent. Field Marshal Paul von Kleist later reminisced about this prevailing sentiment in a conversation with Basil Liddell Hart after the war. He remarked, "Our hopes of victory were largely predicated on the assumption that the invasion would trigger a political upheaval in Russia. There was an excessive expectation that Stalin would be overthrown by his own people if he suffered significant defeats." This optimism was further nurtured by Hitler's political advisers, who painted an overly simplistic picture of the political landscape in the Soviet Union. Von Kleist acknowledged that, as soldiers, they lacked sufficient understanding of the intricate political dynamics at play to challenge these assumptions. This misplaced confidence in a quick resolution would ultimately prove to be a critical misjudgment as the campaign unfolded and the realities of the Eastern Front became starkly evident. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, was notably opposed to the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. He articulated his stance with striking clarity, stating, "I can summarize my opinion on a German-Russian conflict in one sentence: if every burned-out Russian city were as valuable to us as a sunk English battleship, I would support a German-Russian war this summer. However, I believe we can only defeat Russia militarily, but such a conflict would ultimately be detrimental to us economically." Ribbentrop acknowledged the allure of delivering a decisive blow to the Communist system, suggesting that there was a certain logic in allowing the continent of Europe and Asia to unite against the Anglo-Saxon powers and their allies. Yet, he emphasized one critical point: "The decisive factor is whether this undertaking would hasten the fall of England." He expressed concern that a German attack on Russia would actually bolster English morale, framing it as an indication of German doubt in the success of the war against England. According to Ribbentrop, this military venture would not only signal that the conflict would persist for a longer duration but could also inadvertently prolong it. By diverting attention and resources toward the Eastern Front, Germany risked undermining its campaign against Britain, thereby complicating an already challenging war effort. General Walter Warlimont issued a chilling order to all military commanders in the German Army regarding the planned occupation of the Soviet Union. The directive outlined several ruthless measures aimed at eradicating any political opposition. The key points included: Liquidation of Political Officials: The order explicitly stated that all political officials and leaders were to be eliminated. This directive underscored the Nazi regime’s determination to dismantle any structures of Soviet authority and suppress potential resistance. Disciplinary Authority: In cases where political officials were captured by German troops, an officer with the authority to impose disciplinary punishment would decide whether the individual should be liquidated. The mere fact that a person was identified as a political official was sufficient justification for this deadly decision. Treatment of Political Leaders: The order also specified that political leaders within the Soviet armed forces (Red Army) would not be recognized as prisoners of war. Rather, they were to be executed at the earliest opportunity, specifically stating that such actions should occur in prisoner-of-war transit camps at the latest. This directive revealed the brutal approach taken by the German military against perceived enemies, reflecting a broader strategy of annihilation aimed at consolidating control over the occupied territories and eliminating any political influence that could challenge Nazi authority. The attack commenced with the thunderous roar of artillery fire just after 0300 hours. As dawn began to break in the northern regions of the Soviet Union, the sound of the opening salvos shattered the early morning calm. Above, Luftwaffe bombers streaked across the sky, their engines shrieking as they flew toward crucial targets, including ammunition depots, military headquarters, and other strategic installations. At the tactical level, the Soviet military was caught entirely off guard. A crucial lack of communication meant that no alert had been issued to front-line troops, leaving them unprepared for the onslaught. Key infrastructure was left defenseless; bridges remained unguarded, and artillery positions were unmanned, creating a significant vulnerability that the German forces were poised to exploit. In addition, many Soviet aircraft stood idle on tarmacs, completely unprepared for action as the attack unfolded. This lack of readiness would have dire consequences for the Soviet response, as the Wehrmacht took swift advantage of the element of surprise, launching a fierce assault that would set the tone for the devastating campaign that lay ahead. Field Marshal Wilhelm Leeb's Army Group North was tasked with a crucial mission, with its area of operations extending from the Baltic port city of Memel in the northwest to the vicinity of Suwalki in the south. The left flank of this vast formation was commanded by Colonel General Georg Kuechler, who oversaw the 18th Army. As the divisions of the 18th Army advanced across the border,

Last time we spoke about the Hitler’s decision to go to war. As June 1941 approached, Hitler prepared for Operation Barbarossa, an audacious plan to invade the Soviet Union before decisively defeating Britain. Stalin, sensing danger after the Winter War, had restructured the Red Army, but both sides were plagued by logistical woes. Hitler's directive emphasized destroying the Red Army, while his generals, led by Halder, argued for capturing Moscow first. Ignoring Soviet warnings, the Wehrmacht faced weakened armored divisions and critical supply shortages, stemming from a lack of standardized equipment and logistical planning. As the campaign unfolded, divisions became diluted, and the vastness of the front posed significant challenges. War games conducted by Paulus revealed critical insights about Soviet reinforcement capacities, indicating that rapid mobilization could counter German advances. The audacity of the invasion clashed with the grim reality of Nazi genocide plans, shaping a conflict that would become one of history's darkest chapters. Would this confrontation lead to Hitler's ruin, or could he outmaneuver his greatest rival? This Special episode is: the Development of Blitzkrieg Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Yes, this week we actually have a special episode, just before we dive into Operation Barbarossa! What a horrible way to tease you all I know.  Now for today we are delving into a concept that has shaped our understanding of World War II, Blitzkrieg. When we hear the term, vivid images may come to mind: daring Panzer commanders leading their troops from the turrets of their tanks, crashing through unsuspecting Allied soldiers, with the ominous screech of Stukas overhead and infantry riding behind in half-tracks. However, these depictions are more myth than reality, largely crafted through decades of propaganda. Much of this narrative was constructed after the war by none other than the Panzer generals themselves. Figures like Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian played pivotal roles in this movement, striving to cultivate an image of a glorious Wehrmacht, one that was supposedly only thwarted by the stubbornness of the mad dictator, Adolf Hitler. This self-serving imagery not only enhanced their own reputations but also cast a shadow over the complex realities of the war. Let’s take a closer look at what people actually mean when they use the term Blitzkrieg. Generally, it refers to German military operations conducted from 1939 to 1941. At its core, Blitzkrieg is often characterized by the speed and efficiency with which these operations were executed, hence, the term translates to “lightning war.” A prime example of this concept can be seen in the Battle for France in 1940. In that campaign, German forces dealt a staggering blow to the French and British armies in a matter of days, nearly knocking them out of the war. The initial phase of the Battle of France was nothing short of catastrophic, as the British Expeditionary Force or “BEF” and the French Army were on the verge of annihilation. However, it’s crucial to note that this rapid offensive did not mark the end of hostilities in France. In fact, serious fighting continued for another three weeks following the evacuation at Dunkirk. While the Battle of France concluded relatively quickly, around six weeks total, the German tactics were not as decisive as they were often portrayed. For comparison, let’s look back at the Schlieffen Plan from 1914, which reached its climax in front of Paris within four weeks. The Schlieffen Plan was Germany’s military strategy in the early 20th century, designed to avoid a two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. Conceived by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905, the plan aimed for a rapid German victory over France by invading through neutral Belgium and encircling Paris from the north. Schlieffen assumed that Russia would take longer to mobilize its vast army, giving Germany time to defeat France quickly and then redirect forces to the Eastern Front. The plan relied heavily on speed, coordination, and violating Belgian neutrality, bringing Britain into the war when Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914. In execution, the plan faltered. The right wing of the German army, intended to sweep through Belgium and northern France, was weakened to reinforce the left, slowing momentum. Belgium’s resistance, logistical problems, and the unexpectedly fast Russian mobilization forced Germany to divert troops eastward earlier than planned. By September 1914, German forces were halted at the First Battle of the Marne.  The Germans were bogged down at the Battle of the Marne in early September 1914 due to a combination of strategic miscalculations, logistical issues, and effective Allied resistance. The German army, following the Schlieffen Plan, had advanced rapidly through Belgium and northern France, aiming to encircle Paris and force a quick French surrender. However, the rapid advance stretched their supply lines thin, leaving troops exhausted and short on food, ammunition, and reinforcements. Crucially, German command weakened the right flank, the part of the army responsible for encircling Paris, to reinforce other sectors, undermining the original plan. As German armies moved south of the Marne River, a significant gap opened between the First and Second Armies. Allied forces, particularly the French under General Joffre and the British Expeditionary Force, identified and exploited this vulnerability. The French famously used Parisian taxis to rush reinforcements to the front, helping launch a strong counterattack. Fearing encirclement and unable to maintain their offensive, German commanders ordered a retreat to more defensible positions. This retreat marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the end of mobile warfare on the Western Front. The armies dug in, and what followed was a prolonged, grinding stalemate marked by trench warfare. In 1940, however, there was no such miracle for the French. This so-called Blitzkrieg had not achieved a swift and definitive victory; instead, it revealed multiple underlying issues that contributed to France's downfall. There were numerous reasons behind the collapse of the French forces, and their performance was shockingly poor. Yet, in the aftermath of the defeat, very few in the Allied world were willing to confront the uncomfortable truth that the failures of France and Britain played a significant role in this unexpected outcome. It was far easier to believe that the Germans had created something revolutionary, a unique approach to warfare, that had caught the French and British armies off guard.   The reality was that the Germans had never anticipated the war would unfold as successfully as it did. Even the operational plan for the Battle of France emerged from a recognition that the overall strategic situation was grim. Invading France through the Low Countries was the only viable option for bringing substantial German forces across the Rhine. Interestingly, the early drafts of the 1940 plan resembled something directly from the desk of Helmuth von Moltke back in 1908, offering little innovation or new strategy. The German General Staff had spent years analyzing the failures of the 1914 campaign and concluded that there was little hope for a fresh or groundbreaking approach. They believed that only time, luck, and superior organization could allow them to overcome the Allied forces. In May 1940, the actual plan put into action was a reaction to unexpected circumstances. The Allies accidentally acquired a copy of the German plans, prompting the General Staff and Hitler to realize their operational blueprint had been compromised.  Known as the Mechelen Incident, d on January 10, 1940, during the Phoney War phase a German aircraft, carrying the plans for the German invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands, codenamed Fall Gelb or Case Yellow, crash-landed in Belgium near Vucht, now part of Maasmechelen. It was certainl a case of oopsy daisies. The pilot, Major Erich Hoenmanns, was flying a Messerschmitt Bf 108 when low fog caused him to lose his bearings. While trying to reorient himself by heading toward the River Rhine, he inadvertently crossed into Belgian airspace after mistakenly flying over the frozen Rhine. He then encountered mechanical failure after inadvertently cutting off the fuel supply to the engine, forcing him to land in a nearby field. Although the aircraft was severely damaged, both he and his passenger, Major Helmuth Reinberger, survived. Reinberger was carrying key documents related to the planned invasion, a fact that alarmed both men upon realizing the implications of their crash and their accidental entry into Belgium. In a frenzied attempt to destroy these documents, Reinberger tried, but failed initially, to set them on fire. He eventually managed to burn some, but Belgian border guards discovered the scene, leading to the capture of Hoenmanns and Reinberger. The reaction in Berlin was one of shock and anger upon learning that their plans had fallen into enemy hands. Adolf Hitler ordered the immediate dismissal of senior Luftwaffe commanders and debated the